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We are celebrating the 2500th anniversary of Shri Bhagawan Mahavir this year all over the country. The Jaina Philosophy, of which Shri Mahavir is the 24th Tirthankara, has very deep roots in the culture and philosophy of our country. Scholars have suggested that Rsabha, the first Tirthankara must have been a thinker of the Vedic age itself. It goes without saying that the contribution of Shri Mahavir and other Jaina philosophers to Indian society and culture is very great. The roots of this great social, cultural and religious teaching lie in Jaina metaphysics and ethics. Further, Jaina doctrines have led to very important contributions in logic, which are particularly significant in the context of recent developments in modal, deontic and many valued logics. Apart from these logical contributions, the Jaina thinkers also considered and recommended certain very fundamental principles of social understanding and social reconstruction. The doctrine of Ahimsā is but one such instance.

It is fitting therefore, that we should consider the many levels of significance of Jaina doctrines and we are extremely happy to dedicate the present number of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly as a token of our respect and reverence to the memory of Shri Mahavir. While at Karnatak University, Dharwar, Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi organized a Seminar on Jainism. The papers on Jaina Philosophy published in this number are largely an outcome of this Seminar. We wish to record our greatful thanks to Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, now Professor and Head of the Department of Jainology, Mysore University, Mysore, for placing this material at our disposal and for editing this special number.

Editor

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FUNDAMENTAL JAINA CONCEPTS AND MODERN SOCIETY

- I. We are living today between two worlds, as Mathew Arnold said, the dead and the other powerless to be born. Old values have been lost and we are still groping for new values. We are pursuing the purusarthas of artha and kama without reference to the dharma. Hunger and thirst for righteousness is no longer felt. We are only hungry and thirsty. We are giving to Caesar what is Caesar's and to Caesar what is God's. We are blind to the higher values while pursuing the social and political ends. Power and pelf are the ultimate ends for us. Half-educated immature political morones are corrupting the life in society and they do not feel moral compunction for their acts. On the one hand, conscience theory translated in political life has brought about a licentious society; on the other, we find a growing regimentation to ideologies thoughtlessly imposed on men to convert our society into a committed social order without reference to the larger good of social life. It is, therefore necessary if some of the fundamental concepts of Jaina darsana can lead, in the present chaotic situation, from darkness to light. The object of this paper is to see whether we can justify the ways of man to man in the light of some of the Jaina concepts.
 - II. Panaromic survey of Jaina darsana shows that some of the concepts that Mahāvīra taught and that Jainism incorporated in its theory were primarily meant to emphasise the need for the reconstruction of society on a solid foundation of right faith, non-violence and fundamental equality of men. The concepts of (i) anekānta (ii) Social ethics, (iii) ahimsā and their emphasis on equality of men without distinction of caste and creed have for centuries influenced the life course of the people to the realisation of higher values of life.
 - 1. The anekanta emphasises the fundamental principle that Reality is complex and it can be looked at from different points of view. Each point of view presents a partial truth and it cannot be claimed as the whole and exclusive truth. The Jainas give the

example of the elephant and seven blind men to explain this principle. It teaches us to respect other views. The Syadvada is the logical expression of anekanta attitude in propositional forms. We have to respect the views of others also. We should realise that we are not the only persons who are right and that we are alone. Intellectual tolerance is the foundation of this doctrine. It is the symbolisation of the fundamental non-violent attitude. This spirit of tolerance has been the principle of the Indian Weltanschauung. We find this expressed in the social and political life of the people of this country. We cite an instance of the remarkable catholic outlook of the Vijayanagar kings towards their subjects belonging to different faiths. There was a dispute between the Vaisnavas and the Jainas on some injustice done to the Jainas. The king, Bukkarāya the First, took the hands of the Jainas and placing them in the hands of the Vaisnavas said, 'As long as the sun and the moon last, the Vaisnavas will protect the Jainas. The Vaisnavas and the Jainas are one body.'1 What we need today is the spirit of understanding and respect for each other in our social and political life. We are exploiting communal distinctions for political gains. We are made aware of our differences rather than our identity of views and interests. And anekanta attitude will facilitate understanding and sympathy for each other's points of view. Then will disappear the iron, the bamboo and the dollar curtains.

2. Jaina contribution to social ethics is immense and is relevant to the present day social problems. Man's perfection depends on the promotion of individual, and social values. For social betterment, the emphasis should be on good citizenship. Training in good citizenship would lead to self-realization. As Śrāvaka 'citizen' has to aim at the development of personality in and through society. A Jaina lay-follower has to practise five anu-vratas 'lesser vows' three gunavratas and four śikṣā-vratas. Practice of the vratas leads him to righteousness. Aristotle made a distinction between practical and intellectual virtues. This classification of virtues, between the practical and the intellectual, comes nearer to the Jaina distinction between śrāvaka-dharma and Muni-dharma, although intellectual virtues do not possess the spiritual content. The four Puruṣārthas present a synthetic approach to the general view of life. Artha and Kāma are not

to be neglected. They are to be pursued through the value of Dharma. Dharma, in this sense, is both an instrumental and the intrinsic value—instrumental because it is a means to the realisation of the highest ideal of moksa, and intrinsic because it is to be pursued for its sake in the way of empirical life. It is not true to say that the Jaina view of life is non-ethical and pessimistic. Jainism was as ethusiastic about the good of life as of the value of moksa. Moksa is not to be pursued at the cost of the pursuit of righteousness in this life, it is to be realised in and through society. That is why we find that the Jaina Acaryas were robustly positive in their out-look on life. Ācārya Simhanandi was an inspiration and a guide to the establishment of Ganga dynasty in Karnatak. Jaina Ācāryas were considered by the kings as their gurus in religious and social matters. The Jaina kings and generals were no less enthusiastic in establishing the rule of righteousness in society. Eminent Jaina women took active interest in social and even in political fields. The Jaina writers have contributed immensely to the enrichment of Sanskrit, Prākrit and Kannada literature in the South. Therefore, righteousness is the cardinal principle of social life. Lord Mahāvīra said, "As the cartman, even being aware, takes the cart on the wrong road and gets involved in an accident and he suffers, so does the man who strays away from the path of righteousness."2 The Summun Bonum of Moksa is the divinisation of man, a consummation devoutly to be wished for. In this sense also, we can say that Jainism has given importance to self-development in society. They do not advocate dependence on the grace of any higher being. Hunger and thirst for righteousness would be a necessary step to self-realisation. Lord Mahāvīra said, "The life span is short; therefore, make haste and practise dharma."3

The schematic presentation of social ethics mentions the detailed list of the violations of anuvratas. They are the aticaras. To mention a few of the aticaras of the vratas, (i) bandha 'tying up animals', vadha 'mercylessly beating of animals' and (iii) atibharaopana 'heavy loading of animals of burden' are some of the aticaras of ahimsa vrata. Satya vrata is violated in the daily activities of (i) sahasabhyakhyana, 'casual and loose talk against others', as in the case of friends of Othello when they questioned the chastity of Desdemona, (ii) Mṛṣopadeśa 'wrong

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advice leading to bad consequences' and (iii) Kūtalekha karaņa 'preparing false documents'. Asteya vrata forbids us from (i) accepting stolen articles, (ii) instigating others to steal, (iii) acquiring property in a foreign country hostile to us and (iv) using false weights and measures. The practice of Brahmacarva vrata enjoins us to be satisfied with one's own wife. One should not read sex literature and see sex films. One should not take interest in such talk of others and not even brood over sex life. Aparigraha vrata has great social significance. It is parimitaparigraha. We should not have external and internal possessions. Internal possession is expressed in the expression of greed and attachment. 'Greed for material possessions will lead a son to ignore his father and countless evil consequences will follow.'4 In recent years, Acarya Tulsiji is popularising the practice of anuvratas in his Anuvrata movement. It is very much relevant for the solution of the present day ills of society.

The cardinal ethical principles of the Jainas is the principle of Ahimsā. The Anekānta and Ahimsā permeate the texture of Jaina view of life. Lord Mahāvīra exhorted us to abstain from injury to any living being and treat every one with friendliness and equanimity.⁵ But one should realise that the Jainas did not take the practice of ahimsā to the point absurdity.⁶ Certain forms of injury which are unavoidable are to be condoned in the case of citizens performing their social duties. Such are the Ārambha himsā and virodha himsā.

The Jaina theory of ahimsā is a very important principle specially in the present day society. Gandhiji's Satyāgraha has been built upon the Jaina concept of ahimsā. Gandhiji himself said that he derived benefit from the Jaina religious works as from the scriptures of other faiths⁷. However, in the present uncertain state of society where violence freely prevails over other saner ways of approach to the problems, it is necessary to realise that the weapon of Satyāgraha has to be carefully used, lest it would harm society. We have today very few of men of the greatness of Gandhiji who can weild influence. Short of such leadership, in a democratic set up 'Satyāgraha may grow to be dangerously common' and 'would produce as much dislocation of normal work as violent war'.

Jainism was against caste system. Lord Mahāvīra decried the tendencies that brought about the inequality and misery among men. He asked us to realise that one cannot be considered a Kṣatriya or a Brahmin by virtue of his birth. One is a Brāhmin, Kṣatriya or Śūdra by action⁸. One cannot become a Śramaṇa by pulling one's hair, nor a Brahmin by repeating Omkāra Mantra, a muni by residing in a forest, nor an ascetic by wearing the bark of trees as clothes. Similar protests were made in the Upaniṣads also. The story of Satyakāma Jābāla is an instance this attitude⁹.

Today religious and communal distinctions are being politically exploited. Widespread regional feelings, corruption and nepotism have degenerated the very fabric of our society. We have become helpless spectators in the fierce drama of hatred, averice and violence. Under the garb of ideologies of doubtful suitability to our society and the concept of committed social order, we are destroying the very foundations of social order built with ardeous and painful efforts of great men for centuries. It is possible to reconstruct society and resurrect the higher values of life if we but remember that our values and social order stand on the shoulders of great men like the Buddha, Jesus, Mahāvīra, Basava and Gandhi. The Jaina Weltanschauung expressed in the principles of anekānta, anuvrata and ahimsā should be the solid foundation of society today. "We should seek forgiveness of all creatures and we offer friendliness for all. We should have no enmity against any."

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T. G. Kalghatgi

NOTES

- 1. Kuppatur Inscription.
- "Jahā Sāgadio Jāṇam, samam hiccā Māhapaham Visamam māggamoinno, akkhe bhaggammi soyai Evam dhammam viukkamma, ahammam padivajjiā Bāle maccumuham patte, akkhe bhaggeva soyai
- "Jarā jāvanana pīdey, vahī jāva na vaddhai Jāvindiyā na hāyanti, tāva dhammam samāyare
- 4. Tattvārtha Sūtra: Comm. Siddhasena-vii.22.
- "Samayā savvabhūssu, sattu-mittesu vā jage Panaivāavirī, jāvajjīvae dukkaram

T. G. KALGHATGI

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- 6. In this please refer to Zimmer: *Philosophies of India* (Kegan-Paul, 1951), pp. 270.
- 7. Young India: August, 1920.
- 8. "Kammuṇā bhambhaṇo hōi , kammuṇā hovi khattio Vaisso kammuṇā hoi, suddo havai kammuṇā
- 9. Chandogya Upanisad: iv.4.i.4.
- 10. "Khāmemi savva jīve savve jīvā khamantu me mittī me savvabhūesu veram majjham na kenai

SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS

Essence of Jaina ethics provides the best rasion d'être for Mahāvīra's relevance in our times. Melvin Radar in his book "Ethics and the Human Community" holds in opposition to the relativist, subjective, intutional and a priori theories that ethics should be based upon human nature and its potentialities. He finds expression of man's deliberate attempt to make himself at home in the universe through religious sense of community which enables him "to escape from his loneliness and self-alienation" in the ancient Egyption religion, in the Confucian doctrine of human-heart-edness and universal kindness; the Taoist sense of mystic unity with nature; the Buddhist emancipation from self hood' the Hindu vision of all-encompassing, all-penetrating spirit; the Moslem idea of One God and One Humanity; the Hebruic devotion to a God of love and justice; and the Christian fellowship of all men in God².

Moral aphorisms of all religious, including Jainism, confirm their community-mindedness. Religion that ignores society has no chance of survival³. Ethical ideals of universal love and brotherhood, Ahimsā, charity, simplicity, chastity, truthfulness and non-attachment to worldly interests and gains are extolled in all religions. There may be some difference of emphasis on these ideals in one or the other religion but none preaches hatred, malice, pride, prejudice, passion exploitation of fellow human beings or disrespect of life in all its varied and various forms. And if religion is not to be mistaken for dogma or ritual which sometimes sanctioned intolerance and disrespect for life, it can be affirmed without fear of contradiction that religion is no antithesis to humanism, social development, universal understanding and democratic spirit. True Dharma founded on the cardinal ethical virtues is Sanātana, eternal and universal.

Belief in God of any description or permanence of the soul or elaborate metaphysics and ontology can wait for their turn or may even be discarded but concern for the alleviation of suffering of fellow human being and his ultimate and absolute freedom or beatitute is to engage immediate and ever-lasting attention of all religions and ethical quests. In order to realise the

Summum Bonum a seemingly negative, purely individualistic and ascetic ethical discipline, in contrast to a more loving, burning and joyous ethical discipline, may be prescribed. But there is no radical difference between what is said to be the negative and the positive ethical attitudes. If nothing else then history of the followers negates the prejudice of superiority of Western over the Eastern ethical ideal. It is with this basic understanding of religion or ethics that I appraoach to examine the social and contemporary significance of Jaina ethical teachings.

As its very name signifies Jainism stands for extreme severity of ethical discipline both for the ascetic and the house holder. This emphasis distinguishes it form Buddhism which stood for the golden mean in ethical teachings and from Hinduism which in its original spirit is less ascetic and severe is prescribing the ethical extermities. Healthy interest is worldly gains, conception of svarga as the Summum Bonum, elaborate rites and rituals as the means of attaining it mark the period of the Samhitas and the Brahmanas. It is not, therefore, without significance that Indra the War-God is the hero of this period and Varuna, the God of moral virtues is less prominent. It was the souldering dissent of contemporary free thinkers who were denounced by vedic seers as brahmadvisah 'haters of the Veda', devanid 'maligners of Gods', apavratas 'men of no principles' as also reaction against artificial over-elaborate and complex ritualism, arising due to self-critical consciousness of vedic believers which led to the Upanisadic, ethical attitude preferring sreyas 'spiritual freedom' to preyas 'material prosperity' and parā vidyā 'spiritual knowledge' to aparā vidyā 'mundane knowledge' and extolling tyāga 'renunciation', tapas 'penance' and vairāgya 'detachment' over worldly or other worldly pursuits. It is still a question of preference and superiority. Asceticism is not recognised as an exclusive and absolute virtue. After all, entire earlier tradition could not be cast off like a robe, it could at best be critically examined and a new choice or preference was to be underlined in the light of self-critical consciousness, and perhaps more so, because continuing free thinking began gradually to organise itself into well-defined movements of Jainism and Buddhism. Upanisads, therefore, speak in the language of preference. That the Brahmanical tradition stands not only for preference, but d

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actually for a synthesis between vedic ideal of svarga and Upanisadic ideal of liberation is seen in the definition of Dharma which is described as realisation of both the abhyudaya and nihsreyas. Connection of Brahman as sat 'absolute reality', cit 'absolute consciousness' and ananda 'absolute bliss' in the Vedanta, of which the source and authority are the Upanisads, is not a breakoff from the conception of svarga which is an abods of positive bliss but its perfection and absolute excellence. In fact the arguments generally deduced to prove the nature of reality are based on comparision leading finally to absoluteness of existence, knowledge and bliss in the Ultimate. Later Hindu tradition, as manifested through the Mimāmsaka's notion of Mokşa 'liberation', integral harmony of two principles 'sāmarasya, visiṣṭādvita etc.' propounded by Kashmir Saivism and some schools of Vaisnavism, militancy of some sects like Vira, Śaiva, Śākta and Lingāyatas, Tantric eroticism and pervading sensuality of classical Sanskrit literature also underlined that Hinduism is not preeminently ascetic in its spirit or development. It did imbibe the asceticism and renunciation in its course of development right from the age of the Upanisads but did never give up its faith in the life of pleasures here and beyond. It is, therefore, no mistake to declare Buddhism and Jainism as revolt against Vedism. Denial of God and the authority of the Vedas, revolt against ritualism and class dinstinctions are points of agreement between dissenting religious of Buddhism and Jainism. They prescribe ethical discipline and subscribe to the belief in the transmigration and the law of Karman. Sin in their view is no offence against God or against the injunctions of the Vedas which assigned different duties according to the distinction of caste, age and sex. Man is solely responsible for his actions. He is his own refuge. The whole course of moral discipline is his sole responsibility. There is no divine intervention to obstruct this progress in ethical discipline. Nor is there any succour to him if he falters. Interference is from within either psychologically or physically or even spiritually. Man is endowed with freedom and responsibility to embark upon the course of his ultimate perfection. This is the original attitude of Jainism and Buddhism which may have been compromised or modified in the course of long history of perpetual encounter with Hinduism, but was never totally rejected or replaced in theory.

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Between Jainism and Buddhism there have been claims of superiority of ethical teachings of one over the other. Thus for example, Nahar and Ghosh speaking of Buddhism say that its philosophy of momentariness has undermined its ethics because "such a philosophical speculation, by the perfect frankness with which it eulogies the life of momentary experience and undermined importance of calculating wisdom so essential in life, takes away from man what is of worth and dignity to him and thus bears its own condemnation." Contrasting Jainism with Buddhism they conclude that "the Summum bonum of life is here in Jainism not the gratuitous enjoyment of the present in utter disregard of the future as Buddhists hold "4. This is complete misunderstanding of the Buddhist philosophy as it renders the latter to hedonism. Buddha propounded a comprehensive ethical code which was summed up in Eightfold Path: right belief, right aspiration, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right thought and right concentration. Refutation of permanent self has an ethical motive. Existence of suffering is the fundamental fact of human existence. Its recognition is the First Noble Truth, the Second Noble Truth is that it is caused by desire or craving which is based on intellectual and moral error of self-centredness. The very notion of the self, as abiding, permanent and eternal is an illusion. There is no self, one's life is just an unbroaken stream of successive states that are casually connected and behind this stream there is no permanent ego, no self-contained entity independent of change and independent of one's fellows.5 To consider his self supreme, to be selfish about it is the root moral error of life. The Third Noble Truth teaches emancipation from the sense of self; Nirvāna is the result of this emancipation from self. So long as individuality, ego or sel fishness persists there is no freedom, no Nirvāņa. Fourth Noble Truth tells the way, the eightfold path to remove the suffering through extinction of self-centredness. Thus the theory of anatta 'no self' in Buddhism has a very profound meaning and is not to be confused with the "claim of the present even of the momentary present imperious and supreme beyond all others" as Nahar and Ghosh do6. However, what distinguishes Jaina ethics from that of Buddhism is its strict asceticism and non-absolutistic relativism reconsciling opposites between

Hinduism and Buddhism. Buddha practised ascetic life for six years and then declared that the truth cannot be attained by one who has lost his strength". There are two extremes which he who has gone forth ought not to follow habitual devotion, on the one hand, to the passions, to the pleasure of sensual things, and habitual devotion, on the other hand, self-mortification which is painful, ignoble and unprofitable. There is a middle path discovered by the Tathāgata".

Jainism prescribes strict and, in fact, extremely severe ethical discipline for the house-holder and the ascetic, the srāvaka and the sramana. It lays equal emphasis on faith, knowledge and conduct which together constitute way to individual freedom8. The Jaina philosophy divides the world primarily into the duality of jiva 'self' and ajiva 'not self' with their inherent pluralism. The self is infinite, alike eternal and of various forms implaying different stages of development. Its intrinsic nature of perfection, infinite intelligence, infinite peace, infinite faith and infinite power is obscured by its union with matter. Its ethical aim is to cast off this malignant influence of the not-self and realise its real nature which is perfect enlightenment. Perfect knowledge is never inactive. Knowledge does not exist without right action and right conduct. Englihtened self leads active life for the good of others, as he can do no more of good to himself. The seven tattvas postulated by Jainism, namely, Jiva, Ajiva, Asrava, Bandha, Samvara, Nirjará and Moksa underline all-absorbing concentration of Jainism on the ethical perfection of the self as the real objective of metaphysical or philosophical enquiry. This is in bold contrast to other systems of Indian philosophy where ethics does not occupy such an important place in the scheme of philosophical categories. It is, therefore, no surprise that Jainism has propounded in great details the path of ethical discipline both for the clergy and the laity.

Jainism lays down five vows for the ascetic and the same are prescribed for the house-holder with some modification. They are ahimsā 'non-injury', Satya 'truth', asteya 'Chastity' and aparigraha 'renunciation'. While an ascetic has to fulfil these vows fully and completely, the same can be achieved only partially or in small degree by the house-holder. Thus the mahā vratas 'great vows' in the case of the house-holder become anuvratas.

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These vows have significance only in relation to the community. Without social reference the vows lose their virtue. Amongst these Ahimsā occupies the foremost place. And in a way, all others are a means to achieve the perfection of Ahimsā, which, though apparently a negative term signifying non-injury to life, is in essence positive as it will include respect for all forms of life though love of not only human beings but also of all the creatures and plants and in fact, any form of creation vibrating with life. The one word that sums up the whole of Jaina ethics is ahimsā which inspires a Jaina for active social service and makes him to pray for the good of the all: "Let there be rain in every proper season. Let diseases dies and famine and theft be nowhere. Let the law of Jaina give all happiness to all the living beings of the world."

The vow of truth enjoins upon the ascetic that he will not resort to falsity either for his own sake or for the sake of others through fear or frown. Even the truth that hurts others is no truth⁹.

The Asteya is an ethical discipline of neither accepting even the most insignificant thing without the permission of the owner nor approving such an act of stealing the articles which belong to others.

The ethical vow of *Brahmacarya* is the cultivation of good moral character, of celibate life renouncing all forms of sensuous pleasures and company of prostitutes or conclubines. "Wine, Meat, gambling, erotic music with song and dance, personal decoration, intoxication, libertines and aimless wanderings, these ten are the concomitants of sexual passion¹⁰."

Parigraha is characterised by attachment to worldly gains. Problems of modern Indian society, nay, of all the nations are rooted in the spirit of acquisition. The world today is divided into two classes of exploiters and the explited. There will be no final redemption from this evil unless the vow of aparigraha is observed both in letter and spirit. Creed for amassing wealth, hoarding of goods of social need, cornering the material and intellectual wealth of the world for the good of one against others mark our age. Parigraha 'acquisition' has resulted in the depletion of natural resources and pollution of atmosphere. The mankind faces in near future the problem of its extinction.

Scientists are worried over the environmental catastrophy. What has brought about this sorry state of affairs in the planet which has been ruled since long by scientific slogan of conquest of nature which has been achieved through fierce spirit of competition and unprincipled greed and suicidal violence?

As a result of *Himsā* 'violence', asatya 'falsity' of various ideologies based on some or the other kind of violence, Steyas, 'enslavement of nations', abrahmacarya 'permissiveness of sex and a life of luxury and indulgence' and parigraha 'amassing of physical and intellectual wealth by a nation or a group of nations' the world is now sitting over volcano of its own making facing its extinction through its own instruments of death and destruction. What can save us from this mad pursuit?

Lord Mahāvīra preached the ethical discipline of five Vows not merely for the salvation of some individuals but for the survival and development of the whole world through the cardinal doctrine of ahimsā and its other correlaries. The social good in its ultimate analysis depends upon the perfection achieved by an individual. There is no opposition between the good of the community and that of the individual, the two are inextricably inter-linked.

Those who followed Mahāvira during the 2,500 years of his Nirvāņa perfected the details of essential ethical descipline only in relation to the spirit of his message. Many of these details are also significant as they underline the soacial and objective content of the virtues to be cultivated by a true Jaina. Thus it was to perfect the cardinal principle of Ahimsā that the concepts of (i) Mūlagunas 'Primary moral virtues', (ii) the seven Silavratas 'Vows of conduct educating the individual for the life of renunciation' (iii) the elevan Pratimas and of the (iv) Sallekhanā 'spiritual preparation for individual extinction' were developed for the house-holder by a galaxy of Jaina thinkers. For ascetics, the ethical discipline is more regorous as is evident for the description of (i) five great Vows, (ii) the five Samitis 'carefulness', (iii) the six āvasyaka Karmas 'essential acts' consisting of Samayika Stuti, Vandana Prati-Karmana Pratyakhyāna and Kāyotsarga, 11 conquest of twenty-two parisahas 12 obstacles of various kinds caused by others', (v) and six kind

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of both the internal and external austerities, (vi) enjoining of various types of meditation, and finally (vii) espousing the spiritual death by a *Muni*.

While Jainism prescribes individual and spiritual values which seem to have an indirect relation with society it does not in any cage ignore the social values which have been listed by Dr. K. C. Sogani in his book entitled "Ethical Doctrines in Jainism" (p. 266). These are Bhūta Anukampa and Maitri, 'universal compassion and friendship', Dāna 'Charity', Nirvicikitsā 'Nonhatred towards the diseased', Pramoda 'Commendation of the meritorious' and Karunā 'Active compassion for the distressed or helping those who are miserable, thirsty and hungry', Mādhyasta 'Indifference towards the arrogant', Aparigraha 'Non-acquisition', Ahimsā 'Non-injury', Kṣamā 'Forgiveness' and Prabhāvana 'propagation of moral and spiritual values through adequate means'.

The concept of Punya 'Merit' and Papa 'Demerit' again bears a social objective. There are nine ways of earning punya: through service of anna 'food to the needy', pana 'water to the thirsty', Vastra 'clothes to the poor', Layana 'shelter to the needy and the monk', Sayana 'providing beds', and social service through manas 'mind', Sarira 'body', vacana 'speech' and namaskara 'a sense of hunility'.

Himsā or infliction of any kind of suffering has been considered the greatest sin. The other seventeen sins are untruthfulness, dishonesty, unchastity, covetousness, anger, conceit, deceit and cheating, avarice, attachment, hatred or envy, quarrelsomeness, slander, false stories to descredit others, finding fault with others, lack of self-control, hypocricy and false faith. The cultivation of the punyas and abstinence from the sins, enumerated above, do not only lead to the spiritual fulfilment but goes to make world perfect and worth living. This then underlines the relevance of Mahāvīra's teachings and social significance of his ethical discipline.

Dr. Schweitzer distinguishes Indian, more particularly Hindu, thought from Western thought mainly on the basis of antagonism between what he describes 'world and life-negation', and 'world and Life-affirmation'. According to him Indian religion is other-worldly and life-denying, while the western religion affirms life. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan has adequately met his

criticism by pointing out the central features of Hindu thought such as the four stages of life, the doctrines of Karma and rebirth which imply action in a real world, and by under-lining the essential unity of all religions in denying the reality of the world14 and by contrasting religion and humanism. Criticism by Dr. Schweitzer will be appararently more pertinently applicable to the Jainism and Buddhism on account of their more pronounced emphasis on asceticism which is the essence of life-negation. A similar criticism is voiced by Henri Bergon in "The Two Sources of Morality and Religion" (see pp. 216 and 227) wherein he terms Indian mysticism negative as against the positive mysticism of Christians. As pointed out earlier in introductory passage of this paper there is no radical difference between what is described as positive and negative mysticism because in their essence these are rooted in the basic unity of all and are ultimately concerned with the good of the individual and the community. Moreover positive mysticism is not necessarily Christian. It may have different forms. Mahāyāna Buddhism has no less concern, love and compassion for the mankind than the Christianity. The five Vows, the conception of punya and papa and active social service by Tirthankaras make the Jainism equally positive, Hinduism as understood and practised by servants of our age such as Ramkrishna, Vivekananda, and Gandhi underlines that what seems to Western critics as inferior religion in nothing more than their cultural prejudice. Accidents of an age or defilement by the professed votaries of a religion don't mark its essence. Otherwise the life-affirming, positive religion of Christians would appear more exploitative as its avowed followers enslaved one nation after the other, shed more blood than the water in the Ganga, even though Christianity preaches love and service. Essence of all religions is social good and individual freedom. Jainism shows an important way of achieving it through regorous discipline of body and mind.

The noted American physiologist, Prof. M. B. Visscher declared in his plenary lecture (reported briefly in the Times of India, Delhi, dated 24th October, 1974), at the 26th International Congress of physiological Scientists meeting at Delhi that one of the most pressing problem for human society today is "the kind of I.P.Q. 3..2

organised violence we call war. Personal violence, too, is not an insignificant problem as the increase in the incidence of kidnapping, skyjacking, murder, robbery and rape all over the world indicate." He said that a world in which thermonuclear weapons existed in such a quantity as to be capable of destroying all life on our planet, it behoved society to learn more about violence and how to control it. Information gained from behaviour science that violence has biological roots is not sufficient. It is true that human animal has tendency towards violence and lust for power and money. Himsá and Parigraha, to use the words of Jainism, are biologically rooted in man; should we hen give into despair because of the tendency of human animal to use his intelligence in the large number of scientists that the future prospect was hopeless? Mahāvira would say No. His indispensable ethical teachings of ahimsa and aparigraha to name only two out of the five cordinal Vows are the way for the freedom, peace and prosperity of the world troubled by excessive violence and over-powering spirti of exploitation and acquisi ion.

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 - 3. See Pratt, The Religions Consciousness, pp. 7-12.
 - 4. See Nahar and Ghosh: An epitome of Jainism, p. 468.
- 5. Malvin Reader: Ethics and the Human Community, New Yord, p. 915.
 - 6. Op. Cit.
- 7. First sermon on Setting in Motion the Wheel of the Law. See Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Macmillan Company, London, 1956, p. 420.
 - 8. Umāsvāti, Tattvārthūdhigamasūtra, I.1.
 - 9. See Daśavaikālika, VI.11.
 - 10. Yaśastilaka and Indian Culture, p. 267.
- 11. See for details Dr. K. C. Sogani, Ethical Doctrines of Jainism, pp. 88-89, 138-141.
 - 12. Indian Thought and its Development, 1936.
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THE CONCEPT OF WAR AND AHIMSA IN JAINISM IN KARNATAKA

In Somadeva's Yaşastilaka Campū, there is a question being 'asked—'What is dharma?' The answer that is given is 'that which inculcates kindness to all creatures'.¹ In Pampa's \bar{A} dipurāna (2.7), dharma is being described as having a body consisting of kindness, charity, penance and character as its limbs.² It is further stated that it is this dharma that carries mortal men upto the point of liberation. It is very clear from these and many other numerous statements that dayā 'kindness towards all living beings' or ahimsā 'non-killing' is the corner-stone of Jainism (Jivadaye Jaine-dharmam).

Ahimsā is not abstention from mere killing. It includes abstention from all other possible kinds of violence. For example using abusive language could be a form of himsā. It is said that ahimsā includes in its fold also the 'very idea of killing, the complete absence of any sankalpa or will that might have the remotest connection with injury to living creatures'. A Jaina monk is ordained to take upon himself what is popularly known as the Mahāvratas 'the great vows' among which ahimsā is one and perhaps the most important. He is expected to observe this vow very scrupulously, avoiding all kinds of violence, whether intentional or unintentional.

As Jacobi puts it,³ in Jainism, like in any other religion, 'the ideal of conduct is that of the monk which a layman, of course, cannot realize, but which he tries to approach by taking upon himself particular vow'. The vows that are prescribed for laymen are not as severe as the 'great vows' and are, there, called the panca-anuvratas 'small vows' which are five in number⁴. The first one is prānātipātaviramaṇa-vrata which enjoins a layman never to destroy any living being intentionally.

Non-Killing of any kind of being looks like an impossible ideal from a practical point of view. For example, an ascetic may not wage a war. But the society, which consists mainly of laymen, cannot always keep itself away from wars which could be both offensive and defensive. Jainism has taken note of this problem and has tried to offer solutions. In general, a layman

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is forbidden to keep weapons for himself or to give over them to others. He is asked to follow three gunavratas which are aids to the five anuvratas. One of the gunavratas is anarthadandavirati which prescribes, among many other things, ban on possessing weapons and on imparting sastra-vidyā to others. Tatvaratnapradīpike (P. 277), a Kannada commentary on Umasvāmin's work, says that giving away arms as gifts involves himsā and, therefore, should be avoided. (viṣa-kaṇṭaka-śastra-agni-rajjuka-daṇḍādi-himsopakaraṇa-pradānām himsāpradānam).

Keeping the layman in view, himsa is conceived as being of four types.⁵

- 1. Samkalpi,
- 2. Virodhi,
- 3. Arambhi,
- 4. Udyogi.

Virōdhì-himsā is injury caused by a person while defending him self or others. A war may be fought for defending one's land or religion. Thieves may be killed in an encounter. Among the four himsas, samkalpi should at any cost be avoided. As regards the other three himsās, they are an-avoidable, but even there the layman is advised to be discreet and show restraint. Commenting on Jaina ethics, J. Jaini has the following comments to make⁶— "Jaina ethics are meant for men of all positions-for kings, warriors, traders, artisans, agriculturists, and indeed for men and women in every walk of life. The highest will find in the Jaina rules of conduct satisfactory guidance for their affairs; and the meanest can follow them. 'Do your duty, Do it as humanely as you can'. This, in brief, is the primary precept of Jainism. Nonkilling cannot interfere with one's duties. The king, or the judge, has to hang a murderer. The murderer's act is the negation of a right of the murdered. The king's or the judge's order is the negation of this negation, and is enjoined by Jainism as a duty. Similarly the soldier's killing on the battlefield. It is only prejudiced and garbled accounts of Jainism that have led to its being misunderstood."

This is, in summary, the theoretical aspect of the concept of war in Jainism. War is only for defensive and never for offensive. Neither should it be undertaken for personal or national glorification. Even in wars, violence should be kept in the minimum.

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Now, we will go to myths which portray the beliefs, ideals and aspirations of a society or religion in the form of stories. very clear from Jaina myths that all the Tirthankaras Ksatriyas, which was the ruling and the fighting race. Jainism has always glorified this varna over the other varnas. Thus, Brahmashiva in his Kannada Samayaparikse says '(2.23) that the Ksatriya is the master of the land', that he is the Tirthankara and, therefore, superior to every other person in the world. It is said that the first Tirthankara himself created the three varnas except the Brahmins'. Besides, he prescribed to them, among other duties, the duty of ruling the country. protecting the distressed and even waging war if necessary, and forgiving if it comes to that ("Ksatriya jätige satya tyäga prajäpälana saranägataraksana praharana ksamādi guņācāramumam...."—Kannada Ādipurāna, 8.73, prose). King Atibala is described as a devout Jaina (jinepadapankaja-bharamara) in the story of Sukumārasvāmin by Poet Santinatha. At the same time, it is said that he took up the sword for protecting his land and his people (Sukumārasvāmicharitam, 1. 79-80). Somadeva in his Nitivākyāmrtam argues that a king who does not maintain his army properly fails in his primary duties. In Janna's Yasodharacarite, the sword of king Yashodhara is described as being continuously washed by the blood of his enemies. It should be noted here that the same king committed a sin, a papakarma, when he sacrificed a fows made of wheat flour. The himsā here was sankalpī, because, though he knew that he was not killing any being, yet he was not free from the idea of killing something as a sacrifice. This himsā made him to suffer untold miseries in many later bhavas' births'. We have again the story of Jivandhara, wherein both Satyandhara and his son Jivandhara fight many battles. While in the end Jivandhara renounces his kingdom, he advises his son (1) not to run away from battle, (2) not to give up dharma, (3) and not to forget the feet of Jina—("Dhuradoodadiru.... dharmava toreyadiru, jinapādapadmava mareyadiru). These and many other stories clearly suggest that waging war and killing is part of the 'Profession' of a Warrier, his Kşatriya-dharma. A tradesman does his trading an agriculturist his ploughing, a weaver his weaving. So a warroir does his fighting. Therefore fighting itself does not mean in itself

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either good or bad. A farmer kills many insects while ploughing, but it is unintional. Even then he could try to minimize killing, so also a soldier, while fighting. A Jaina warrior is expected not to inculcate hatred towards his enemy. He should do minimum killing. That is the way a soldier can pursue his profession and still be a man of religion.

Wars cannot always be for the defensive. Jaina ethics has allowed kings to go out of their lands and annex fresh territories. Mention may be made here of the of digvijaya by Bharata in Rathnakaravaraṇi's Bharatēṣa Vaibhava. Bharata worships and invokes the blessings of Jina before taking his army out of his capital for conquests. Again, Jainism, like Buddhism, believes not in the conquests of arms but in the conquests through dharma. These conquests, the dharmajayas, were achieved by the Tirthankaras and are glorified by almost all Jaina poets.

Ш

Jainism has made some signal contributions towards Karnatak culture. Among them its contribution towards the heroic tradition of the country is equally noteworthy. That the religion which lays stress on non-violence as the supreme ideal should have as followers some of the greatest warriors looks rather strange. We have seen earlier that fighting wars was never rejected. At the same time we should remember that fighting, even fighting for a good cause, was never glorified in Jaina ethics. It was given a place in the system for purposes of utility and it is highly doubtful that a normal layman was really conscious of it. Even taking for granted that he was conscious of it, it becomes almost impossible to observe to the letter the limitations imposed on killing. For example, how can any king be always on the defensive? How can anybody help not having an attitude of hatred towards his enemies? How can a warrior do minimum killing on the warfield? That amounts to saying that inspite of itself. produced some of the greatest heroes.

Jainism was not only patronized by almost all royal families of Karnatak, both major and minor, some of the rulers were themselves its devoted followers. It is recorded in the inscriptions belonging to the Ganga dynasty⁷ that it was Simhanandi, a Jaina Monk, who inspired Madhava to establish the dynasty. The

advice given by this celebrated teacher is believed to contain some basic moral precepts prescribed for Jaina kings. He is said to have advised him not to run away from the battle even in times of danger ("....āhāvānganadolodidodam kindugum kulavratam"). Rulers who succeeded Madhava patronized the religion to a great extent and a few of the rulers devoted themselves to its cause. Marasimha was one such who ruled during the end of the tenth century. One of the inscriptions at Shravanabelgola8 describes in length his voluntary death by the vow of sallakhanā. He is prased as a great warrior who fought many battles and conquered many fots. It is further stated that the dedicated most of the wealth which he amassed through conquests to the cause of his religion. (palavedeyol ariyaram piriyarumam kādi geldu palavedegalolam mahādhrajamanettisi mahādānangeydu negalda vidyādharam.... dharmāvatāram kadanakarkasam...." The Chalukyas of Badami were mainly Saivites or Vaisnavites. Yet they did not hesitate to patronize Jainism. Mention may be made here of the famous Aihole inscription of Ravikirti, which records gifts made over to the Jaina temple by the Emperor Pulakeshi II. Rāṣṭrakūṭas who succeeded the Chalukyas continued the patronage. Among them Amoghavarsa Nrpatunga (850 A.D.) and Indraraja (982 A.D.) were devoted followers. The Shravanabelagola inscription of 982 A.D.9 describes the death of Indraraja by Sallekhanā vow. It calls him 'a hero among heroes' (birara bira). The later Chalukyas of Kalyana, the Hoyasalas, the Vijayanagar kins and many other minor dynasties extended their support and patronage to the religion. All these examples are quoted here to show that Jainism was a religion which did not come in the way of might kings the emperors in building and expanding their kingdoms.

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The religion has produced some of the greatest generals of Karnataka. Chavundaraya and Shankaraganda were great generals who served under the Gangas and the Rashtrakutas. Chavundaraya got the gigantic image of Bahubali made in Shravanabelagola and he was also the author of a Kannada prose work entitled Cāvundarāyapurāna. His work records his many titles which he had earned as a general and a soldier. He was called 'Vairikula Kāladandam', because he had killed a hero called Tribhuvana in the forts of Bāgeyūr. He was also called 'Bhatamari' which title

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he had earned by killing numerous soldiers ("Virabhatakotiyam Kondudarim Bhatamāri"). From his inscription at Shravanabelgola we come to known that he belonged to the family of the bramha-ksatriyas. Another contemporary of his, and equally a great name in the history of Jainism was Attimabbe, and extraordinarily pious lady. She not only built a very beautiful temple for Lord Jina in Lakkundi, but also patronized the great poet Ranna. It was she who was mainly responsible for Ranna composing his Ajitana thapura natilakam. Hers was a family completely devoted to the cause of Jainism. Her father Mallappa was mainly responsible for Ponna composing his classic Santipurāna. It was also a family of warriers. Mallappa himself was wellversed both in sāstra and sāstra (" Mallapanallade Peranavano śāstra-śastra vidyākuśalam")10. His younger brother, Attimabbe's uncle, was Ponnamayya. He fought for his master Tailapa on the banks of the river Kaveri. He is described by Ranna as announcing 'Let Tailapa be victorious' (.... tailapanrpam balgendu....") before he charged into the army of the enemies with a sword in hand, killed his enemies and got himself killed. Her husband Nagadeva was also a great warrior and was called the 'Champion of the ruffians' (Orațara malla). The martial tradition continued: her son was Padevala Taila or Major General Taila. A great army officer during the times of the Hoysalas was Gangaraja (12th century). He was the greatest social leader of the Jaina community of his times and was looked upon as an equal to Chavundaraja of the tenth century. He was called the Kalingalabharana 'jewels of heroes'.11

A few names of generals who died taking upon themselves the sallēkhanā vow are recorded in inscriptions. For example Buchana, ¹² Baladeva, ¹³ Singana. ¹⁴ A remarkable official under the Rattas of Saundatti was Manichandra. The Rattas were ardent devotees of Jina Dharma and their royal preceptor (rattarāja-guru) was Munichandra who was their minister also. By his sheer wisdom and military tactice he was able to expand the territories of the Ratta Kingdom. ¹⁵ He was a teacher who gave formal education as well as military training to the king Lakshmideva (sastra-sāstra sthira parinatiyol Lakmīdēvange dīksāguru-vādam). Jaina poets like Pampa and Janna participated in political activities and fought battles.

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The persons mentioned above-kings, officials and poetswere intellects who had a failry clear knowledge of Jainism and knew that their profession as warriors had religious sanction. It is true that religion is a personal thing. At the same time the religious beliefs and convictions could have an impact on the outlook of an individual, on his likes and dislikes, on his sense of which is right and which is wrong.—A Jaina warrior, in spite of his knowing the religious sanction for his profession, cannot escape from a mental agony of having killed or wounded many on the battle field. As we have seen, in Jainism it is the man who suffers and never the man who inflicts suffering that is painted in vivid colours. This could supply some explanation as to why some generals took up the sallekhanā vow and ended themselves. They did it, probably, as a kind of atonement, Prayascitta, for the acts they did in their prime of youth, as warriors or as army officials. Sometimes our emotions could get an upper hand over our intellectual convictions.

broad concept of his religion. To him religion is a bundle of rituals and beliefs. His sense of right and wrong will be shaped by the culture into which he is born. If ahimsā is the key-note of Jaina culture, there is no escape from the fact that it becomes an important part of the ethical system of the layman. A cursory study of the hero-stones in Karnatak reveals that there are comparatively few which can be treated as Jaina. Hero-stones record the death of heroes, soldiers, men who actually fight and die. We have a large number of Jaina kings and generals whose names are recorded in inscriptions. But the number of ordinary heroes is comparatively small. Could the reason be that ordinary layman thought that fighting in general was taboo for Jainas? Could it be that a Jaina in general was reluctant or at least not enthusiastic about participating in wars or warlike activities?

The popular Hindu conception prevalent in earlier times was that a warrior who dies fighting goes to heaven to enjoy hevenly pleasures, amidst fairies. This is—depicted in the form of sculptures on hero-stones. In later times, the hero is depicted as being in the presence of God himslelf. The notion that a yogi and a hero both get liberated through their yoga and heroic death

is expressed in many inscriptions. ("dvavimau purusam loke suryamandala bhedinaul Parivrat yogayuktasca rane cābhimukhe hatah"). This notion is something unacceptable to Jainism which allows fighting as a profession only. Besides Jainism does not believe in God who could shower grace or divine mercy on human beings. It is man and man himself that should do his karmaccheda and attain liberation. Brahmasiva-(12th Cent. A.D.) in his Samayaparikse (9.34) makes fun of the popular notion mentioned above and says that it is only the ignorant that believe in heavenly damsels carrying the dead warrior to heaven. Soul is formless, and how can the damsels carry this formless thing, he asks. Devappa, a poet of the Sixteenth century, repeats the same idea. He describes, no doubt, the deceased heroes going to heaven and enjoying among damsels there. (Rāmavijaya Kāvya, 18.85-90). But he takes care to say that he has described so because of poetic convention.16 That the dead heroes went to heaven was a popular convention acceptable to all but jains becomes amply clear from the above statements of Brahmasiva and Devappa Kavi.

But there are a few Jaina Hero-stones which depict the hero as going to heaven or to the presence of Jina, but their number is so small that we are compelled to treat them as exceptions. In Kaikini, in North Canara District, are a bunch of hero-stones kept near the Jaina temple there. On the top panel of a few of them the hero is depicted as sitting near the Jina. The first two panels at the bottom contain scenes of battle, the third one depicts the hero being taken to heaven by fairies, the fourth depicts dance by the damsels, the fifth or the last panel contains the picture of a hero, the Jina and a Jaina monk. (There is a similar sculpturing on a hero-stone in Bhatkal). All the inscriptions on the herostones in Kaikini belong to the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. One of the inscriptions¹⁷ beings with the usual verse praising jinasāsana and goes to describe how the hero Mabunayaka killed many and was killed in the battle-field. Another 18 inscription beings with the phrase vitarāgāya namah and states that the herostone was erected to commemorate the death of Thammannanayaka. If further states that the erection of the stone facilitated the hero to go to heaven. There is a similar hero-stone at Haduvalli in the same District.19 There are one or two similar hero-stones in

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Śravanabeloagola itself.20 But the most interesting comes from Udri of Sorab Taluk, Shimoga District.21 It describes the death of a hero-Baicappa, while fighting against the Konkanigas killing many of them. In the beginning of the inscription he is described as 'reaching the feet of Jina' (" aidida jinapādapadamamam baicappam"). While still fighting, all of a sudden he seems to have taken up sallekhanā vow on the battlefield itself and dies. He is said to have reached 'heaven' (".... samādhi vidhānamonde cittadolu māravirodhi...ārjita nākalokamam saridam"). He reached the feet of Jina, because he died of sallekhanā vow; because he died while fighting on the battlefield he went to heaven. I do not know whether the composer of the text of the inscription was conscious of the difference between heaven and the word of Jina. The hero-stones at Kaikini depict Jina on the top panel. This is in imitation of the usual hero-stones; the Hindu God, usually Siva or his emblem and occasionally Viṣṇu, is replaced by Jina. But nowhere do they expressly say that the hero went to the world of the Tirthankaras. The inscription at Udri is the only place where a hero is described as going to the world of Jina, and even here, as we saw above, the composer is in confusion.

The arguments which I have put forth in the latter half of this paper seem to contradict the earlier-statement that Jainism has its own contributions towards the heroic tradition. I have also tried to answer this apparent contradiction. Jainism, as a religion, was never militant, and by its very nature, it could never be on such. As D. S. Sharma has rightly observed, "... it is remarkable that for scores of instances that could be cited for persecutions directed against the Jains, there is hardly a single instance of retaliation by the latter". Though controversals, I still believe that this lack of militancy was one of the factors which contributed towards its decline. That is as good as saying that it could not stand up against more militant religions. That is a different story, rather a sad one, and it is not for me to speak about it here.

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- 4. "Kole pusi Kalavu paradāra atikānkse embivam torevudu anuvratangal" (Giving up killing, telling lies, stealing, illegal, sexual connections and greediness are the small vows).

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 - 14. Ep. Car. VIII, Sb. 149.
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 - 22. Jainism and Karnatak Culture, P. 150.

RIGHTNESS OF ACTION AND JAINA ETHICS

He who lives in society inevitably asks himself and others on many occasions in life, 'what shall I do in a particular situation? or whether I ought to do or ought not to do certain actions? Many a time we have been told, "What you have done is wrong." "You ought not to have done this." Sometimes in answer to such questions and such statements, judgments or evaluations, it may be said that an action is wrong if it does not conform to the moral code in question. Particular actions are to be performed in a particular situation. inasmuch as they are enjoined by a particular moral code of the community. An impartial reflective mind cannot be satisfied with such kinds of decisions, regarding the rightness or wrongness of doing certain actions. Besides, moral codes may conflict and what is considered right according to one moral code, may be regarded as wrong according to the other moral code. For instance, in accordance with one moral code untouchability is right, whereas in accordance with the other moral code untouchability is wrong. In one moral code meat-eating is forbidden, while in the other it is enjoined. The situation is worsened when two parts of the moral code of community prescribe contradictory performances to be right or wrong. All this means that moral codes cannot be relied upon as a sure guide to the rightness of an action. Of course, I do not wish to deny that there may be moral codes which prescribe universal rules of conduct, but even then it cannot be said that 'right' 'wrong' could be defined in terms of conformity or otherwise to the moral code of a particular society. The reflective mind is not convinced of the reason for an action's being right or wrong in terms of a moral code. In fact, he is concerned with the criterion of the rightness of actions. He wishes to enquire the ground on which the rightness of actions depends. In Jaina terminology it may be asked: How do we regard an action as Samyak? By what standard is an action judged to be Samyak?" It will not be out of place to point out here that the terms Samyak action in Jaina Ethics is not equivalent to the term right action in modern ethics, but it implies that the action has a good motive in addition. It is, therefore, called good action. The other

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term in Jaina Ethics for good action is Subha action. But for our purpose we shall treat Samyak-action or Subha action as right action without any inconsistency. In the present paper I propose to discuss the theories of the criterion or standard by which we can determine whether an action is right or wrong. Further, I shall endeavour to point out the stand of the Jaina Ethics regarding the issue under consideration.

In order to judge the rightness or wrongness of an action or rule, if the goodness or badness of its consequences is taken into consideration, we have the theory known as the teleological theory of right or wrong. For instance, gambling is wrong, because it leads to many bad consequences and helping others in distress is right, because it leads to good consequences. In other words, the teleologist contends that an action or rule is right, if it is conducive to the greatest balance of good over evil, for the agent or for the society. The former position is taken by an ethical egoist, whereas the latter one, by the utilitarian. Since ethical egoism cannot be consistently maintained as a moral theory, we set it aside without going into the arguments for its rejection. What concerns us now is to discuss utilitarianism as a teleological theory of the rightness or wrongness of an action or rule.

The other theory regarding the rightness or wrongness of an action or rule is styled deontological theory of right or wrong, according to which rightness or wrongness of an action or rule is not the function of consequences, but is decided by the nature of certain characteristics of the action or rule itself. In other words, the deontologist holds that an action or rule is right even if it does not bring about any good to self or society. For instance, promise or conformity in mind, body and speech ought to be kept even if bad consequences are brought into being.

Thus the difference between the teleologist and the deontologist consists in the fact that the former regards the rightness or wrongness of an action or a rule as a function of good or bad consequences alone, while the latter regards rightness or wrongness as depending on factors other than the goodness or badness of consequences. For the teleologist there is no way of determining the right apart from the good, while for the deontologists right owes nothing to the good. Both of them I

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may regard certain actions as right or wrong, but the reason or justification given by each is different. If I say that I ought to do actions of gratitude to my benefactor and then suppose I am asked the reason for holding it. In reply, I may say, if I hold teleological point of view, that I ought to do actions of gratitude to my benefactor if they contribute to the productiveness of good, and if they do not, the 'ought' loses its significance; but if I hold deontological point of view, I may say that I ought to do actions of gratitude to my benefactor, even if they lead to bad consequence, i.e. 'ought' on this theory is to be followed under all circumstances regardless of the consideration of any effect. To be more clear, suppose I have borrowed a sword from my friend for self-defence, shall I return it to him at a time when my friend is planning to kill his parents owing to some discord? The teleological reply is 'no', the deontological reply seems to me to be 'yes'. Thus the teleologist believes in hypothetical imperatives and the deontologist, in categorical ones.

Having explained the two general types of tests or criteria of rightness of actions or rules, I propose first, to examine the forms of deontological positions upheld by moral philosophers and secondly, shall go on to the utilitarian positions regarding the issue ander consideration. While examining these theories, I shall endeavour to bring out the contribution of the Jaina ethics to the problem of the rightness of actions.

(i) The deontologist may take two positions, (a) act-deontology and (b) rule-deontology. (a) For the act-deontologist, particular actions are in themselves intrinsically right or wrong without regard to the goodness or badness of their consequences. The moral judgement that in this situation, I ought to do so and so is a function of the immediate intuitive knowledge of the rightness or wrongness of an action in a particular situation.

In other words, the rightness or wrongness of actions is ascertained by simply looking at the actions themselves without considering their consequences, i.e. it is cognisable apart from the goodness or badness produced by them, either for oneself or for the society. It may be noted here that the act-deontologist may hold without contradicting himself that the general rule can be

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formed indirectly by making use of perceptions regarding the rightness or wrongness of particular acts. But this general rule cannot outweigh the particular judgement considering the rightness or wrongness of particular action. (b) As distinguished from act-deontologism, the rule-deontologist, holds that what is right or wrong is to be ascertained by appeal to general rules intuitively apprehended. The validity of these rules does not depend on the productivity of the goodness or badness of consequences, and they are not inducticively arrived at, but rather given to us directly by intuitive apprehension. For example, the particular action of killing or stealing is wrong, because it violates the rule, 'Do not kill' or 'Do not steal' which is intrinsically right, and the particular action of fulfilling a promise is right, because it observes the intrinsically right rule 'keep your promise'. Thus the rule-deontologist asserts that there are certain rules which are absolutely always right and certain others which are absolutely always wrong regardless of the goodness or badness of consequences. In other words, there are certain actions, like telling the truth, keeping the promises, repaying the debts, doing acts of gratitude, which are our duties, and duties ought to be performed even when they do not promote any good whatsoever, that certain actions are our duties is a sufficient ground for our doing them and considering them as right.

According to Jaina Ācāryas, both act-deontologism and ruledeontologism are untenable theories of the criterion of rightness or wrongness. The weakness of act-deontologism is that it regards human situations as extermely different from one another, and does not recognise the universal element inherent in them. No doubt each human situation has something of its own, but it is contrary to moral experience to say that it is not like other situations in morally relevant respects. In many human situations, because of their likeness in important respects, the general rule 'do not kill' can be applied without any incongruity. In practical life, according to Jaina ethics, moral rules cannot be dispensed with and each man's moral judgements cannot be relied upon. " 'The fact is that when one makes a moral judgement in particular situations, one implicitly commits oneself to making the same judgement in any similar situations.2 The merit of act-deontologism is that it takes into consideration the particularity of the I

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situation. It advises us to look into the act as such. Besides. the weakness of rule-deontologism is that it occupies itself with the extreme rightness or wrongness of the rule without allowing any exception to it. In this case, fulfilment of duty may sometime become fanaticism. Truth ought to be spoken even if the society has to face bad consequences. The defect of this position in particular and deontologism in general is that they do not take account of the specific situations and goodness or badness of the consequences following from such circumstances. Actions cannot be right or wrong in vacuum. They always produce certain effects either good or bad, and to be indifferent to effects is to ignore the verdict of moral experience which is deeply rooted in the goodness or badness of human situation. According to Jaina ethics does not condemn the action of telling a lie to enemies, robbers, and even to persons who ask questions when they have no right to ask. Under some circumstances it is right to break a promise, or to take something that belongs to another without his permission. Thus no rule can be absolutely always right or wrong as the rule-deontologist prescribed. Mill rightly remarks, "It is not the fault of any creed but of the complicated nature of human affairs that rules of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exception, and that hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable".3 The merit of rule-deontologism is that it gives excessive importance to rules in moral life.

After critically examining the deontological position from the point of Jaina ethics, we now proceed to discuss the position taken by the teleologist. Since teleologists have often been called utilitarians, we shall be regarding teleological position as utilitarian position. (a) Act-utilitarians say that the rightness or wrongness of each action is to be determined by appealing to goodness or badness of its consequences and I ought to do an action in a situation which is likely to produce the maximum balance of good over evil in the universe. One ought not to tell the truth in a situation which is such as to cause maximum balance of evil over good by telling the truth. (b) Rule-utilitarians hold that moral rules like truth-telling etc., are significant in life and duty in a particular situations is to be decided by appeal to a rule. In this respect they are like rule-deontologists; but,

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unlike deontologists, they affirm that rules are to be framed on the basis of their effects on the society as a whole. Thus rules have utilitarian basis and they must be selected, maintained, revised and replaced on this basis. Once rules are so framed, they are to be followed even if it is known that they do not have the best possible consequences in certain particular cases.

It may be noted here that Jaina ethics subscribes to the utilitarian basis of the judgements of right or wrong. Do not kill, Do not tell a lie, Do not hoard, Do not steal and Do not commit adultery-all these rules have as their basis the productivity of good consequences to the society. However, Jaina Ācāryas maintain that sometimes it is not the following of the rule that produces maximum balance of good over evil, but its breaking. Though Jaina Ācāryas allow breaking of the moral rules in exceptional circumstances on utilitarian basis, yet they have warned us time and again that breaking of the rule should not be made common, since it may lead to the weakening of faith in rules which are in a way the basis of social order. The Nisitha Sutra is a compendium of exceptions to moral rules. This work has very carefully laid down the principles of breaking the rules. This implies that Jaina ethics does not allow superstitious rule-worship, but at the same time holds that scrupulously conscientious caution is to the exercised in breaking the rules. Thus rule-utilitarianism like rule-deontologism does not find favour with Jaina ethics. Rules are merely guiding principles in common circumstances, but when the circumstances are exceptional we have not to look to rules for making any moral decision, but to situations and particular actions from the point of view of producing greater balance of good over evil. This goes to show that every time, as the act-utilitarian suggests, we have to calculate anew the effects of each and every action on the general welfare. The whole discussion brings us to the view that both acts and rules, specific situations and general principles, are to be taken into account for deciding the rightness or wrongness of actions. This may be called modified act-utilitarianism which cannot allow a rule to be followed in a particular situation, when, following it is regarded as not to have the best possible consequences. This means that Jaina ethics accepts the possibility that sometimes general moral principles may be inadequate

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to the complexities of the situation, and in this case a direct consideration of the particular action without reference to general principles is necessary. Thus according to Jaina ethics acts are logically prior to rules and the rightness of the action is situational. The corollary of this view is that duty is not self-justifying, it is not an end in itself. It is good as a means. Its rightness is dependent on the fact of producing a greater balance of good over evil in the universe than any other alternative.

Here it may be said that rightness or wrongness of an action does not depend upon the goodness or badness of consequences, but upon the motive or motives from which it is done. We can find references in Jaina ethical texts wherein good motives are given prime importance for the performance of action producing good consequences. So long as good motives issue in right action productive of good consequences, there is nothing wrong in accepting the dependence of rightness of action on good motive. Jaina ethics seems to tie good motives with the rightness of actions producing good consequences. Its conviction is that if there is good motive, like kindness or charitable disposition, right actions are bound to occur. At one stage in man's moral evolution it may be possible; at ordinary man's level this may not happen. Since ethics, it seems to me, could not evenly face the problem arising from the fact that sometimes good dispositions are not able to produce right actions issuing in good consequences, it made rightness of action productive of good identical with good motive. But the point is that such actions are not so blameworthy as they would have been if they had been done from bad motives. No doubt the agent deserves praise for acting as he did, but the action is wrong. Jaina ethics seems to confuse 'that to call an action morally praiseworthy is the same thing as to that it is right, and to call it morally blameworthy the same thing as to say that it is wrong.4 In point of fact these two judgements are not identical. It so often happens that a man may act wrongly from a good motive, i.e. conscientiousness may lead to fanatical cruelty, mistaken asceticism etc., and he may act rightly from a bad motive, for instance, feeling of revenge may be able to check certain criminal actions. However, in the former case we regard the actions as wrong, whereas in the latter we regard them as right. This means that the consideration of motives

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does not make any difference to the rightness or wrongness of actions. In other words, goodness or badness of disposition is to be distinguished from the rightness or wrongness of conduct. Thus if a right action is done from a good motive and the same action is done from a bad motive, though the goodness of the consequences will be the same, yet 'the presence of the good motive will mean the presence of an additional good in the one case which is absent in the other.⁵

In conclusion, we may say that according to Jaina ethics the criterion of right or wrong is the goodness or badness of consequences. It rejects the view that certain rules ought absolutely always to be followed, whatever the consequences may be. No action is to be unconditionally done or avoided. No action can be our duty irrespective of the goodness of the consequences. The question whether an action is right or wrong does not depend on motive, and the presence of motive whether good or bad, constitutes an additional factor in therightness or wrongness of actions.

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Kamal Chand Sogani

NOTES

1. In some of our moral judgements, we say that a certain action or kind of action is morally right, wrong, obligatory, a duty or ought or ought not to be done. In others we talk, not about actions or kinds of action, but about persons, motives, intentions, traits of character, and the like and we say of them that they are morally good, bad, virtuous, vicious, responsible, blameworthy, saintly, despicable, and so on. In these two kinds of judgement, the things talked about are different and what is said about them is different. (Frankena, Ethics) pp. 8-9 (Prentice-Hall, India).

- 2. Frankena, Ethics, p. 22 (Prentice-Hall).
- 3. Mill, Utilitarianism, Chapter II, P. 23 (Everyman's Library ed., New York).
 - 4. Moore: Ethics, P. 116 (Oxford University Press, London).
 - 5. Moore: Ethics, P. 115 (Oxford University Press, London).

JAINA YOGA: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Introduction

Great religions of the world are ways of life conceived and propagated by highly distinguished sons of humanity. Some of the insights that these great souls have had into life and its relation to universe as well as into the psychology behind, are indeed amazingly rational and potentially capable of standing the test of objective analysis.

Jainism being a great religion with powerful metaphysical conceptions and theories based upon sound logic and with the system of ethics of higher order, is rich with psychological insights relating to the evolution and behaviour of the individual. However, it should be remembered that "since the psychological analysis is subordinate to the metaphysical system, several facts of psychological interests are thrown into the background of the philosophical scheme. Nevertheless, there is no mistake about the striking psychological analysis exhibited by the Jaina thinkers". Such analysis is more profound with regard to the sensory and preceptual processes; the types of Samyagjñāna 'cognition'; Gunasthanas 'the stages of evolution of the soul'; Marganasthanas 'the multiple approaches to the understanding of the soul'; Lesyas 'the six thought colourings'; the activities of the body, speech and mind (Yoga) and a host of others. The rational and vivid depiction of the above topics would really attract any student of modern psychology and would encourage him for a scientific enquiry into the phenomena described. However, not many attempts worthy of notice have been so far made to evaluate the psychological insights depicted in Jaina thought, in the light of a modern psychological facts, except only a few like the studies of Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi and Dr. Mohanlal Mehta. In these studies a beginning is made and a few topics like sensory perception and higher cognitive processes are given more consideration while psychologically more significant topics like 'Yoga' and 'Mārgaṇasthānas' have been given little psychological interpretation. Besides, the attempts made so far have not emphasised the need for an empirical verification of the well conceived psychological processes by means of scientific methods like objective

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observation and if possible even experimentation. I may not be wrong if I say that some of these conceived psychological processes can be hypothesized and subjected to emperical testing. Such an approach would become more meaningful in the study of Jaina Yoga.

Jaina yoga:

The Jaina thinkers have used the term 'yoga' to denote the vibrations of the mundane soul resulting from one or more of the three types of activities—mental, vocal and physical. However, it is interesting to note that in the formula KĀYAVĀNMANAH—KARMA—YOGAH, the activities of body, speech and mind themselves have been conceived as 'yoga'. This is more akin to modern psychological approach wherein the behaviour, rather than the individual, is the object of study. Such an approach becomes empirically more meaningful as the activities stated above can be subjected to objective observation. To explain the 'what', 'how' and 'why' aspects of the activities the Jaina thinkers have depended upon introspection and intuition but the modern phychologists, to describe them, use scientific methods.

The study of Jaina yoga from the modern psychological view point and in the light of the available empirical findings would help us in gaining better insight into Jaina yoga itself on the one hand and in utilising the concepts and theories put forward by the Jaina thinkers for a better understanding of the human behaviour in general. Besides some of the rich subjective observations and intutions of the Jaina thinkers may be formulated into testable hypotheses and subjected to empirical verification which would in turn enrich the theory of human behaviour.

Aspects of Yoga:

Jaina thinkers have explained yoga in all its three aspects—'what', 'how' and 'why'. These three aspects are to be found in all the three main types of activities—mental, vocal and physical activities (manoyoga, vacana-yoga and kāya-yoga). The 'what' aspect comprises of the various activities, gross and subtle, and are subjected to different classifications. The physical movements as well as the various physiological processes of the individual are examples of kāya-yoga while the variety of vocal sounds produced

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as are ced and the language spoken are examples for vacana-yoga and the thoughts, feelings and emotions are examples of manoyoga. It is surprising to see that the Jaina thinkers have made a minute analysis of the various psycho-physical activities and have assumed some types of interaction between the mental and the physical processes. Such an inter-action is well conceived and explained in the modern clinical psychology. For instance, today it is an accepted fact that some of the physical ailments like asthma, stomach ulcer and rheumatoid arthritis have psychological bases while some of the psychological experiences like the feelings of anxiety and tension, inferiority complex etc. have physical foundations. The obsessive and compulsive experiences are vivid examples for establishing the interaction between the mental and the physical processes.

Compulsive gambling, paranoic fears leading to murders, conversion hysteria, sexual perversions like nymphomania and manic reactions are a few clearcut examples of the influence of mental processes on the actual physical activities of the individual. Besides through hypnosis it is possible to demonstrate practically the influence of mental processes on the physical activities.

In explaining the 'why' aspect of yoga the Jain thinkers have attempted an extremely subtle analysis of the various psychological dynamics. Accordingly, the different activities of the individual and their effects are attributed to the operation of the five senses, four passions krodha, 'anger', mana 'pride', māyā 'deceit' and lobha 'greed'; five types of vowlessness; twenty five kriyās are activities-Samyaktva kriyā, mithyātva kriyā, prāyoga kriyā, iryāpathakriyā, pradosiki-kriyā, kāyiki kriyā adhikaraniki kriya, paritapiki kriya, pranatipatiki kriya, darsana kriyā, sparśana-kriyā, samanta-pātana kriyā, anābhoga kriyā, swahasta kriyā, nisarga kriyā, vidāraņā-kriyā, anāvyāpādiki kriyā, anākānksā kriyā, prārambha kriyā, parigrahi-kriyā, māyā kriyā, mithyādarśana kriyā, apratyākhyāna kriyā and also the activities performed by the individual while dealing with the lifeless things in the environments (e.g. two kinds of mixing-bhaktapāna and upakarana). Any yoga is not only determined by the above stated activities but also by the variations in intensity, intentional character etc. of the activities.

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It is interesting to note that some of the above mentioned dynamics of behaviour have their factual basis. The kasāyas, for instance, through their operation, can stir up the whole individual in gross or subtler forms. The gross changes taking place during emotional experience like thumping heart beat, increased respiratory rate, excessive sweating etc. are clear indicators of emotional experience. But in their absence when emotional experience is in a subtler form, one may not be able to recognize the operation of emotions. However, today even the subtler changes that take place during conscious or unconscious emotional experiences can be observed and recorded by means of sophisticated instruments like the psychogalvanoscope, polygraph and the electroencephalograph (E.E.G.) A person with guilt consciousness but who is concealing the same from others, can be made to confess his guilt by means of galvanic skin responses. Similarly, the E.E.G. for instance, can give us the subtle variations that may be taking place in the brain waves during normal and emotional states of mind. Besides modern psychology has also recognised the role of unconscious emotions and complexes in the disturbed behaviour of the individual. This fact supports, in a way, the operation of Karmas at the upasama and ksayopasama levels. This means that there are rich resources in Jaina theory of emotions which can be utilized for formulation of tentative hypotheses by the modern psychologists.

Many of the twenty five kriyās mentioned above seem to have empirical foundations as to their effect on yoga. A few examples are prādoṣikī kriyā (tendency tó accuse others in anger) which is similar to projection of blame on others; darśana kriyā (infatuated desire to see a pleasing form) which is similar to the perversion of darśana rati and sparśana kriyā (frivolous indulgence in touching etc.) which is akin to some other sexual perversion often expressed in the form of kleptomania. Today in modern psychology darśana rati and sparśana rati are factually established forms of sexual perversion. Some of the twenty five kriyās which are not finding their similarity in modern psychology can be hypothesized and empirically verified.

The supremacy of Manoyoga:

The importance of the mind in the total behaviour of the individual is very well depicted in the line

'Mana eva manusyāṇām kāraṇam bandhamokṣayoḥ'.

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If mind is the root cause of both the suffering and happiness of the individual, it is necessary that its activities are to be analysed and understood in a more detailed manner which indeed has been attempted by Jaina thinkers in a more rational way.

The continuously flowing thoughts and feelings of the individual may be good or bad in their effect. On this ground the Jaina thinkers have thought of two types of feeling 'Bhavas' in the They are 'subha-bhava and asubha-bhava', mundane soul. which are also sometimes known as subha yoga and asubha yoga respectively. If subha-bhava is the feeling of pleasant nature, asubha bhava is the feeling of unpleasant nature (It should be noted here that there is a third type-suddha-bhava which refers to the enjoyment of self by self. Since it is taken to mean the spiritual experience of the pure self, it is of little psychological importance for us in terms of the problem at hand.). However, the other two correspond to the normal feelings that can be accepted by students of psychology. These feelings are generally related to certain objects in the environment which may have either positive or negative values (attraction or repulsion).

In terms of thoughts, manoyoga can also be classified into three types—'śubha-dhyāna', 'aśubha-dhyāna' and 'śuddha-dhyāna' or 'śukla-dhyāna'. As it is in feeling, here again, the third type refers to the spiritual experience of the soul while the other two refer to the meditation of the mundane soul.

It is really surprising to see that the Jaina thinkers have had sound reflection on the nature and consequences of the first two types of meditation which today have factual support. The varieties of aśubha-dhyāna-himsānanda, steyānanda, 'mṛṣānanda' and parigrahānanda have their equivalents in 'sadism', 'kleptomania' 'compulsive lying' and abnormal acquisitive tendencies' respectively. The highly valuable insights into these forms of behaviour gained by the Jaina thinkers can make useful contributions towards the advancement of psychological knowledge. Similarly the types of subha-dhyana—padasta dhyāna, pindasta dhyāna, rūpasta dhyāna, and rūpātit-dhyāna and their descriptions in Jaina thought may contribute towards the advancement of the theory of imagery and thought processes when they are meaningfully hypothesized and empirically studied.

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Concluding remarks:

Jain yoga is a rich concept full of potentials for scientific investigations. The several aspects of this concept stated so far and also the Samjñās, anuprekṣās and the lesa aspects of yoga are to be thoroughly analysed, studied and interpretated from the point of view of modern psychology. Many of the psychological findings upto date do support some of the concepts depicted in Jaina yoga. They can even find their direct applications in the clinical, counseling and mental health activities of the modern psychologists.

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JAINA CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN POETICS

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I. In the histories of Sanskrit Poetics available today, though some Jaina authors are referred to in passing, we have neither a full survey of all the works nor an objective assessment of them taken as a whole. Even in exhaustive surveys like that of Krishnamachariar, the major works on poetics by ancient Jaina authors in languages other than Sanskrit are not to be found. The object of this paper is to give a brief outline of the Jaina contribution to the development of literary theories in India, taking into consideration some of the major works in Sanskrit as well as in old Kannada.

Jinasena's Mahāpurāṇa (9th Century A.D.) records in unmistakable terms the tradition of the Jainas that Alaṅkāra-sāstra or science of poetics, including topics like alaṅkāras, two mārgas and ten guṇas, was revealed by the $\bar{A}di$ Tirthaṅkara himself for the benefit of humanity:

Upamādinalaṅkārān sanmārgadvayavistaram |
Dasaprāṇānalaṅkārasaṅgrahe vibhur abhyadhāt | |
(XVI. 115)

It is again in this Mahāpurāņa that we get for the first time an illuminating explanation of the word 'vānmaya'. Jinasena says that the three disciplines, viz., grammar, prosody and poetics collectively form vānmaya:

Padavidyāmadhicchandovicitim vāgalankītim | Trayisamuditāmetām tadvido vānmayam viduḥ | | (Ibid. XVI, 111).

As Dr. Raghavan has pointed out, the first clear enumeration of nine $k\bar{a}vya$ -rasas including prasānta and substituting vridanaka for bhayānaka is to be had in one of the of the very ancient Jaina āgamas viz., Anuyogadvāra-sūtra (Āgamodaya Samiti Series Ed. P. 134):

Nava kavvarasā paņņattā, tam jahā—
Viro singāro abbhuo a rodddo a hoi boddhavvo |
Velaņāo bibhaccho hāso kaluņo pasanto a | |
(The Number of Rasas, Second Ed. p. 158).

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It has been estimated that this canonical satra cannot be later than the 5th century A.D. Possibly it is much older. In the Jaina poetic tradition as recorded by several old Kannada poets like Ranna (10th century A.D.), Jinendra has only one rasa and that is santa.

"Ninage rasamonde säntame jinendra" (Ajita-tirthankara-puräna-tilaka, Jina-stuti).

While praising Sarasvati, the same poet states figuratively that her ornaments are not sixteen, but thirty-six, alluding to the thirty-six lakṣanas, as against sixteen samskāras:—

Padinārallavalankriyāracane
Mūvattāru nerpaṭṭavu /....(op. cit.).

The doctrine of *lakṣaṇas* seen in Bharata was thus kept alive in the Jaina tradition, though it went out of vogue in later Sanskrit poetics.

The Jaina religion naturally gave the highest importance to tranquility or prasonta as the highest value in spiritual life. The same was imported openly into the field of poetics too; so openly that the Jainas went even to the extent of branding even secular poets like Kālidāsa as kukavis because of their excessive devotion for sīngāra. Jinasena, uses all his wits in rewriting Kālidāsa's Meghadūta in such a way that each line of Kālidāsa breathing the spirit of vipralambha-sīngāra is transformed to yield the sānta significance with the help of two or three more new lines added to each line by Jinasena himself. It is the famous Pārsvābhyudaya. In this Kāvya we have the out-and-out declaration that 'kāvyadharma' i.e. Kavisamaya has forced kukavis like Kālidāsa to regard sīngāra as satya though it is asatya in fact:—

Syād vā satyam kukaviracitam kāvyadharmānurodhāt Saty apy evam sakalam uditam jāghatīty eva yasmāt | Sabhrūbhangaprahitanayanaiḥ kāmilakşyeşv amoghaistasyārambhas caturavanitāvibhramair eva siddhaḥ | |

(Pársvábhyudaya, III. 11).

This presents a new attitude towards poetry as such and gives for the first time an unqualified importance to religious instruction as the foremost concern of poetry. Although Bhāmaha and other

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Hindu theorists had allowed some room for ethical instruction incidentally in poetry, the general Hindu attitude is represented by the clear-cut statement in the Vişḥnudharmottara-Purāṇa:

Dharmārthakāmamokṣāṇāṁ Śāstraṁ syād upadeṣakaṁ |...... Tad eva kāvyam ity uktaṁ Copadeṣam vinā kṛtaṁ || (Ch. XV. 1-2).

The dividing line between sāstra and kāvya was thus none other than upadesa or ethical instruction. The Hindu theorists stood for secular poetry, while the Jaina theorists, like the Buddhists, pleaded strongly for a new tradition of religious and ethical poetry. In practice too, we find that almost all the Jaina literature in Sanskrit, Prakrit and old Kannada, is more religious than secular. This new tradition of pure religious classical literature left its strong influence on later development of vernacular literatures.

II. The Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Nṛpatunga (9th century A.D.) is credited with the authorship of the first work on poetics in old Kannada, the Kavirājamārga. The work is more or less a free adaptation of Bhāmaha's Kāvyalaṅkāra and, much more, of Daṇḍin's Kāvyādarṣa. But it begins with Jinastuti and has some unique ideas, not found in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. His definition of poetry, for instance, takes us beyond the words of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin to the bhāva of the poet on the one hand and to the viṣeṣa of ṣabdas as well as alaṅkāras relating to arthavyakti.

Kavibhā vakṛtāneka —
pravibhāgaviviktasūktamārgam kāvyam |
saviseşasabdaracanam
vividhārthavyaktivartitālankāram ||

What is still more interesting is his treatment of mārgas and their guṇas in relation to particular rasas, a fact not found either in Bhāmaha or Daṇḍin. More surprising is his nomenclature of the pathetic sentiment as karuṇarasa in place of the usual karuṇarasa. Nṛpatunga realises for the first time that mārgas are dependent on rasa. There is no clue in the book that he had read Rudrata or

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Anandavardhana. Hence all the more reason that Nṛpatunga should get the credit for this progressive doctrine:

Bagedu mõrgadvitayamam gatigalam
Praguna-gunaganodayarkal vitarkadim |
Sogayisuvantu vacanaracaneyim
Negaldire berasi pelge rasavisesadol || (II. 98).

Virarasam sphuţoktiyinudāratamam karunārasam mṛdū—ccāraneyindamaobhutarasam nibidoktigaļindamalte sṛ—ngārarasam samantu sukumārataroktigaļim prasannagam—bhīrataroktiyim prakaṭamakke rasam satatam prasāntamum. (II. 99).

utsavadinde hāsyarasamā madhuroktiguļindamalte bī—bhatsarasāntaram sithilabandhanadim satatam bhayānako—dyatsurasam karam viṣamabandhanadim nṛpatungadeva-mā rgotsavamūrjitoktigaļinakkati-raudrarasam rasāvaham.

(II. 100).

'After considering carefully the procedure of the two mārgas, the poet should so compose his work that it will give the impression of beauty to learned critics. And he should select each of them in tune with particular rasas as indicated below.

The guṇas of spuṭatā and udāratā are appropriate for virarasa, Mṛdutā suits karuṇarasa most, and compactness (sleṣa) is best for adbhuta, sukumāratā is suited for sṛṇgāra; prasāda and gāmbhirya go well with the delineation of prasānta.

Utsava is the occasion for the hāsyarasa wherein Madhurokti preponderates; sithilabandha favours bībhatsarasa; vişamabandha is helpful in bhayānaka. Ūrjitokti is best suited for raudrarasa'.

We cannot dismiss his karunārasa as a scribal variation of karunārasa. For, the example cited by him describes the virahotkanthā of the heroine and the hero is called upon to show pity on her (III. 191). The sthāyibhāva involved here is karunā or dayā (pity) as against soka or suffering.

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An even more intriguing tenet of Nṛpatunga is his reference to dhvani as an alaṅkāra and his description of it as 'based on śabda though defective in artha'. His illustration of it is as follows: "A pair of animişas (fish) is shining in the lotus. What a wonder!" The original is as follows:—

Dhvaniyembudalankāram Dhvaniyisugum sabdadindamarthade dūsyam | Nenevudidanintu kamalado— Ļanimisayugamoppi torpudintidu codyam || (III. 208).

This reference is of unique interest to scholars because it shows an awareness of *dhvani* as a poetical concept in far off Karnatak even before the *Dhvanyalōka* reached that remote province from Kashmir. It provides an uncontestable proof to the fact that *dhvani* was *samāmnātapūrva* among literary theorists even before Ānandavardhana. Of course his idea of it is too hazy and mistaken to be considered seriously.

III. The next old Kannada theorists is also a Jaina. He is Nāgavarma II, the author of the Kāvyāvalokana (Circa, 11th Century A.D.). Though he expressly acknowledges his indebtedness to Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana and Rudraṭa, he has some new points of his own to add. His definition of poetry and idea of sabda and artha are unique:—

Ire sabdārthaṅgaļ ta—
Tparateyinadu kāvyamadaroļucitaikārthān |
Taravāci sabdamavabhā—
Sarupamahlādakāriyappudadarthuṁ ||

None of the early Sanskrit, theorists explain the nature of sāhitya, the unique relation of sabda and artha in poetry. Nāgavarma explains for the first time that it is tatparatā or exclusive aesthetic concern. Regarding the nature of sabda, again unique to poetry, none of the early Sanskrit theorists tell us anything important, including Rudrata who is the model for Nāgavarma. They just mention that it should be meaningful, and without defects besides possessing excellences. The principle underlying the avoidance of defects or the inclusion of excellences goes unexplained. But Nāgavarma rightly points out that aucitya or propriety is the underlying principle of all literary usage of words. He regards

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artha again in aesthetic terms by characterising it as āhlādakāri in so many words. His addition that artha is avabhāsarāpa hints at his new philosophy of poetry comparable with the theory of vaiyākaranas that pratibhā is vākyārtha. (The word 'arthāntara' in the verse cited above does not mean 'another meaning'; it means 'one single meaning' like the word 'śabdāntara' used in his definition of śabdasleṣa). There is absolutely no trace of Nāgavarma's familiarity with Navya ālankārikas. Hence his ideas become doubly important. He does not refer to dhvani.

Another outstanding contribution of Nāgavarma to Indian poetics is his characterisation of $r\bar{t}ti$ as the śarira or body of poetry and rasa as the Jiva or its life-breath. He adds significantly that though there may be no $\bar{a}lank\bar{a}ras$, so highly praised by the learned, the infusion of $r\bar{t}tis$ and profusion of rasas will make a composition very enjoyable:

Rīti vinūtavastuk_ttigoppuva mai rasabhāvav_ttti-ni— Rnītivye jīvamantadarinanyitanappa kavīsvaram budha | Vrātamoraldu biccaļisi naccuvalamkriti kūḍadirdodam Rītiyoļonde peļvudu rasam biḍe bandhurakāvyabandhamam ||

This is indeed a new synthesis brought about for the first time between $r\bar{i}ti$ and rasa even in the absence of a knowledge of *dhvani*.

IV. We might now turn to Jaina writers on Sanskrit poetics. These have been discussed in detail by modern scholars and do not therefore need any introduction. The first place among these is reserved for Hemachandra, whose Kāvyānusāsana with his own commentary is noteworthy for more reasons than one. Though modelled after the Kāvyāprakasana, his brilliant text-book covers all the topics of poetics thoroughgoingly. This is the first book to include dramatic theory in its purview and sets and example to later writers like Visvanātha and Vidyānātha. Hemachandra has also often quoted in extenso from old works which are now lost, like Bhattatauta's Kāvyakautuka and Lollata's commentary on Nātyasāstra. Sometimes he gives reference to sources not available to us elsewhere. For example, the verse Lavanyadravinavyayo.... is cited by Anandavardhana as a most likely composition of Dharmakirti. Even Abhinavagupta does not explain in his Locana regarding the exact work of Dharmakirti in question. But Hemairi its

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chandra tells us that it is from the concluding portion of vinis cayavitti by Dharmakirti:—

Tathā cāyam viniscayavṛttyante Dharmakīrtyācāryasya sloka iti prasiddhiḥ |

(VI. under Anyokti).

In his treatment of alankāras as well as dhvani, he often cites new examples not found in Mammața and Ānandavardhana.

The next Jaina writer deserving our notice is Vāgbhata I. (12th century A.D.). He follows in the main the older tradition of poetics, and brings about a synthesis like Nāgavarma between all the well known concepts viz., guṇa, alaṅkāra, rīti and rasa. His whole book is written in verse like the Kāvyaḍarsa and often the first line of his śloka forms the definition and the second line, its illustration. It was so famous as a convenient text-book that Mallinātha in his commentary over Raghuvaṁsa etc., has often referred to him. One speciality of the book is, however, the lengthy treatment of kavisikṣā.

Vāgbhata II hailing from Mewar (also 12th century A.D.) has also called his work by the name Kāvyanusāsana. But this work is a very short one when compared with Hemachandra's. It deals at length with kavisamayas and kavisikṣā exercises. One most interesting feature of the book is his illustrations for Kāvyadoṣas which are taken from popular Mahākavis. e.g. "dilīpa iti rājenduv induh kṣīranidhāv iva" (Raghuvamsa) illustrates the defect punarukta "mātsaryamutsārya vicārya kāryam..." (Bhartṛhari) illustrates sandigdha. He is aware of Ānandavardhana and refers to him for details about dhvani; yet he brings under paryāyokta all the varieties of vastudhvani. He even gives examples, not found in any other work, on dhvani. Its brevity is its chief merit.

The Kāvyakalpalatāvṛtti by Arisimha (14th century A.D.) is a work out-and-out on kavisikṣā, dealing with Sanskrit poetic composition as a mechanical craft which could be taught. Its four chapters are devoted to the topics of Chandassiddhi, sabadasiddhi, slesaṣiddhi and arthasiddhi. We get interesting details here of the tuition offered: e.g., (1) practice of Indravajrā metrewith one syllable-

Kākā kakakā kakakā kakākā Kiki kikiki kikiki kikiki | Kūkū kukūkū kukukū kukūkū

Kamkam kakamkam kakakam kakamkam // (I. 2)

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(2) a specimen of samasyāpurāṇa:—

Kastūri jāyate kasmāt

Ko hanti kariṇāṁ kulaṁ |

Kiṁ kuryāt kātaro yuddhe

Mrgāt siṁhaḥ palāyate | |

The Alankāra-mahodadhi of Maladhāri Narendraprabha, produced in the court of Vastupāla, is a comprehensive text-book on all aspects of Sanskrit poetics with copious standard illustrations. He sometimes adds to the varieties of well known concepts. For example, he gives for the first time the following new sub-varieties of vṛttyanuprāsa:—Karṇāṭī, Kauntalī, Kaungi, Kaunkaṇī, Vānavāsikā, Trāvaṇī, Māthurī, Mātsi and Māgadhī.

The Nāṭyadarpaṇa by Ramachandra and Guṇachandra is a standard work on dramaturgy. It gives a novel view of rasa that it is sukha-duḥkhātmaka and controverts the usual thesis that all rasa including karuṇa is ānandātmaka.

The Alankāracintāmaņi by Ajitasena is a late work from an author hailing from South Kanara district of the present Mysore State. It is influenced very much by the Pratāparudrīya of Vidyānātha. Like the Prataparudrīya, all its examples are in praise of Bharata cakravartī. It abounds in details relating to citra-kāvya varieties.

For further Jaina writers on Sanskrit poetics, I should refer the interested scholars to a very informative article in Hindi by Pandit Amrutlal Shastri on Jaina Alankara Sahitya published in the Acharya Bhikshu Smriti Grantha, Jaina Shvetambara Terapanthi Mahasabha, Calcutta, 1961, Vol. pp. 199 ff.

V. It will be seen even from the above brief survey how the Jaina contribution to Indian poetics is substantial, qualitatively as well as quantitatively. They have not merely given compilations of earlier material. They have added their own thoughts also. It is mainly in this field that the Jaina contribution has succeeded in transcending the narrow boundaries of religion and becoming the common property of Indians at large.

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TREATMENT OF DHYĀNA IN THE TATTVĀRTHĀ DHIGAMASŪTRA OF UMĀSVĀTI

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Samyara and nirjarā tattvas are expounded in the T.S. (Tattvarthadhigamasūtra) in its 9th chapter. Dhyana is herein classified as one of the tapas which enables ascetics to achieve both samvara and nirjara, of which the former is said to be effected also by the practice of gupti, samiti, dharma, anupreksā, parisahajaya and caritra. Tapas is classified into two kinds, i.e., internal and external, which are each subdivided into six types, wherein dhyana belongs to the last subdivision of the internal tapas. The classification of tapas as such has been already found in the texts such as Uttarādhyayana 30 and Bhagavati 25.8.801. In the same canonical sources, fourfold dhyanas are mentioned in the Samavāya 4.12, Uttarādhyayana 30.35 and Āvasyaka 4. And their subclassification into four kinds each is recorded in the Bhagavati 25.8.802, Sthāna 4.1.308 and Aupapātika 19, of which the contents of the first two texts are identical, and the third identical with a slight difference in expression. These texts discuss lakṣaṇa as to the subdivisions of ārta and raudra, and lakṣaṇa, ālambana and anupreksā as to the subdivisions of dharma and sukla dhyanas, which are neglected in the exposition of dhyana in the T.S. The nature of the compilation of the Sthana allows later interpolation, therefore, the chronological data of the content of dhyana therein is not certain. Aupapatika is generally accepted as a later composition, and Bhagavati sataka 25 is also considered as a later accretion.1 Thus the formulation of the classification of dhyana with their complete subdivisions seems to have been made not in the early stage of Agamic age.

T.S. adds in contribution two new features to the Agamic treatment of dhyāna, namely, the definition of dhyāna and its treatment in relation with guṇasthāna. These two points which are generally referred to in the literature of dhyāna and yoga in the post-Umāsvāti period have never been brought into attention in the pre-Umāsvāti period. The oldest record of Jaina literature

like Acaranga 1.9.4.14-15 gives the account of dhyana in such a manner, 'avi jhāi se mahāvire, asanatthe akukkue jhānam/uddham ahe tiriyam ca pehamāne samāhim²apadinne//akasāi vigaya gehi ya sadda-rūvesu amucchie jhāi/ chaumatthovi parakkamamano, na pamāyam saimpi kuvvitthā//'. The role of dhyāna is weighty in the Jaina praxis, because videha-mukti is impossible to be accomplished without it, however it never gained an independent position in the Jaina ethical conduct in the canonical stage, being subordinated to tapas. This is precisely because of the ontological ground of Jainism consisting of the two principles of the soul and the matter, wherein the disintegration of them aimed at for moksa is assumed to be achieved mainly by the rigorous practice of tapas, of which the last two subdivisions of sukla dhyana are a part, and for which the dharma and the first two subdivisions of sukla dhyana the auxiliary position of dhyana in the are mere aids. Thus ethical practice of Jainism differs greatly from its position held in Buddhism wherein the original teaching of Buddha of duhkha-ksaya was formulated on the ground of the way of meditation praxis. The dependent position of dhyana to tapas in the Agama is likewise accepted by Umāsvāti. However he spares nearly 1/3 of the total aphorisms in this chapter to the exposition of dhyana, which clearly indicates its important place as so evaluated by him in the context of samvara and nirjara. Heavy weight assessed on dhyana therein was probably derived by having observed its innegligible position placed in the texts of non-Jaina schools such as Buddhist and Yoga sects, and the prevalent yoga practice in most of the religious schools for the sake of final release, against which he wanted to display and from which he wanted to distinguish the Jaina concept of dhyana. Also the concept of dhyana had been gradually on the way of making in the later Agamic stage as we have noted in the texts such as Bhagavati. Thus both internal as well as external factors must have incited Umāsvāti to give greater assessment to the elucidation of dhyana. It is however only in the post-Umasvāti period that dhyāna established its independent position in the Jaina literature as we see in the works of Pūjyapāda and Jinabhadra, which soon developed into the branch of yoga scheme in Jainism, of which literature is represented by Haribhadra, Subhacandra, Hemacandra, Yasovijaya and so on. In this stream of the development of Jaina concept of dhyana into the scheme of i

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Jaina yoga, treatment of dhyāna made by Umāsvāti that seems to have prepared the ground to promote its later development, although initiation for it had been already there in the *Bhagavatī* and the other texts, requires a critical evaluation, which is attempted in this inquiry. And the inquiry is going to be made on two points, namely, the definition of dhyāna and the treatment of dhyāna in relation with guṇasthāna.

Dhyana is defined in IX: 27, 'uttama-samhananasyaikagracinta-nirodho dhyanam', of which duration is stated in the succeeding sūtra 28, 'ā muhūrtāt'. These two aphorisms are combined into one in the text of Pūjyapāda, 'uttama-samhananasyaikāgra-cintā-nirodho dhyānam ā antarmuhūrtāt (27)'. Definition of dhyana is thus enunciated together with its authorized dhyātā and duration. The source of the duration of dhyāna which differs slightly between the two versions is difficult to trace in the canonical codes, about which we do not dwell in for further query. Bhāṣya understands 'uttamasamhanana' as the first two divisions of joints, i.e., vajra-ṛṣabhanārāca and ardha-vajra-nārāca, which is extended to the third division of joints called nārāca in the Sarvārthasiddhi, thus both traditions hold slightly different views on this point. Dhyana is defined as 'ekagra-cinta-nirodhah', which is elucidated as denoting two separate contents in the Bháṣya, 'ekāgra-cintā-nirodhasca', but as denoting one content by all the other commentaries on the T.S. in both traditions.3

Uttarādhyayana 29.25 reads, 'egagga-maṇa-saṁnivesaṇayāe ṇaṃ bhaṁte! jīve kiṁ jaṇayai? egagga-maṇa-saṁnivesaṇayāe ṇaṃ citta-nirohaṃ karei'. Its 29.56 further reads, 'maṇa-samāhāraṇayāe ṇaṃ bhaṁte! jīve kiṁ jaṇayai? maṇa-samāhāraṇayāe ṇaṁ jīve egaggaṁ jaṇayai/ egaggaṁ jaṇaittā nāṇa-pajjave jaṇayai/ nāṇa-pajjave jaṇaitta sammattaṃ visohei, michattaṁ ca nijjarei//'29.25 does not pronounce it in relation with dhyāna, and the controlling of mind in 29.56 is stated together with vocal and physical control in 29.57–58 pertaining to the attainment of jñana, darśana and cāritra. However, it is sufficiently clear to see that Umāsvāti caught hold of these Uttarādhyayana passages to formulate the definition of dhyāna after the model of Pātañjala sūtra I.2, 'yogaścitta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ'. He replaced the word manas and citta in the Uttarādhyayana passages

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into cintā to make it fit in the context in question, about which we shall discuss later. And it is lucid here to see that 'ekāgracintā-nirodhaḥ' denotes two different contents, 'egagga-maṇasamnivesaṇam' and 'citta-niroham' by replacing manas and citta by cintā.

Umāsvāti received the Agamic classification of dhyāna, to which he gave the definition of 'ekagra-cinta-nirodhah'. Agama classifies dhyana into four major divisions, i.e., arta, raudra, dharma and sukla, of which history of evolution is difficult to trace, though we may naturally assume that their evolution precedes the formulation of samhanana-nāma-karma with its sixfold subdivisions in karma-prakṛti. T.S. IX:30 (29) distinguishes the last two dhyanas as the cause of moksa, of which the closest sense finds its expression in the Uttaradhyayana 30.35, 'attaruddāni vajjittā, jhāejjā susamāhie / dhamma-sukkāim jhānāim, jhāṇam tam tu buhā vae / / 'Ārta dhyāna is subdivided into four kinds by the object of meditation, i.e., (1) amanojñānām samprayoge tad-viprayogāya smrti-samanvāhārah, (2) (3) viparitam manojñānām, and (4) nidānam. These contents are expressed in terms of brooding over the sense objects of parigraha and abrahmacarya, while four subdivisions of raudra dhyāna pertain to brooding over the first four avratas, i.e., (1) himsa, (2) anrta, (3) steya and (4) visaya-samraksana. It is therefore evident that arta and raudra dhyanas signify absorption in thinking on avratas or the objects of avratas, which only promote the cause of samsāra. No doubt, 'ekāgra-cintā' applies to these dhyānas as their definition, but not 'cintā-nirodha' because it shall direct the meditators of these dhyanas towards moksa, which contradicts the concept of arta and raudra dhyanas. Two contents of dhyana here meet sharp contradiction. Neither the definition of the authorized meditators as possessed of 'uttama-samhanana' alone does not fit to them at all. The said definition is appropriate to the performers of dharma and sukla dhyanas, and the possessor of any types of joints can surely meditate on the objects of arta and raudra dhyanas.

Dharma dhyāna is subdivided into four kinds by the object of concentration, i.e., (1) ājñā, (2) apāya, (3) vipāka and (4) samsthāna-vicayas. The definition of 'ekāgra-cintā' passes here certainly without any obstacles, but 'cintā-nirodha' again fails.

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The purpose of dharma-dhyāna lies in developing the performer's discriminative knowledge of samsāra and mokṣa by meditating on these objects of dhyāna in order to prepare and condition his mental world thoroughly fit for the achievement of mokṣa. As such 'cintā-nirodha' of these contents of dhyāna makes no sense but it only discourages the proposed aim. On the contrary, cintā on these objects should be encouraged and envigoured to fulfil its purpose. If the definition were stated as 'citta-vṛtti-nirodha' in the sense of suppressing all the other fickle thought activities hampering cintā as such, it may make sense here, but this meaning is already covered by the definition of 'ekāgra-cintā'.

The first two subdivisions of sukla-dhyana, i.e., pṛthaktvavitarka and ekatva-vitarka, indicate the stages of citta-vṛtti arranged in the progressive order towards the advancement of mental concentration, wherein the performer is expected to achieve mental collection on the minutest possible entity like the atom while suppressing all the other frivolous thought activities. The first kind is savitarka and savicāra, and the second savitarka and avicāra. Here again the definition of dhyana as 'ekagra-cinta' passes in both cases, but 'cinta-nirodha' fails in the case of the latter as the cinta as such should be strengthened. In the case of prthaktva-vitarka, wavering cittā-vṛtti should be suppressed, and cintā should not be suppressed but should be kept in the state of ekagrata, only in this sense 'cinta-nirodha' can be accepted. These two stages of dhyāna are also found in the beginning stages of samprajñāta samādhi in the Yogasāstra I.175 as well as in the beginning stages of the first dhyana in the Buddhist works such as Abhidharmakosa.6 The twofold definitions of dhyana totally lose their relevancy in the case of the last two subdivisions of sukla-dhyāna, i.e., Sūksmakriyā and vyuparata-kriyā, wherein there is absolute lack of mental activities. These two dhyanas are performed solely for the sake of karmic destruction by the cessation of kaya-yoga in order to attain videha-mukti.

The above definition of dhyāna made by Umāsvāti evinces that 'ekārga-cintā' holds good for all types of dhyāna excluding the last two stages of śukla, but 'cintā-nirodha' fails in all cases. 'Cintā-nirodha' can be taken in two senses, firstly in the sense of suppressing all the fickle mental activities other than the main stream of cintā, and secondly complete suppression of cintā itself.

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The first sense is meaningless to add as it is implied in 'ekārgacintà ' and adding the second sense is suicidal as it destroys the definition of 'ekāgra-cintā' itself. Therefore, 'cintā-nirodha' which is useless and harmful in the context should have been removed from the definition of dhyana. 'Uttama-samhananasva' does not apply to the meditators of arta and raudra dhyanas. Thus he utterly failed in giving a correct definition to the Jaina concept of dhyana. Failure in this task was obviously brought about by his imperfect analysis of the Agamic content of dhyana. to which the definition of yoga of Pātanjala sūtra was introduced irrespectively without giving much thought to the basic difference of the speculative thought-pattern of the two systems. inappropriate definition of dhyana had to meet therefore correction later by the authors of the works of dhyana and yoga, for instance, by Hemacandra, who upon removing arta and raudra from the category of dhyana, defines it separately for chadmastha-yogis and ayoga-kevalis in his Yogasāstra 115, 'muhūrtāntar-manaḥsthairyam dhyanam chadmastha-yoginam / dharmyam śuklam ca tad-dvedhā yoga-rochastv-ayoginām / / . As logically expected, 'cinta-nirodha' and 'uttama-samhananasya' disappear from the definition of dhyana in most of the post-Umasvati literature of dhyāna and voga.7

The doctrines of Yoga and Buddhist schools are built much upon the psychology of mind and its activities that cause duhkha in samsara, of which extinction is postulated to be achieved by cultivating the discriminative knowledge of the cause of duhkha and by suppressing the wavering mental activities. Both Yoga and Buddhist psychologists therefore scrutinize what are the contents of citta-vṛtti and how this citta-vṛtti comes into being. Yoga school considers that karmas or actions leave their samskaras upon manas or citta, the psychical organ, by which various vṛttis or activities are produced therein in the forms of pramana, viparyaya, vikalpa, nidrā and smṛti. Buddhist philosophers like Yogācāras in particular replace the function of ātmā virtually by that of mind, upon which they constructed the huge edifice of their doctrine. Such psychological thought-pattern is totally lacking in the realistic philosophy of Jainism. According to the Jainas, citta-vṛtti means no other than the soul's parinama brought about by the karma matters, and the contents of mental impressions discussed by the

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non-Jaina schools are expressed in terms of the efficacies of the respective karmas.

The Jainas conceive that the mind which is called anindriya is of two kinds, i.e., bhāva and dravya. Bhāva-manas is a spiritual capacity, hence it assumes the function of the reflecting organ. However, really speaking, the soul which is endowed with upayoga consisting of jñāna and darśana of both samyag and bhanga types is the authority in performing the reflective function as well as the function of judgment and will. Dravya-manas which is made of material mano-varganās is the mediating organ which assumes the forms of sense data received by the external senses. Therefore mind conceived by the Jainas is meant as the mediating tool in controlling the external sense data as so presumed by the Nyāya-Vaiseşikas rather than as the faculty of thinking as so postulated by the Samkhya system. In that case, the polemical question concerning how many sense perceptions occur at the same time which is frequently raised by the non-Jaina schools in relation with the function, size and location of mind, is expected to be posited, but this problem seems to have never been posed in the treatises of Jaina theory of knowledge. This appears to be due to the obscure concept of the said function, as well as the size and seat of mind in Jainism, the latter of which is maintained in the Svetāmbara tradition as all pervading in the body, but in the Digambara tradition as located at heart8, and still more views on it are implied in the passage of a Svetambara text, 'sva-kāya-hrdayā' 'diso hi manasah sva-deśa eva '9.

It is difficult to see what is the exact function of bhāva-manas, even though it is generally considered as presiding the spiritual function such as thinking, because cognitive, emotive and all other activities of psychological contents are performed by the soul itself activated by the respective efficacies of karma matters. Cittavṛtti in Jainism is therefore primarily meant as the pariṇāma of dravya-manas that assumes the external sense data, which excludes all the mental activities performed by the soul. In this context, the definition of dhyāna as 'citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ' does not make sense, therefore Umāsvāti replaced the word citta-vṛtti by the word cintā so that it may fit the Jaina concept of dhyāna in question.

Umāsvāti arranges the performers of fourfold dhyānas in the proper stages of guṇasthānas. *Uttarādhyayana* 29.71–72 read, '...kevala-nāṇa-damsaṇam samuppāḍei / jāva sayogi bhavai//71 // aha āuyam pālaittā amtomuhuttadhāvasesāe joganiroham karemāṇe suhumakiriyam appaḍivāim sukkajjhāṇam jhāyamāne tap-padhamayāe maṇa-jogam nirumbhai, vai-jogam nirumbhai, kāya-jogam nirumbhai, ānapāṇa-niroham karei / isi-pamca-rahassakkhar-uccāraṇaddhāe ya ṇam anagāre samucchinnakiriyam aniyaṭṭi-sukkhajjhānam jhiyayamāṇe veyaṇijjam āuyam nāmam gottam ca ee cattāri kammase jugavam khavei//72//. Sūkṣma-kriyā and samucchinna-kriyā which are conducted for the purpose of yoga-nirodha had been already incorporated with the kevalīs in the last two stages of guṇasthānas before the time of Umāsvāti.

14 Gunasthanas indicate the theoretical gradation of the spiritual advancement of aspirants, which are provided in the order of gradual ascendance in accordance with the disappearance of the causes of karmic bondage. As such these stages facilitate us to see in which stages which karmas are in the state of satta, udaya and so on, upon which the complex fabric of karma doctrine was constructed together with 14 marganastha anas and 14 jivasthanas. The concept of gunasthana must have evolved in the context of karma doctrine, of which list was in the process of making in the Agamic period. Its complete list of 14 as it stands now is said to be available for the first time in the Satkhandagama. Full list enumerated in the Samavāya 14.48 seems to be the later accretion, and the Prajñapana knows not more than 12 excluding the 2nd stage of sāsvādana and 8th stage of apūrva-karaņa10. Umāsvāti reckons gunasthanas in relation with the topics of parisaha-jaya, dhyana and nirjara of karmas (IX: 47), of which enumeration suggests that he knows not more than the 12 list of prajnapana.

Non-Jaina schools have the provision of the stages of dhyāna or samādhi, for instance, Yogasāstra provides four samprajñāta samādhis and asamprajñāta samādhi, and Abhidharmakośa upapatti and samāpatti of which steps and stages are therein elaborately worked out¹¹. Āgamic classification and subclassification of dhyāna are made by the object of concentration excluding the case of śukla dhyāna. Possibly for this reason, necessity was

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felt to arrange them according to the stages of the progress of meditation as so done in the non-Jaina schools. And guṇasthāna which was on the way of formulation was seized for this purpose. As we have already noted, *Uttarādhyayana* 29.72 already interrelated the last two divisions of sukla dhyāna with the last two stages of guṇasthāna. This must have been done so due to the specific nature and function of these dhyānas which are primarily fit to the concept of guṇasthāna, but not due to the conscious attempt to arrange the meditators of these dhyānas in their specific guṇasthānas. Umāsvāti performed this task of assigning the meditators of fourfold dhyānas to the proper guṇasthānas by drawing the existent materials in the Āgama as we see below.

We have earlier mentioned that Bhagavati, Sthana Aupapātika refer to the lakṣaṇa of the subclassifications of dhyāna which is dropped from the treatment of dhyana in the T.S. Lakṣaṇas of the subdivisions of dhyana are therein described in due order as follows: (1) ārta; kamdanayā, soyanayā, tippanayā, paridevaņayā, (2) raudra; osanna-dose, bahula-d., annāṇa-d., āmaraṇamta-d., (3) dharma; āṇā-rui, nisagga-r., sutta-r., ogāḍha-r., and (4) śukla; avvahe, asammohe, vivege, viussage. Prajñápaná 1.74 classifies sarāga-damsanāryā into ten types, i.e., abhigama-r., nisagga-rui, uvaesa-r., ānā-r., sutta-r., biya-r., vitthara-r., kiriya-r., samkheva-r., and dhamma-r. Here the first three lakṣaṇas of dharma dhyāna mentioned in the texts of Bhagavati etc. find their corresponding types of saraga-darśanaārya. The 4th lakṣaṇa called avagāha-ruci meaning inclination towards deep study of scriptures may correspond with the type of ārya designated as abhigama-ruci above.

Prajīāpanā 1.75 further classifies viyarāya-damsaṇāryā into, two, i.e., uvasamta-kasāya and khiṇa-kasāya, of which the latter is further divided into two, i.e., chaumattha-khiṇakasāya and kevali-khiṇakasāya. Therein chaumattha-khiṇakasāya is again of two types, i.e., sayam-buddha and buddha-bohiya; and kevali-khiṇakasāya is also of two types, i.e., sayogi-kevali and ayogi-kevali. The four lakṣaṇas of śukla dhyāna enumerated in the texts such as Bhagavati do not find here the corresponding four types of vitarāga-darśana-ārya as so expressed, yet these lakṣanas are self-evident that they belong to the class of vitarāga-darśana-

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ārvas, but to no others. Prajnāpana 1.76 continues to say that sarāga-cāritra-āryas are of two types i.e., sūksma-samparāya and bādara-samparāya who belong to the 10th and 9th gunasthāna in the list of 14 stages. Summing up all these accounts, the performers of dharma dhyana according to these Agamic texts fall in the 9th and 10th stages, and those of sukla dhyana in the 11th stage onwards.

Compass of the stages of dharma dhyana above does not exactly agree with that given by Umāsvāti who must have used some other materials which escaped our sight and which are no more available to us. The source materials used for allotting the stages of arta and raudra dhyanas are difficult to trace, but these are logically assignable with the basic knowledge of avratas and gunasthānas. Systematizing the Agamic literature on this subject, Umāsvāti assigns the meditators of raudra dhyāna to the lst through 5th stages, of arta to the 1st through 6th stages, of dharma to the 7th through 12th stages, and of sukla to the 11th through 14th stages of which the performers of the first two divisions to the 11th and 12th stages, of the 3rd division to the 13th stage, and of the 4th division to the 14th stage. The 11th and 12th gunasthanas are thus shared by the meditators of dharma dhyana and the first two divisions of sukla dhyana who are necessarily the purvavids. (Umāsvāti does not know the full list of 14 stages, neither he calls them in terms of the numerical series, therefore the corresponding stages of meditators made here is for the sake of convenience and clarification.)

The text of Pūjyapāda drops the portion of dhyāna from the sūtra 37 together with the succeeding sūtra 38 in the Svetāmbara recension. Consequently no statement is made in the Digambard text as to the authorized performers of dharmya dhyana, of which explanation must be supplied by the commentaries. Sarvārthasiddhi on the aphorisms (36-37) explains that the meditators of dharmys dhyana belong to the 4th through the 7th stages prior to the ascendance of srenis. Here arises the discordance between the two recensions of the text, which however does not mean the doctrinal divergence between the two traditions, because Dhavall 13/5.4.26/14/10 is in perfect agreement with the view held by the Svetāmbara tradition¹². Pūjyapāda, who is thoroughly familial with the 14 gunasthanas and the concept of karanas involved with

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two srenis which Umāsvāti must not be fully acquainted with, insists that dharmya dhyana cannot be performed beyond the ascendance of érenis. However it is not at all clear what is the exact reason underlying this rule of prohibition, because commenting the sūtra (37) he permits the performance of dharmya dhyāna to the possessors of purva knowledge in the 11th and 12th stages. "ca' sabdena dharmyam-api samucciyate / tatra "vyākhyānato viśesa-pratipattih" iti śreny-ārohanāt-prāg-dharmyam, śrenyoh sukle iti vyākhyāyate'. His statement is confused and contradicted. His position is defended by Akalanka under the sūtra (36), 'kaścid-āha-upaśānta-kṣinamoha-kaṣāyayoś-ca dharmyam dhyānam bhavati na pūrveṣām-eveti; tan-na; kim kāraṇam? śuklābhāva-prasangāt /14 / syād-etat—ubhayam dharmyam śuklam copaśānta-ksinakasāyayor-astīti? tan-na; kim pūrvasyānistatvāt / pūrvam hi dharmyam dhyānam śrenyornesyate ārṣe, pūrveṣu ceṣyate / 15 / (36)'. Defence is made in miserably poor manner. This obviously indicates that Akalanka was also unable to find the logical reason for the creation of the border line of sren is beyond which is assigned as the territory of sukla dhyanas.

Umāsvāti utilized the existing Agamic materials and systematically arranged the respective dhyātās in the corresponding gunasthanas after the model of the treatment of dhyana in the non-Jaina circles. His table certainly can impart a general idea as to which type of dhyana falls in approximately which collective stages of gunasthana. However his attempt of interlinking the two separate categories of concept, i.e., divisions of dhyana and stages of gunasthana, does not change the original structure of dhyana which is mostly arranged by the object of meditation, of which improvement by gradation through orderly stages must be worked out by the reclassification of dhyana itself. Haribhadra approached this problem from the entirely different angle and established his own scheme of the stages of dhyātās under the influence of non-Jaina yoga by disregarding the Agamic classification of dhyāna. Some authors met this problem by introducing the four steps of pada, pinda, rūpa and arūpa to dharmya dhyāna under the influence of Saiva yoga¹³. Thus the treatment of the stages of dhyana met a new approach and improvement in the post-Umāsvāti period.

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It is difficult to say if his over-emphatic treatment of the topic of dhyāna in the context of saṃvara and nirjarā reflects the real position of dhyāna practised in the totality of the then daily conduct of ascetics. As we have observed in the texts such as Bhagavatī, dhyāna had already received a semi-systematic treatment in relation with lakṣana, ālambana and anuprekṣā in the later Āgamic stage, which may reflect the actual condition of the current practice of dhyāna among Jaina monks. Weighty exposition of dhyāna in the T.S. no doubt must have given an impetus for its further development, which resulted in the production of many independent literature on dhyāna and yoga, and it certainly must have influenced the methods of the aspirants' actual yoga praxis and vice versa. His treatment of dhyāna as a wbole, even though it contains fatal defect, should be therefore counted to be highly meritorious in this historical context.

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Suzuko Ohira

NOTES

- 1. K. K. Dixit: "A recent study of Bhagavatīsūtra reviewed". In Sambodhi, Vol. 1, No. 3, Oct. 1972, p. 59 ff.
- 2. The word samādhi is also used in the different sense in the canonical texts such as Daśavaikalika 9.4 and Sthāna 10.942.
- 3. This point has been early brought into attention by Pt. Malvania See Pt. Sukhalalji's commentary on Tattvārtha sūtra of Vācaka Umāsvāli, Engl. ed., p. 345, footnote 1.
- 4. Uttarādhyayana 29.57-58, '....vaya-samāhāraņayāe ņam jīva vaya-sāhāraņa-damsaņa-pajjave visohei.../ 57 //....

kāya-samāhāraṇayāe ṇam jīve caritta-pajjave visohei / caritta-pajjave visohittā ahakkhāya-carittam visohei.. // 58 // '

- 5. Yogaśāstra I.17, 'vitarka-vicāranānandā smitānugamāt sanir prajūātah'.
- 6. See footnote 11.

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TREATMENT OF DHYANA

Jinabhadra: Dhyūnaśataka 2-3. jam thiram-ajjhavasāņam tam jhāņam jam calam tayam cittam / tam hojja bhavana va anupeha va ahava cinta // 2 // anto-muhuttam-ettam cittavatthanam-ega-vatthummi / chaumatthanam jhanam joga-niroho jinanam tu // 3 //


Pūjyapāda: Samādhiśataka 17. evam tyaktavā bahirvācam tyajed antar asesatah / esa yogah samasena pradipah paramatmanah //

Haribhadra: Yogasataka 2. nicchayao iha jogo sannanaina tinha sambandho / mokkhena joyanao niddittho joginahehim //

Subhacandra: Jñonornava 17. citte tava viveka-śrīr-yady-aśanka sthiri-bhavet / kirtyate te tadā dhyāna-lakṣaṇam svānta-śuddham //

Āśādhara: Anāgāradharmāmrta 1.114.117. istānistārtha-mohādi-cchedāc-cetah sthiram tatah / dhyanam ratna-trayam tasman-moksas-tatah sukham //

- 8. Gommatasāra jīvakānda 443.
- 9. Abhidhāna Rūjendra kośa, Vol. 6, p. 81 on Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣyasabrhadvrtti 240.
 - K. K. Dixit: Jaina ontology, p. 15. 10.
- P. Pradhan attaches the following table of dhyana summarized from Ch. VIII of the Abhidharmakośa. Abhidharmakośa-bhāsya of Vasubandhu, K. K. Jayaswal Research Institute, Poona, 1967.



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12. Dhavalā 13/5.4.26/15/10. asamjadasammādiṭṭhi-samjadāsamijada-pamattasamjada-apuvvasamjada-apiyaṭṭisamjada-suhumasāmparāiya-khavagovasāmaesu dhammajjhāṇassa pavutti hodi tti jiṇāvasādo /

(Jainendra Siddhanta kośa Vol. 2, p. 481)

13. Dr. Upadhye considers that these sthas were imported from the Saiva practice of yoga, and brings our attention to Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka* X.241 etc. which refer to them.

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ANEKANTAVADA AS SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF SOME WESTERN VIEWS

Altruism of Jaina philosophy emerges directly out of the Jainas' ethics of ahimsā 'non-violence'. Man as man must protect and respect the life of all kinds of living creatures. Mallisen, while endorsing the views of the Sāmkhvas in support of 'ahimsa', rejects the weak plea of the Mimamsakas and the Vedists that himsā 'violence' though ordinarily a sin. is not so when prescribed by the Vedas. This strong advocacy for the practice of non-violence is not confined to physical life; rather it extends to the intellectual outlook of the Jainas. This is one of the main reasons why the Jainas entertain all kinds of views held by other systems of philosophy; for they believe that if the other systems of philosophy "see things from the point of view of the opponent as well as from their own, there would be perfect harmony all around "2. The implementation of this principle is not very difficult for the Jainas who, being a thoroughgoing empiricist and realist, rely upon sense-data as given to experience, although the latter may vary from person to person even with respect to the same thing. This intrinsic faith in the sensedata is based not on any dogmatism, but on a sound logical ground. Thus as a solution to the manifold conflicting views regarding the nature of reality, the Jainas offer their metaphysics of Anekantavāda. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is firstly to discuss the conflicting claims of the absolutists regarding the nature of being and to point out wherein they err; and secondly to elaborate the tenet of Anekāntavāda in the light of some modern Western views.

II

To begin with, the Jainas' doctrine of Anekāntavāda stands in a sharp contrast to the eternal and absolute views of the Advaita Vedāntins, the Buddhists and even the Vaisesikas. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad³, the changing states and forms are condemned as mere illusions of the senses, mere nāma-rāpa objects of name and, therefore, mere appearances for their true nature cannot rationally be ascertained. But what remains

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stable and permanent in the midst of these changing modes and forms is alone true and real and this we know as substance. The Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad⁴ too supports this and considers the whole creation as the work of $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ contrived by the ultimate reality, Brahman.

As against this, the Buddhists go to the extent of denying the reality of all existent entities. Since all things and beings are found to be momentary, changing and impermanent, what we ordinarily think to be a permanent substance must also remain vitiated. For, according to the Buddhists, there can be no substance devoid of qualities which the Upanisadic seers regard as real. In short, there can be no permanent reality underlying change, rather one change is continually determined by another.

In the like manner, the Vaisesikas err in admitting Sāmānya 'universality' and visesa 'particularity' as distinct realities over and above 'dravya', 'guna', 'karma', etc.—" distinct inter se and distinct from the things in which they are supposed to inhere".5

Ш

Thus the above schools of thought advocate views which conflict with one another. The Jainas, therefore, repudiate the claims of all those who either believe that somethings are eternal and some are evanescent, or that all is evanescent or all is eternal. As a reconciliation between the conflicting claims of the above thinkers, the Jainas introduce their celebrated doctrine of Anekāntavāda 'Relative Pluralism'.

The Jainas find the views of the Vedāntins, the Buddhists or the Vaisesikas as one-sided and partial, for each one of them lays emphasis either on the permanent nature of being or on the changing modes. But the truth of the matter is, as the experience shows, that in everything that changes some qualities remain druva 'permanent' that some new qualities are found to be utpāda 'emerging' and finally there is a vyaya 'loss' of some old. In view of this, everything that we experience is found to possess this triple character. Thus the nature of being sat as Mallisena describes it, is "that which is possessed of origina-

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tion, destruction and permanence.... And that is the acceptance of a single entity variegated by plurality of attributes, namely eternal, non-eternal, etc., that is what it comes to."

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It would be clear then, that triple is the development of all subjects of attributes'. Thus when we take a lump of gold, its development in the shape of a dish or an ornament etc., is a form of its character-development. When the goldsmith, having melted up the gold-dish, makes ornaments out of it, the dish having been deprived of its marks of presentness, 'assumes the mark of pastness; whereas the ornaments, having abandoned the mark of futurity, assume the mark of presentness.' This shows therefore, that modes and substance exist together and neither is possible without the other; for both are primarily two relative aspects of one and the same thing and not absolutely opposed. In view of this character that most ostensibly belongs to a thing, the Jainas, while condemning the unequivocal and absolute standpoints that their opponents adopt with respect to a thing, remark:

"Whosoever, through seeing before his eyes one lasting thing, equipped with momentary origination and destruction, looks down, O Jina! upon Thy precepts, he is madman, O Lord, or demon-possessed." 9

This gives, in a nutshell, the main metaphysical tenet of Anekāntavāda, which the Jainas advocate, regarding the nature of reality. This doctrine, which gives due importance to the variegated nature of reality, later on forms the basis of Jainas' syādvāda and the principle of naya replacing admirably the rigorous and rigid unequivocal views of philosophers by a humanistic and pragmatic darsana' outlook'.

IV

Now, since everything is anantadharmātmakam vastu 'equi pped with infinite attributes', no categorical or unequivocal assertion can be made about it. All affirmations can be true only under certain limitation or reservation. It is only when the forces of Karmas 'actions' that obstruct perfect knowledge have been removed, which is possible only when one has over-

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come rāga 'attachment', dveṣa 'hatred', irṣa 'jealousy', moha 'infatuation' etc. that one can have kevalajñāna 'absolute knowledge'. 10 Since for an ordinary human being this is not possible, he has to satisfy himself only with the knowledge that is conditional and relative. This is why the Jainas are compelled to adopt the principle of naya, according to which the mind is thought to approach reality differently from different points of view. This doctrine of naya refers particularly to the context in relation to which "we define and separate our stand-points by abstraction".11 Thus in a positive sense disease cannot be affirmed of a healthy man, but in a negative sense it can safely be held that 'the healthy man has no disease'. In this connection it may further be held that, it is because of this conditionality and relativity of knowledge that the Jaina thinkers favour the view of asserting the existence, non-existence and unutterable characters of things, as is reflected in their doctrine of Syādvāda or Saptphanginaya having seven-nuance-views12—syāt asti, syāt nāsti, syāt asti ca nāsti ca, syāt avaktyvyam, syāt asti ca avaktavyam ca syāt nāsti ca avaktavyam ca, and syāt asti ca nāsti ca avaktavyam ca. These views of Jainas with seven-nuances reveal the possible shades of affirmations necessitated by the manifold nature of reality and are perfectly in conformity with their "intellectual ahimsā. Just as a right-acting person respects the life of all beings, so a right-thinking person acknowledges the validity of all judgments. This means recognizing all aspects of reality."13

V

In this connection it may be mentioned that this peculiar feature of Jainas' logic of Anekāntavāda has a great similarity to the views of some leading contemporary Western thinkers, who also seem to have been guided by the principle of relative pluralism and empiricism in ascertaining the nature of reality, as the Jainas.

Bertrand Russell, for instance, while discussing the 'Nature of Matter' 14, makes a sharp distinction between physical objects in their private spaces and those that are in public spaces. According to him, in the sphere of epistemology, we are ordinarily concerned with the existence of objects in their private

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spaces and their true nature, as is given to experience, is ascertained in accordance with the different stand-points of the observer, although their intrinsic nature "which is what concerns science must be in real space, not the same as anybody's apparent space". 15 As a matter of fact, an existent entity in the real space, which is primarily public, transcends a percepient's view. What one is ordinarily concerned with is, therefore, a thing in its private space which varies according to the different points of view or nayas as the Jaina might say. Thus Russell remarks:

"A circular coin, for example, though we should always judge it to be circular, will look oval unless we are straight in front of it.... In different people's private spaces the same object seems to have different shapes." 16

The ordinary percipient beings, are concerned only with the sense-data concerning knowledge of physical objects. The relative positions of physical objects 'more or less correspond to the relative positions of sense-data'. However affirmations of percipient beings regarding the nature of objects are bound to vary. And this substantiates the Jainas' view that no unequivocal or absolute assertion can ever be made about a thing.

In a like manner Prof. H. H. Price, while refuting the claims of the Naive Realists¹⁷ that perception makes no difference to what is perceived and that there is a complete unanimity between the sense-data and the object perceived, supports our above contention that perception or conception of things are largely determined by many other conditions with the result that, unless we take account of those conditions, our views regarding their nature are likely to be erroneous. As Prof. Price observes:

"A stone feels heavier when you are tired, and lighter when you are fresh.... the way it appears, the sensuous qualities, it appears to have, depend partially on us, on the state of our bodies and minds—are as it were plastic, and vary with alterations of those states." 18

Similarly the realistic relativistic theory of Prof. A. N. White-head or the idealistic relativistic trend in the systems of W. James and F. C. S. Schiller can further be mentioned in support of Jainas' Anekāntavāda.

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Whitehead develops his epistemological theory in the study of nature, as a thorough-going phenomenologist, in the most scientific manner and takes account of the manifold details like electrons, protons, the spatio-temporal relations, the perceiving mechanism etc. all of which go a long way in determining sense-perceptions. According to his dynamic view of nature, the perceiving mind and the object perceived are not separate and independent of the environmental changes incessantly occurring in nature so that each 'actual entity' is like a cell-fission, a microscopic organism. Knowledge of a thing, therefore, is the net result of a reciprocal interaction between the perceiver and the perceived leading to a variegated view of it. And this dynamic view of reality is not different from the view held by the advocates of Anekāntayāda.

In a like manner, the pragmatic empiricist James observes that in course of perception sensations are, as it were, forced upon us and the minds 'exert an arbitrary choice' in arranging and selecting the sense-data. Our knowledge of reality, therefore, "depends on the perspective into which we throw it. The 'that' of it is its own; but the 'what' depends on the 'which'; and the 'which' depends upon us. Both the sensational and the relational parts of reality are dumb. "20 So the reality can be taken to be an ambiguous stuff and can be conceived in many ways relative to the percipient's purpose, propensity and choice. This initiates a novel method of approach towards objects of knowledge which James calls radical, "because it is contended to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypothesis liable to modification."21. And this reminds us of Jainas' attitude towards things and beings which is subject to change, according to different points of view.

Lastly, we may refer the views of the British pragmatist, Schiller, whose 'Humanism' is an application of James' study of nature. Schiller adopts a similar experimental and biological principle as James', though in a more rigorous manner, to the extent that even mathematical truths, the validity of which cannot ordinarily be questioned, are conditional and tentative, according to him. Thus two plus two, according to him, can be four only under certain conditions, i.e., if and only if the entities

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added together retain their respective characters, but not otherwise. This means that there can be no absolute and necessary truths, as what the Jainas' Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda is committed to.

These and many other such illustrations which we come across in philosophy simply strengthen our faith in the Jainas' Anekāntavāda. What we mean to suggest, therefore, is that the Jaina thinkers were not blind to what the present-day scientific theories of perception and phenomenology advocate regarding the nature of things seen and perceived. It was because of such considerations as these that led the Jainas believe in Anekāntavāda and for that matter in Syādvāda.

VI

Several objections have been raised, especially by the Advaita Vedāntins, Buddhists and Rāmānuja, against the view of Anekāntavāda. They object as to how the nature of reality (sat) can be considered to be inclusive of attributes both existent and non-existent, which obviously are contradictory to each other. According to Rāmānuja, although the alternatives envisaged by the Jainas like "May be, is; May be, is not; May be is, and is not; etc. describe the particular states of things, yet this is not tenable on account of the impossibility in one (entity)—on account of simultaneous existence of contradictory things "23" As a consequence of these objections, there can be no such relation as Samavāya 'inherence' in which variegated attributes are thought to co-exist in a substance.

In reply to such objections, the Jaina thinkers remark that the real is simply composed of infinite attributes and what is not considered so, is also not any existent entity. Thus what is equipped with origination, falling off and permanence is alone existent; for "existence otherwise than so is not easily justified." 24

In this connection it may be mentioned that the Jainas' view of reality comes very close to the views of some Western idealists like Hegal and Bradley, who too do not find any contradiction when qualities of opposed nature co-exist in a thing. For, what they consider as real is an individual or a concrete universal indicative of an identity in the midst of multiplicity. The only diffe-

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rence between the Jainas and the idealist thinkers lies in this that the view of the former are governed by their ontology of realistic plura lism, whereas the views of Hegel or Bradley stem out of their monistic idealistic thought. But so far as the nature of reality is concerned, whether it is one or many, or even ideal or real (in the sense in which the real is an extramentally existing entity), it can never be abstractly simple or devoid of complexity. Although different attributes belong to the reality, yet they are compatible and conjoined. In so far as they are diverse, they may be incompatible and disjoined. As Bradley observes:

"The object possesses this diversity, so far, all together and at once. The qualities thus seem simply joined and are called compatible..... The object has these qualities. It has them now one and now another, according to the conditions." ²⁶

In view of the above considerations, every thing and being must comprehend and reconcile differences within it, though of course, the contrary and contradictory qualities cannot exist in one and the same thing at the same time and in the same part of it. Thus there is no absurdity or incompatibility when attributes that are of opposed nature co-exist simultaneously in a thing in different relations. As Mallisena observes:

"In a single man, through difference of such and such conditions, even mutually contradictory attributes, father-ness, son-ness, maternal-uncle-ness.... etc. are familiar, what is to be said?" 27

Further, since the reality in every respect comprehends differences within it and is a unity of inter-related reals, no categorical or unequivocal assertion can be made of a thing. All affirmations can be true only in the syād asti 'may be it is' sense. Referring to the views of the absolutists like the Advaita Vedāntins or Buddhists, who find contradictions in the doctrine of Anekāntavāda and for that reason in any equivocal assertion, the Jainas remark:

"Not contradictory, when conditioned by differences of conditions,

In things is non-existence, and existence and unutterability.

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Simply from not having awoke to this, afraid of contradiction,

The stupid fall slain by that 'unequivocal' view".28

Thus it would be utterly wrong to hold that the Jainas' Anekāntavāda is subject to contradiction and for that matter their Syādvāda, having seven-nuance-views, stands vitiated. Prof. C. D. Broad, the eminent British philosopher, thinks that there can be no contradiction when 'sensible appearances' of physical objects vary and appear differently under changing conditions or relations. As he says:

"There is no incompatibility between the mere facts that something appears to you to be circular and that something appears to me to be elliptical at the same moment... still there is felt to be some important sense in which a physical object can remain unaltered, whilst some of its appearances change".²⁹ And this also answers the question as to why when some existent, non-existent and unutterable attributes are conceived to be conjoined together in an entity, there seems to be no contradiction at all.

In short, the Jainas' doctrine of Anekāntavāda or Relative Pluralism, arising out of their view of reality, is a commendable step to reconcile the one and the many, the universal and the particular and the Vedāntic Substance and the momentarily evanescent attributes of the Buddhists. In this sense, this doctrine visualizes the 'whole truth', while other systems "possess only the gleams of the broken light". Indeed, this effort, on the part of the Jainas, to create harmony among the conflicting claims of philosophers, by introducing the doctrine of Anekāntavāda, is a natural consequence of their attitude towards life aiming to foster world-brotherhood and the ethics of ahimsā.

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NOTES

Cf 'vedavihitā tu himsā pratyut dharmahetuḥ' etc.
 Syādvādamanjari, stanza 11.,3.
 P. LXXIII A. B. Dhruva, Mallisena's Syādvādmanjarī, Poona, 1933, Intro.,

- 'yathā samyaiken mṛtpindena sarvam mṛnmayam vijnātam syād vācārambhanam vikaro nāmdheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam, Chāndogya, Chap. VI.I.
- Cf 'māyām tu prakṛtim viddhimāyinam tu maheśvaram; tasyāvayavabhūtaistu vyāptam sarvamidam jagat.'

Śvetāśvatara, Chap., IV. 10

- 5. A. B. Dhruva, Mallisena's Syādvādmañjarī etc., Intro., p. LXXXiv.
- 6. Cf 'that, they say, is in one case simply eternal, in another simply non-eternal.'

Thus the chatterings of the foes of Thy precepts. 'Mallisena, Syādvādamañjarī, Trans., F. W. Thomas, Motilal, Delhi (India). Verse 5, P. 22.

- 7. Ibid., p. 22.
- 8. Ibid., p. 24.
- 9. Ibid., Verse XXI, p. 129.
- 10. See Umāsvāmin, Tattavārthādhigamasūtra, Chap. I, Verse 9.12.21.
- 11. Radhakrishnan, Indian Phil., Vol. I, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 298-99.
- 12. Cf Mallisena, Syādvādmañjari, Trans. F. W. Thomas, etc., pp. 145-46.
- 13. G. B. Burch, 'Seven-valued Logic in Jain Phil.', International Phil. Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 1, Feb. 1964, pp. 71-72.
 - 14. See Problems of Philosophy, Oxford Univ. Press., 1959, pp. 27-36.
 - 15. Ibid., p. 29.
 - 16. Ibid.
- 17. See his article, 'Reality and Sensible Appearance', Mind, Vol. 33, 1924, pp. 20-43.
 - 18. Ibid., p. 31.
 - 19. See especially his 'Nature and Life', Cambridge.
 - 20. W. James, Pragmatism, Paperback, Longmans, Green, 1958, p. 161.
- 21. W. James, The Will to Believe and other Essays, New York, Longmans, Green, 1896, p. VII.
 - 22. Cf Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇa-Vārtika, I, 182-85.
- 23. Rāmānuja, Śrībhāṣya (ed.), R. D. Karmarkar, University of Poona, 1962, Vol. I, Part II, Verse 321, p. 687.
 - 24. Mallisena, Syādvādmañjarī, Trans. etc. Verse XXII, p. 132.
- 25. Cf. "The fact, which is given us, is the total complex of qualities and relations which appear to sense," F. H. Bradley, Principles of Logic, Vol. I, Oxford Univ. Press., 1967, p. 94.
 - 26. Ibid., p. 138.
 - 27. Syādvāda Mañjarī, Trans. F. W. Thomas, etc., p. 143.
 - 28. Ibid., Verse XXIV, p. 144.
 - 29. His article 'The External World', Mind, Vol. 30, 1921, p. 386.
- 30. A. B. Dhruva, Mallisena's Syādvādmañjari, Poona, 1933, Intro-

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Intro.,

I will be concerned in the following with a problem regarding the explanation of rational action to which I will refer (somewhat unwillingly) as rational explanation after Dray. The question is: is rational explanation hypothetico-deductive in nature or not?

Briefly, the Dray-Hempel controversy is this: Dray argues that rational explanation proceeds by appeal to principles of action which are not laws; hence the explanations that rest on them are non-deductive. Hempel's answer to this is that in so far as Dray's model is truly non-deductive it is also unsatisfactory as an explanation, since no appeal to a principle of action can explain its being followed by any particular agent. If on the other hand, one adds the premise that agent A was disposed to act rationally and also modify the premise stating the principle of action, presenting it as a generalisation of how in fact rational agents act in a given situation, then the explanation of A's (rational) action is indeed satisfactory but now is clearly deductive in nature. Laws, in other words, are in principle unavoidable.²

To this debate is added a further dimension by Donagan when he claims that rational explanation really rests on analytic truths; it is deductive but not hypothetico-deductive.³

My contention in the following will be that all explanation can indeed be shown to be deductive in nature. This follows from the fact that any explanation which claims something more than just psychological value must depend heavily on logic for its acceptability. Thus it is deductive and also does rely on general principles. But these principles do not have to be covering laws though of course there is nothing to rule out that possibility; principles of inference will suffice to make an explanation logically satisfactory.

Let us look at the alternative formulations of the model for rational explanation.

Dray ... A was in situation of type C.

In a situation of type C, the appropriate thing to do is X.

Hence A did X.

Hempel .. A was in situation of type C.

A was a rational agent.

In a situation of type C, any rational agent will do X.

Hence A did X.

That Dray's major rejection of the H-D model (as adequate for the explanation of rational action) lies in its deductive form, is unambiguously stated by Dray:

"In view of what has been said about non-deducibility of the *explanandun*, it should be clear that my quarrel with this is that it does get the form, not the content, of rational explanations wrong." Hempel on his part sees no way of introducing the notion of rationality into an explanation except by changing Dray's model in two respects which are:

"First, the assumption that A was a rational agent is explicitly added; and secondly, the evaluative or appraising principle of action, which tells us what is the thing to do in situation C, is replaced by a descriptive generalisation telling us how a rational agent will act in situations of that kind: but this restores the covering-law form to the explanation".

Are both these changes strictly necessary in order to turn Dray's model into a satisfactory one? Clearly the assumption that A was a rational agent can bear explicit statement and I doubt that Dray would object to its addition. A modified Dravian model would then be:

- (1) A was in situation of type C.
- (2) A was a rational agent.
- (3) In a situation of type C the appropriate (rational) thing to do is X.

Hence A did X.

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It would, I submit, be difficult to insist that this is still a clearly unsatisfactory explanation of why A did X. Yet, since premise 3 still cites a principle of action, it contains no law; moreover, it is at least not explicitly, deductive in form. It would of course be unacceptable to Hempel who would argue that the second change he suggests is also essential. On what grounds would that be? Clearly the grounds that one may not deductively infer the explanandum "A did X" from the premises, since the major premise refers to a principle of action rather than a lawlike generalisation. That his objection is not to principles of action per se but to their rendering an explanation non-deductive is clear when he says:

"In this disagreeing with Dray's analysis of rational explanation I do not wish to deny that an explanatory account in terms of motivating reasons may well have evaluative overtones: what I maintain is only that whether a critical appraisal is included in, or suggested by a given account, is irrelevant to its explanatory force and that an appraisal alone, by means of what Dray calls a principle of action, does not explain at all why A did in fact do X ".6"

Why not? Because—and we have been here before—from "X is the thing to do" we may of course not infer "X was done".

At this point the disagreement has clearly hit rock bottom. Dray insists on working principles of action for rational explanation. Hempel insists that such explanation be deductive. Can we get out of the impasse? I believe that one can, that Hempel is right in insisting that explanation is deductive but mistaken in holding that only laws or law like generalisations will make it so. For if one takes seriously the view that rationality is itself a relative concept, largely dependent on the agent's own perception of the situation he is in, then one can evolve a model of explanation that is clearly deductive but which does not involve laws. Thus we get the following:—

(1) A believed that in a situation of type C, the thing to do was X.

(2) A believed that he was in a situation of type C.

(3) If A believed that he was in a situation of type C, and that in *this* situation, the thing to do was X, then A did X. Hence A did X.

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Premise 2 is clearly not redundant for in order to explain why A actually did X, one must refer not only to his beliefs connecting situations of type C with action X but also his belief that he was in such a situation. I thus disagree with Hempel when he says that "a critical appraisal....is irrelevant to (an explanation's) explanatory force. "

But now we see that premise 3 is really the unpacking of the statement "A was a rational agent" the inclusion of which Hempel rightly argues for. However, this unpacking itself turns out to be more Dravian then Hempelian.

It is interesting but not absolutely essential for our present purposes to determine whether belief and action and analytically related i.e. whether 3 is a Donagan type premise or not.⁷

The point is that it is not law-like not even in the sense of being dispositional. It simply connects A's action with his perception of the situation he was in and his critical appraisal of it, which together are its sufficient conditions. And it is clearly deductive.

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NOTES

- 1. Cf. Dray, W.: Laws and Explanation in History.
- 2. Hempel, C. G.: "Rational Action", Proceedings and addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 35, 1961-62, p. 5-23.
- 3. Donagan, A. O.: "Rational Explanation rests on Analytic Truths" in Krimmerman, L. ed. The Nature and Scope of Social Science, p. 314-16.
- 4. Dray, W.: "Rational Explanation makes no use of empirical laws", in Krimmerman, L., The Nature and Scope of Social Science, p. 307.
 - 5. Hempel, C. G. op. cit., p. 12-13.
 - 6. Hempel, C. G., op. cit., p. 13. *
- 7. Note that the acceptance of Donagan's interpretation does not render the explanation itself a tautological unravelling of meanings. For even if actions are analytically related to beliefs, the content of A's beliefs remains a matter of empirical discovery. Donagan in any case claims analytic connections between intention and action rather than belief and action.

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MENTAL HEALTH AS A CATEGORY OF MORALITY

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This paper aims at a limited purpose: to emphasise a line of argument to the effect that functional morality in contradistinction to ideal morality considerably depends upon the mental health of the individuals. It is implied that the intellectual knowledge of morality, edifying as a human value or pursuit though it be, does not necessarily lead to commensurate moral actions. Unless a piece of knowledge becomes an integral part of the total reflective-behavioural apparatus of the individual, it is not able to bridge the gap between knowledge and profession on the one hand and practice on the other. And if the gap between knowledge and practice remains overmuch, it makes for a damaging situation of deceit and hypocrisy lowering individual and public standards of conduct.

Granting that basically morality means high quality of human relations i.e., treating others as persons and not as things, the chance of reflective and conventional morality both flourishing is high if the mental health of the people is sound. With poor mental health on the other hand, the chances of poor moral perception go up, prescriptive morality runs the danger of being miscarried, moral prescription lends itself to acceptance of irrational principles and moral command conditions habits of obedience out of timidity or insecurity. However, it is not intended to maintain that morality depends on any single factor. Moral action, to be sure, is a consequence of a number of factors coalescing or conflicting among themselves as the case may be. However, what is sought to be suggested is that there is a philosophical urgency in modern 'sick society' to explore the ethical implications of mental health as also to analyse the total human situation to be able to redirect individual and cultural potentialities and ongoings for inproving the moral health of the people.

It is granted that mental health is a complexity, rooted in the biological, the bodily, the social and the personal. In any case, it is an index of the quality of living, causing one to attach specific meanings to objects and persons and to interpersonal relations of conflict, co-operation and indifference. Only a rough and ready working definition of mental health can be attempted here: Rooted in a sense of security and self-assurance, a mentally healthy

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person developes a certain minimum degree of self-thinking, self-discipline and self-direction. He has a certain minimum level of detachment and objectivity to be able to enjoy both the state of his own mind and his relations with the outside world. In general terms, he succeeds in striking a comparative integration within himself and without.

This morality of smug satisfaction as its critics may so style it. may be objected to on the ground that it would lead to status quo morality by cutting down heavily the powers of conflict as an engine of social change and progress. While a good deal is made of conflict and frustration as the fly-wheel of revolution and social and moral reconstruction, it can not be maintained that these by themselves are of intrinsic moral worth. As such these cannot be legitimised as moral ends. Such conflict and frustration as obtain in any culture can at best be exploited as doubtful means for moral ends. Any culture that skillfully endeavours to keep conflict and frustration in trim business so that the mill of unethical power keeps grinding relentlessly gives a lie to intrinsic moral values. For even political power, such as it be as a value, has no claim to ethical status unless it functions under the tutelage of morality. Poor mental health, inter alia, breeding as it does conflict, frustration and the rest is at once a moral loss. Of course, a clearcut line has to be drawn between pathological conflict and healthy conflict. Such noble conflict as arises out of the human urge to forge moral progress is of a different genre from the pathological conflict that feeds on personal insecurity, hatred and social injustice. The former has a constructive role in morality while the latter a destructive one. It is therefore a poor logic to deify social conflict in the prayerful hope that conflict and its allies would eventually work out to a conflict free society.

Significantly, the potentialities of sound mental health are not fully reckoned with, particularly by the revolutionaries swearing by violence. This is mostly so because mental health and violence would prove to be contradictory and would work out to two altogether different strategies of moral reconstruction. In any case, unless a strong case can be made against mental health as a negative factor in moral progress, it is obligatory to work with this as one of the central concepts, through the gamut of culture for the moral growth of the individual and society. Many a social and moral evil

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from gross crime to subtle jealously and hatred and mad nursuit of power can be easily blamed on poor mental health. whatever be its causes. A confident and self-secure person would not fly into rage or crime nor would he have neurotic urges of unreasonable jealously, hatred and authoriatarian power. It is. amongst other things, in the pathological pursuit of power that other peoples' right are trampled and human relations embittered. The sharp teeth of power have an insatiable lust for all the sweet things of life which alone make life meaningful and worth living. But, to be sure, authoritatianism as a compulsive style of life of an individual or of politics matches more the inner hollowness than the legitimate demands of ones' station or office.

The foregoing should not give an impression that mental health is not a positive concept. The mental health being talked about in this paper does not relate to the people, who though may have equanimity and mental poise and yet or because of it, are desensitised to all personal and social issues. Nor does it refer to people who in order to be smug and satisfied care little for the fruits and challenges of knowledge. The mental health as a theme of this paper has reference to persons whose enhanced powers of mind enable them to face the modern challenges of knowledge and life, helping them to give right direction to personal and social life on behalf of rationally sound moral values.

What robs mental health and morality both is selfishness incapacitating the individuals to see human relations in a proper perspective and thereby denying them the satisfying emotions attendant on sharing and co-operation. Often rugged individualism is justified in the name of freedom which has long been in the making in human history both as a value and practice. In recent history, freedom has come to occupy a central position in thought and practice and it is therefore necessary to examine its full implications for mental health and conduct alike.

Freedom within social nexus, it is admitted, is a necessary condition of mental health and morality. For without it selfdiscipline, self-direction and self-choice have a remote chance of realization. Nor without it is possible either the correct selfimage or correct image of others both of which are otherwise essential for the moral quality involved in inter-personal relations.

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Freedom as a principle and force of transcendence has its roots in the maturity of individuals and has to be achieved creatively Accordingly, freedom and rugged individualism or selfishness are contradictory. In any case, the practice of freedom as spelt out above is rather rare due to both cultural and personal shortcomings. What passes for freedom generally is licentious conduct individually or even at times on the mass scale under the garb of philosophically sanctified ideologies. The charge on a culture and the individual first of all is to ensure the best conditions of freedom which in turn become means to ever greater freedom of an individual on behalf of self-growth and social progress. Unless both self-development and social progress are rationally integrated, freedom in our sense of the term becomes meaningless. And this cannot be done all too easily for reasons of deep seated conventional habits of thought and living including inevitably vested interests of all sorts. Therefore, a vigorous and rational individual and social action towards desirable social change does emerge as the inevitable logic of the situation.

Social reconstruction, in the nature of things, can not be accomplished at one stroke as it were. It calls for a deep understanding of interlocking personal and social forces, an experimental and rational approach shorn of all sentimentality and unexamined presuppositions. Progress in knowledge and historical forces have forced an urgency for the vigorous reconstruction of culture before it is too late. While the economic factor claims priority so that first of all the economic basis of the society is justly ordered and reasonable equality of incomes ensured to all individuals, it would be an utopian claim to maintain that the rest of the ills of an individual and an society would evaporate at the magic touch of economic equality. The human ego, to be sure, is much too complicated and vainglorious to rest content with economic equality. In view of the available knowledge of human psychology, it is impossible to establish one to one correlation between economic equality and sound mental health. All the non-economic elements therefore have to be pressed into service through acculturisation and broadbased education, formal and informal, to disabuse man of greed, lust and power. Even purely economic growth cannot be success. fully achieved through purely economic means. It has to galvanise the social purpose of the individuals and to win them into an ente

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enterprise of co-operation and high motivation for production before people can enjoy its fruits.

If poverty is detrimental to mental health, no less is affluence and its erratic distribution over a small section of society. Paradoxically, both poverty and affluence have been accepted as ends in one garb or another by certain philosophers with the result that a rational approach to the production and distribution of wealth and all it implies in terms of reordering of status hierarchy and human relations, is at best a poor show. Similarly, technology has come to acquire, wittingly or unwittingly, the status of an end. And the lightning speed with which it has blasted the age-old habits and customs have thrown the moral world out of gear, enveloping it with a thick-fall-out of confusion. This willful technology is identified by many a philosopher of culture as one major cause of the cancer of mind. The oppressive technology is causing an allmost neurotic reaction to it, sending many people reeling nostalgically to the dreamland of pre-technological civilization. It is highly doubtful if one of the basic problems of humanity can be eradicated without both high and medium technology as the specific need may be. Nor without it, is it possible to maximise leisure which is indispensable for freedom and personal growth, granting of course that people be properly educated for availing of leisure creatively. It does need however all the powers of the mind and the best of planning to subdue technology to desirable human ends so that all kinds of goods including economic and political power have a chance of fair distribution making for a healthy, dialogic, face to face community away from the monolithic society of face-less individuals.

Contemporaneously, violence is on the ascendance which is symptomatic of the loss of human morings. While the world has never been without violence, there has never been a worship of violence on such a large scale as today. What was considered a sort of helplessness in human nature is being gradually turned into a positive value; all kinds of pseudo-philosophies are being pressed into service to justify violence as an arch-value for social change. Therein lurks the catastrophe and, equally, the challenge for mankind. For peace may no longer be viewed as an ultimate goal but an immediate necessity without which civilization may not survive.

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ccessranise o an An understanding of the implications of sound mental health in the service of morality and peace suggests a limited focus on the enormous problems of violence and peace. Mere echoing of values, however noble, may not go very far. Nor may any insight into the problem of peace, however meaningful, cut much ice unless the mind is healthy enough to profit by values and insights.

While no doubt mental health itself is partly nurturned by lofty values, historical and psychological experience demands that a many-pronged attack be made to ensure mental health to the people in this ever growing "acquisitive society" smarting under runaway technology. As such, it is imperative that a continuous appraisal of our culture be made in terms of physical, interpersonal, and socio-political environment, right from the family through school to the world at large.

A full-fledged programme of mental health with a sound philosophy to back it needs to be integrated with the formal and informal education of the people. Such a programme must aim at educating the emotions and reason of the people and cultivate the things of the mind without which freedom and sanity would always be in danger. Much of the violence of the modern day is due to ontological devitalization of our society. The mental health programme must succeed in restoring to our civilization the lost biological and spiritual vitality to make this world safe for peace and effloresence.

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CAN 'KNOWLEDGE' BE DEFINED ? A SKEPTICAL APPROACH

In the present article I attempt a survey of certain objections urged by the Absolute Skeptic as to the possibility of knowledge. The word 'Knowledge' is ambiguous and has been applied to mean different things. Of these senses one important and wellknown sense is : Knowledge is true and sure awareness. According to this usage, it would be improper to speak of any 'Knowledge' as false. To avoid confusion, it is necessary to use the word in one specified sense in one specific context, and in the present discussion I propose to employ the word 'Knowledge' in the sense just mentioned to mean 'true and sure awareness'.

Now there is an attitude of thinking in which there is a reluctance to admit 'Knowledge' in the sense of true and sure awareness. This attitude is usually known as that of a 'Skeptic'. 'Skepticism' questions the possiblity either of knowledge in general or of any one or other of its accepted varieties.

Skeptical thinking has existed ever since the dawn of philosophy. The Skepticism prevailing since the early age to the modern days may be divided under two broad types. There are some Skeptics who do not cast doubt on all the ways of knowing accepted by ordinary people but only on one or more of them. This type of Skepticism may be described as 'moderate Skepticism'. Again, there are others who do not admit the cogency of any cognitive method at all and who challenge even the validity of sense-perception. The variety of 'Skepticism' in this extreme form is usually known as 'Absolute Skepticism'. A moderate Skeptic, like Cārvāka or Mach, admits atleast the possible veracity of sense-awareness, where as an Absolute Skeptic questions the certainty even of sense-perception and thus, according to him, nothing can be relied upon. It has been held by him that like inference and testimony, perception is also incompetent to lead to truth. Such an extreme skeptical theory has been elaborated in the Buddhist School of 'Mādhyamika Śūnyavāda' the chief exponents of which are Nāgārjuna, Aryadeva and Candrakirti. It has also been formulated in detail in the Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśi. It has also been reported in different Nyāya aphorisms of Gautama in which the Skeptical Views of a nihilist and a relativist

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have been examined. It is interesting to note that the Pyrrohonic View which has been reported in detail and emphasised by Sextus Empiricus in also extreme 'Skepticism'; the validity of every mode of cognition has been challenged there. Nothing is reliable to an Absolute Skeptic and he cannot trust even his own senses. The philosophy of Wittgenstein in his latest phase also contains traces of such 'Absolute Skepticism'.

The question about knowledge in general breaks up into (i) the problem as to whether it is possible to have a correct definition of 'knowledge'; (ii) whether it is possible to establish actually of knowledge. The first problem has been discussed by Jayarāśi in Tattvopaplavasimha and by Śrīharṣa in his Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya' with a detailed criticism of different definitions of knowledge in general. The second problem has been considered by Nāgārjuna in his Vigraha-vyāvartanī and by some other Absolute Skeptics as reported in Gautama's 'Nyāya-Sūtra' and commentaries thereon. It is to be noted that the present essay is concerned exclusively with the skeptical objections in regard to some definitions of knowledge and with special reference to some of the objections urged by Jayarāśi. Objections concerning some other definitions of knowledge in general as found in Jayarāśi and Śrīharṣa are not considered here for the sale of brevity.

[It is to be remarked that the present article is not an historical one. It is an analytical study of some of the genuine difficulties found by Jayarāśi, the Indian Absolute Skeptic and an attempt to assess the logical value of those difficulties.]

Now, what exactly is meant by a 'true cognition'? In other words, what is it that constitutes the truth of a knowledge, or, under what conditions is a unit of cognition regarded as true? Commonsense thinking tries to answer this question in different ways and here are some of the alternatives which have been suggested by different thinkers in answer to the question just mentioned:

- A. Knowledge is that cognition which is not conditioned by any vitiating factor.
- B. Knowledge is that cognition which leads to volitional success: that is to say, it is a cognition leading to pragmatic success.

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- C. Knowledge is that cognition which corresponds with fact.
- D. Knowledge is that cognition which is uncontradicted by other cognitions.

According to an Absolute Skeptic, each and every definition of knowledge is found, on examination, to be defective and unacceptable. It is not possible, therefore, on his view, to define the truth of a true cognition; and since what cannot be defined cannot be established as 'real', a so-called 'true' cognition and a mistaken one are to be regarded as sharing the same status.

We take up here the skeptical objections against the first two of these definitions.

A. Knowledge as that cognition which is not conditioned by any vitiating factor.¹

There are different types of cognition, viz., perception, inference, testimony etc. Now every cognition is not regarded as a correct one; some cognitions are found to be wrong also. To take the case of perception. A number of conditions, like the sense-organ, sense-stimulation, the object to be perceived, attention and some other factors like light etc. are necessary for perceiving an object. But it is observed sometimes that even with the presence of all these required conditions we have the phenomenon of wrong perception. A distant forest, for example, looks like a black sheet. A person is not able at that time to perceive and distinguish the different trees with their leaves and branches. Distance is here the factor which prevents that person from seeing the trees of the forest in their true nature. Again, sometimes, a patient suffering from jaundice sees all things as pale yellow. The mind is, also, found in many cases to control a perceptual awareness. For example, when a man eagerly waits for the arrival of his friend, he may hear a sound similar to the knocking at the door though actually there is none. These are some instances of wrong perception and in each of the above cases, in addition to the conditions of cognition, a vitiating factor is found to operate. The visiting factors are of three types, viz., environmental, physiological and psychological.

It is seen that the veridical character or truth of a perceptual state depends largely upon the nature of its conditioning factors. And this is to be admitted in the cases of other cognitive states as

well. A true cognition or knowledge has accordingly been defined by some thinkers as that cognition which is not conditioned by any vitiating factor.

According, to an Absolute Sceptic, like Jayarāśi, however, this definition cannot be justified. For, to determine the truth of a cognition in this way it is necessary at first to know its conditioning factors as non-vitiated or faultless. But one can hardly know that all the conditioning factors of a so-called true cognition are not vituated. According to the common-sense notion, a thing is to be known either by perception, or, by inference, or, by testimony. Now the skeptic urges that it is not possible to know by any of these 'means of knowledge' that the conditions of a congnition are really devoid of any vitiator, environmental, physiological and psychological. The skeptical attitude will be more evident if, in this context, the arguments urged by Jayarāśi are taken for consideration.

According to Jayarāśi, it is not possible to know by perception that the conditioning factors of a cognition are faultless or non-vitiated². Consider the perception of a tree. This perception is conditioned by a number of factors viz., the eye, the tree itself, the sensory stimulation, light etc. Now, the Skeptic asks; how is it possible to know that the sense-organ itself, is without any defect. One cannot surely perceive one's own eye in its non-vitiated condition.

It might be urged, that one can perceive one's own eyes through a mirror. But this cannot solve the problem. For it is a fact that the retina and the nervefibres of the occipital region are responsible for a state of visual perception. But, surely, a person cannot perceive his own retina or the occipital region in his brain. And if the retina etc. are invisible, it goes without saying that their defects, if any, would be equally invisible. The sensory stimulation causing the perception itself is also imperceptible by nature. Thus it must be concerned that the faultless character of the physiological factors of knowledge cannot be known by perception.

It is to be noted, further, that on assertion like 'the faultless character of a perceptual cognition is known by perception' involves a petitio.

It is to be added, further, urges Jayarāśi, that our sense-organ is sometimes found to deceive us. Therefore, one cannot assure

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oneself that an awareness based on sense-evidence must be always of a veridical character. In other words, as the validity of a knowledge by testimony depends on the validity of the satatements of other persons, so the validity of a perceptual cognition dpends on the infallibility of the sense-organ concerned.³ In the former, the cognition turns out to be false if the statements are found to be false; and in the latter, the cognition turns out to be false if the relevant sense-organ is found to be defective. Therefore, the doubt that a perception may be invalid cannot be ignored. It is to be concluded, therefore, that the faultless character of the conditioning factors for a cognition cannot be known by perception.

Again, a sound ground or probans is always demanded by a valid inference. But it has been held by Jayarāśi that no such ground can be pointed out on the strength of which one can infer the absence of any fault in he conditioning factors for a cognitive state, and that it is not possible, therefore, to know by inference that the conditioning factors are not vitiated.⁴

If it is said that the truth of a cognition itself may be taken as the ground or probans (from which one can infer the faultless character of its conditioning factors), then it would clearly involve the fallacy of petitio. For, then, the inference would be of the following form: 'the conditioning factors of a cognition are not vitiated because the cognition is true'. But it is to be emphasised that the question regarding the faultless character of the conditioning factors for a cognition arises only for the reason that the truth of the cognition is not self-evident. How can the cognition itself be regarded. then, as the ground? It would, obviously, be a case of petitio.

Now, as the faultless character of the conditions of a perception cannot be proved by perception or inference, it is impossible to say that it can be known by testimony. For knowledge by testimony ultimately depends on perception. Therefore, the Skeptic Jayarāsi emphasises that the faultless character of the conditions of a cognition cannot be proved by perception, inference or testimony.

It is to be observed, however, that the difficulties urged by the Skeptic concerning the perception of the non-vitiating character of the conditions of a cognition need not worry the non-skeptic

thinker for the simple reason that the latter does not claim that perception is at all competent to reveal the non-vitiators. What he claims is that inference is not incompetent to do that work It is to be noted that Jayarāśi's claim about the incompetence of inference in this reference cannot also be maintained. The reason is that the possible argument mentioned by him as establishing the thesis of the non-skeptic is not actually put forward by the latter. The non-skeptic would not deny that the argument suggested by Jayarāśi is vitiated by a petitio. That does not mean. however, that there is no other argument in support of his position. As a matter of fact, he would emphasise that the probans for his inference is 'pragmatic success'. The inference acceptable to him would then be of the following form; 'the conditions of a cognition do not involve any vitiating factor because the cognition leads to pragmatic success'. It is held by him that the correct method to find out whether a cognition is true is to see whether it leads to a successful volition or not. Perception of water by a thirsty person is regarded as correct or not-hallucinatory if he can reach that water. In other words, the success of his effort to achieve the object cognised is a proof that his cognition is true or veridical.

It is to be noted here that this inference mentioned above embodying the test of truth has been also taken by some thinkers as a definition of true cognition. Knowledge has been defined by them in terms of pragmatic success. In other words, knowledge is that cognition which leads to volitional success.

B. Knowledge defined as that cognition which leads to volitional success.⁶

It is often seen that after cognising an object a person either wants to obtain or to avoid that thing. And his desire of attainment or avoidance causes in him a sort of volition or exercise of the will (like going towards the thing of fleeing away from that). If this volition is followed by the attainment or avoidance of the object, then the volition is termed successful and the cognition leading ultimately to this volition is regarded as true.

It might be objected, however, that there are some cases where a false perception is also followed by the success of a relevant volition. The case of getting a gem after a false perception of such a gem may be taken as an example. To elucidate. It may

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be supposed that a gem hidden in a dark room casts its radiance on a portion of the floor. A man perceives that radiant portion of the floor, and taking it to be a gem he has a desire to get it; then the desire is followed by the requisite volition and effort. Then, in course of his effort to get the gem he happens to come upon an actual gem lying at an adjacent place. In this case, a false cognition of a radiant surface (of the floor) as a gem ultimately leads to the attainment of an actual gem. Hence, in this case, the man's volition following from his false perception may be claimed to be successful. It would be a mistake to hold, therefore, that the success of a volition following from a cognition always proves the truth of that cognition.

This objection seems to be quite plausible and is based on the assumption that the volition, in the case under reference, is really successful. This assumption, however, requires a close examination.

It is to be explained first, under that circumstances a cognition is regarded as leading to a 'successful volition' and, as a consequence, that cognition is claimed to be veridical. The case of obtaining a gem after perceiving the gem may here be considered. 'Perception of the gem' is followed by the 'desire for the gem' and then by the 'will to get it'; and, then, if the requisite means are utilised, there follows the 'attainment of the gem! Here the stages of the sequence are : cognition, desire, will and attainment. Now each of these stages has not merely some object but also the self-same object. That is to say, on the present case the objects of the four stages of the sequence are indentical entities. It is only when we have such an identity, that we can properly speak of a cognition leading to or causing a volitional success. To deny this identity would be to deny a direct or indirect causal relation between the first stage, viz., the cognition of an object and the final stage, viz., the attainment of that object. It is to be emphasised, however, that in the case where a gem is obtained after perceiving a radiant surface near the gem, this required identity is absent, and, as a consequence, the relation of 'leading to' between the cognition and the volitional success cannot be claimed to be established. Why such a relation is absent in the case under reference requires to be explained. It is a matter of common knowledge that mental states, like cognition,

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desire and volition have always a reference to some object, Now this object, it is to be noted, is not anything simple or unanalysable but is always a complex of two aspects, viz. 'the characterised' and 'the characteriser'. The former means 'that which is characterised' and the latter 'that by which something is characterised'. To explain. When a man perceives a gem, the object of his perception is a complex of two aspects, viz. a 'something' and the 'Peculiar features of a gem'. Again, when that person desires to have that gem, the object of his desire is also a complex of the self-same aspects, viz., 'something' and the 'peculiar features of a gem'. Similarly, when again that person exercises his will to get that gem, the object of his will has the same two aspects without any difference what-so-ever. And the object, that is to say, the gem which is ultimately secured by him is a complex exactly of the two aspects present in the cognition, the desire and the will. And the volition, concerned, is regarded as 'successful' owing to this identity of the aspects of the complex entity, viz., the gem. And because of this identity of the object, a causal relation expressed by the phrase 'leading to' is legitimately claimed to exist between the starting perception of the gem and the attainment of that gem. So much for the analysis of a valid cognition. Let us now analyse the other case, viz., attainment of a gem following a false perception of something other than the gem, viz., some radiance. When a man perceive some 'radiance' (of a gem near-by), the object of his perception is a complex of two aspects, viz., a 'something' and the 'peculiar features of radiance'. But since mistaking it to be the gem itself he desires to have it, the 'characteriser' of the object of his desire becomes quite different from that of the actual object of his perception8. Now the 'characteriser' of the object of his desire is the 'peculiar features of a gem', while the 'characteriser' of the object of his perception consists of the 'peculiar features of the radiance (that is actually seen)'. When, again, the man puts forth his will to obtain the gem, the 'characteriser' of the object of his will is the same as that of the object of his desire. Lastly, the thing attained by him is also a complex exactly of the two aspects, viz. a 'something' and the 'peculiar feature of a gem' Now since, in the case under reference, the 'characteriser' of the object perceived is actually something other than that of the object of the desire and the volition, the former cannot be regarded as

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oject d as identical with the objects involved in the next three stages, viz. the desire, the will and the attainment. And consequently, a casual relation expressed by the phrase 'leading to' cannot be admitted to obtain between the starting cognition of the radiance of the gem and the attainment of the gem. There is, therefore, no good ground, in this case, for regarding the volition as successful. The attainment of a gem following the perception of some radiance is nothing but a coincidence. It is thus seen that the objection that a false perception sometimes leads to a successful volition cannot be maintained. For it is based on the assumption that the volition is really a successful one. But it has just been shown that this assumption is unwarranted. There is no difficulty, therefore, in defining a true or veridical cognition as that which leads to a volitional success, or in other words, pragmatic success.

A question; How to prove the falsity of this perception under reference? So far it has been discussed whether a successful volition can follow from a false perception or not and the discussion above is based on an assumption that the perception concerned is a false one. But is there really an ground for assuming this perception in question to be false and not something veridical? If knowledge is defined in terms of volitional success, then this 'perception of some radiance (as a gem)' also amounts to 'knowledge', since it is followed by the actual attainment of a gem. In other words, the 'radiance' is perceived as a gem by a person and following it an actual gem also has been obtained by that person. There appears to be no difficulty then to admit that this perception amounts to knowledge; or, in other words, it is a true cognition (since it satisfies the definition of 'knowledge').

This, however, cannot be granted, The perception in question is not admitted to be true for the reason that it does not tally with any reality. To explain. A thing is always cognised as occupying a certain place. Nothing in this world is known as existing nowhere. To cognise a thing is to find it at some place. If an object is not found to exist at the place where it has been perceived, then the perception cannot be said to correspond with fact. It is true indeed that, in the case mentioned above, some 'radiance' at some place is perceived as a gem and, ultimately, a gem is obtained near that place. But, as a matter of fact, that gem is not obtained at the same place where the

'radiance' is perceived. This perception, then, surely, cannot be described as tallying with a real thing. There is not the real object 'gem' which is to correspond with the perception of 'gem' (in place of 'radiance'). This perception of some 'radiance' as a gem is to be regarded, therefore, as something non-veridical or false.

Thus correspondence with reality may be considered as one of the characteristics of a true cognition. It is to be noted here that this correspondence with reality finds so much importance to a group of thinkers that knowledge has been defined by them as 'that which corresponds with fact'.

Let us now return to the discussion regarding the definition viz., 'knowledge is that cognition which leads to volitional success'. This definition may, however, be immediately challenged by the absolute skeptic. He may urge that it involves a regressus ad infinitum. To explain.

It may be asked by the skeptic whether this definitional statement is analytic or synthetic? In other words, it may be asked whether the predicate of this statement, viz., 'that cognition which leads to voltional success' is a part of the subject of the statement viz., 'knowledge'. The answer, surely, is not in the affirmative. It is obvious that it is not part of the meaning of the term 'knowledge' that it is 'somethking which leads to volitional success'. The statement cannot thus be regarded as analytic. It is, then, to be regarded as synthetic. That is to say, that a true cognition is one which leads to volitional success is to be established by some evidence other than the mere analysis of the subject-term. This statement viz., 'knowledge is that cognition which leads to volitional success' is then, to be established by means of some inference. That inference, in its turn, will require another inference for its validation. But this validating inference, in its turn, will require still another validating inference and so on ad infinitum. The skeptic emphasises that the definition of a true cognition as one that leads to volitional success thus involves a vicious regress.

Now it is to be observed that there is no quarrel with the skeptic as to whether the definitional statement in question is synthetic in its character. But as Vācaspati-miśra points out, the truth of this synthetic statement is self-evident. Volitional

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success is such an impressive thing that one does not, as a matter of fact, require any other inference to prove the truth of the definition, that, 'knowledge is that cognition which leads to volitional success'. The skeptic may, however, demur to this claim of self-evidence and demand a ground in justification of the synthetical statement mentioned above. The justification to be offered by the opponent would apparently involve a vicious infinite regress. It will be shown, however, that such a regress cannot be pronounced to be vicious. This will be discussed presently in connection with the examination of the objection (i), viz., that 'the successful volition cannot be known', relating to this definition in question.

Thus it is seen that there need not be any difficulty in defining knowledge as 'that cognition which leads to volitional success'.

The definition, however, has been attacked by Jyarāśi, in his Tattvopaplavasimha, from three sides. The objections urged by him are, (i) a volitional success cannot be known; (ii) the exact nature of the object of a successful volition cannot be described; (iii) the truth of a so-called true cognition cannot be proved even if it is followed by a subsequent volitional success.

To elucidate:

Obj. (i) A volitional success cannot be known: Let it be granted that a cognition called 'C1' is true or veridical because it is followed by a successful volition. Now the skeptic asks, is this volitional success known or unknown? 10 And it has been urged by him that none of these two alternatives can be sustained. Let us take up the second alternative first. It is to be noted that the case under discussion is an inference. Now it is obvious that in an inference, the probans has got to be known if the probandum is to be correctly asserted. If a person is unable to know whether a volition following 'C1' is successful, then it is not possible for him to assert that the cognition in question, viz., 'C1' is true. Thus the second alternative, that the volitional success is something unknown cannot be accepted. The volitional success is to be regarded, therefore, so something known. But there appears to be a difficulty of infinite regress and it is as follows. The cognition of the volitiona success following 'CI' may be called 'C2'. Now this 'C2'

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as a cognition, is either true or false. To admit that it is true is to admit that it also leads to a volitional success since a true cognition has been defined in terms of volitional success. This fresh volitional success may be called 'V1' and, again, the same question, 'is this 'V1' knwown' arises and a third cognition i.e., 'C3' is to be postulated as before and so on an infinitum To avoid this infinite regress, 'C2' may be regarded as false: but then the object of this 'C2', that is, the volitional success following from 'Cl' is to be regarded as something unreal or non-existent, and thus the first cognition viz., 'C1' also turns out to be false or non-veridical. For it is seen that to prove the truth of 'C1' it is necessary to prove the relevant volition as successful. In short, one is to admit either that a volitional success is not known and thus to conclude that the truth of the relevant cognition cannot be established or to admit that a volitional success is known and thus to invite and infinite regress. But none of these two alternatives, is, acceptable to the skeptic and, therefore, according to him, the truth of a cognition cannot be defined in terms of volitional success.

This objection, however, seems to be unwarranted. For, this we are to accept vacaspati's position mentioned before, the cognition regarding the success of a volition following an awareness does not require to be tested any further.

But even admitting that such a question actually does not arise, a skeptic may urge that there is always a possibility of asking such a question. For, it is not impossible for a person to challenge the truth of the cognition of a volitional success following an awareness. And if the cognition thus challenged is found to be false or non-veridical, then its object viz., the volitional success itself fails to be the ground or probans of the basic awareness. And if, again, the cognition of a volitional success is admitted to be true or veridical, then, as it has been pointed out by the skeptic, an infinite series of successful volitions and their cognitions is to be admitted.

With reference to this objection, it might be observed, however, that there is no good ground to regard a regress of this soft as actually anything vicious. For if it were the case that owing to this infinite regress the truth of the basic cognition viz., 'Cl' could not be established, then the regress would be regarded as

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vicious. But the case here is otherwise. The truth of 'Cl' has been established by the first volitional success and the other members of the infinite series of 'C2' 'C3' and 'V1' 'V2' etc.. come as answers to the subsequent queries advanced by the skeptic.

A fresh objection might be urged now on behalf of the skeptic. that the same ground or probans, i.e. 'volitional success' has heen employed in each case of this infinite series in question to establish the truth of 'C2', 'C3', etc., and, this to him, is inadmissible. To explain, 'Cl' is true because it is followed by a volitional success. Again, 'C2' (that is, the cognition regarding this volitional success) is true because it is also followed by another volitional success and so on ad infinitum. skeptic feels that it involves a petitio. For it is a case where the truth of 'C1' is sought to be proved by 'volitional success' and the truth of 'C2' (that is, the cognition of volitional success) is claimed to be proved by 'volitional success' itself.

But it is to be observed that this is not really a case of petitio in the proper sense of the term. It is true indeed that the selfsame phrase 'volitional success' has been employed in each case as a probans or ground to establish the truth of each cognitive unit. But though the self-same phrase has been employed in all the cases, what is meant by that phrase differs from case to case. The nature of a particular 'volitional success' just like the nature of a cognition, differs in each case. In other words, the 'volitional success' termed 'V1 (by which the truth of 'C1 is established) is different from 'V2' and 'V2' is, again, different from 'V3' and so on, There is, therefore, no good reason to regard the case under discussion as involving a petitio.

It is well-known that an infinite regress is regarded as vicious only when it vitiates or serves to repudiate the truth or reality of the starting point of the series involved in the regress. But where it is not so, particularly, in a case where it is the outscome of recurrent queries, the infinite regress cannot be adjudged to be anything vicious. In the present case, the regress is a result of the skeptical queries. One cannot, then conclude from it that the volitional success following from a cognition cannot be known at all and hence the definition, viz., 'a true cognition is that which

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leads to a volitional success is unacceptable. It is to be emphasised further that a question about infinite regress can possibly be brought forward by the skeptic only by a previous acceptance of this definition and not by its denial. Thus the skeptical objection is, as a matter of fact, self-stultifying.

Obj. (ii) The exact nature of the object of a successful volition cannot be described:

It has been held by Jayarāśi that it is not possible to describe the nature of that object with reference to which a volition is described as successful. A thirsty man perceives water of a stream and, taking the requisite means, he is ultimately able to drink water from that stream. His perception of water, in this case, is admitted to be veridical. Here the object of his perception is 'water' and the element of the object of his subsequent volition (which is admitted to be successful) is also 'water'. Now, the skeptic asks, what exactly is the nature of this 'water' which is the object of this successful volition under reference? Surely, it has a sort of identity with the object cognised; otherwise the volition would not be regarded as successful. Now it has been urged by Jayarāśi that two plausible alternatives may be suggested regarding the nature of the object of this successful volition. The object of volition has either numerical identity with the object of the relevant cognition or it has qualitative identity with the latter.

It may be said that the 'water' attained in numerically identical with the 'water' cognised. 12 It is the ordinary view and there appears to be no difficulty in admitting this. It has been objected, however, by Jayarāśi that this view cannot be accepted. For an object cognised is not obtained immediately after its cognition. A man perceives an object and desires to have it; then he puts forth his will, and taking the requisite means he is able to obtain that object ultimately. And, as a matter of fact, there is a time-interval between the perception and the final attainment of an object. The object cognised may suffer a change or alteration during the interval between the perception and the volition. As for example, the object perceived in this case, viz., 'water' may be disturbed by some outer force, say, by some animal. And, it would then be quite plausible to hold that the man is not able to drink the same 'water' which was

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previously perceived by him. Owing to this disturbance in the 'water' caused by some outer force the 'water' obtained is something different from the 'water' cognised. In this case, a numerical identity cannot be admitted therefore, between the object of cognition and that of the apparently successful volition. And thus the volition cannot be called really 'successful' and hence the perception of water cannot be called true or veridical.

It might be urged, however, that this difficulty, as pointed out by the skeptic, can be overcome by giving a more precise description of a case in which a cognition is taken as true or veridical. When it is said that the object of a cognition is numirically identical with the object of the relevant successful volition, the phrase 'numerical identity' is to be taken to mean-identity of spatio-temporal position. If there is an identity of the spatiotemporal position as between the two objects, viz., the object cognised and the object obtained, then alone should the volition be regarded as really successful and the relevant cognition as veridical.¹³ And, if the object obtained is not found to exist exactly at the same place where the object was perceived to exist then the volition cannot be admitted to be successful. The result is the same if there is a difference between the time-position of the object of perception and that of the object of the volition. Thus if it be the case that the spatial position of the 'water' obtained differs from that of the 'water' cognised, then the perceived object cannot, surely, be admitted to be what is obtained. In other words, the volition then would not be successful, and accordingly, the perception of 'water' could not be regarded as true or veridical.

The skeptic urges, however, that this clarification does not succeed in overcoming the difficulty mentioned by him. It fails in the case of a veridical cognition of an object which is about to perish, or, again, of any celestial body, like the 'moon". To elucidate. A man perceives a snake which is on the point of dying. He desires to avoid it and by an exercise of his will he flees away from that snake. Now if it is admitted that a volition is 'successful' if there is an identity of spatio-temporal position between the object of a cognition and that of the ensuing volition, then the volition of this person as far as the snake is concerned is not successful. For the snake is dead when his

volition is accomplished. And, surely, there cannot be an identity of temporal position between a thing when it lives and when it perishes. Similarly, in the case of a celestial body, like the 'moon'. It is well-known that the 'moon' undergoes a perpetual change of positions. And in case a person has a subsequent volition relating to the moon, the object of the volition cannot evidently have the same spatial position as that of the perception of the moon. In the case then of a perception of the 'moon' followed by a volition, it is impossible to have an identity of the spatial position between the object of the perception and the object of the volition concerned.

It may be urged, however, that though the cognised object and the object of volition cannot be nummerically identical.. they may nevertheless be regarded as qualitatively identical. In other words, the object of the successful volition and the object of the cognition belong to the same kind. According to this alternative, a perception is to be regarded as veridical if the volition in question leads to the attainment of an object of the same kind as the perceptual one. But, as the skeptic points out, a cognition in such a case is not, as a matter of fact, regarded as veridical. When after perceiving 'A' and with a desire to obtain it a person finds 'B' (which is an object of the same kind as 'A' but not 'A' itself) instead of 'A', then the volition in question is not actually accepted as successful.15 To take the case of the perception of a ball. A person perceives a ball and desires to obtain it. But if, in fact, he succeeds in having not that ball but another ball of the same kind, then he is surely not justified in claiming that he has secured that observed ball. In other words, even though his perception of one ball is followed by his obtaining another ball of the same kind, he cannot, surely, regard his volition as successful. This alternative, is, therefore, seen 10 be unacceptable like the former one.

The upshot of all this discussion, according to the skeptic Jayarāśi, is that the exact nature of the object of a so-called successful volition cannot be described. And, therefore, it is not possible to define a true cognition as 'that which leads to volitional success'.

It may be observed, however, that there is no quarrel with the Abolute skeptic regarding the qualitative identity mentioned objecthis

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above. It is not indeed claimed by the non-skeptic that the object in a successful volition is qualitatively identical with the object cognised. What is claimed by him is that the two things are numerically identical. The skeptical objection above regarding this alternative is now being examined.

The skeptic assumes in his objection that any change of the parts of an object causes a change in the nature of the whole object. Keeping this in mind he argues that the 'water' perceived is something different from the 'water' obtained when the former is disturbed by some outer force. The non-skeptic may not have any disagreement with the skeptic on this point. He would also admit that the volition regarding an object cognised cannot be called really successful if the object undergoes any change during the interval between the cognition and the volition. And if that be the case, then it is not logically possible to regard the relevant cognition as a true one; for the required identity of the object cognised and the object obtained is not found in a case like this. But the skeptic seems to assume further that every object cognised does undergo some change before the emergence of the relevant volition. This assumption is, however, quite unwarranted. There are many things in the world, like a 'table', a 'book', a 'jar' etc. which may be treated as exceptions to this skeptical view. Let us take for example, the true perception of a book: A person perceives a book on the table and he desires to have it. Then putting forth the required will he ultimately succeeds in having that book. There is no reason to assume here, the non-skeptic says, that any part of the book cognised has necessarily undergone some change within the time-gap between the perception and the final attainment of it; and to doubt the numerical identity between the object cognised and the object obtained is here quite uncalled for. It is, surely, a case of successful volition and the cognition in question, is veridical.

But it may be argued on behalf of the skeptic that the time-Position of the two objects in question, surely, undetgoes some change, for time is commonly accepted as an ever-changing entity. And since every object exists in time, the nature of ever object is to be admitted as changing in accordance with the change

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of time. The 'book' of the example mentioned above is cognised at the instant 'T1' and the 'book' is obtained at another temporal instant, say 'T4'. According to the skeptic, the 'book' existing at 'T1' is not identical with the 'book' existing at 'T4'. The nature of the 'book' is changed with the change of its time-position. And thus it is not possible for any person to obtain the object which was cognised by him.

But it is to be observed here that the skeptic, in his argument, assumes that the nature of an entity necessarily changes with the change of time. There is, however, no good ground for thinking so. It is indeed true that every object exists in time; but one cannot infer from this that time is constitutive of the existence or reality of an object. When it is said that a thing exists in time, it is, surely, not claimed that the thing is the time in which it exists. The two, viz., the thing and its time-position are not thus identical. Any change in the latter does not, therefore, automatically mean a change in the former. To claim any such thing would be quite dogmatic. To sustain the claim it would be necessary to advance cognent grounds. But no ground can be advanced here excepting merely re-iterating the claim.

Again, time is admitted to be an ever-changing entity. Therefore, to admit the view that the nature of an object changes with the change of time is to admit that an object is also of an everchanging nature. Now the most important objection to be urged against this theory of momentariness is that it makes recognition unintelligible. If the nature of a 'book' or a 'table' for example, changes at every moment, then how can one recognise it as that 'book' or that 'table'? But, it is a matter of fact, that a person is actually able to recognise an object as 'this object is what I knew before'. It cannot be held, therefore, that a thing under goes change at every temporal instant. It is to be added further that if, for the sake of argument, the theory of momentariness is accepted, then the skeptic argument itself cannot be main tained. The skeptical argument is either a real phenomenon of it is not. If, on the one hand, it is regarded as something unreal, then it fails to serve the purpose for which it has been offered If, on the other hand, it is regarded as something real then just like other real things the argument itself would change with the have lose

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the change of time. And thus the skeptic's argument would not have a constant or unchanging nature and would, accordingly, lose its cognecy.

Obj. (iii) The 'truth' of a so-called true cognition cannot be proved even if it is followed by a subsequent volitional success:

Javarāśi emphasises that the definition of a true cognition as 'that which leads to a successful volition' cannot be sustained even after granting that the object cognised is numerically identical with the object of the relevant successful volition. According to him, the non-sceptic's argument is able at best to prove that a volitional success regarding an object cognised is possible. But the truth of a perception cannot be established even by the fact of the successful attainment of the object which is perceived. It has been urged, for example, by Jayarāśi that a cognition cannot be taken as true even if it is followed by the success of a relevant volition. It is commonly thought that the 'truth' or 'veridical character' of a cognition is known by the subsequent successful volition concerning the object of that cognition. Now it has been pointed out by the skeptic that the knowledge that a cognition is true is either a case of inference or of perception. On the first alternative, volitional success is a ground which establishes the truth of a cognition. And, on the second alternative, volitional success is a ground which established the truth of cognition, and on the second alternative, volitional success is perceived to exist in true cognition. 16 But in Jayarāśi's opinion, none of these alternatives can be admitted. To elucidate.

Generally the 'truth' of a cognition appears to be known by inference. It is an inference like the following: "a cognition is true because it leads to volitional success". It has been urged, however, by the skeptic that the truth of a cognitive unit, e.g., a state of perception cannot be inferred from the ensuing volitional success and the reason given by Jayarāśi is that it is not possible to be aware of the relation between a volitional success and the 'truth' in question. To explain. It is well-known that for every inference a uniform relation between the relevant ground or probans and the probandum requires to be established. Now the apprehension of the concomitance of the ground and the probandum in a particular instance is necessary to establish this uniform relation. In the present case, the ground

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is 'volitional success' and the probandum is 'truth'. To assent a uniform relation between 'truth' and 'volitional success' then, requires a direct apprehension of the relation of concomitance between 'volitional success' and 'truth' in at least one particular case of cognition. But it is not possible, according to the skeptic, to perceive such a concomitance between the ground and the probandum concerned in any instance at all. The probandum of this inference, viz., 'truth' (of a cognitive state) can never, according to Jayarāśi, be an object of perception or immediate apprehension. It has been held by him, therefore. that since one of the two terms of the relation of concomitance. viz., 'truth' cannot be an object of direct apprehension, it is not possible to apprehend directly the relation of concomitance even in one case. And that being the position, it is not possible to establish a uniform relation between 'volitional success' and 'truth'.

And if again, it be granted that it is possible to perceive in a particular instance the relation of concomitance between the ground, 'volitional success' and the probandum, 'truth' then, also, the inference under discussion cannot possibly be sustained. For to admit the direct apprehension of the concomitance in a particular instance is to admit the direct apprehension of 'truth' in that instance of cognition. But Jayarāśi urges that if the veridical character or 'truth' of a cognition is admitted to be apprehended directly, then it would be quite needless and a sheer wastage of time to infer its existence in a state of cognition from 'volitional success'. 18

The upshot then is that the inference in question cannot be sustained because it is not possible to establish a uniform relation between the ground 'volitional success' and the probandum 'truth'. The truth of a socalled true cognition or knowledge then cannot be regarded as known by inference. The inference under discussion is either impossible or needless. So much for the first alternative.

Let us now pass on to the second one, viz., that 'volitional success is perceived to exist in a true cognition'. It might be urged that when the 'volitional success' is perceived as existing in a unit of cognition, that cognition is to be regarded as a true one. But Jayarāśi points out that this alternative also cannot

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be accepted. The reason for this non-acceptance appears to be as follows. A unit of cognition is admitted, on the Nyāya view which is here sought to be repudiated by the skeptic), to last for two temporal instants only and it is bound to disappear at the third instant. Now the perception of an object may be followed by a desire in regard to that object, which in its turn may be followed by an act of will. And a volitional success can take place only after an exercise of that will. Thus it is seen that there is a time-gap of at least three instants between the cognition and volitional success. The 'volitional success' in question can thus occur only after the cognition concerned disappeared. But then it is difficult to see how a 'volitional success' can be perceived to exist in a unit of cognition which cannot exist at the time of perception. Therefore, this alternative also falls to the ground.

The difficulties pointed out by Jayarāśi have been discussed so far. It may be observed, however, that the non-skeptic has no hesitation to accept the skeptic's position that 'volitional success cannot be *perceived* to exist in a true cognition'. But he does not admit the skeptic's position that the truth of a particular cognition cannot be inferred from 'volitional success'. The skeptical objections in this latter connection are now being examined.

The perceive in one instance the concomitance of a probans and a probandum, it is necessary indeed to perceive the existence of the probandum in that instance. For example, when in the kitchen the concomitance of 'smoke' and 'fire' is perceived, the 'fire' is also perceived there. Similarly, it is not possible to admit the perception of the concomitance of 'volitional success' and 'truth' (of a cognition) unless 'truth' itself is apprehended directly at least in one instance. Now the perception of this concomitance under reference has been denied by the Absolute Skeptic on the assumption that 'truth' is not perceived in any instance of cognition. There is, however, no good ground for accepting this assumption as a true one. For it is a matter of fact that there are some instances of cognition which are directly apprehended as true. In other words, the truth of these cognitive states are self-evident. To take, for example, a true cognition like 'the cognition of cow is different from that of

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horse'. No second factor is required here to prove that this cognitive state is true. The 'truth' of this knowledge is an object of direct apprehension by the mind. Other instances can be multiplied ad libitum. And if 'truth' can be perceived in some instances of cognition, then there should be no difficulty about the claim that the concomitance of 'volitional success' and 'truth' may, for all that we know, be the object of perception. And, accordingly, it is not impossible to establish a uniform relation between the probans, 'volitional success' and the probandum, 'truth'. The skeptical claim that the truth of a cognition cannot be inferred from the ensuing 'volitional success' cannot be sustained.

It is to be noted, further, that the objection urged by the skeptic that it is not possible to perceive the concomitance of 'volitional success' and 'truth' in an instance of cognition is also without any good ground. In the skeptic's judgment, there should be no need for the inference at all if 'truth' becomes an object of direct apprehension in the case where the concomitance under discussion is perceived. But the skeptic may be reminded here that it is a very common fact that an object of perception may also sometimes be an object of inference. To take the case of the inference of fire in the hill from smoke. Fire is admitted to be an object of perception and it is perceived to exist in the kitchen, for example. But when fire exists unseen in the hill, one is to infer its existence from the 'smoke'. And this inference is not regarded by anybody as needless. Similarly, though the truth of a cognition is an object of direct apprehension in a particular instance, there is no logical bar to its being an object of inference in other cases.

skeptic's claim that the 'truth' of a cognitive state is sometimes apprehended directly by the mind is found, on analysis, to be quite unintelligible. For the state of internal perception under reference cannot be admitted to take place at any temporal instant. To explain.

It has been said before that, on the Nyāya view, a cognition persists generally for two temporal instants. Emerging at 'Tl'

a cognitive unit like the perception of X, or in short 'PX' continues to exist for a second instant, 'T2' and disappears at 'T3'. This 'PX' is an instance of veridical cognition, and, it may be claimed that 'truth' of the cognition called 'PX' is apprehended directly in internal perception. This internal perception of the truth of 'PX' may be called 'CPX'. Now the skeptic asks, at which instant does exactly this 'CPX' emerge? The emergence of 'CPX', or the internal perception of the truth of 'PX' requires an 'operative relation', say 'R' between the mind and 'PX'. For the perception of an object is always conditioned by an 'operative relation' (sannikarsa) between the object to be perceived and the sense-organ concerned. The perception of a jar, for example, is conditioned by an 'operative relation' between the 'eye' and the 'jar'. Similarly in the case of internal perception. The perception of an internal state, like 'desire' of 'cognition' requires an 'operative relation' between the mind and the relevant state. The emergence of 'CPX' or, in other words, the internal perception of the 'truth' of 'PX' requires, therefore, an 'operative relation', say 'R' between the mind and 'PX'. For the perception of the 'truth' of a cognition implies the perception of the cognition itself. Now the skeptic might point out that it is not possible to have this 'R' at the instant called 'T1'. For to have 'R', (that is, an 'operative relation' between the mind and 'PX') the latter must exist before the occurrence of 'R'; since without the presence of the objects to be related the relation itself cannot take place at all. Therefore, if 'R' would occur at 'T1', then it would have to occur before the emergence of 'PX'. But this is patently absurd. For 'T1' is the very instant at which 'PX' itself comes into being. And thus the emergence of 'CPX' cannot be explained. Accordingly, the 'truth' of 'PX' cannot be admitted to be known in internal perception or the direct apprehension by the mind.

It might be urged, however, that the two events, viz., the emergence of 'PX' and the emergence of 'R' may take place at once at 'T1'. In other words, 'PX' becomes an object of direct apprehension when it is in the process of its emergence. But this may be regarded by the skeptic as altogether unwarranted and for the following reason. It is not possible to have a relation with a thing which is only in the process of its emergence.

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ition Tl' For a thing which is in the process of emergence cannot be regarded as an existing entity for existing entity means only an accomplished entity. It is a fact that to have a relation with an object, the object has first to be in existence, that is to say, in must be something accomplished. But, in this case, with the accomplishment of the object in question, viz., 'PX' the temporal instant called 'T1' continues tinto the subsequent instant which may be called 'T2'. How can it be held, therefore, that the emergence of 'PX' and 'R' can occur at once at the same unitary instant called 'T1'?

It is to be noted here that even if the skeptic waives the difficulty regarding the emergence of 'R' at 'T1', the emergence of 'CPX' at 'T1' can by no means be conceded either by the skeptic or by the non-skeptic. For the concession would imply the co-emergence of a cause and an effect, which is palpably absurd. Here 'R', or the 'operative relation' between mind and 'PX' is admitted to be a condition of the emergence of 'CPX' or the internal perception of 'PX'. Now if 'CPX' as the effect, were taken to emergence at 'T1' along with 'R' as the cause, then it would amount to saying that a cause and its effect can emerge at the same time. This, however, is not intelligible.

It is to be emphasised, again, from the skeptical stand point that the difficulty cannot be overcome by assuming that 'CPX' emerges at 'T2' or at any subsequent temporal instant. To elucidate. To admit that 'CPX' emerges at 'T2' is to admit that a person perceives 'X' at the instant 'Tl' and he mentally apprehends that perception of 'X' to be true at the instant which immediately follows, i.e. at 'T2'. But this, in the skeptical judgement, is quite inadmissible. According to the skeptic, 'CPX' cannot be admitted to emerge at 'T2' and the reason is that 'CPX' is an effect of 'R' (that is, the 'operative relation between mind and the object 'PX') and it has just been shown that 'R' cannot take place at 'T1'. It must exist prior to 'CPX' or the direct perception of 'PX'. 'R' might, then, be taken to come into being at 'T2'. Now if 'R' occurs at the instant called 'T2', then it is clear that 'CPX' cannot emerge at 'T2'. The co-emergence of 'R' and 'CPX' cannot be gran caus rega

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granted; for it would imply, as before, the co-emergence of a cause and its effect and with it a number of insoluble difficulties regarding the casual principle.

Now since the emergence of 'CPX' at 'T1' or 'T2' cannot be accounted for, then it would have to be admitted to emerge at the instant subsequent to 'T2', viz., at 'T3'. It would follow, then, that 'PX' or the perception of 'Z' occurs at 'T1' and 'CPX' or the mental perception of 'PX' takes place at 'T3'. And thus it would be possible to admit that the 'truth' of the cognitive state called 'PX' can be apprehended directly at 'T3'.

But that, again, can hardly be accepted. For 'PX' (that is, the perception of X) endures, according to the Nyāya tenet, only for two instants and is bound to disappear at 'T3'. Now it is well-known that a thing that is perceived has got to be contemporaneous with the state of perception. In this case, however, 'PX', according to the Nyāya position, does not persist at 'T3'. The skeptic is thus forced to conclude that it is never possible to apprehend directly the truth of a cognitive state, since the state itself can never be an object of direct apprehension.

With reference to the above skeptical difficulties it is to be observed, that the non-skeptic should have no hesitation to concede the skeptical claim that the emergence of 'CPX' at 'T1' would violate the principle that a cause and its effect cannot emerge at the same time. But he fails to understand why there should be any difficulty about the emergence of 'CPX' at the next temporal instant, viz., at 'T2'. It appears to be assumed by the skeptic that 'R' as a condition for the emergence of 'CPX' cannot emerge at 'T1'. This assumption, however, is neither self-evident nor something that can be demonstrated. What after all is the ground of this assumption under reference? The ground seems to be that though 'PX' which is one of the terms of the 'operative relation R' emerges at 'Tl', it is not a fully accomplished entity at 'T1', and that there cannot be any relation between terms one of which is only in the process of emergence. Now this ground, far from being self-evident, appears to be highly questionable. What exactly is the distinction between the 'process of emerging' and 'emergence'? The pro-

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cess as well as the accomplished state are, surely, effects depending on certain causal conditions. They can be distinguished only if the conditions are different. But it is difficult to see the difference in the case of any effectuation whatsoever. To take the case of an effect, like a jar. It has, if the skeptic's distinction is to be granted, two aspects, viz., 'jar as emerging' and the same 'jar as on accomplished entity'. Now can the causal conditions, in this case, be differentiated into the conditions for the two aspects, viz., 'process of emerging' and the 'product as accomplished'? None, whatsoever. The same conditions that determine the process, determine the product as well.

Further, to distinguish between the process and the product would imply the acceptance of some discontinuity between 'Tl' and 'T2' due to the intervention of a series of instants between them. But 'Tl' and 'T2' are supposed to be *contiguous*. This involves a patent self-contradiction.

It is seen thus that the acceptance of an aspect of an effect describable as a 'process' distinguished from the effect as a 'product' or something accomplished involves a self-contradiction. To escape from this, one will have to say that there is no distinction but a verbal one between the two aspects of an effect, viz., the process and the product. In other words, the time-position of the two aspects is exactly the same. That being the case, there should be no harm in admitting the emergence of an operative relation 'R' between mind and 'PX', at 'Tl' along with the emergence of 'PX'. The skeptical objection, then, does not appear to have any legs to stand upon. Accordingly, the skeptic should feel no difficulty in admitting the emergence of 'R' at 'T1' and that of 'CPX' or the internal perception of 'PX' at 'T2'. Therefore, there seems to be no logical bar to the possibility of direct apprehension of the truth of a cognitive state as has been previously suggested by the non-skeptic The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no difficulty in admitting that knowledge or true cognition can be defined in terms of volitional success.

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Bhaswati Bhattacharya

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NOTES

- 1. 'Yatra ca duṣtam karaṇam yatra ca mithyā iti pratyayah sa eva asamīcīnaḥ pratyayaḥ "—Śabara on "Mīmā hsa-Sūtra', 1.1.5.
- 2. "Sa eva Kāraṇānām adustata kena avagamyate? Na pratyaksena; Nayanakuśaladeh atīndriyatvāt"—Jararāsī: 'Tattvopallavasimha": p. 2.
- 3. "Kim ca indriyāṇām guṇa-doṣāśrayatve tadutthe vijñāne doṣāśanikā na ativartate pumvyāparotpādita-śabdavijñānavat", *Ibid*.
 - 4. "Na api anumanena; lingāntarā-' navagateh". Ibid.
- 5. "Nanu idam eva jāānam lingam taduttham tasya višistatām gamayati; yadi evam itaretarasrayatvam durūtttaram āpanīpadyate" Ibid.
- 6. "Pramāṇataḥ arthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyāt arthavat pramāṇam"—Vātsyayāna's introduction to 'Nyāya-Sūtra', I.1.1.
 - "Maņipradīpaprbhayoḥ maņibuddhyābhidhāvataḥ Mithyājāānāviśeṣe'pi Viśeṣorthakriyām prati"—Dharmakīrti: 'Pramāṇavārtika'.
- 8. Vide Tarkavāgīśa in Nyāya-darśana: Vol. I; 2nd edition, p. 4. (foot-note).
- 9. "Anumānasya tu pravṛttisāmarthya-lingajanamanah anyasya vā nirasta-samasta-vyabhicāraśankasya svataḥ eva prāmāṇyaṁ anymeyavyabhicārilinga-samutthāt"—Vācaspati: 'Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatīka": p. 12, CSS.
- 10. "Tat kim avagatam anavagatam vā? Yadi na avagatam tad 'asti' iti katham vestsi? atha vagatam; tadavagatesh avyabhicāritā katham avagamyate iti pūrvoktam arusartavyam"—Jayarāśi: "Tattvaplava-Simha': page 3.
- 11. "Udakaprāptyā pūrvotpannodakavijāānaysya avyabhicāritā vyava sthāpyate; kim tat pratibhātodakaprāptyā, āhosavit tajjātīyodakaprāptyā..". lbid,
- 12. Tat yadi pratibhātodakaprāptyaā, tat ayuktam; pratibhātodakasya avasthānain na upapadyate, jhaṣa-mahiṣa-parivartanābhighātopajātā " vayavakriyānyāyena pratyastamayasambhavāt". Ibid.
- 13. "Atha taddeśakālasamlagnam udakam na prāpayati tena tat avyabhicāri iti cet". *Ibid*.
- 14. "Yat na prāpayati tat vyabhicāri tarhi mumūrsupadārthotpāditam jūānam candrārkagrahanakṣatratārakādi-samvedanam ca vyabhicāri prāpnoti". *Ibid*.
- 15. "Atha tajjātīyodakaprāptyā, evam tarhi asati udakajñāne' pi jāte kvacit toyam āsādayanti pumāmsah tat api avitatham syāt". *Ibid*.
- 16. "Kimca, pravrttisāmarthyena avyabhicāritā pūrvoditajñānasya jñāpyate.—kim lingābhūtena, āho adhyakṣātmakena". *Ibid* p. 9.

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- 17. "Tat yadi lingabhūtena; tat ayuktam; tena sākam sambandhā. navagateḥ". Ibid.
 - 18. "Avagatau vā alam pravṛttisāmarthyena". Ibid.
- 19. "Atha adhyakṣātmakena; tat ayuktam; pūrvoditapratyastami tana sākam sannikarṣā'bhāvāt". Ibid.
- 20. The reference to the Nyāya tenet, it is to be noted, is due to the fact that this discussion is an offshoot of the controversy between the skeptic Jayarāśi and the Nyāya thinkers regarding the direct apprehension of the truth of a cognitive state.

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THE MISUNDERSTANDING OF HINDUISM *

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In his paper entitled "The Misunderstanding of Hinduism" Professor Santosh Chandra Sengupta defends Hinduism from its Western critics. Hinduism, according to Sengupta requires its defence from such objections as that it is "other-worldly or world and existence-negating, mystical and monistic etc." He assumes without questioning that it would be a disqualification for Hinduism if it is other-worldly etc. disqualification of a kind where the very status of Hinduism as a religion is at stake. He assumes, again without questioning, that Christianity is this-worldly, existence-affirming, theistic etc. And his supreme assumption is that a religion, in the genuine sense of the term, is world and existence-affirming, theistic etc. Therefore, Christianity, according to Sengupta's definition of religion, fully qualifies to be called a religion. The only issue worth consideration is whether Hinduism is similar to Christianity.

The description of Hinduism in terms of existence-negation etc., i.e., its "Western description", in Sengupta's language, "is due to some of the Indian Scholars' one-sided approach to Hindu philosophy and religion. They select one of the systems of Hinduism for which they have a preference and interpret the whole of the Hindu thought in the light of that system. The system in this case is Advaita-Vedānta (pure monism) as expounded by Śankara."3 While interpreting Hinduism sometimes the Indian scholars do not select any system of Hindu thought, not even Sankara-Vedanta; they select some system foreign to the Hindu thought, and try to interpret the whole of Hindu thought in the light of that system. What would be the value of such interpretations? While referring to the study of Hinduism by Christian (Western) scholars Professor Geoffrey Parrinder says, "Clearly there are dangers in viewing other people's beliefs through the coloured spectacles of our own religion".4 What would be the situation if one comes to view one's own religion through the coloured spactacles of others?

To present the true as against the false picture of Hinduism, Sengupta considers three concepts: the concept of ultimate I.P.Q. 3..8

reality, of this world and of liberation. Since the fundamental assumption of his paper is that Christianity is not unlike Hinduism therefore, most of his paper is devoted to his crusade against Advaita-Vedanta. Perhaps Advaita-Vedanta seems to him the only Hindu system which is quite unlike Christianity. He begins his attack on Advaita by arguing that the Advaita conception of Ultimate Reality as impersonal and indeterminate does not have sufficient grounding in Vedas. As he says, "There is no denv. ing that one or two hymns of Rgveda, which is one of the many Vedas, point to the impersonal and indeterminate nature of the Ultimate. But against these one or two hymns there are four other hymns that refer to the notion of the Ultimate as God or Viśva-Karmā, i.e., the maker and the Lord of the Universe"! Let us not dispute Sengupta's statistical analysis of the hymns from Rgveda. But he forgets to quote any of the hymns to which he refers. Since Rgveda is an ocean of hymns, it is diffcult on our part to guess the hymns to which he refers. Then how can we verify Sengupta's analysis and estimate of the hymns in question? Further, Sengupta does not produce any supporting argument for his view that the notion of God signifies the Ultimate Reality in Rgveda. In Rgveda so many different names have been used, such as, Prajāpati, Viśva-Karmā, Puruṣa and Time etc. Whether they are the names of the concrete God of the abstract Absolute is not obvious at the first glance. Again though Rgveda is only one Veda, for Hindu philosophy and religion it is the most important scripture. All the other Vedas Sām, Yajur and Atharva contain large portions Therefore, the importance of Rgveda cannot be decreased simply by saying that it is one of the many.

While discussing the nature of Upanishadic concept of Ultimate Reality, Sengupta uses the same sort of argument which he uses in connecction with the Vedas. As he says, "To cont to Upanishads: There is no denying that there are negative passages here, passages that deny personality and qualities to the ultimate"... "However, against a few such passages there are numerous passages that refer to the Ultimate as a person having qualities..." After his analysis of the two sorts of passage he comes to conclude, "The Upanishads consistently maintain that the world is the expression or the manifestation of the Absorbate that the world is the expression or the manifestation of the Absorbate that the world is the expression or the manifestation of the Absorbate that the world is the expression or the manifestation of the Absorbate that the world is the expression or the manifestation of the Absorbate that the world is the expression or the manifestation of the Absorbate that the world is the expression or the manifestation of the Absorbate that the world is the expression or the manifestation of the Absorbate that the world is the expression or the manifestation of the Absorbate that the world is the expression or the manifestation of the Absorbate that the world is the expression or the manifestation of the Absorbate that the world is the expression of the transfer that the world is the expression of the transfer that the world is the expression of the transfer that the world is the expression of the transfer that the world is the expression of the transfer that the world is the expression of the transfer that the world is the expression of the transfer that the world is the expression of the transfer that the world is the expression of the transfer that the world is the expression of the transfer that the world is the expression of the transfer that the world is the expression of the transfer that the world is the expression of the transfer that the world is the expression of the transfer that the world is the transfe

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lute or God, which means that the world is itself real, for the manifestation of the real cannot be unreal."7 Do Upanishads consistently maintain any particular view? If they do, then how could there arise such diverse interpretations of their views? Again, Sengupta's argument "the manifestation of the real cannot be unreal" fails to do any harm to the position of the Advaitin. Sengupta's 'cannot' is a logical 'cannot'. It is unlike saying 'I cannot' win a hundred miles race'. Suppose one refers to one's dreams and says that they are the unreal manifestations though he himself, i.e., the person who is dreaming, is a real person. Sengupta's view remains unrefuted, for he can easily maintain that dreams are real. Why should they not be real? The term 'real' is ambiguous, it refers to material objects, after-images, ideas and sensations etc. The reality of one object may be unlike the reality of another, yet all sorts of objects that are entertained by one's mind are real in one sense or the other. No empirical situation, no empirical fact, can be brought against Sengupta's position. But if empirical facts do not refute Sengupta, they also fail to support him. From the logical truism that the real cannot manifest what is unreal, nothing can be deduced about the nature or character of this world. This world may very well be unreal though it may be logically true that the real manifests only what is real. If this world is unreal then it would of course, be objectionable on the part of an Advaitin to say that it is the manifestation of the Real. The responsibility of creating this world, therefore, the Advaita-Vedānta puts on Māyā.

Sengupta further says on the above issue "The concept Māyā occurs in the Upanishadic literature. But Māyāvāda, i.e., the doctrine of the unreality of the world, is alien to Upanishads".8 The manner in which Sengupta rejects Māyāvāda shows as if isvaravāda is fully developed in Upanishads. The sense in which Māyāvāda is alien to Upanishads Īśvaravāda is also alien to Upanishads. Upanishads themselves are not the philosophical or metaphysical systems; they are the sources of such systems. It is because no one particular system is developed in them that they could, as has already been pointed out, produce such a variety of systems.

His. analysis of the Upanishadic verses leads Sengupta to find affinity between "theism as it is found in the Upanishad and in Christianity".9 Since Sengupta's analysis of the Upani shadic verses is the same as his analysis of the Vedic hymns (according to both Vedas and Upanishads God is ultimately real), Christian theism should also be like Vedic theism. But Sengupta discovers that the two "conceptions of God-the Upanishadic and Christian—differ in one essential respect in that the former stresses the metaphysical while the latter emphasises the moral qualities of God."10 If the Vedic or the Upanishadic God is provided with the moral qualities, Hinduism would be exactly like Christianity. The Bhagavad-Gitā bridges the gull between Hinduism and Christianity for it "focuses on the moral attribitues of God and recognizes devotion (Bhakti) as the principal mode of union with Him". 11 Bond between Hinduism and Christianity becomes perfect when we come to the school of Rāmānuja, i.e., Vaisnavism or theistic Vedānta, for in this system there is "stress on the moral attributes of God, such as love".12 The evolution of the theistic concept of God in Rāmānuja, according to Sengupta, is the result of the impact of Christia nity upon Hinduism. This is proved by the fact that while discussing the nature of the moral attributes of God in the theisite Vedānta or Vaisnavism, Sengupta closes his discussion by saying "There are some historians of Indian philosophy who even speak of the influence of Christianity upon the schools referred to."13 Though Sengupta uses the word 'schools' (in plural) as a matter of fact he refers to only one school, for he talks of the theistic Vedanta and Vaisnavism as if they are two different schools. In referring to the historians of Indian philosophy, this context, he is not referring to any historian having authentic work. He is referring to the Western (Christian) historians of Indian Philosophy. Leaving a few exceptions, most of whom have either deliberately distorted the Indian philosophy or exhibit a lack of understanding of Indian philosophy. The fact that Ser gupta has simply reported without contradicting the views of these historians shows that he is in agreement with their views His agreement with the views of these historians is further prove by the fact that Sengupta refers to the historical position of Ramb nuja as 1000 A.D.—a sufficient gap after the death of Christ

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provei Rāmi Christ without at all referring to the historical position of Sankara or any other Hindu thinker in the whole of his paper. A religious system which comes after Christ, one may be misled into thinking, has influence of Christianity. Consider a piece of wild guess produced by the American scholar Dr. Ruth Reyna. She says, "The saving grace of a personal God is characteristically Christian and may stem from Christian influence. Although this has not been established historically, Rāmānuja having come from the South of India where Christianity has established itself in the early centuries of the Christian era lends considerable support to the idea". Since Gītā has much currency in the West, and even the Western scholars place it in the third century B.C. I would like to quote just one verse from Gītā to exhibit that Hindus knew about the saving grace of God:

"Put your trust in Him and have no other thought; by His grace you will attain supreme peace and the everlasting abode." (17-62)

(Translation—C. Rajagopalachari)

Rāmānuja was not ignorant of Gita. The Western scholars like Reyna and Sengupta force Hindu scholars to produce similar wild guesses. There is abundent historical evidence, the writings of the Greek and Roman historians like Ptolomy, Arrian, Strabo, Diodrus, Pliny and Plutarch, that the literate West was quite aware of the Wisdom of the East. The Buddhists established their missions in the Mediterranean regions (Palestine, Egypt and Syria) long before the birth of Christ. And the Hindu traders were not unknown to the people of these regions. No surprise if the Pre-Christian Mediterranean people already knew about the complexities of Hinduism, for Hinduism at that time was the main terget of Buddhism. The Christian religion to a Hindu scholar appears to be a simple combination of Bhuddhism and Hinduism. The missionary spirit of Buddhism coupled with the Bhakti religion of Hinduism can be combined to form a new religion. One may not be surprised to know the fact that the New Testament has something in common with the Bhagavad-Gitā. If one likes one can compare: Ch. VII-17 (B.G.) with John XIV-21 (N.T.); Ch. IX-18 (B.G.) with John IV-6 (N.T.); Ch. VI-30 (B.G.) with John VI-57 (N.T.); Ch. VI-29 (B.G.) with John XVII-23 (N.T.) and so on.

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If Hinduism as reduced to Rāmānuja's Vaisnavism is connected with Christianity in such a way that the former is the result of the latter, then Sengupta's reference to Vedas, Upanishads and Gita becomes futile. For these scriptures were written centuries before the birth of Christ. Sengupta says, "A Hindu is no less a Hindu in his openness or adaptation to what he finds. say, in Christianity and misses in his own religion."15 Had the traditional or orthodox Hinduism exhibited the sort of 'openness and adaptation' to which Sengupta refers, the Mediterranean religions would have failed to capture the land of Hindus. Failure to be absorved in Hinduism, Buddha had to start his own independent religion. Not only Hinduism, even Buddhism and Jainism lack the Christian concept of Crusade. Islam adopted it in the form of Jihad. But Hinduism would prefer annihilation to the adaptation of such a barbaric concept. The most important question in the present context is to consider whether Hinduism missed the theistic concept or Bhakti tradition. Was Rāmājnuja a product of the Bhakti tradition of India, or did he start this tradition? Śankara who was the strongest critic of the Bhakti tradition admits in his works the antiquity of this tradition, afterwards, so much emphasised by Rāmānuja. Even a Western scholar like Scheweitzer, who is so found of the terminology of world-affirmation and world-negation etc., the sort of terminology used by Sengupta, admits that "The Hindu Bhakti religion may be older than Buddhism, but is certainly of later date than Brahmanic mysticism, to whose influence, indeed it ows its rise. The beginning, then, of this higher development of popular religion may be referred to about 700 B.C.". 16 But if the Bhakti tradition already existed in Hinduism, there is no scope for the wild guesses.

Continuing his attack on Advaita Sengupta remarks, "The Advaita view of Ultimate Reality associated with Śaṅkara, is not a religious view at all, for it considers religion as a matter of ignorance (Avidya). This is evident from the view of the strong central distinction between the Absolute of philosophy (Braḥman) and the God (Iśvara) of religion." Sengupta is right. There is a sense in which Śaṅkara's conception of Braḥman is no more a Hindu conception than, say, Bradley's conception of the Absolute is a Christian conception. However, what Sengupta considers as an objection to Advaita, is simply a statement of its position.

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The fact that God is not Ultimately real or that religion is the product of Avidya does not imply, as Sengupta thinks that it implies, that every body should stop worshipping God or should give up religion. Worship of God (Bhakti) is one of the paths which can produce knowledge of Brahman, and consequently liberate a man. Those who cannot follow the path of knowledge directly because of their limitations can take the path of Bhakti. What Advaita denies is simply that one should be liberated directly with the help of Bhakti without the intermediate state of the knowledge of Brahman. Advaita does not reject religion, it simply gives a secondary importance to it. Why should religion be given primary importance?

Referring to the attitude of the Western scholars towards Bhagavad-Gitā Sengupta says, "We can say that Gitā is to the Hindus what the Bible is to the Christians and the Quran is to the Muslims. The Gita is the most popular Hindu scripture and it is unfortunate that many Western interpreters of Hinduism do not take much notice of it."18 There is a religion called Christianity, and it has one and only one scripture called the Bible. There is another religion called Islam, and it has one and only one scripture called the Quran. There is a third religion called Hinduism, therefore, by analogy with Christianity and Islam. It should also have one and only one scripture. Sengupta has discovered that scripture, it is Gita. It is an interesting fact to know that Gitā is not a sacred canon of Hindus as Bible is the sacred canon of Christians and the Quran a sacred canon of Islam. responsibility of raising the status of Gitā to the Bible of Hindus goes to the British. Since the sacred canon of Hindus, the Vedas, could not be touched by all Hindus, the Gita started performing the function of the Bible of Hindus for taking oath in the courts of justice. Sengupta thinks that the Western scholars commit the error of omission by not taking into consideration the teaching of such a scripture as Gitā. It is the other way round. The Gitā is an extremely popular book in the West, perhaps next to the Bible. It is not the Indian but the Western (Christian) policy these days to interpret Hinduism in the light of the teachings of Gitā, particularly in terms of its path of devotion. Both R. C. Zehner and Geoffrey Parrinder, the leading contemporary British Christian theologians, have interpreted the teaching of Gitā in the light of its

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path of devotion, rejecting the Advaitic interpretation. Western scholars cannot but appreciate Sengupta's own reduction of Hinduism to its Bhakti path and Rāmānuja's Vaiṣṇavism.

Let us now consider Sengupta's Hindu view of the world, the world which we are presently occupying. As on the issue of the Ultimate Reality so also on the issue of this world Sengupta's only interest is to oppose Advaita view. Consider his remark, "Māyāvāda is alien to the scriptures—the Vedas, the Upanishads and the Gītā". We have already commented on such a remark. Concerning Gītā he goes on making even stronger remarks, "In the Gītā there is no reference to the unreality or the illusory character of the world". There are several verses in Gītā which clearly maintain that the world is Māyā, i.e., illusion, in the sense in which the term Māyā, singifies illusion. For Sengupta's satisfaction two verses are quoted below:

"This divine Māyā, operated by Me and founded on the play of qualities, is hard to overcome; but they who seek refuge in Me cross over this illusion." (VII-14); (translation—C. Rajgopalachari).

"I am concealed from view by this illusion of creative activity. This ignorant world does not know Me, who have neither birth nor ending." (VII-25); (Translation—C. Rajagopalachari).

Just as Gitā is the source for Rāmānuja's Īśvaravād, so also Gitā is the source for Śaṅkara's Māyāvāda. Since Gitā does not claim to say anything which has not already been said in the earlier scriptures, Upanishads and Vedas, it gives support to Śaṅkara's interpretation of Hinduism in terms of Māyāvāda.

Sengupta says, "It is no exageration to state that it is not the affirmation but the negation of Māyāvāda that is more characteristic of Hinduism". Does Sengupta mean to say that the number of Hindus who accept Māyāvāda is less than the numbre of Hindus who reject it? What is meant by the expression more characteristic? Is Māyāvāda the characteristic of any other religion? Have the Christians, the Muslims or the Jews ever maintained that the world is Māyā? Then Māyāvāda is surely a very striking characteristic of Hinduism, a characteristic that distinguishes Hinduism from other religions. Sengupta says that

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has confi atter Hino Seng esser To 1 "it is erroneous to interpret the whole of Hinduism in the light of one system or school".22 He is revolting against the reductionistic tendencies in the interpretations of Hinduism. But Sengupta himself suffers from the reductionistic tendencies. He has reduced Hinduism to its theistic school. Again, all Hindu scriptures have been reduced to Bhagavad-Gitä. Throughout his paper Sengupta has expressed bias in favour of God, that he has gone to the extent of converting the existence of God into the defining characteristic of a religion. As he says, "Different religions are God or infinite-centred".23 The term infinite in this context is restricted to God, for Brahman is also infinite but Sengupta does not allow a religion to be Brahman-centred. The remark of Sengupta should not be taken as an empirical generalisation about religions. For only such religions as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism are God-centred. Buddhism, Jainism and some systems of Hinduism are not God-centred. Sengupta has already excluded Sankara-Vedanta, But he has failed even to mention in his paper that Hinduism includes Sāmkhya, Mimāmsā and Carvakas. With the exception of Vijnanabhiksu, the concept of God is inconsistent with the Sāmkhya doctrine. And unfortunately the God of Vijnanabhiksu does not satisfy Sengupta's prescribed qualifications, for Sengupta's God does not allow the prior existence of Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Again, for Sengupta nothing but God is ultimately real. But to accept the existence of God in this sense for a Mimāmsaka could be to accept some authority higher than Vedas. Only the Vedas are Ultimately Real. There is no necessity to tell about the notorious Hindu saints, Cārvākas. For all sorts of things Sengupta puts blame on Sankara-Vedānta, which according to him, is only one system of Hinduism, as if all other systems have the same sort of views. The belief in God is not an essential feature of Indian religions.

The final issue of the paper, the Hindu concept of liberation, has become, in Sengupta's hands a zoo of confusions. These confusions are the natural outcome of a conflict between Sengupta's attempt to convert Hinduism to Christianity and on the part of Hinduism trying to break away from his grips. To understand Sengupta's treatment of the Hindu concept of liberation, it is essential that we understand first the Christian concept of liberation. To be liberated for Christianity does not mean to be liberated from

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moral actions. All this follows from the Christian doctrine of Resurrection. Since liberation from this world does not imply liberation from the bodily existence, so morality is also transfered to the Spiritual world with the transfer of bodies. The Christian concept of death is not strictly bodily-death, for a Resurrection person is required to arise with the same body which he had before he died. This is perhaps the reason why Christianity does not allow the bodies of its dead to get injured through fire or water. A liberated person is as distinct from God as is the person who is in bondage. God's spiritual world is unlike, but not wholly unlike, the world of persons who are in bondage. Since Advaita considers liberation as a state of being one with the Brahman, it appears to be wholly an UnChristian view.

Hinduism could be a religion of the same pattern as Christianity if somehow the concept of liberation is tagged with the concept of bodily existence. Therefore, Sengupta's attention is directed towards the Hindu concept of a liberated embodied person. As he says, "The way of liberation does not mark the cecession of the way of action, for liberation in the world is possible. For liberated persons, living in the world means performing actions, for to live is to act. All that we can say is that with liberation there is a change of activity, to the extent that the moral life is the life of conflict and resistence for one who is in bondage, while it is natural and spontaneous for one who is emancipated",24 In referring to liberated persons, in this context, Sengupta is referring to those persons who have been described in the Hindu tradition as Jivanamuktas. But in referring to Jivanamuktas in this context Sengupta is committing a grave mistake. Rāmānuja totally rejected the possibility of Jivanamukti, i.e., the possibility of emancipation while one is living in this world. Death or destruction of the material body is a precondition for liberation. And the Non-Vaisnava systems evolved the concept of Jivanamukta to show the possibility of freedom from all sorts of actions without having one's bodily death. Does a liberated person, living in the world, act because he considers that some action is good or bad? liberated person no action is good or bad, for he has transcended the notions of goodness and badness. Janak is as indifferent to the beautiful woman sitting in his lap as his hand burning in the fire By obtaining liberation one has lost the sense even of pleasure ne of imply sfered ristian ection before

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and pain. It does not matter for a liberated person whether he sleeps on a confortable cushion or on the thorny bed in the forest, for comforts and discomforts have no distinction for him. It is because of the fact that the liberated emobodied persons transcend the moral and religious distinctions that we hear queer stories about their behaviour. The pure concept of a liberated person, however, does not allow a person to be embodied. Death of this body is essential for final liberation. Some Hindu systems (all shades of Vedāntins) believe that the final liberation consists in becoming one (merging) with the Absolute. Sengupta rejects this view, for this view goes against the Christian concept of liberation. According to him the "state of being one with God is not one of complete absorption into the divine or ultimate reality".25 Granted that it is not complete absorption; does a liberated person continue to retain the same material body which he had before he died! All Hindu systems, those which accept as well as those which reject the merging of oneself into the Absolute, accept the destruction of the material body with which they have come to this samsara as a precondition for final liberation. Even in Rāmānuja's Vaisnavism this body being material (acit) has to be given up. Then, in what sense is the Hindu view of liberation similar to the Christian view?

In his attempt to show that liberation has a moral content Sengupta simply argues that it is obtained through moral action. Consider his remark, "In the Hindu view, liberation which has ethical content, is also ethically conditioned".26 In support of his remark he says such things as, "Liberation is a matter of attainment through moral action".27 "Hindu religious believers maintain that one principal way of obtaining emancipation is moral action". 28 None of these remarks shows that liberation (Moksa) has an ethical content, unless one confuses what is simply a means (moral action) with what is an end (Mokṣa).

In his attempt to show that the philanthropic ideal or the ideal of social service is not alien to Hinduism, Sengupta says, "We know of many religious leaders, the foremost among whom is Swami Vivekānand, who have through their extensive social reforms tried to show that the ideal of social service is not alien to Hindu religion".29 Is this a defence? What about Pre-Vivekānanda Hinduism? Sengupta's defence of Hinduism 124

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against the attack by the Western Christian scholars is a mock defence. In showing that Hinduism is a world and existence. affirming religion he gives the name of Rāmānuja. And then immediately also accepts that Rāmānuja was the product of Christian influence. Is Sengupta defending Hinduism or arguing against its unique character? The question about the altruistic or philanthropic character of a religion is deep-rooted question Can helping one's son or wife or any other member of one's family be regarded as a case of performing a philanthropic act? It is helping others, who are not related to oneself, that the question of philanthropic action arises. Can Christianity provide indescriminate help to others? Do Christians have the same sort of attitude towards the heathen as they have to the persons of their own faith with whom a sort of kinship is established? So far the heathen is concerned, there is a simple principle-conversion or elimination. In Hinduism the question of philanthropic actions towards human beings plays a very minor role. The compassion for all living creatures includes the compassion for human beings.

In his attempt to produce a simplified version of Huinduism Sengupta suppresses its complications. Believe in the abstract Absolute or believe in the concrete God, you remain a Hindu. Believe in as many Gods as you like and do not believe in any God whatsoever, you remain a Hindu. There is not one but many scriptures of Hindus, but you remain a Hindu even if you consider all these scriptures as frauds introduced by the cunning Brahmins. For Hindus there are worlds other than this world, but you have not given up Hinduism if you reject the reality of even this world. For some Hindus one cannot be liberated if both mind and body are not dissolved. For others, only the body, is to be dissolved, mind has to be retained. And still others, the material body is to be given up and in its place the non-material body is to be acquired. But even if you reject the concept of liberation, you have not lost your faith in Hinduism. Hinduism is unlike, wholly unlike, Christianity. For the question of likeness and unlikeness is considered in its totality. One is not allowed to remain a Christian if one has lost his faith in the Bible or the God. But losing faith in the existence of God or one or all the scriptures is not losing faith in Hinduism. God is above the Bible, but for Hindus, Mimāmsaka's the Vedas are final, that nothing could be abov depe

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above the Vedas, not even God. The knowledge that God exists depends on Vedas. A Christian cannot be liberated if he has lost faith in his religion. if he has become a heathen. But a Hindu would allow you liberation even if you are a Christian, what is required for you to be liberated is simply that you follow your own religion faithfully. These and several other complications about Hinduism would perhaps lead one to think that Hinduism is a repository of all truths, that it is a permutation and combination of all possible religious truths. Hindus have not to go outside their religious fold to learn any new religious truth. But this goes against Sengupta's conception of a religion. His conception of religion is such that no one particular religion or him could be the "repository of all truths".30 Thus to show that Hinduism is not a repository of all truths, that it is as simple as any other religion, Sengupta has to reduce Hinduism only to those truths that are found in Christianity. What purpose does such a study as the study of Hinduism by Sengupta serve? Is the education of comparative religion, the education of a new religion, based on the common elements of all religions, the university professors being its priests and the universities its temples for prayer and worship?

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NOTES

*This research was supported by the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla.

- 1. Truth and Dialogue, edited by John Hick, pp. 96-110.
- 2. Ibid., p. 96-7.
- 3. Ibid., p. 97.
- 4. Ibid., p. 112.
- 5. Ibid., p. 97.
- 6. Ibid., p. 98.
- 7. Ibid., p. 99. 8. Ibid., p. 99.
- 9. Ibid., p. 99.
- 10. Ibid., p 99.
- 11. Ibid., p. 99.
- 12. Ibid., p. 101.

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- Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Tata, Mcgraw-Hill, 1971, p. 224 14.
- 15. Truth and Dialogue, p. 109.
- Indian Thought and Its Development, London, 1936, p. 181. 16.
- 17. Truth and Dialogue, p. 100.
- 18. Ibid., p. 101.
- 19. Ibid., p. 103.
- 20. Ibid., p. 103.
- 21. Ibid., p. 103.
- 22. Ibid., p. 103.
- 23. Ibid., p. 108.
- 24. Ibid., p. 105.
- 25. Ibid., p. 106.
- 26. Ibid., p. 106.
- 27. Ibid., p. 106.
- 28. Ibid., p. 106.
- 29. Ibid., p. 106.
- 30. Ibid., p. 109.

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WHAT DO ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD REALLY PROVE?

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In the history of philosophy, both eastern and western (although more in the latter than in the former), considerable philosophical acumen, effort, and energy were spent in constructing arguments for the existence of God. Such pre-occupations with the existence of God are not just a matter of the past. Quite the contrary, to-day as ever before, philosophers are busy either polishing and revising old arguments or constructing new ones witness recent work of Norman Malcolm, Charles Hartshorne, George Mavrodes, and Alvin Plantinga, to mention only a few contemporary philosophers of different persuasions but all interested in proving the existence of God. The purpose of the present paper is to show that in a very real sense arguments for the existence of God can never even get off the ground—in the sense that their premises cannot be formulated in an unambiguous way, let alone their truth as well as that of their conclusion, namely, God exists; and that all purported proofs for the existence of God are nothing but rationalizations producing the illusion that one has a rational basis for holding that God exists. It will also be shown that insofar as there are different conceptions of God in different cultures, any argument for the existence of God is necessarily culture-bound. The most a given philosopher can claim, then, is that God, according to his own conception, exists. If so, paradoxically enough, it follows that many Gods with mutually incompatible properties exist. This is indeed a disturbing conclusion for monotheists. I turn now to a consideration of these points.

Let us start with the type of arguments for which the conception of God as most perfect being is crucial, irrespective of such arguments being called 'ontological' or 'moral'. Proponents of arguments of this type usually do not clarify "most perfect being," besides saying that such a concept necessarily includes 'existence' or means, among other things, "the being with highest moral perfection." But this would not do, for 'perfection' is a valueladen term and one has to make clear what attributes constitute perfection, while we may readily grant that all the constitutive

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attributes, whatever they may be, may be thought of as exemple fied in God in the highest degree. That is, perfection has two aspects, a qualitative and a quantitative, and unless the two aspects are distinguished and the attributes which make up the qualitative aspect are spelled out, the argument cannot be form. lated unambiguously. And it is obvious that different advocates of argument from highest perfection consider different attributes as marks of perfection. Which attributes a given philosopher so regards depends upon his cultural background and philosophical persuasion. Thus it is only by unpacking the crucial term. namely, 'most perfect being', we come to know that two philosophers have different conceptions of perfection and hence of most perfect being, whose existence both claim their arguments prove. Otherwise, one would mistakenly believe that they have both proved the existence of the same God. It is clear now that the so-called ontological argument, or, for that matter, any argument which employes the notion of perfection, is, contrary to general belief, in an important manner grounded in value judgments. That such is the case may not, however, be apparent. Thus when a philosopher from a given culture and with a certain philosophical persuasion presents an argument employing the concept of highest perfection, his fellow-philosophers (from the same culture and philosophical persuasion, of course) do not ask for a clarification of 'highest perfection', the reason being that all of them being from the same culture, implicitly agree as to what attributes constitute highest perfection. And those among them who challenge the argument usually do so from some other angle, such as whether 'highest perfection' necessarily includes 'existence', etc. My point here is that if the advocate of the argument is pressed right at the beginning to define 'highest perfection', he confronts serious and insurmountable difficulties and it becomes clear that he cannot proceed with the argument without making controversial value judgments. Thus suppose he says that 'highest perfection' means, among other things, highest wisdom, and I ask him why not highest stupidity, for after all the latter is as rare and hard to come by as the former. The philosopher would immediately object to my question by saying that perfection is made up of only the positive and not the negative qualities. The bag of troubles is empli. as two e two up the ormu.

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now wide open, for the philosopher has to tell us on what criteria he classifies a given attribute as positive or negative. To continue, consider two conceptions of God, according to one of which perfection includes might and heroism and according to the other neacefulness and non-violence. Surely, then, any proof for the existence of God according to the first conception will be at odds with a proof according to the latter. It is fallacious, then, to think that both are proofs for the existence of the same God. If two conceptions are different then the two entities (actual or possible) to which they refer are also different and hence a proof for the existence of one entity is not the same as that for the existence of the other. To be sure, a philosopher may try to reconcile two incompatible conceptions of God as the above by saying that God as most perfect being exemplifies both highest power for violence and wrath and highest non-violence and peacefulness. But such an amalgamated conception is obviously selfcontradictory, and the philosopher may again try to remove this self-contradictoriness by maintaining that God, although He has both these attributes in the highest degree, uses them appropriately in any given situation in light of His highest wisdom. This suggestion seems nice and interesting. But the question arises as to how the philosopher knows that such is the case? only answer to this is that the philosopher so conceives God. And what does this prove? Nothing, except that the philosopher, has a certain conception of God, not that there exists an entity fitting that conception. His argument thus never gets off the ground. The so-called arguments for the existence of God are often constructed without explicating of such crucial concepts as 'highest perfection' and 'most perfect being'.

In order to substantiate this observation further, I now point out a similar difficulty with respect to the type of arguments known as cosmological arguments. These arguments, as is well-known; try to establish the existence of God by not permitting an infinite casual chain and by arbitrarily terminating it in God. But, one asks, why so terminate the chain? The answer is that the advocate of the argument so conceives God that He is the uncaused cause (or the unmoved mover) in whom, by definition, originates the causal chain needed to account for what there is.

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But has the advocate of the argument thereby proved there exists God who is an uncaused cause? Surely not, all that is shown is that the philosopher has a certain conception of God. It might be mentioned in passing that for an Upanishadic Hindu such cosmological arguments as the above do not prove the existence of Brahman which, according to the Upanishads is beyond all predicates, including 'uncaused cause'. Thus the argument for the existence of God which convinces, for example, a Christian philosopher fails to convince an Upanishadic Hindu philosopher. The important point to note here is that the former and the latter have two radically different conceptions of God.

Let me now throw further light on this point by considering that notorious and ignominious phenomenon known as 'religious wars', for example the Crusades. For our purposes, we need not worry about the real (!) reasons for and causes of the Crusades. All we need to acknowledge is religious animosity between two peoples. Now suppose that the Christian and the Moslem each has his own argument for the existence of God. The question now arises whether their proofs are centered around the same concept of God. My contention is that insofar as there is religious conflict, in the sense that each is not content to leave the other in peace with his own conception of God and is actively engaged in opposing the other's, their conceptions of God differ in at least one respect, whatever that may be. If so, their supposed proofs are not proofs of the same God. Nor does the fact that during some periods they both live in peace prove that they have the same conception of God. Each prays to and worships his own God without concerning himself with the other. Some might object that these observations are irrelevant to a philosophical proof of God. I submit that such an objection is mistaken and powerless, for it is futile to pretend that philosophers and their proofs are somehow totally unrelated to their education, upbringing, culture, and religious and philosophical persuasions, Thus Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Paley, Hartshorne, Malcolm, Plantinga, Sankara, and Ramanuja have each his own conception of God in their proofs. It may be the case that two or more philosophers have the same conception of God. But it is imprortant to note that although different philosophers may accept, for example, argument from highest perfection, they give different meanings to 'highest perfection' and this means exists nown L. It Lindu

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that they are proving the existence of different Gods. Thus there is only verbal agreement among them insofar as they all employ the phrase 'highest perfection' or 'most perfect being' and no real agreement. Each philosopher proves to his own satisfaction the existence of God according to his own conception. Thus in the Jewish conception of God is included His choosing some people (in preference to others). And if we ask a Jewish philosopher why God choose a particular people rather than others. he can only answer, "Well, to have so chosen is a mark of His nerfection." Needless to say, such an answer will be rejected by others who believes that such acts as choosing and displaying preferences cannot be marks of highest perfection. The point, then, is that when a philosopher constructs a proof for the existence of God, he has to set up some conception or other of God and no conception of God can incorporate in itself all the properties all people attribute to God. If someone tries to be so large-hearted as to generate an all-inclusive conception of God, the resulting conception of God would be either vacuous or selfcontradictory. Thus when a philosopher presents an argument for the existence of God, the question to ask is not whether the argument is valid but rather what his conception of God whose existence he is trying to prove is and why that particular conception and not some other. In answering this question, it becomes clear that his conception is only one among many possible ones and that all that the philosopher is doing is to rationalize his own conception through some supposed proof. Against this charge, the philosopher might maintain that he is not concerned with other people's conceptions of God and that he is proving the existence of God according to his own. Such an assertion is both honest and correct. But the only trouble is seldom do philosophers state that their proofs are proofs for existence of God according to their own conception and often leave the impression that they are proving the existence of God according to some universally accepted conception. I have rarely come across a Moslem philosopher who says he is proving the existence of Moslem God, a Christian philosopher a Christian God or Moslem God, a Christian philosopher a Christian God, or a Bahai philosopher a Bahai God, etc. And there is no need to point out that philosophy books and articles are notorious for such titles as "Arguments for the existence of God" and one wonders which God (s).

R. PULIGANDLA

I now raise the question why in the first place a philosopher concerns himself with proving the existence of God. It should be kept in mind that this question is different from the one as to why people believe in God-to which we have the well-worn Freudian, Marxist, and other kinds of psychological and sociopolitical answers. Whether or not such explanations are satisfactory and acceptable is not our concern here. One main reason. philosophers engage in constructing arguments for the existence of God is that they want to assure themselves that their belief in God is rationally grounded. That is, they want to support their belief in God by reasons. But while granting that a desire to seek such rational grounding of one's belief in God is the motivating force behind constructing arguments, we may still legitimately seek psychological and other explanations as to why someone in the first place believes that God exists. Be the latter as it may, we want to ask whether arguments for the existence of God really provide a rational basis for believing that God exists. It seems not, for as has been argued earlier, if each person or group of persons proves at best only that God according to a particular conception exists, none of the arguments satisfies what I call the 'uniqueness claim', namely, the claim that only God according to one's own conception exists but not according to those of others. That is, offering a uniqueness argument is part of the meaning of rationally grounding one's belief in God, insofar as one believes that one's own conception of God is universal and does not even hint that one allows for its being not so. But in the absence of uniqueness arguments all the so-called arguments for the existence of God are no more than rationalizations of one's own belief that God according to his own conception exists. Put differently, in order for it to be acceptable, any argument for the existence of God should prove not only that God according to its proponent's conception exists but also that it is impossible for God according to their conceptions to exist. But to the best of my knowledge and belief this has never been done. It is worth noting that this observation has serious implications for monotheism. A polytheist, by definition, grants that he believes in the existence of many gods and by rationally is primarily concerned with proving his gods grounding his belief, leaving aside the question of rational vindicati is r

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is radically different with respect to monotheism, for a mono-

theist, such as a Jew, Moslem, or Christian, by definition believes

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y defids and ionally vindithis belief he has to show not only that there exists God according to his own conception but also that no other gods can exist. And surprisingly enough, this requirement has never been squarely faced by monotheistic philosophers and theologians. Having lacked arguments, when challenged they resorted to the sword and the bayonet and a variety of religious and philosophical chauvinism. Witness the Moslem destruction of Hindu temples and idols which the Moslems saw as the epitome of polytheism. Thus the problem of universality and uniqueness has a special bearing on proofs for the existence of God. For all monotheists maintain that their God is not a sectarian God but universal and the only one. And such a claim can only be supported by showing that it is impossible for any God other than their own to exist.

My claim that any supposed argument for the existence of God is a rationalization of an initial belief is supported, ironically enough, by Mavrodes (who, it seems, holds that God's existence can be proved) when he writes: "unless a person

God is a rationalization of an initial belief is supported, ironically enough, by Mavrodes (who, it seems, holds that God's existence can be proved) when he writes: "....unless a person has faith in God, the mere fact that there is a sound argument for God's existence—or even that he has heard such an argument -cannot make his belief in God rational."2 In other words, Mavrodes is saying that a mere proof, no matter how logical and sound, is not enough unless backed up by prior faith in God. And what is faith in God? I answer that it is that frame of mind in which rationalization appears as rational vindication. Prior faith is a necessary condition for accepting a given argument as providing rational basis for one's belief in God's existence. But how explain the initial faith? On rational grounds? Obviously not. It can only be explained by bringing in psychological logical, cultural, and other considerations, individual and collective. In order to bring into focus the rationalizing role of faith, it is enough to ask whether a man would give up his faith if he is unable to find arguments in which to rationally ground it or it. it or if his arguments are rationally refuted. The answer to this is by and large 'no', and this shows that the supposed proofs 134

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a believer produces are no more than rationalizations of his anterior faith. They have little bearing on what he originally comes to hold on faith, no matter how he comes to embrace that faith.

Philosophers in general and in particular those who busy themselves with proving the existence of God are a strange and curious breed of men. Thus while priding themselves as men guided by reason and rationality, they nevertheless go on looking for and constructing proofs to provide a rational basis for something which in the first place they come to hold on the basis of faith. No wonder, then, the whole enterprise of proving the existence of God is a thorough failure. But philosophers are men of robust souls not to be daunted by such failure. The driving current of faith is too strong for them to see the distinction between ratiocination and rationalization when it comes to their precious faith.

Let someone think that my claim that when a philosopher presents arguments for the existence of God he does so with a specific conception of God in mind is unfounded, let me quote Plantinga: "In this study I set out to investigate the rational justification of belief in the existence of God as He is conceived in the Hebrew-Christian tradiation."3 Let us assume Plantinga's arguments are valid. What do they prove? They prove no more than that he has proved to his own satisfaction (and that of the followers of the Hebrew-Christian tradition) that the Hebrew-Christian God exists. But these arguments do not convince a non-Christian, for example a Hindu or a Buddhist. It is also interesting to note that Plantinga passes by the notion of perfectly good4 without saying that it means different things to different people. To be sure, he does deal with the problem of evil. But what is to be considered as evil depends upon what is meant by 'perfectly good'. Thus my point that one at best proves the existence of God according to one's own conception of God holds with respect to Plantinga. It is to Plantinga's credit, however, that unlike many other philosophers he explicitly states at the beginning of his work that it deals with the existence of God according to a particular conception.

WHAT DO ARGUMENTS

That the power of anterior faith is too strong to resist constructing arguments can be clearly seen in the case of Malcolm. Thus while he claims to do and exhorts others to do philosophy according to the Wittgensteinian view that the proper task of philosophy is to disentangle conceptual confusions and clear up conceptual muddles and not to tell what does or does not exist Malcolm defends Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God.5 But to claim that God exists is not just clearing up conceptual muddles. It is much more than that—it is to claim that there exists something with certain attributes. It is an existential claim with respect to a certain kind of entity, not an empty verbal claim which in any case need not be taken seriously. The point of these remarks is that the power and hold of faith is so strong that Malcolm does not hesitate philosophizing against his own canons, to the extent one can gather them from his writings.

A similar observation with regard to the power of faith can be made with respect to Plantinga. He tries to prove the existence of God by an analogical argument which he himself sums up as follows: "If my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God. But obviously the former is rational; so therefore, is the latter."6 Limitations of space do not permit me to deal with this argument in detail here and so I restrict myself to comment or two. It seems quite rational to believe in other minds (the term 'minds' is admittedly complicated and ambiguous) without having to believe in God and there are many who do so. It then follows that either these men are irrational or Plantinga's argument simply fails. Plantinga would have had a stronger case had he constructed an argument of the following type: It to believe in other minds is rational and God (the Hebrew-Christian, of course) is another mind, then to believe in God is rational. But what does it mean to show God is another mind? Further, he should show that God is not just another mind but a mind with the attributes of the Hebrew-Christian God. I simply cannot see how any one could go about showing this. It is also to be noted that Plantinga's argument is concerned with having a rational belief (on some agreed criteria of rational'), not with whether such a belief is true. If by 'rational' we mean logically possible, then it is logically possible that God

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does not exist. Plantinga's argument, then, seems to be no more than saying that God's existence is logically possible, which is really not saying much in spite of the fine distinctions he makes and the subtle arguments he presents. And, as pointed out earlier, even if one accepts Plantinga's arguments, it only proves the existence of the Hebrew-Christian God and not that other gods do not exist. If so, it conviences only those who are already committed to the Hebrew-Christian faith. Thus Plantinga's arguments cannot circumvent my basic thesis that any argument for the existence of God is necessarily tied down to some particular conception of God and as long as it is logically possible to have other conceptions no arguments need be taken seriously, for it would be merely a rationalization of a prior faith and commitment to a certain conception of God.

To conclude, the so-called proofs for the existence of God prove nothing about God's existence but only that a philosopher has a certain conception of God. Further, even if we have a particular proof for the existence of God, by giving different meanings to the different crucial concepts occurring in the argument, for example 'God' and 'most perfect being', we can prove the existence of many Gods. In fact, each instantiation of the argument-form, of which the original argument is but an instance, is a proof of a different God. Thus if someone accepts the argument from highest perfection, then each different conception of highest perfection results in a proof for a different God. That a given argument for the existence of God is based on some particular conception of God presents serious difficulties to monotheism. For insofar as every monotheist claims that his own God is both most perfect and the only one, it follows that the claims of different monotheists, such as Moslems and Christians, conflict with each other. The only way out of this impasse, then, is either to give a uniqueness demonstration of withdraw the monotheistic claim as well as the claim to highest perfection. In my judgment, for what it is worth, withdrawal of the monotheistic claim is particularly commendable not only for its intellectual integrity but also for its promise and potential for religious tolernance, for, after all, monotheism, whatever may have been its supposed merits, is certainly responsible for much of the zealotry, fanaticism, and bloodshed in the sad saga of the WH.

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talking, thinking, and philosophizing animal. Finally, what arguments for the existence of God really prove is that different people commit themselves a priori to different conceptions of God and not that any God exists at all.

University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio.

R. Puligandla

Notes

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- 3. A. Plantinga, God and Other Minds, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1967, p. XII (emphasis added).
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- 6. A. Plantinga, God and Other Minds, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1967, pp. VIII and 271.

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REVIEWS

J. Krishnamurti: The Awakening of intelligence, (London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1973, £3.20)

This attractively got up volume is a record of the talks and discussions held since 1967 in America, Europe and India, illustrated with photographs by Mark Edwards. The talks cover a wide range of subjects relevant to meaningful existence. The proper use of intelligence and thought without allowing the latter to eclipse saneness and objectivity is one of the key themes.

Out of the vast range of our mental faculties we function only from a small portion. But we often fail to realise this fragmentary nature and think that everything under the sun has been exhausted by the march of thought. But we should remark what J. Krishnamurti says about the total mind "Only Love makes the total mind sensitive. You can learn a technique and yet love but if you have technique and no love you are going to destroy the world". Inspite of its vast comprehensive influence over mankind throughout the centuries, thought has failed to solve any problem satisfactorily while functioning purely by itself. While organised thought is necessary for the efficient functioning of the world, thought in human-beings due to its narrow distorting factor creates images, prejudices and ultimately conflicts. Even as we utilise knowledge we must be able to see its limitations and go beyond it. If we always function within the field of knowledge we should always be prisoners either within narrow or extensive borders. Thought signifies past and future projected from the past. being a slave to thought means being enslaved to time. The mind tries to go beyond time and to enter into the immeasurable and still have a firm grip on the world. It wants to function still with time and technology. Such a mind should be absolutely free of illusions. It is very easy to cheat oneself, to be caught on some vivid imagination and think to be living in a timeless world. This illusion-free state requires 'tremendous honesty'. The mind should be free of the distorting factor to be in this free state.

We withdraw into our little circle of family or nations caring little for else. We become callous to general suffering. Because of this

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isolation we lack real communication with our neighbours or members of our own family. Thought cannot bring about the vast space in which there is complete utter silence. The space created by thought lacks the dimension of real space which is not of thought. If thought can be completely silent and function only when it is called upon, the very functioning will become sane and objective. Otherwise knowledge will become an end in itself. If thought becomes silent, in the space and silence, beauty and love spring. Not material beauty but the sense of beauty. parallel functioning of thought, both the skillful aspect and the functioning aspect without coalescing, without any perversion, lopsidedness, nemesis or vagueness has been the goal of all serious religious men. Thought or knowledge being an accumulation is of the past. But when the mind is total, when it is constantly learning, there is intelligence. It is intelligence which is able to perceive divisions, distortions and perversions. Intelligence is the freedom from the division of thought. The silence coming out of the stillness of thought is this impersonal intelligence. The stillness is Harmony. The instantaneous perception of this sense of complete harmony of mind and heart and the body and the presence of silence is the function of intelligence.

The brain is conditioned throughout the centuries and responds instantly to any situation out of its stored memory in a predictable way. If there is an interval between challenge and response howsoever brief there is scope for the brain to act in a new way. The part of brain with which we function is so superactive that we are unaware of other parts which may be functioning in another way. But the brain cannot be denied its past knowledge as then functioning would not be possible. If it realises that it cannot offer a new dimension and is still, then the other part of the brain the new brain' would start functioning. The brain should not force itself to be quiet. It is the realisation of the truth of inability that brings about quietness not the intention to be quiet. The new brain functions in quietness alone. While functioning with the old brains we cannot discover anything new. We would not know about love, freedom and death. We know only jealousy, envy and fear. At the moment of discovery of this limitation, there is a total reversion in a different direction. This totally different movement is freedom. The above the state of the st is freedom. The old brain can have no relation with the new which REV

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cannot be part of the old. But the new dimensions, the unknown, love can have a relationship with the old. This new different dimension operates only with the aid of intelligence. The realisation of the limitations of the old is intelligence.

Over indulgence in any from destroys the body's own intelligence, its sensitivity. When there is an awareness of the body it becomes a sensitive beautiful instrument. Intelligence brings about order which is virtue, spontaneous virtue, not mecahnical. Once we are aware of our humility, it is no longer humility.

Thought, intelligence both are two forms of energy. The three, thought, matter and intelligence have a common source. Thought instead of functioning within the organism eclipsed others because supreme and created this chaotic world. When intelligence understands this thought operates differently. Then thought is in harmony with intelligence. Normally human beings are unable to touch the source as they are consumed with thought and are wasting their energy. This energy when conserved helps us to come upon this insight. This awakening of the intelligence within the mind is then the answer to the numerous problems of our existence. The unconscious mind is subtler and quicker. It understands much more quickly than the conscious mind. The external consciousness is hard, clever and subtle. But real communication can be had if this is penetrated by someone with affection and total feeling. Thus communication is possible even when there is no external, verbal understanding, even when there is resistance from the outer mind. This is the only way, addressing the conscious mind, to impart to others the harmony one gets.

The book is very stimulating and completely absorbing. It lends a new dimension to the reader. The talks on various subjects cover the whole gamut of psychology. Serious perusal of the book by earnest intelligent readers will doubtless lead to vast changes in the world, if the perception of the facts is immediately translated into action without the intervention of thought and deliberation.

Dept. of Sanskrit, University of Madras.

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
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Pandey, Sangam Lal: Pre-Śamkara Advaita Philosophy. (Darshan Peeth, Allahabad, 1974, Rs. 80/-).

In order that a good history of Indian Philosophy and a worth-while history of Indian Philosophical Ideas may come to be written data of atleast three kinds needs to be made available. Firstly, we must have the important philosophical texts properly edited. Secondly, we must know, for certain, what has been said by which philosopher. Thirdly, we must also know, wherever possible, the chronological order in which various philosophers flourished. The book by Mr. Pandey "Pre-Samkara Advaita Philosophy" is a very prominent step with reference to the second and third kinds of data mentioned above, at least so far as Pre-Samkara advaita philosophy is concerned. Through his painstaking research he has collected enormous material which would be of immense help to the historians both of Indian Philosophy and of Indian Philosophical Ideas. The contribution that the book makes in this direction is great.

Mr. Pandey starts with a claim "na amūlam likhyate kiñcit na avicāritam uccyate" (p. vi). But in the body of the book these commitments are sometimes superceded by certain other considerations. We shall single out two kinds of instances in each one of which the two commitments and claims are damaged.

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We turn first to the claim "na amūlam likhyate kiñcit". What does Mr. Pandey mean by mûlam likhyate? It may mean either that what Mr. Pandey has written occurs in the texts that he has scrutinized or the one that is literally supported by them. On each count, however, Mr. Pandey belies his commitment. Firstly, if Mr. Pandey is serious about his claim that everything he says does occur in the texts he has scrutinised, then this is not so. Take such examples as (a) Śamkara doctrine of Vivarta (p. 97), (b) the contention that Audulomi's concept of the self is finally the same which is upheld by Śamkara (p. 122) and there is no direct textual evidence for any one of these in the that every argument he advances is atleast supported by the texts, this too is unwarranted. While criticising the argument of

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Pandit Gopinath Kaviraj that Śamkara read Sūtasamhitā eighteen times Mr. Pandey writes, that this is derogatory to the genius of Samkara (p. 94). What is the criterion to decide what is derogatory to a genius? Reading a work by some authors repeatedly is certainly not derogatory to a genius. To have reverence for Samkara is one thing and to say that every argument that is advanced by the author is supported by the text is quite another. Which text is it which supports this argument of Mr. Pandey? But someone may argue that this case should be left out. What Mr. Pandey means by his claim is that he would be prepared to stand by any argument that is supported by the text. Even this contention, however, Mr. Pandey does not always stand by. Mr. Pandey, in agreement with Prof. Hiriyanna, argues that "Brahmadatta put forward a theory which is known as the theory of the dissolution of the phenomenal world (Prapañcavilayavāda)" (p. 239). He also endores Prof. Hiriyanna's argument that the doctrine of prapañcavilaya leads to the doctrine of Māyā (p. 240). This may be correct. But there is a textual support that Samkara does criticise this doctrine, of course without naming Brahmadatta. (See his commentary on III.2.29 of the Brahmasūtras.) Now if prapañcavilaya leads to the doctrine of Māyā and if Samkan criticises the former then does it not follow that Samkara rejects Māyāvāda? Further, it is a fact that Śamkara even once does not use the expression 'Māyāvāda' in any one of his commentaries Thus, although this contention is supported by texts, Mr. Pandey does not show even the slightest indication that he endorses it Why? Either because he does not wish to come out from the clutches of traditionalism or because he reverentially considered that Samkara's philosophical erudiction would stand if and only if he is a Māyāvādin.

The second claim of Mr. Pandey "na avicārya (kiñot) ucchyate" may mean either that that which is written alone is clearly thought about by him or that not only what is written but also its implications are clearly thought about by him. On each count, however, the arguments of Mr. Pandey belie his claim. Let us consider the first alternative. Consider now three expressions used by Mr. Pandey: (a) the ontological knowledge of Atman (p. 377) (b) the world soul or Modal soul (Vikāra puruṣā) (p. 188) and (c) Argument from the existential theory of the

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apriori (p. 432) which is also called ontological argument for the sake of brevity (p. 433). These expressions clearly show that Mr. Pandey has used these expressions not only without clear thinking but also without any thinking at all. Without lingering any longer on this point let us, however, move to the consideration of the second alternative. We shall select three instance to show that Mr. Pandey is not only unmindful of the significance of the contention that he puts forward but also of the implications thereof. (a) Writing about Gaudapāda Mr. Pandey writes, "...... (Gaudapāda) observes that his philosophical views are the settled conclusions of Vedanta" (p. 75). This may be the case. But what is it that decides that somebody's contention is a settled conclusion or not? Further, are settled conclusions of Vedanta also the settled conclusions of philosophy in general? It is this which Mr. Pandey, it seems, in the heart of hearts, wants to maintain and if so, this is certainly unwarranted. (b) Writing about Gaudapāda again Mr. Pandey writes, "He (Gaudapāda) indentified philosophy with epistemology which is at the same time ontology.." (p. 247). Leaving aside the consideration of the problem whether Gaudapāda did really maintain this, does it show any sign that Mr. Pandey has understood either what he has written or the implications of it? Can philosophy be identified with epistemology? If it is not possible to do so, why did Mr. Pandey not protest against it, granting that Gaudapada has inadvertantly maintained this? Further, is it sensible to identify epistemology ontology? Does Mr. Pandey understand the implications of such a project? Lastly, (c) writing by way of comparison of the dialectic of Gaudapada and that of Hegal Mr. Pandey has brought his knowledge of German to bear the weight of the argument he has advanced. Comparing the word 'Advaita' with the German word 'auf/heben' he writes, "This word (i.e. Advaita) reminds us of the German word auf/heben which represents the positive meaning of preservation and the negative meaning of annulment in the dialectic of Hegal" (p. 249). Although it is true that the German word auf/heben means to preserve or to abolish, it also means to lift up or to raise. The synthesis, that arises, arises not on the same level on which the so-called thesis and antithesis come to collide with each other but on a higher level. In Hegelian

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146 M. P. MARATHE

dialectic the dialectical process is spiral and not linear, such that the same point is never touched again on the same level. Unless Gaudapāda's dialectic (granting that Gaupaḍapāda has given one) is shown to embrace this point, so crutial to the Hegalian dialectic, it will be a gross injustice to Hegal with whose dialectic Mr. Pandey has compared Gauḍapāda's dialectic. But this is not all. Mr. Pandey further contends, "But by this comparison we do not suggest that Hegel's dialectic is the same as Gauḍapāda's although we believe that the latter's dialectic is geuine and the former's dialectic is the nearest approach to it." (p. 249). We merely rest satisfied with saying that Mr. Pandey, in his haste of writing reverentially about Gauḍapāda, has given us a good example of what he himslef calls "Identity Mistake" in his book.

If one sets aside the tall claims that Mr. Pandey makes and tailors the coat of his arguments for what they are really worth, that is if one separates the grain from the chaff then one is likely to find immense material that can become the basis of further research. It is for this grain that Mr. Pandey's book is to be welcomed wholeheartedly.

Department of Philosophy, University of Poona. M. P. Marathe

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PHILOSOPHY NEWS :

Release of the Marathi Encyclopaedia of Philosophy

The Second of August 1975 marked a memorable event in the Indian History of Philosophy, when Shri Ali Yawar Jung, Governor of Maharashtra State released the Marathi Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. The M.E.P. is a major work of reference in three volumes running to 1801 pages and including about 1217 entries, contributed by 129 scholars from India and abroad. completion of this unique project under the chief editorship of Prof. D. D. Vadekar therefore is a land mark in philosophical studies in India. The M. E. P. is intended to be a Book of Reference in Marathi on all the important Branches and Disciplines and Areas in Philosophy. It is organised around Five Central branches of Philosophy (1) Epistemology, (2) Logic, (3) Metaphysics, (4) Philosophy of Religion, and (5) Ethics. On all these central branches, the M.E.P. includes detailed analytical and critical articles. Besides there are briefer articles on subsidiary branches such as (1) Methodology, (2) Philosophy of Science, (3) Cosmology, (4) Philosophical Psychology, (5) Philosophy of History, (6) Axiology, (7) Social Philosophy, (8) Philosophy of Economics, (9) Political Philosophy, (10) Philosophy of Law, (11) Philosophy of Education, and (12) Philosophy of Art.

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(5) Taoism, (2) Buddhism, (3) Jamish, (1) Taoism, (6) Confucianism, (7) Shintoism, (8) Judaism, (9) Christianity, (10) Zoroastrianism, and (11) Islam.

The plan of the M.E.P. is itself enough to give an idea of the magnitude of the task as well as the theoretical basis and perspective of the whole project. There is no doubt that the M.E.P. will fulfill a vital need of students and scholars of Philosophy for generations to come and it may even hopefully be translated into other Indian languages. We are deeply grateful to Prof. D. Vadekar and other members of the M.E.P. Council for the immense contribution they have made to philosophical studies in India.

EDITOR

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Philosophical Monographs announces that it will publish monograph-length studies in philosophy beginning Spring 1976 PM is an independent, non-profit venture, assisted by the University City Science Centre, an established non-profit consortium is Philadelphia, and devoted exclusively to servicing the publishing needs of the profession. Manuscripts are invited, of not more than 200 typescript pages, on any topic of general interest to the profession at large. These should be accompanied by adequate return postage and an explanatory brief. All inquiries should be addressed to the Editor, Professor Joseph Margolis, Department of Philosophy, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122. The Editorial Advisory Board includes: Kurt Baier (Pittsburgh), Steven Barker (Johns Hopkins), Panayot But chvarov (Iowa), Norman Care (Oberlin), V. C. Chappel (Massachusetts, Amherst), Keith Donnellan (California, In Angeles), Jerry Fodor (MIT), Donald Gustafson (Cincinnati) Michael Lockwood (Oxford), Ernin McMullin (Notre Dame) Harold Morick (SUNY Albany), Terence Penelhum (Calgary) Jerome Shaffer (Connecticut), H. S. Thayer (CUNY), Zak Val Straaten (Witwatersrand), Richard Wasserstrom (California Los Angeles).

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
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DR. S. RADHAKRISHNAN

It is an element of the tragic destiny of a high culture caught in a process of rapid change that it should suffer the vanishing of landmarks, the passing away of its moments of splendour and achievement. The passing away of the old is the inevitability of its destiny; the emergence of the new is perhaps its hope. Contemporary India has perhaps had more than her allotted share of this destiny. We have witnessed the eclipse of luminaries that once shone so brightly in the Indian firmament, in Politics, in Social life, in art and literature and in high Philosophy. The lights that were once the pride of India and the wonder of other lands are no more. Consequently, there is amongst us a sense of forlorness, a mood of abandonment and the sadness of nostalgia. But perhaps precisely at this late hour we require the wisdom as well as courage in coming up to the realization that it is now our turn to face up to the trials of the day. In this hour, of course, the memory of those who have gone before us and who have shown the true measure of what could be done may be a crucial element of our courage. This should of course prevent us from merely living in the shadow of the great ones; of all stances that of the epigones is the most crippling. Rather, the memory of those who have gone before us should instill in us a blend of reverence, homage, understanding and fresh resolve. It is in this spirit that the Indian Philosophical Quarterly wishes to record the close of a chapter of contemporary Indian Philosophy marked by the Passing away of Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan on 17th April, 1975 at Madras.

It is not necessary to detail the several incidents of Dr. Radha-krishnan's life of crowded glory. Born on 5th September, 1888 at Tirutani, he had his postgraduate studies in Philosophy at Madras Christian College, Tambaram, under the perceptive guidance of Prof. A. G. Hogg. It is significant to note that allmost the very first philosophical writing of Dr. Radhakrishnan, namely a thesis on the ethics of the Vedanta was an interpretation and defence of the Hindu view of life. This intial effort seems to have implicity set the pattern of his complex and rich philosophical career—

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a sustained and eloquent interpretation of the philosophical wisdom of India. He has served as a teacher and professor of Philosophy at various institutes of higher learning in India as well as abroad. Besides, he has also served as the Vice-Chancellor of the Andhra University from 1931 to 1936 as well as the Vice. Chancellor of the Banaras Hindu University in 1939. In 1926 he delivered the Upton Lecturers at Oxford and the Haskell Lectures at Chicago as well as the Hibbert Lectures at London In 1936, he was appointed to the chair of the Spalding Professor of Eastern Religion and Ethics at Oxford; he retained this profe ssorship for 16 years. During these years of high productivity Dr. Radhakrishnan primarily saw his philosophical mission as the vindication of the Indian view of life before the Western Philo sophical world. Allmost all the books and essays which flowed from his ever fertile pen were designed to this task. His two volumes on Indian Philosophy, as well as the "The Idealist Via of Life" and "The Hindu View of Life" were dedicated to restor respectability to Indian Philosophic thought. It may not be to much to say that these works of Radhakrishnan won for Indian Philosophy a secure and honoured place in the world Philosophic forum.

Although by training, talent as well as inclination, Prof. Radhakrishnan was first and foremost a man of intellect, a contemplative and a seer, yet the momentum of his life plunged him into the arena of public affairs. The range of his experiences, outward as well as inner, is astonishing. He has visited, apart from U.K. and U.S.A. countries and cultures as far flung as China, Peru, Belgium. Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Bulgaria East and Central Africa, Germany, Singapore, Indonesia and Japan. In terms of encounters with public personages and world historical individuals, his experiences have ranged all the way from Stalin to Mahatma Gandhi. But amidst all the vicissitudes of his career, he preserved a stability and equanimity of spirit perhaps some might even liken this to the Sthita Prajna of the Gits

In the platonic conception of the philosophic life, there is an ascent as well as a descent, a turing away from the trivia of empirical existence as well as a struggle with and a mastery over them. It is a flight from the vulgarities of politics to the values of states where ship. In this matter too, the life of Dr. Radhakrishnan has contained to the values of states where the politics is the values of states where the politics is the values of states where the politics is a second to the philosophic life, there is an ascent as well as a descent, a turing away from the trivia of empirical existence as well as a struggle with and a mastery over them. It is a second to the philosophic life, there is an ascent as well as a struggle with and a mastery over them. It is a second to the philosophic life, there is an ascent as well as a struggle with and a mastery over them. It is a second to the property of the philosophic life, there is an ascent as the property of the property of

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issitudes spirithe Gita formed to the paradigm of a philosophic life for he was called upon to officiate as the Vice-President and the President of the Republic of India. Many have recalled the words of Plato in this context. But the truth in the platonic dictum has its own shadow, as it were. as evidenced by the Syracusan experiences of Plato himself. discipline of the cave has its own trials and tribulations, especially when the hard realities of a country seeking desperately to emerge out of the slough of degradation meet with the visions of a philosopher which are sub specie aeternitatis Inevitably, Dr. Radhakrishnan could not have been spared some of these torments of a conflict between the Philosophy of spirit and the Politics of poverty. But whatever might have been these inner troubles and vexations of spirit, Dr. Radhakrishnan bore them with urbanity; the greek virtue of sophrosyne never deserted him. His retirement from public life, therefore, was marked by an inward grace and all lack of cavil and carping.

If one may view Dr. Radhakrishnan's philosophical pilgrimage in the round, one may perhaps come to realise that he has bent all his time and talent for three things—a revitalization of Indian Philosophic thought, a synthesis of Eastern and Western wisdom and the elucidation of the idealist conception of man. He struggled to achieve these in the context in which he found himself. The context has vastly changed, but the tasks still remain. The revitalization of Indian Philosophy may have to be persued in other ways and with different techniques. So also the possibility of a synthesis will have to be striven for in new areas and in terms of different concepts, and lastly the working out of a conception of man is still an urgent trask, for, if there is one crowning function that Philosophy can perform, it is the achievement of humanization. We believe that this is the legacy that Dr. Radhakrishnan has left us.

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THE ARISTOTELIAN-THOMIST CONCEPTION OF MAN

Saint Thomas Aquinas, whose 700th death anniversary is commemorated this year, turned deliberately the whole current of thought in medieval Western Europe from a heavy philosophical reliance on Plato to a new confident reliance on Aristotle. We may well wonder why. Was it to appear up-to-date, as the works of Aristotle were then avidly read and studied in successive Latin translations, first from the Arabic and then soon from the Greek itself? But the dedicated truth-seeker he was, did not care for either antiquity or modernity. Rather, what conquered him was the philosophical satisfaction he found in Aristotle's method of enquiry and in his understanding of man. The aim of this paper is to throw some light on these two topics.

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Aristotle departed—painfully—from Plato because he had found the idealistic method of the latter and his idealistic doctrines unable to answer correctly the host of questions which his own attentive observation of man and world and his critical study of the development of philosophy from the Presocratics to his own time were urgently raising. Raising questions, establishing the problematics of a discipline, took great importance in his teaching and written notes as they would in the teaching and works of his renovator, St. Thomas. This may be shown through an outstanding example.

A rich problematics

In the first chapter of Aristotle's Peri Psyches (Concerning the Soul), the following questions are set out:

What is 'psyche', what is meant by the word, what is its nature and essence? What attributes and events are peculiarly psychological, and what are also organic? Is any general definition of psyche, which will cover all cases and no others, in any way possible, and if so by what method is it to be attained? Is it an 'it' at all, and if so, in what senses: as an independent existent subject (as Plato had implied), or only as a component of such an existent? Or is psyche only a qulitative, or quantitative or otherwise secondary predicate of some other existent? Should

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RICHARD DE SMET

we attribute psyche only to man, or is there an animal and even plant psyche? Wherein precisely do the human and non-human psyches converge and diverge? Should we admit a multiplicity of psyches in one individual? In what way, if any, can psyche be analysed into a number of component parts? Is psyche quantitative, divisible, localised? How is psyche related to space and time, that I can attribute to it an 'inner' and an 'outer', a 'before' and an 'after'? If intrinsically divisible, in what sense can it be analysed into parts? If only in terms of potentialities to phenomenal operations, how are these to be characterised and classified? Are we to argue a-priori from the psyche and its potentialities to their operations, or inductively from the latter to the potentialities and to psyche itself? Are all the operations and experiences attributed to psyche dependent on organic processes, and do all (as some evidently do) involve affect? How is the psychological and the physiological treatment of the same phenomenon to be distinguished? Are there also operations of psyche which can be only of the psyche and which, even though presupposing organic activities, can in no way be their product but are inherently independent? Must not a psyche, capable of activity independent of the corruptible body, be itself incorruptible and capable of independent existence? What should we think of attempts to conceive the psyche solely in terms of physical kinetic force, as by many of the earlier Greek thinkers? Can psyche be identified with, and limited to, consciousness, as by Democritus? Can consciousness itself be accounted for in terms of micromacrocosmic correspondence, whether in the materialistic form of Empedocles or in the mathematical fashion of the Timaeus? If neither dynamic nor quantitative concepts cover all the facts, can they be combined as in the "self-moving number" of the later Plato? Or can we conceive psyche solely in terms of functional pairs of opposites, as perhaps by Heraclitus? Or as a Gestall, a Harmony of opposites? Or as a wholly independent entity, mysteriously indwelling the body, but with no esential relation to the organism, as by Plato and the Pythagoreans?

For the sake of brevity I omit to cull from the works of SI. Thomas a parallel array of the problems which the topic of the soul musters up in his mind, though it would be most interesting to compare such parallel lists. But I want to stress the non-artificial

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character of their problematics. The questions they raise are not meant to fill up some oratorical or pedagogical need. They are called up by the sincereity of their enquiry which considered the whole extent of the phenomenon of psyche (or any other phenomenon they have decided to study) and they press upon one another like waves surging crest after crest and moving onwards till they subside in their resolution.

From the totality of the phenomenon to its necessary conditions

A first characteristic of Aristotle's procedure is that he considers the whole extent of the phenomenon he tries to understand and explain. This is a rare feature among philosophers for too many of them are quickly fascinated by some particular aspect which gains prominence in their view, be it change or permanence, the cogitatum or the cogito, the sensatum or the idea, the analytical plurality or the unity, etc.

With regard to the particular field of psyche, Aristotle multiplies his observations, avoiding the premature intrusion of any interpretative concept, and explores it in all its dimensions, physiological, biological, affective, mental, intellectual, volitional, linguistic and historical. The results of this total observation are recorded not only in *Peri Psychès* but in his treatises about *Sensus and Sensatum*, *Memory and Recollection* and many of his other writings.

His observation is analytical and implies a certain amount of classification but he never breaks up the given unity of the phenomenon and keeps in view its totality. This totality defines the field to which he applies the exact method of empirical observation, induction and deduction which he has described and worked out in detail in his *Analytics*.

What is the unitary field of psyche? Aristotle insists (e.g., in Book Delta of Metaphysics) that the scientific definition of words must be based on common experience and common speech. Now, common speech ascribes 'psyche' to the living as distinct from the dead. The most elemental of human experiences—life and death—this is what gives rise to the everyday ascription of psyche to what is alive, and the denial of psyche to what is dead. And what distinguishes the 'live' body from the 'dead' body is movement,

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change, process. Not any movement, but spontaneous, immanent self-produced movement. The living being moves or changes no only when acted upon by other agents or forces, but by its own forces it at least nourishes, conserves, repairs and reproduces itself as in the vegetable kingdom. In the higher forms of life, the animals, come higher forms of self-transmutation-locomotion sensation, memory, phantasy and corresponding forms of appetites In man there is also nous (approximately, the intellect)—the power of transcending his own mechanically conditioned organism of forming conceptions which likewise transcend material spatiotemporal limitations, and the conceiving, and arguing to, realing which lies beyond sense-perception entirely—and the forms of desire, volition and conation which correspond to it. All this constitutes the psyche phenomenon, the rich field of self-immutation through activities and passivities; as such it is unitary despite its great qualitative variety.

The second important characteristic of Aristotle's method consists in the kind of rational explanation which he devises to account for the well-observed phenomenon. First of all, a rational explanation is demanded because we have no intellectual intuition of the inner nature of any reality. And it is possible because we have at least an intuitive apprehension of those of our activities and passivities which fall under the purview of our sensitive intellectual consciousness. As St. Thomas will say, "whenever I know an object, say a stone, I simultaneously know this knowing as performed by me, and the nature of this activity." On the basis of undeniable similarity, I can then extend the knowledge thus gained directly and internally to other activities known only through their external phenomenon or their effects. It is in this two-way fashion that I know, for instance, the whole phenomenon of psyche as related to me and not only as conditioned by objects. And I know more than that for I thus apprehend myself as the subject of that phenomenon which is at least partially intuited Thus, even though I have no pure intuition of the self, I at least know its existence and somehow its nature as subject of the psyche phenomenon. From this can be formulated the first gnosed logical principle: The self is known through its activities (and passivities), and, in general, every being is known (by us) from what it does (continued to the second to the seco what it does (actively) and undergoes (passively). Yatha krij (bhogas ca) tathá kartá (bhoktá), thus may this formula be rendered if we accept to understand kriyā as extending even to cognitive activities.

Now we may ask, what is there in the subject-agent which links it so intimately with its activity. This obviously is not a passive or static disposition but a dynamic force, an energy, what Aristotle, indeed, calls energeia, from en (in) and ergon (work, from the same IE root werg-). According to him, this energeia, which characterises the agent acts through the opearation (praxis, the working process) upon the potency or potentiality (dynamis). It actuates this potency according to the latter's limiting dispositions (pathos, exis, proairesis) so that, as a result (en telei), there is found in the work (ergon) a received perfection similar to that of the energeia. As resulting at the end of the process, this perfection is called entelecheia, entelechy. But since it derives from the energeia, it a fortiori pertains to the latter which is, therefore, with even more right called entelecheia. The following diagram presents the conceptual field of ENERGEIA and DYNAMIS:

Source-ENERGEIA

=ENTELECHEIA

="Act", actuating principle

ENERGEIA in PRAXIS

=actuation, activity

=TELOS **ERGON** =Work End-result

← ENTELECHEIA as Resulting perfection .

PATHOS, EXIS, etc. → DYNAMIS

=dispositions / ="Potency", potentiality Principle of receptivity and limitation.

The ENERGEIA-DYNAMIS couple is inferred by Aristotle through a rational process meant to discover the ontological necessary conditions immanent in every type of activity wherever activity results in a positive change. We may throw light on it if we notice that it reconciles satkāryavāda with asatkāryavāda.

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It explains, indeed, that the sat of the result, its perfection or entelechy, was causally present in the energeia or actuating principle viewed as entelecheia, and that the asat of the result, its limitation which makes it new, non-identical to its actuating principle, is due to a receiving and limiting co-principle, the potency or dynamis. Dynamis is not logical possibility and it is not an ontological nothing though it is a no-thing, a not-yet-thing apart from its actuation by an 'act' or energeia. It is the ontological receiving principle in every change, the co-principle of energeia. On the lowest and most primordial level of change, it is pure dynamis. which may be called prime matter (prôtê hylê). This is distinct from concrete matter which is already a synthesis of 'act' and 'potency' and, therefore, full of energy and forces (in act) but unstable and liable to change (in potency). Energeia and dynamis are the contrary but synthesizing co-principles necessarily immanent to any change. The actuality or perfection (entelechy) of the energeia is found in the result only in the measure of the receiving dynamis. This is why effects are not identical to, but similar-anddissimilar to, their cause. They only participate in its perfection.

Aristotle's inference of energeia and dynamis may now appear to be of the arthapatti type. This consists in reconciling two contrary features of a given reality by assuming either a sufficient or a necessary condition of their co-existence. In the first case, a choice between a variety of possible sufficient conditions imposes itself and the principle of parsimony generally determines that choice resulting only in a more or less high probability and revisability. This is the case of all the positive, whether physical of human, sciences. In the second case, there is no such choice but a most penetrating dialectic helped by discerning acumen and insight endeavours to determine not simply the formal but the ontological necessary conditions of the observed state of affairs. Such an endeavour characterises the metaphysical enquiry. measures of its success are the intelligibility, coherence and adequacy of its conclusions. Being concerned only with necessary and not sufficient conditions, it cannot claim self-sufficiency in accounting for the state of affairs. It only accounts for the radical possibility of the facts and the solution of their apparent antinomies whereas it yields to the scientific enquiry the task of explaining their particular how and contents.

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Applying this method to the psyche-phenomenon which is 'the field of all life-activities and passivities from the organic to the noetic, Aristotle determines that its most radical necessary condition must be a first entelechy whose actuating energy synthesizes with the pure potency of prime matter so that their very synthesis is an organic body endowed with whatever degree of life (cf. his definition of psychê in *Peri Psychês*, 412a20: "The first entelechy of a natural body in potency to possess life.") This then is the soul in general and there are various types of souls (and organic bodies) from the vegetable to the human since there are distinct levels of bodily life.

By naming this entelechy a soul we seem to hypostatize it and to fall back into Platonism. But no Aristotelian 'soul', not even the human one, is a substance; for what Aristotle's arthapatti led him to assume is not a separate entity mysteriously indwelling and animating a living body, but a co-principle, the life-providing energeia, essentially synthesizing with another co-principle, the prime dynamis, equally a non-substance. It is still the raison d'être of the body-subjectivity, of its vitality, centricity, and eventually of its interiority and consciousness, but it has no nature of its own apart from these functions. It is not an ātman, a jīva or a puruṣa and neither is it a pure sāksin, dṛs or jña.

The Conception of Man

We may now ask, why was Aristotle so concerned to formulate the psychê in terms of pure reason? Why, more precisely, in terms of energeia and dynamis (act and potency)? What theoretic or practical value is to be found in this insistence, as against Plato, that psychê is not a complete "it" but that "by which we live" (ibid., 414a5), not an independent entity but the energetic, determining, constituent principle of a living compositum?

The answer to these questions lies in his historical situation. As a Greek of the fourth century B.C., he felt himself claimed and challenged by two opposing worlds: the changeless world of nous, of Pure Thought, of Being, of Changeless Certainty, of "Is"; and the world of sense-perception, of Aisthesis, of Becoming, Instability, Change, of "Seems". On the one side, the world of Parmenides in which man was dissolved into the indivisibility of Being; on the

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other side, the world of Heraclitus in which man is a mere wave of the flux of change. The strife between the two worlds was no mere academic discussion: it was the initial struggle for the wholeness of man. Was man nothing but a field of opposing forces, and was his aspiration to transcend spatio-temporal processes an illusion? Or was he, contrariwise, nothing but the one Being strangely involved in the unreal, weary wheel of purposeless becoming, from which his sole aspiration should be liberation?

Plato had inclined heavily towards the latter alternative. Somehow, unaccountably, man was involved in the world of sense-perception but his true home was the realm of pure thought and eternal ideas. Man, in short, was not soul and body. Man was soul, and soul was the godlike *Nous*. The body was his unfitting prison-house or, at best, his steed.

Energeia and dynamis was Aristotle's rational answer to the dilemma of Nous or Aisthesis, of Being or Becoming. It alone provided the terms of reference without which change remained unintelligible. Assumed first of all to make intelligible the changeful psychê-phenomenon, act and potency substituted "Both-And " for the previous "Either-Or" and preserved its complex integrality. They enabled Aristotle to see psychology on the one hand, and biology and physiology on the other, as concerned, neither with two disparate fields of enquiry, nor yet with two purely subjective aspects of the same reality, but as concerned respectively with the determining and the potential constituents of the integral humanum. The explanation they command can still enable us to avoid the pitfalls of psychophysical parallelism, of psychological epiphenomenalism, those of a psychology which would restrict psychê to conscious mentation, and all a-priori limitations which would banish the irrational and the unconscious from psychological consideration. As Wundt remarked in his Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie (4th edn. p. 633,) "it is only the psychê conception of Aristotle, in which psychology is combined with biology, that issues in a plausible metaphysical conclusion for experimental psychology." Indeed, it enables us to see psychology as concerned with the whole man—as soul and body.

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It was this vigorous affirmation of the flesh as being of the very essence of man which finally recommended the Aristotelian formula to Catholic Christianity. It was accepted notwithstanding Aristotle's hesitations concerning immortality, the denial—at least by most of his school—of the individually of Nous, and the absence from his later work of the "other-worldly", "religious" qualities of Platonism which made the latter more congenial to Christian faith. Already Tertullian (160-230) in the De Anima (esp. ch. 4, 12) and others had in early times seen the incompability of Platonic "spiritualism", and the relative compatibility of Aristotle's hylemorphism, with the Gospel whose central message was that of man's psycho-physical integrity—the message of health or salvation (salvus comes from the same root as Skt sarva and Gk holos, entire, intact, whole, wholesome, healthy, integral) wrought in and through the flesh and the hope of glory through the full redintegration of man, soul and body. It was finally St. Thomas with the Gospel in one hand and Aristotle in the other who could give both their due and show how the former could supply the insufficiencies of the latter.

He retained and secured even more firmly the holism of Aristotle's conception of man but completed it by establishing the "other-worldly" dimensions of the human soul. Already Aristotle had been compelled by his very principles of Act and Potency to the conclusion, "summing up all that has been said about the psyche," that "the human psyche is in a sense the whole existing universe" (Peri Psychês, 431b20). St. Thomas expressed the rationale of this in his statement that "the intellect (nous) in act is the known in act" (Summa Theologica, I, 87.) In the actuation of thinking both the thinking 'I' and the things 'known' emerge, on reflection, as potencies to one unique and identical act of knowing and being known. Thus by passing from potency into act, the intellect (nous) opens up the limited individuality of man to the reality of the universe. And Aristotle consequently places the highest end of man in the perfect understanding and contemplation (theoria) of this reality. Man's bliss, he thinks, must consist in the highest activity of the soul's highest power, the nous, exercised on the highest objects and with the maximum of perfection and permanence "so far as this is possible" (Nicomachean Ethics, X, 7 passim). But this seems to be a very aristocratic and seldom practicable ideal.

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St. Thomas preserves and amends the truth of Aristotle's view There is, he shows, in the dynamic intellect an essential, natural desire (jijñāsā) for the perfect intuition of the highest Intelligible and in it of all others. This ineluctable desire plays even the chief role in his best argumentation that this supreme Intelligible exists as the Deus simplex (nirguna), Fulness of Being, Life, Knowledge and Happiness, and free, independent and total Cause of all other realities, whether spirits, or matter. Man's highest end, therefore can only reside in the fulfillment of that desire for the Absolute which imbues the intellect and impells it to ever higher and higher intellections. But Thomas also shows that this fulfillment escapes the unaided power of man's intellect. Not because its potentiality would fall short of the Absolute but because the Absolute cannot be conquered by a finite intellect. Indeed, it is a constant datum of our experience that our finite intellect cannot pass into act unless it be informed (through the pramanas) about the objects to be known (jñeya). But with regard to the supreme Jñeyam (Intelligible) no pramāņa, no worldly source of valid knowledge. can provide adequate information. They may provide correct pointers but these remain apophatic. God's Absolute remains the complete Mystery and man's most radical and co-essential desire seems destined to be ever frustrated.

Is this the ultimate answer? Is there no other possibility? There is, says St. Thomas, the possibility of receiving gratuitously what we cannot conquer. Since the potentiality of the intellect for the intelligible is unlimited, it is thinkable that the Absolute itself, which is all intelligibility, may through a free and magnanimous self surrender inform directly our intellect about Itself. In such an event, he says, God's very Infinite Essence would be communicated to our finite intellect not only as the Known of a blissful intuition but as that by which it is known. We would know the Absolute through its own Essence of Consciousness. And since "the intellect in act and the intelligible in act are one," we would truly become, not ontologically but epistemically, namely, through this perfect actuation of our intellect, God the Absolute itself.

As a Christian believer, St. Thomas held that this Goddependent possibility was the supreme promise warranted by Christ. It supported his whole life as a scholar, a mystic and a saint and, we may believe, he at last reached its fulfilment.

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Conclusion

This paper is only a bird's eye view of the method devised by Aristotle for investigating the psyche-phenomenon and of some important features of his conception of man as completed by St. Thomas. His method is phenomeno-philosophical. Its problematics is not artificial but arises from an extensive observation and analysis of the phenomenon. This analysis does not result in mere units of description, classifications and valuational hierarchisation: it never loses sight of the field-unitariness of the phenomenon. Consequently, it is followed by a philosophical re-synthetization of the analyzed data around an arthapattic discovery of their immanent necessary conditions. The formulation of the theory of Act and Potency (Energeia and Dynamis) does not precede but emanates from this endeavour. It yields the important result that the psyche is to be viewed as the first entelechy in any life-manifesting body. Thus it cancels the myth of the soul imagined as an eternal, free substance mysteriously incarcerated in a body and alienated by the vicissitudes of the world of space and time.

Through his further special study of the human psyche, Aristotle arrived at a holistic understanding of man. It bridged over the gap between the intellect with its space-and-time transcending activities and the senses bound to time and space. Yet he remained uncertain about the capacity of the intellect to reach the fully transcendent Absolute. This uncertainty was overcome by Thomas Aquinas. Adopting and expanding both the method and the holistic psychology of Aristotle, he went on to explore more deeply the nous-phenomenon and discovered as pertaining to the very essence of the noetic dynamism a desire for intuiting the very Absolute of Godhead. He showed this desire to be constitutive of the intellect and, therefore, preconscious but at work at every point of the noetic activity. By itself alone this desire can only tend towards an achievement which it cannot conquer due to the very transcendence of the Absolute. Yet where conquering is impossible, receiving may achieve its goal. The One supremely free may surrender freely to man's desire.

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NOTE

I am very conscious that this paper has omitted so much that the picture it gives is quite incomplete and somewhat lopsided. It has stressed certain features at the expense of others. But this was intended to suggest that a holistic understanding of man is possible and that psychology need not be alienated from philosophy.

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INNER TIME AND A PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXISTENCE

Elements of a Reductive Consciousness

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To Edmund Husserl, the secret of meaning seemed hidden in the structure of consciousness. To unlock the structure of consciousness and reveal the nature of meaning, he forged his unique notion of intentionality, a theory which underpins his entire attempt to create a Transcendental Phenomenology. Husserl developed his theory for application strictly within the absolute realm of a reduced consciousness. Before dealing with the relevance of inner time to a phenomenology of existence, Husserl's theory of consciousness and the essentialized temporality necessary to its deployment, must be briefly outlined.

As guarantee both of the intrinsic significance of each act of consciousness and its nature as a directedness towards its objects, Husserl isolates two aspects of consciousness, separate from each other but always strictly correlated within the flow of consciousness. On the significant organization of these two correlates rests all meaning, both actual and potential. The mode of appearance of the object of knowledge is distinguished from that aspect of the object of knowledge which appears within consciousness. The act of consciousness is termed the 'noesis', the object as it is revealed through the act, the 'noema'. The noema as the perspectival appearance of the object constitutes the objective content of the reduced realm:

"Like perception, every intentional experience—and this is indeed the fundamental mark of intentionality—has its "intentional object" as its objective meaning."

Noetic acts are unique formations of consciousness and may not be re-enacted. The noema of consciousness can however recur and may be recaptured through a variety of noetic acts. Take for instance, a flower growng in the midst of a meadow. It may be apprehended not only through a variety of spatial perspectives—from the side, above, below, from very close, from a great distance, and so on—but also from a variety of temporal projected; it can be seen in time present, remembered or I.P.Q. 4, 2

act of consciousness that aspect of the flower which is perspectivally brought into the realm of consciousness forms the noema; the various acts of consciousness through which it is made available form the noeses. Meaningfulness is dependent on the systematic organization of the noemata. As each noema is a perspectival grasp of the flower in the meadow, so knowledge of the same flower rests on the systematically organized totality of its noemata, a multiplicity of noemata being attributable to the one object in reality.

To create significance, these noemata must be ordered into an integrated whole. In *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl offers an example of the organized unity of noemata achieved through a variety of noetic acts:

"I see in pure reflection that "this" die is given continuously as an objective unity in a multiform and changeable multiplicity of manners of appearing, which belong determinately to it."

Indeed the entire span of conscious life, he continues, is composed of nothing less than a "describable structure of multiplicities", formed of that strict correlation between noesis and noems through which alone significance is brought into being for the conscious man.

Husserl is at pains to insist that the correlation of noesis and noema far from being a mere "continuous connectedness" brought about through the highest possible organization. Their intentional co-existence is achieved through a "unity of synthesis". As he emphatically reiterates: "the whole of conscious life is unified synthetically". But the identity and objectivity required of a significant consciousness do not and cannot exist apart from a certain modal prerequisite of the noetico-noematic structure. And it is to this modality, essential to the formal unity of intentional configurations that Husserl now turns:

"The fundamental form of this universal synthesis, the form that makes all other synthesis of consciousness possible, is the all embracing consciousness of internal time."

Only through an original grasp of an internal or inner time cal the various noetic apprehensions of the meaning or meanings of all object be distinguished and their contents organized into synthetic unity necessary to identity. Noetic acts as unique mations of consciousness exist only for a moment in inner time.

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as such they can never be recovered in their exact shape for each fresh noetic act would involve an original reformation of consciousness. Knowledge of identity, whether of a conscious act, a real object or even the subjectivity, would lie irreperably beyond the grasp of consciousness could the various noetic acts not be temporally differentiated and their separate significance organized into a unity. Objectivity is equally dependent on inner time: it can be brought about only through an inner time capable of organizing and reorganizing the noemata of past acts in time present and so constructing a durable meaning for the subjectivity. Aron Gurwitsch in a masterly article explains the relation between identity and objectivity:

"Objectivity is identifiableness, i.e., the possibility of reverting again and again to what, through the present experienced act, is offered to consciousness, and the possibility of doing so whether in the same or in any other mode of awareness." 10

From this succinct description of the nature of the objectivity available within consciousness, he turns to the inner time which underpins both it and the identity on which it depends:

"Objectivity and identity have then no sense, unless with regard to a multiplicity of acts, that is to say with reference to the temporality of conscious life." "11

(b) These reflections of Husserl on the relevance of inner time to the significant organization of consciousness are unfolded within the reduced arena of Transcendental Phenomenology. Through use of the epoché an absolute consciousness and its phenomenological data are refined out of the spatio-temporal realities of human existence. The first step in enactment of the epoché involves suspension of all beliefs relating to the external world. The world his given in perception, the world of objects and others, disconnected..."

The bracketing of the world of existence is the prelude to the next steps: the eidetic reduction of the particular subjectivity. In his preface to the English edition of Ideas Husserl claborates on the theme of the reduction of existential consciousness:

"If we now perform this transcendental-phenomenological transformation of the natural and psychologically

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inward standpoint whereby it is transcendentalized, the psychological subjectivity loses just that which makes it something region the world that lies before us; it loses the meaning of the soul as belonging to a body that exists in an objective spatio-temporal Nature. This transformation of meaning concerns myself, above all the 'I'...."

The suspension of the world of existence has, correlatively involved the reduction of existential subjectivity to pure, impersonate consciousness.

In *Ideas*, Husserl maintains that enactment of the *epoch* reveals a Transcendental Ego which stands outside the structures of reduced consciousness as the guarantee of unity in the objects of thought. As such it is the one necessary *a priori* to all significant configurations of the reduced realm. Within the purity of the eidetic sphere, the Transcendental Ego is the ultimate guarante of the signifying powers of that inner time through which along the synthesis of meaning is acheived. The identity, objectivity and coherence of inner time rest on the *a priori* existence of the ego revealed to consciousness in reflection on itself. That the realm of reduced consciousness over which this ego presides had no connections with the relativity of common existence, is a point of fundamental importance to Transcendental Phenomenology. As Husserl so vividly puts it: "between the meanings of constrousness and reality yawns a veritable abyss". 14 He continues:

"Consciousness, considered in its purity, must be reckond as a self-contained system of Being, as a system of Absolute Being into which nothing can penetrate, and from which nothing can escape; which has no spatio-temporal exterior and can be inside no spatio-temporal system; which cannot experience causaling from anything nor exert causality upon anything, it being presupposed that causality bears the normal sense of natural causaling as a relation of dependance between realities.

On the other side, the whole spatio-temporal world to white man and the human Ego claim to belong as subordinate singular realities, is according to its own meaning mere intentional Being a Being, therefore, which has the merely secondary, relative sense of a Being for consciousness.¹⁵

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The Husserlian cogito is as radically cut off from the real world s the Cartesian cogito on which it is based. Descartes had been able to posit interaction between the res cogitans and the res extensa through miraculous means; "animal spirits", he tells us, like a pure vivid flame or a fine and subtle wind mediate between mind and the bodily machine. 16 Ideas mediate between consciousness and reality; though occurences in consciousness they correspond 10 objects in the external world. Their authenticity is guaranteed by the existence of God. The Husserlian cogito has however, no such divine guarantees to relate it to the external world, Unlike the Cartesian cogito it has subsumed all objective reality as its sense and objectivity may be granted a place within the reduced system only insofar as it is immanently implied by the eidetic structures. And so Husserl can speak of the 'reconstruction of the world' from transcendental data, a step which Descartes, in spite of his desire to create a universal mathematics would have found inconceivable. A "veritable abyss" does indeed loom between the reductive consciousness and reality. The deployment of the epoché and the revelation of the Transcendental Ego have subsumed all need for mediating principles. This sharp severance of the inner time of the reductive consciousness from the extension of reality constitutes the defining characteristic of this stage Husserlian phenomenology. 17

Sartre's Negation of Inner Time

It will be evident from this brief exposition of some points concerning Husserl's theory of intentionality, that the significance of the noetico-noematic structures depends on the unity of inner time and further that this inner time, guaranteed in its identity by the Transcendental Ego, is a modality radically cleft from the shared reality of existence. Since Husserl forged his theory with unique reference to the reduced realm of consciousness, its use in the existing format is restricted to the phenomenological data revealed by the epoché. But can his discovery of a consciousness which exists as a directedness towards the objects of thought and powers of inner time, in short an intentional consciousness, be human historicity? Can the notion of intentionality be forged

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In marked contrast to the Husserl of Ideas, Sartre felt that phenomenology should deal with precisely such an existential consciousness and in terms of just that which makes it real in the world that lies before us. The consciousness which concerned Sartre exists as an intrinsic part of the saptio-temporal work interpreting it, experiencing and exerting causality within it. Bu how was the Husserlian theory to be existentialized and so fashioned into a method adequate to the analysis of an existential subjects vity? This was the problem facing Sartre who as a youthit philosopher had been deeply excited by his discovery of Husserlia phenomenology. He spent the year 1933-34 in Berlin, active studying phenomenological principles and his earliest theoretical work, The Transcendence of the Ego (1936), outlines the frei vision of intentionality which was to underpin his entire phene menology of existence. But in what measure is Sartre's attempt successful? Does he in fact forge an existentialized notion d intentionality capable of analysing the configurations of an exis tential consciousness? In the following section I shall attempt to provide an answer.

In his efforts to existentialize the phenomenological vision of consciousness, Sartre concentrates his attack on that one a prior to the unity and identity of the reductive realm, the Transcendental Ego, he characterizes it as "the death of consciousness By negating the validity of the Transcendental Ego, consciousness could be freed from the grip of the epoché. Further an irreducible substantial ego discovered by consciousness in reflection on itself seemed to Sartre a typical symptom of Idealist self-deception. The new phenomenology was to liberate consciousness from the last remnant of the Idealism which had governed much Western philosophy since the Cartesian discovery of the primacy of constitutions. Only through an intentionality freed of the ego could phenomenology return consciousness to reality:

"As long as the *I* remains a structure of absolute conscious ness, one will still be able to reproach phenomenology for being an escapist doctrine, for again pulling a part of man out of the world..."

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With brilliant insight he moves to attack that inner time, the identity of which it is the function of the Transcendental Ego to guarantee. Consciousness has no inwardness, it is burdened by no inner time, it is a "monstrous spontaneity" a 'nothingness' which exists solely as a directedness towards its objects. As such it has no need of ego or other prior entity to bring it into being and safeguard its coherence. In *The Transcendence of the Ego* he sets forth his vision of a fully existentialized consciousness, freed of the old ego, its intentionality directed without mediation towards the objects of a shared reality:

"When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in contemplating a portrait, there is no I, there is consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-be-overtaken, etc. and non-positional consciousness of consciouness. In fact, I am then plunged into the world of objects; it is they which constitute the unity of my consciousness; it is they which present themselves with values, with attractive and repellant qualities-but me, I have disappeared; I have annihilated myself. There is no place for me on this level. And this is not a matter of chance, due to a momentary lapse of attention, but happens because of the very structure of consciousness." 21

Sartre has cut away the epoché and the ego it reveals and plunged consciousness into the tumultuous world of objects and others. A subjective consciousness fully involved in its actions within the spatio-temporal world has no knowledge of that I brought into being through reflection on inner time. But this unawareness of an I which is as integral a part of the existential consciousness as the Transcendental Ego is of the reductive consciousness, is, Sartre asserts, not the outcome of any peculiarity in the configurations of active consciousness, but an invariant aspect of the structure of each and every conscious act. Consci-Ousness in its very nature, according to Sartre, cannot have awareness of an I brought into being through the activity of self-reflection. The chief function of an existential analogue to the Transcendental Ego-an I which stands as the immanent manifestation of unity in inner the stands as the immanent manifestation of unity in the consciinner time-has been taken over by the objects with which consciousness engages: "it is they which constitute the unity of my consciby bit the by bit the chief thrust of his attack is made clear, each description

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of the structure of consciousness shares in a negation, either implicit or explicit, of that inner and reflective time necessary to the unity and identity of the existential subjectivity. The I which he negates—"I have disappeared; I have annihilated myself"—is the most powerful and intimate correlative of such a unified inner time

The consequences of his refusal to allow his phenomenology of existence an inner and subjective time are evident in The Transcendence of the Ego. To return to the passage quoted above without an I and the inner time which underpins it, how can identity whether in the objects of thought or in the subjectivity itself. be accounted for? If objects in reality alone constitute the units of consciousness, how can significance be accorded past perceptions? If objects in reality "present themselves with value, with attractive and repellant qualities" what has become of the interpretative consciousness which is fundamental to a phenomenology? Sartre's conceptual movement from "objects which present themselves with values...." to the next assertion: "but me, I have disappeared....there is no place for me on this level...." is phenomenologically untenable. Were Sartre to deny that 'values' and 'qualities' exist outside in reality as characteristics of objects apart from any activity of the intentional consciousness. he would be in the position of denying one of the fundamental tenets of the phenomenological theory of intentionality. Further such a denial would involve an implicit rejection of the ability of consciousness to interpret and choose, a freedom in the interests of which he dissolved the epoche and annihilated the Transcendental Ego.

The atomism underlying the negation of the I is made clear in another passage; again it is a description of consciousness:

"Transcendental consciousness is an impersonal spontaneity. It determines its existence at each instant, without our being able to conceive anything before it. Thus each instant of our conscious life reveals to us a creation ex nihilo. Not a new arrangement, but a new existence."²²

The unified inner time of the identity-bearing subjectivity has shattered and given rise to an atomistic temporality. The present moment is shorn of its horizons of past and future; neither memons nor projection can be made to impinge on time present. And a

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consciousness composed of a series of present moments without recall is effectively robbed both of the interpretative powers of inner time and of the I which signifies their unified coherence. Each instant of life, insists Sartre, reveals not a "new arrangement, but a new existence "—" a creation ex nihilo." There could be no clearer repudiation of Husserl's notion of an intentionality whose noemata are constantly rearranged, redisposed in time present to imbue the moments of new existence with significance.

Since an atomistic temporality cannot organise the past and project the future, activities vital to the immanent existence of the I. Sartre moves to assert that any I which exists, stands "outside. in the world": "The ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness; it is outside in the world. It is a being of the world like the ego of another."23 But immediately further problems arise. If my ego is given to me not through reflection on my own consciousness and awareness of the identity of its past actions, but in the same manner as the ego of another is given me, how am I to know my ego as my own? And without an ego I can identify as my own, how am I to exist in consciousness as myself? Subjective identity is impossible without an inner and reflexively identifiable coherence, and such a coherence cannot exist apart from a recoverable inner time. Atomism cannot allow for such a temporal coherence. But identity must be accounted for, and to do so, Sartre involves himself in a circular explanation. Having rejected an ego which brought into being through reflection stands as the unifying principle in the objects of thought, he invokes a notion which effectively subsumes the previously rejected possiblities of reflection; a notion of "intimacy".24 "My" I" he explains, "in effect is no more certain for consciousness than the I of other men. It is only more intimate."25 To function validly the intimacy of which Sartre speaks, necessarily implies the existence of an inner time which both interprets reality and identifies its interpretations. But Sartre goes on to deny the consiousness which realizes this intimacy any freedom to accord or deny value to experiential reality; in short he denies its interpretative capacities. His denial leads to an ethical position untenable by his own existential standards.

"Ethical situations", he writes in the same work, "exist as part of external reality, forming an objective world of things and

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actions, done and to be done, and the actions come to adhere as qualities to the things which call for them ".26 He illustrates his point:

"I pity Peter, and I go to his assistance. For my consciousness only one thing exists at that moment: Peter-having-to-be helped. This quality of "having-to-be-helped" lies in Peter. It acts on me like a force....there is no me: I am in the presence of Peter's suffering just as I am in the presence of the colour of this inkstand..." 27

The key to Sartre's point lies in his use of the compound "Peter-having-to-be-helped". Peter, in this case the object of consciousness, is, together with the act of consciousness directed towards him, reified and granted the status of a compound whole. The complexities of the interpretative act are blurred over and the value I accord the situation of the other is viewed as though it were the same sort of thing as the colour of his hair or the sound of his voice and as intrinsic a part of him as either. As with the previous example of "streetcar-having-to-be-overtaken", the noetic act which through the interpretative synthesis of inner time allows me to enter into active relation with the object in reality, is not mentioned at all.

Following a plan as yet but roughly sketched of an existential intentionality, the complex of intentional acts ordered in inner time which leads to the conclusion of "Peter-having-to-be-helped", may be broken down into a triadic order which illuminates the activity of the interpretative consciousness:

- (i) I see Peter. My noetic apprehension is spatial and as such implicity relates me to him.
- (ii) The significance of Peter's relation to me is organised. The perceptual act is interiorized and its noematic significance in my inner time is organized through the synthesis of various noematic including that of my act of seeing Peter.
- (iii) I reach a conclusion which is the prelude to an ethical fulfillment of my spatial co-existence with Peter, both by implicitly seeing myself in relation to him and through meditation on the correlative to this spatial fact: his relation to me. From both my spatial apprehension of Peter which at the first glance interprets myself into perspectival relation to him, and from the subsequent

interiorization of this relation and my inner and temporal meditation on its significance for me, springs this third act of relatedness to the other: the vision of Peter as "Peter-having-to-be-helped". This third intentional act is ethical; the vision of Peter's condition which "acts on me like a force" ought to be the prelude to my actual helping of him. It is at this third stage that my subjective interpretation of his plight comes to seem a very part of Peter's being. This concluding act of consciousness is the result of the significant organization of the two prior acts. It could not have arisen as an isolated moment of consciousness; the identity of inner time has generated it.

One can only conclude that a thinker of Sartre's brilliance could not have been unaware of such intentional distinctions, of vital importance both to a phenomenology of the existential subjectivity and to the ethical world. It would seem however that his continued emphasis on the equivalent reality of subjective acts and spatial objects has led him to place too great an emphasis on the unified reification of these distinct elements of the shared world and caused him to neglect that subjective principle through which alone acts of consciousness penetrate the world and imbue its objects with value. I refer to the inner time which underpins the spatial interpretations of consciousness.

Having proceeded thus far, a question springs to mind. How far is Sartre who has neglected the inner time through which noemata are organized into significance, justified in calling his theory of consciousness a theory of intentionality? A short paper of 1939 deals with just this point. To Sartre, the core of Husserl's notion lay in a consciousness which exists as a directedness towards its objects. Objects of perception may not as in Idealist theories be dissolved into the sphere of consciousness. The act of knowledge may not be compared, he argues, to the act of digestion. Only an image of sheer transcendence, of 'bursting towards, can convey its impulsion. In a truly existantialized intentionality this outward impulsion is directed towards the realms of a shared reality. Indeed consciousness, continues Sartre, being totally devoid of inwardness, has no other motion open to it. There is absolutely nothing to hold it back from reality. In sharply polemical fashion he argues:

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"You know very well that the tree is not youself, that you cannot draw it into your dark stomach.... at once consciousness is purified, it is as clear as a strong wind, there is nothing in it but a flight from itself, a slipping out of the self; if perchance, against all odds, you should enter "inside" a consciousness, you would be seized by a whirlwind and flung outside, near the tree.... for consciousness has no inside.... and it is this absolute flight, this refusal to be reified which constitutes a consciousness.... The Philosophy of transcendence has thrown us.... outside into the world, amongst other people." 28

But to live in the world of outer reality amongst the others of that world, consciousness has to be more than just a "strong wind" depleted of all inwardness. Between the extremes of the "dark stomach of the Idealist consciousness and the "strong wind" of his Existentialist vision, Sartre can offer no mean. But for a theory of man which deals with that historicity of subjective existence through which choices are made and values accorded or denied reality, in short for the sort of phenomenological theory that Sartre wants to achieve, consciousness must be subjectively owned-it must be shown to be my consciouness through the personal structures of which I meditate upon and act within reality. But as we have already seen, Sartre's "absolute consciousness", purified as it is of the I, cannot allow for such subjective acknowledgement. The intimacy he posits as the ground for my reccognition of my ego as my own, falls back upon nothing less than those very structures of temporal significance he so strongly rejects.

The inability of consciousness without ego to exist meaning-fully in reality is reflected in the experience of Antoine Roquentin, the anti-hero of Nausea. The novel was published in 1938 as a fictive illustration of the new theory of consciousness propounded in The Transcendence of the Ego. Roquentin is afflicted by an inability to reflect on his own consciousness and discover himself. His reflexive aspirations are constantly frustrated. Unable to escape the confines of the present, Roquentin has no way of ordering it into a meaningful temporality: "I am rejected, abandoned in the present. I try in vain to rejoin the past.... His consciousness without ego lacks that inner time necessary to unify the present moment with the rest of conscious existence

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and so through a 'new arrangement' imbue the present itself with value. At the end of the novel Roquentin stands alone, shorn of any illusion he might have had of discovering a meaningful I, an I sustained by the inner time of consciousness. There can be no I for the frail reflexive consciousness flickers and vanishes for ever:

"A pale little memory of myself wavers in my consciousness, Antoine Roquentin... And suddenly the I pales, pales, and finally goes out. Lucid, motionless, empty, the consciousness is situated between the walls; it perpetuates itself. Nobody inhabits it any more. A little while ago somebody said me and my consciousness. Who?"30

Roquentin has lost the owned self which could penetrate space around the body and imbue it with intentional significance. Thus the other great anguish of his life is hardly surprising; it springs from his total failure to order space around himself. Spatial objects escape all his fumbling attempts to catch them in the web of meaning. He stands alone in a night mare realm where things have lost even their names: "They are there, grotesque, stubborn, gigantic.... I am in the midst of Things which cannot be given names."31 No mediation between the nothingness of his consciousness and the opaque profusion of a res extensa which escapes all meaning is possible. Lacking an inwardness which through its powers of temporal synthesis could draw spatial objects into relation with itself and grant them a subjective significance, he is doomed to inhabit a chaos. Order is beyond his grasp: the world is rendered absurd. For in a world utterly shorn of the meaning generated by the centrality of the self, not only can objects not be named, but they cannot be related to each other, measured and valued. Even the simplest of spatial relations involved in the perceptual act are impossible to establish:

"Superfluous: that was the only connection I could establish between those trees, those gates, those pebbles. It was in vain that I tried to count the chestnut trees, to situate them in relation to the Velleda, to compare their height with the height of the plane trees; each of them escaped from the relationship in which I tried to enclose it, isolated itself overflowed...."32

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Gradually the realization comes to the forlorn Roquentin that he is witnessing nothing less than the "collapse of the human world".33

Spatial significance granted through inner time is essential to the human world and it is precisely this significance which Sartre renders theoretically untenable. Correlatively the validity of all his analyses of historic existence are called into question. In Being and Nothingness published seven years after The Transcencence of the Ego a related standpoint towards inner time may be discerned. The prior failure to account for the significant existence of a temporal consciousness in shared reality is carried over and intersubjective significance, the maximal guarantee of a valid historicity is deemed untenable. Self and other are viewed as two "equally isolated systems" between which is preserved a spatial separation as the very type of exteriority "34 The inwardness of the other cannot justly interpret the space which I inhabit; I cannot grasp the spatial significance of his inner time. Meaningful encounter between us is impossible:

"The Other is defined not as the absence of a consciousness in relation to the body which I see but by the absence of the world which I perceive, an absence discovered at the very heart of my perception of the world." 35

The brilliant stratagem of making consciousness as totally dependent on external reality has been carried out at the expense of consciousness itself. Lacking an adequate vision of the relevance of the meaning-endowing structures of inner time to the life of consciousness in the shared world of objects and others, Sartre has inadvertently undermined the very heart of his phenomenology of existence.

Existential Intentionality: Notes towards a Triadic Analysis.

To establish an existential intentionality the temporality of the noetico-noematic organization developed by Husserl must be transmuted from its reduced state into a human modality capable of harbouring the existential self. At the same time the organizational powers of internal time must be guaranteed. Indeed one can speculate as to whether in existentializing this reduced modality one is not in fact returning to Husserl's own starting point. It is possible to conceive of Husserl himself moving for-

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ward from nothing less than a primary intuition of the organizing powers of inner time, powers discovered through reflection on his own consciousness and only then formulating the *epoché* which while refining and reducing the reflective data robs the inner time from which the data is gathered; of its manifold connections with the shared spatial world.

Reflection on inner time reveals that existential relativity which links the time of consciousness to the perpectives of spatial perception. All my perception in space is relative to my own position; the perspectives through which knowledge is available to me, determine my knowledge. And it is in its original perspectivity that my spatial knowledge is carried into the inner temporal realm. Thus even the most intimate time of the existential I, far from being shut off from the space of shared existence in the manner of a reduced de-spatialised time, is intimately linked in each and every configuration to the perspectival spatiality of bodily apprehension. This phenomenological principle holds true for simple perception, recollection and projection as well as for the more ambiguous realms of dream or hallucination. The body is the only locus of consciousness and apart from it, consciousness has no way of assimilating reality. The perspectival nature of its knowledge holds true for all modes of existential apprehension. Apart from my body, I cannot imagine a space where I might be located. Any scene I imagine implicitly locates my body as the point from which its spatiality unfurls. To deny this would be to deny that relativity which is of the essence of man; to grant him a knowledge which exists apart from the perspectival relativity of his apprehension would be to elevate him to the level of an omniscient Being.

Through an existential intentionality which indissolubly links the I of consciousness and the I of reality, Sartre's negation of the temporal dimension of selfhood is overcome. One turns to the subjective instrument which actualizes the temporal consciousness into the spatial self: the lived body. It is through the lived body that a perspectival space is implicated in the temporal synthesis of consciousness. Of the unique nature of the lived body, Merleau-Ponty writes:

"We have become accustomed, through the influence of the Cartesian tradition to jettison the subject....we have the trans-

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parency of an object with no secret recesses, the transparency of a subject which is nothing but what it thinks it is...there are two senses and two only of the word exist : one exists as a thing or else one exists as a consciousness. The experience of our own body, on the other hand, reveals to us an ambiguous mode of existing.³⁶

The "ambiguous" existence of the lived body stems from its nature both as a subject possessed of the intentionality of inner time and as object occupying a place in the extension of the spatial world. To reject either pole of its existence and fall back upon a Cartesian dichotomy would involve a total rejection of the human self.

The spatial self is brought into being through the configuration of intentionality the lived body generates round itself. Perceiving space it imbues it with order by relating objects to its own implicit position and organizing their perspectival neomata through the significative synthesis of inner time. Merleau-Ponty tells us both of the historicity the lived body thus brings into being for itself and of the perspectival space within the bounds of which this historicity is attained.37 His phenomenology of the body brings us this far in our attempt to illuminate the nature of an existential intentionality. But in what manner are the perspectives of spatial perception implicated in the temporal synthesis of existential consciousness? In answer to this question which probes the structure of existential intentionality one must uncover some of the layers of interpretation involved in the complexities of human signification. I choose an incident from Proust for analysis, for Marcel, the protagonist of Remembrance of Things Past constantly involves himself in creating precisely that unified temporal order which Sartre rejects. Nausea itself is directed in part as an attack on Proustian intentionality. In the celebrated incident of the spires of Martinville dealt with below, Marcel attempts to establish his version of that "human world of measures, of quantities, of bearings "38 which collapses all around Roquentin.

The young Marcel is given a lift by an old doctor and allowed to sit on the box by the coachman and watch the world flow by. Suddenly at a bend in the road he is struck with a strange delight.

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llowed ow by. elight: "I caught sight of the twin steeples of Martinville, on which the setting sun was playing, while the movement of the carriage and the windings of the road seemed to keep them continually changing their position; and then of a third steeple, that of Vieuxvicq, which, although separated from them by a hill and a valley, and rising from rather higher ground is the distance appeared none the less to be standing by their side." ³⁹

His consciousness of the spatial perspectives through which the landscape is given to him, imbues the whole of the passage. The "special pleasure" he feels, rises out of the harmonizing variations between the changing points from which he catches sight of the steeples. In the constant variation of perspective which relates the boy to the steeples, a curious interpenetration of spatial planes in achieved, one which distorts his apprehension of the actual distance between himself and the three steeples but heightens his awareness of the lived or emotive distances which bind him to them. His sensitivity to the perspectival nature of human spatiality leads him to ponder the relationship between his own self and the steeples which fill him with such delight. Through wonder at the delight evoked in him by the curiosities of a spatial knowledge, Marcel is led to the second level of human intentionality. He passes beyond his perspectival apprehension of spatial phenomena into the realms of inner time. The spatial perspectives yield noemata to the synthesising powers of inner time. Through their organization in his unique, inner time, his perspectual apprehension of space is analysed and granted an individualized significance. This interiorization of the perspectival noemata gathered through spatial interpretation and their analysis through redisposition in inner time, represents the second level of existential intentionality.

Soon, through the pressures of a temporal interpretation his subjectivity moves from the level of interiorization to the third and culminating level of intentionality: expressive signification. The transition between the two levels is brought out in the follow-steeples:

Marcel is speaking of the interiorized vision of the

"Their outlines and their sunlit surfaces, as though they been a sort of rind, were stripped apart; a little of what they l.p.q. 4..3

had concealed from me became apparent; an idea came into my head which had not existed for me a moment earlier, framed itself in words ".41

Through points of emphasis peculiar to a Romantic episle mology, the act of signification is clearly depicted as springing out of the interiorized interpretation of spatial knowledge. Borrowing pencil and paper from the doctor, the boy starts writing. The words which occur to him order themselves into one of the most exquisite descriptions in the novel. They evoke a human value which has risen out of the complexities of subjective interpretation.

A triadic motion of consciousness underpins the interrelation of these three basic levels of an existential intentionality. It the first and outward movement, consciousness is projected into the spatial world int the act of perception. A perspectival space is instinctively ordered around the lived body. In the second inward movement enacted if the spatial perception calls for it the perceptual perspectives are interiorized. Consciousness draws into itself in reflection on the meaning of the objects of knowledge for its inner time. The synthetic powers of inner time are activated through the drawing in of the noemata. In the third and culminating motion, once again only enacted if required by the prior acts of interpretation, consciousness thrusts out wards in expressive signification. This triadic out-in-out movement fulfils the intentionality of an existential meaning-giving by 15 turning the subjectivity to the reality in which its meaning can have a shared validity.

This triadic configuration implicates all three modalities of human time: perception, recollection and projection. The noese of present perception even as they are interiorized, become past acts. Their noemata must be reconstituted in memory and then through the power of an interiorized interpretation, impelled into the future in the act of expression. Thus the moment of expressive signification is a present moment brought into being only through the ability of a temporal consciousness to interpret past noemata and order them in a fresh thrust of human intentionality. The potentialities of a temporal synthesis underlie the significant order.

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In the example given above, Marcel's act of creating order is aesthetic in nature: his significant standpoint to the objects of perception being primarily meditative. Elsewhere as in the example quoted earlier of "Peter-having-to-be-helped", the standpoint is primarily active and may give rise to an ethical act. Expressive signification, the third and culminating level of intentionality is either meditative or active. If a meditative signification gives rise to an expressive order which is aesthetic in nature, the spatiotemporal configurations of the intentionality which under-pins that order may be analysed and the phenomenological dimensions of the art-work revealed. If an active signification expresses itself in terms which may be analysed ethically, the spatial activity of the individual may be bracketed, analysed in relation to the temporal perspectives which generate it, and particularised notions subjective existence such as guilt or authenticity, illuminated. no instance however can the structures of human signification, whether meditative or active, exist apart from the deployment of inner time. And it is in relation to inner time that they must be analysed if an adequate phenomenology of existence is to be established

Miranda House, University of Delhi.

Meena Alexander

NOTES

1. The reduced sphere of consciousness was the arena within which Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology was to operate. His vision of a phenomenology which was to concern itself solely with those aspects of the object of knowledge brought within the realm of consciousness was realized hattree of the epoché. Through deployment of the epoché the reduced outlined in The Idea of consciousness could be guaranteed. Of the epoché first Husserl writes: "I use the phenomenology (1907) and developed in Ideas (1913), the from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence', W. R. Boyce Gibson (London: Allen and Unwin, 1952; pp. 110-111)

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- 2. Ibid. p. 261
- 3. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970) p. 39
 - 4. Ibid. p. 40
 - 5. Ibid p. 41
 - 6. loc. cit.
 - 7. Ibid. p. 43
 - 8. Ibid. p. 43
- 9. Indeed Husserl has delimited the noema as an ideal unity within the life of consciousness identifiable with meaning itself see Ideas p. 258
- Aron Gurwitsch, "On the Intentionality of Consciousness" Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, ed. Marvin Farber (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968) p. 83
 - 11. loc. cit. (my italics)
 - 12. Ideas, p. 110
 - 13. Ibid. p. 15
 - 14. Ibid. p. 153
 - 15. loc. cit.
- 16. René Descartes, A Discourse on Method, Meditations and Principles trans. J. Veitch (London: Dent, 1969) p. 43
- 17. It is not with this earlier stage of Husserlian phenomenology but with the last vision of phenomenology developed by Husserl in his great unfinished work (The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy), that the plan of an existential intentionality I outline in my concluding section, may be held to be compatible. But the interdependancies between a developed notion of existential intentionality and the 'Lebenswelt' of Crisis must await a later exposition.
- 18. Jean-paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, trans. F. Williams and R. Kirkpatrick (New York: Noonday Fress, 1971) p. 40
 - 19. Ibid. p. 105
 - 20. Ibid. 99
 - 21. Ibid. pp. 48-49
 - . 22. Ibid. pp. 98-99
 - 23. Ibid. p. 31
- 24. Ibid. p. 85. The circularity of Sartre's argument has been previously noted by Maurice Natanson, Literature, Philosophy and the Social Sciences (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968) pp. 31-32
 - 25. Sartre, op. cit. p. 104
 - 26. Ibid. p. 56
 - 27. loc. cit.
- Sartre, "Une Idée Fondamentale de la Phénomenologie & Situations I (Paris e Calling) Husserl. "Situations I (Paris: Gallimard, 1947) pp. 32-34. (My translation)

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29. Sartre, Nasusea, trans. R. Baldick (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965) p. 53

30. Ibid. p. 241

31. Ibid. p. 180

32. Ibid. p. 184

33. loc. cit.

34. Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, trans. H. Barnes (London: Methuen, 1969) p. 231

35. Ibid. p. 256

36. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962) p. 198

37. See for instance "Eye and Mind", The Essential Writings of Merleau-Ponty ed. A. L. Fisher (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969) pp. 272-273; Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 239-240

38. Nausea p. 184

39. Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff. 12 vols. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1941) 1. 247

40. loc. cit.

41. Ibid. pp. 248-249

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MONOTHEISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

The main objective of this paper is to show that the presence of evil in this world appears to be irreconcilable with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent God, Who is claimed to be the Creator of the world, and that this can be regarded as one of the cogent arguments for doubting the plausibility of monotheism.

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Monotheism, as a religious hypothesis, holds that there certainly exists a unitary personal being (God) Who is omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, just and benevolent and Who has created this universe to achieve a specific purpose of His own. This means that, according to this hypothesis, God is a Personal Reality or a Transcendent Person Who can be worshipped and loved by us, and Who also loves us and cares for us. As a Creator of this world, He is immanent in it and also transcends it; but He is not identical with it, nor is He indifferent to it. Thus, so far as the relation of God to the world is concerned, both pantheism and deism are rejected by monotheism. This theory also rejects polytheism and dualistic theism by maintaining that there is only one God Who cannot in any way be influenced or limited by any other power. This infinite personal God alone is the object of our prayer and worship, and we can always rely upon His unlimited power for attaining guidance, strength and peace in our lives. It is obvious that, on this theory, God is not an impersonal force or an intellectual principle; He is rather a conscious personal being Who can be affected by our prayer, worship or true devotion for

This theory is confronted with many serious difficulties, and of these the problem of evil is perhaps the most formidable and appears to admit of no satisfactory solution. This problem can be stated as follows. All sentient beings have to undergo an experience of physical pain or suffering in their lives at some time or other in more or less acute degree either because of certain natural forces over which they have no control or because of their own behaviour towards one another. This experience of physical suffering is common to both animals and human beings, and no individual being is completely immune from it. In addition to this physical pain, human beings, at some time or other, have to

undergo an experience of mental agony caused by certain unfortunate happenings (such as an incurable disease or untimely demise of a beloved one) which are completely beyond their control This pain or suffering is so pervasive in the world of sentien beings that none of them remains and can remain wholly untouched by it. Gautama Buddha rightly held that suffering is an undeniable fact of life as such. It is this suffering (whether physical or mental) which constitutes the problem of evil and which seems to be irreconcilable with the omnipotent, omniscient, just, loving and benevolent God of monotheism.

To understand this problem more clearly it is necessary to divide evil into two categories—(1) moral evil and (2) natural evil. Evil which is caused by man's own negligence, ignorance or wickedness may be termed "moral evil". A serious train accident causing untimely deaths of many innocent people or crippling injuries to them may be the result of sheer negligence on the part of some railway employees. A person may suffer from incurable cancer of lungs caused by heavy smoking simply because of his ignorance of the fatal effects of tobacco. Man's deliberate and wanton cruelty to his fellow-beings, which is so widespread in our world today, can be said to be the result of his wickedness or moral turpitude. It is clear from these examples that man himself is more or less responsible for this sort of evil, because it results from the exercise of his own will. It is for this reason that this kind of evil is called "moral evil".

But the second category constitutes that type of evil over which man has no control and therefore he cannot be held responsible for it. This kind of evil may be called "natural evil", for it results from the operation of certain natural laws. This natural evil causes considerable pain or suffering to human beings and also to other creatures. Floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, famines, epidemics and volcanic outbrusts are some of the examples of this "natural evil". Thousands of sentient beings are destroyed or seriously crippled by these natural calamities which do occur in all parts of the world at sometime or other. Even today, when science and technology claim to have made tremendous progress, man becomes quite helpless against these natural catastrophes. Thus, it is obvious that evil, in the form of physical pain or mental agony, is a hard reality which must be faced by theists.

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The important question now to be considered here is: how can the presence of this widespread evil be reconciled with the existence of God Who is omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent Creator of this world? Has He created this evil which He does not want to eradicate? In other words, does He deliberately make His sentient beings suffer helplessly? If so, He cannot be regarded as an all-good, all-loving and benevolent God as theists claim Him to be. On the other hand, if God really wants to remove this evil and is unable to do so, then He cannot be considered to be all-powerful or omnipotent. Moreover, if God has created this evil, where has it come from? Has it been created by some power other than God? If this is the case, it implies that there is some other power which is at least equal, if not superior. to God. It also implies that God is only finite and limited, since this other power necessarily imposes a limitation upon Him. This position cannot, however, be acceptable to monotheists, for they claim that there is only one God Who, and Who alone, is the Creator of this world and Who is at the same time infinite and all-powerful. This monotheistic view necessarily entails God has created evil, since there is no other power which, without His consent, could have created it. Now we are landed in a very serious dilemma if we fully accept the implications of the monotheistic position. Either God cannot eradicate evil despite the fact that it is His own creation, or He does not really want to remove it If we accept the first alternative, God cannot be said to be allpowerful or omnipotent; and if we accept the second alternative, He cannot be considered to be all-good or benevolent. Indeed, it is this serious dilemma concerning the existence of evil and its relation to God which constitutes the most formidable problem for monotheism and which appears to me to be fatal to this religious hypothesis.

Many philosophers have, however, attempted to reconcile the presence of evil in this world with the existence of an omnipotent and benevolent God. Some of the so-called solutions of this serious problem, claimed to be consistent with monotheism, are as follows:

It is held by some religious-minded philosophers that pain or suffering is the result of or just recompense for man's own sin for which either the sinner himself or his descendants are rightly

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punished by God. It is therefore man himself, and not God, who is responsible for his suffering. This is how the theory of Karma is popularly interpreted by many religious persons. But there are several serious objections which seem to be fatal to this theory. In the first place, it is very difficult to say what precisely is meant by "sin". If "sin" means the disobedience of God's will as most religious people contend it to be, how do we exactly know what God's will is and to whom it is revealed? There appears to be no satisfactory and unanimously accepted answer to this question. Secondly, it may be asked why after all man commits sin if he does commit it at all. The only reasonable answer to this question seems to be that man commits sin because of certain innate tendencies or instincts. But who has implanted in him these natural proclivities which lead him to the path of sin? The only answer, consistent with monotheism, is that it is God Who has implanted these innate instincts in man. This means that God is ultimately responsibile for man's sin, because He could have freed him from these natural instincts if He had so willed. Thirdly, on this theory, it is very difficult to account for the suffering of animals and innocent children, for they have not yet had the opportunity of committing sin if we do not already subscribe to the highly dubious hypothesis of rebirth and the immortality of the soul. Finally, this theory does grave injustice to the descendants of the sinner since it holds that they are rightly punished by God not for their own sins but for the sins committed by their ancestors. If God punishes innocent people for what they themselves have not done, He can be anything but righteous and just. In short, all these serious objections conclusively prove this theory to be unplausible.

The second solution of the problem of evil is presented by some philosophers who subscribe to absolute idealism. These philosophers completely deny the reality of evil and regard it as wholly illusory. They hold that what seems to be evil is in fact good if viewed in a larger context. They also contend that evil is a wholly subjective experience and therefore has no real existence as a part of objective reality. Thus, F. H. Bradley frankly tells us that, "Since in Ultimate Reality all existence and all thought and feeling become one, we may even say that every feature in the universe is thus absolutely good." Similarly, advocating this view

regarding the problem of evil, Bosanquet writes: "Evil, one might say, is good in the wrong place. ... There is nothing in evil which cannot be absorbed in good and contributory to it; and it springs from the same source as good and value." It is thus clear that, according to this theory, our experience of pain or suffering is a sheer delusion and has no objective reality.

But this theory is also open to many serious objections. the first place, it does not satisfactorily answer the question why all sentient beings, including rational beings, are involved in such a pervasive and engrossing delusion of evil. Has this delusion been created by God? If so, He (and not human beings) is wholly responsible for it. If God has not created this illusory experience of evil, how can its origin be accounted for? Secondly, calling evil a sheer illusion does not in any way lessen the acuteness or intensity of the suffering of those who are subjected to it. If a person is suffering from an acute physical pain or mental agony, it would, indeed, be cruel on our part to tell him that his suffering is not real but only an illusion resulting from his incapacity to look at it from a larger point of view. This kind of approach towards the problem of evil completely ignores its acuteness and intensity experienced by those who are confronted with it. Thirdly, if evil is a sheer illusion, all of us, who regard it as genuine, are wholly deluded. It means that God has created the world in which so many beings are in perpetual delusion. Why, then, does He not emancipate them from this self deception? In fact, such a world of dupes can hardly be preferable to that of suffering sinners. Finally, if this theory is accepted as true, it would be unnecessary and even undesirable to struggle against moral evil and also to strive to remove or alleviate the suffering of human beings and other creatures. If evil is nothing but a mere illusion, it is better to forget or ignore it than make efforts to overcome it. Thus, this theory makes moral struggle and a sincere effort to conquer evil completely worthless. This objection can also be urged against the theory of sin mentioned above, since according to this theory, pain or suffering is a punishment given by God rightly for the sins of creatures, and therefore it is futile and undesirable to strive to eradicate or mitigate their suffering. Thus, on both these theories, our moral struggle against evil and our sincere sincere efforts to overcone it (to which we attach so much value) are wholly meaningless.

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The third theory proposed by many philosophers to account for the problem of evil regards pain or suffering as a necessary and unavoidable factor for the existence and recognition of good It does not deny the reality of evil but rather holds that we value what is good because of the presence of evil in this world. Our moral character becomes stronger and loftier when we have to fight and conquer various temptations and evil tendencies within us The protagonists of this theory also contend that it is suffering which gives us strength and enables us to endure hardships with courage and fortitude. "A world", says William Temple, "in which there was no victory would be, so far, an inferior world But if there is to be victory, there must be opposition. To demand the good of victory without the existence of an antagonist is to demand something with no meaning."3 Thus, on this theory, the existence of evil makes our world morally superior to one in which there is no evil to be conquered. The exponents of this theory maintain that the value of our moral character lies in striving to fight and overcome what is evil. They also hold that it is suffering which generates genuine compassion and profound love in human beings for one another, so we cannot deny its great value in our lives.

This theory seems to be more convincing and satisfactory than the two theories mentioned above. But, like the earlier theories, it is also not free from many serious objections which appear to be fatal to its plausibility. In the first place, it makes the existence and knowledge of good wholly dependent upon the existence and knowledge of evil. In other words, on this theory, good cannot exist and cannot be recognized as good without the existence and knowledge of what is bad. We know what is good simply because we can distinguish it from what is evil. This means that good and evil are internally related—that is to say, the relation to evil enters into the very being of good and makes it what it is. If this is true, then good cannot be wholly good. Secondly, it may be asked why after all, God constituted our mind in such a way that it is unable to know good without distinguishing it from evil. God is omnipotent; and therefore if He had desired, He could have given us the capacity to recognize good as good without the necessity of distinguishing it from evil. Thus, if monotheism is true, our knowledge of good and its existence need not necessarily depend

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upon the knowledge and existence of what is bad. Thirdly, it is very difficult to believe that suffering—especially long and acute suffering—can in any way improve man's character. It is a common experience that acute physical suffering, continued over a long period, often turns a cheerful, good-natured and generoushearted person into an irritable, inconsiderate and self-centred individual whose sole interest is to get rid of his own suffering. This shows that suffering is not only unnecessary but can even be a positive obstacle in the improvement of man's character. Fourthly, this theory fails to account for moral evil—that is to say, it does not answer the crucial question: why do human beings deliberately commit sins or crimes and torture their fellow-beings and other creatures? This question cannot plausibly be answered (as Leibniz tried to answer it) by saying that man, by his very nature, is imperfect and because of this imperfection he is sometimes involved in moral evil. If this answer is accepted as true, then the responsibility for man's moral evil ultimately falls on God Who created him with this imperfection which is the source of his moral evil. God, being omnipotent, could have created man without this imperfection and thus could have saved him from moral evil if He had so willed. This argument shows that God, and not man, is ultimately responsible for his moral evil. Finally, this theory, wrongly presupposes that there is the right amount and also there is just distribution of suffering amongst human beings. It is not very difficult to prove that some human beings have to undergo too much suffering while others have too little share of it. It is not at all clear how the proponents of this theory would reasonably account for this obvious gross injustice regarding the distribution of suffering. To explain this injustice they will perhaps fall back on the theory of man's sin, but this theory, as we have seen, is far from satisfactory. Besides this injustice concerning the distribution of suffering, the presupposition of the right amount of suffering in the world has a very serious implication which is worth pointing out here. If our world has the right amount of suffering and if good exists and can be known simply because of this suffering, then pain or suffering has its own great value in the Divine Order of the world. This implies that it is not only unnecessary and undesirable but also a serious crime against God to strive to eradicate or even to diminish the amount of suffering in this world. Thus, like the earlier two theories, this theory also

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makes our efforts to eradicate or to alleviate suffering wholly futile and undesirable. This, indeed, is a very serious implication which constitutes a fatal objection to the theory in question. In short, all these objections, taken together, conclusively show that this theory also fails to provide a satisfactory solution of the problem of evil.

The fourth solution also recognizes the reality of evil and tries to account for it on the basis of free will which, it is said, is God's gift to man. God has created man with the capacity to choose freely between good and evil, and it is because of this freedom of will that he is called "a moral being". Morality rests both on the knowledge of good and evil and also on the ability to choose freely what is good and eschew what is bad. If man is to be genuinely free, he cannot be compelled even by God to choose what is good—that is to say, he must be left free to choose evil as well. Thus, according to the proponents of this theory, evil is the result of man's misuse of his freedom of will and therefore he, and not God, is wholly responsible for evil in this world.

This free will theory also appears to be very convincing. and many philosophers have regarded it as a satisfactory solution of the problem of evil. But if we examine this theory more thoroughly and critically, we shall find that it is also liable to many serious objections which prove it to be conclusively untenable. In the first place, it does not at all account for natural evil which, as we have seen, is beyond man's control. Considerable suffering is caused to human beings and other creatures by natural catastrophes, and man cannot be held responsible for this kind of suffering. Moreover, there is a great deal of suffering in the animal world, and it cannot be explained on the hypothesis of man's free will. It is generally held that animals do not have the freedom of will; and if this is so, why do they suffer so much pain which they themselves do not freely choose? Secondly, even if it is accepted that evil is the result of man's misuse of the freedom of will, God is not thereby absolved from the responsibility for the evil. If, as theists claim, God is really Omniscient, this means that He was already fully aware of the fact that man might misuse his freedom of the will. But, des pite this knowledge of man's possible misuse of his free will. God endowed him with freedom and thus deliberately intro-

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this capacity. Before the creation of this world there was only God Who, according to theists, is all-good. This implies that there was no evil in the universe before the creation of man, and God knowingly introduced pain or suffering in it by creating man with the freedom of will which, He knew could be misused by him. Thus, God cannot be wholly absolved from the responsibility of creating suffering in the evil-less universe. Thirdly, it is not unreasonable to raise an important question herenamely, why does after all man sometimes misuse his free will by rejecting good and choosing evil? The only answer which appears to be reasonable is that man some times prefers evil to good because he is himself partially evil—that is, he has certain innate ignoble tendencies which some times lead him to the path of evil. From this it follows that evil is not the result—but rather it is the cause—of man's misuse of free will. He some times makes misuse of this free will because by his very nature he is at least partially an evil being. Why, then, it may be asked, did God create man with this potentiality of evil while He Himself is all-good and, being Omnipotent, He could have created him without any evil natural tendencies? So far as I know, theists have not given any satisfactory answer to this question. Moreover, another significant question to be considered here is: how could God, Who is Himself all-good, have created man with the potentiality of evil? In other words, whence, does man's partially evil nature (because of which he sometimes makes misuse of his free will) come from? All these difficulties, which arise when we consider man to be only partially evil, would become far more formidable if we regard him as wholly evil and sinful as some religious philosophers or saints believe him to be. It may, for instance, be asked whence, after all, man derives his wholly sinful nature while his Creator, God is all-good and contains no evil within Him. Finally, if man's freedom necessarily entails the possibility of evil, it is hard believe that ours is the best possible world. The world in which this possibility of evil was wholly absent would certainly be much be much superior to ours; and since God is all-powerful, He could be We are the created such an evil-less world if He had so willed. We are thus driven to the conclusion that the free will theory,

like all other theories considered above, also fails to reconcile the presence of evil in this world with the existence of an all-powerful and benevolent God.

The fifth solution (if it can at all be called a "solution") of the problem of evil has been proposed by some religious philosophers who regard it as wholly absurd on the part of man to seek for a solution of this problem. They hold that human understanding is very limited and man can perceive only a small segment of Reality. With this limited capacity of understanding finite human mind cannot expect to comprehend the mysterious ways of God. Many things, says Saint Augustine, are beyond man's comprehension, and the problem of evil is one of them. It is sheer impertinence on the part of man to venture to question the arrangements of the infinite and all-powerful God. Who are we to ask why God did not arrange things differently? Despite pain or suffering in the world, a truly faithful worshipper does not give up his faith in Omnipotent and benevolent God Who, for him, always acts for the best. Thus, according to the propoponents of this theory, man is too ignorant to be able to find a solution of the problem of evil.

It is, however, not difficult to see that this religious approach towards the problem of evil cannot satisfy those who want to examine it critically and objectively. Perhaps it would not be unreasonable to say that the advocates of this approach condemn the very attempt to find a solution of the problem of evil in order to save their own child-like faith in the omnipotence and benevolence of God. At least two serious objections can be urged against their view. In the first place, human reason can readily comprehend that the two propositions—(A) "pain or suffering exists in this world" and (B) "God, the Creator of this world is both omnipotent and benevolent "-are wholly inconsistent with each other. In fact, these mutually conflicting propositions are not so much beyond reason as against it. We cannot understand them simply because they militate against reason and not because our understanding is limited. Thus, it is hard to accept the view that the problem of evil is beyond human understanding. Secondly, if reason is impotent in comprehending God's ways, then we shall have to cease to reason to be to cease to reason about religious matters. But religious philosophers do not maintain cont

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tain that their hypotheses cannot be proved by reason; on the contrary, they contend that their religious hypotheses are wholly rational and therefore must be accepted as true. Many arguments, as we know, have been advanced by these philosophers to prove the existence of God and also to prove their assumntion that this universe is created by Him alone. All this means that these philosophers do accept the competence of reason in regard to religious matters. How, then can they hold without self-contradiction that human reason is absolutely impotent in comprehending the problem of evil? Is it not wholly arbitrary to reject the competence of reason in finding a solution of the problem of evil while its competence is fully accepted in all other religious matters? As a matter of fact, to say that the problem of evil is beyond human understanding is just to evade the whole issue in order to save monotheism from this insuperable difficulty which, indeed, is fatal to it.

In short, all these solutions of the problem of evil which we have examined here and which are supposed to be consistent with monotheism fail to solve this problem—that is to say, they fail to reconcile the presence of evil in the world with the existence of its omnipotent and benevolent Creator.

In view of this formidable difficulty posed by the problem of evil to monotheism, some advocates of this theory have suggested that, although God is all-good, He is not all-powerful. This means that, in some sense, God is limited, and it is not possible even for Him to do certain things which He wills to do. "It has long been believed", says David Elton Trueblood, "that God is limited by the laws of logic.... Even God cannot create an interdependent community of persons without also producing a situation in which evils spread.... If omnipotence means ability to do anything, then surely God is not omnipotent, and the problem of evil is not only insoluble but irreducible. this simple notion of omnipotence is a purely childish notion and one which reflective thought can remove."

This statement of an advocate of monotheism is a frank admission of the fact that the existence of evil cannot be reconciled with the omnipotence of God and that God is not therefore omnipotent in the sense of being able to do whatever He wills to do. But True-

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blood calls this notion of omnipotence "a purely childish notion" which, according to him, must be abandoned. The question then arises: if to be able to do anything one wants to do not omnipotence, what else can this term mean? So far as I know, Trueblood does not give any satisfactory answer to this question. I think if omnipotence is to be ascribed to God, He must be expected to do anything He wants to do; and if He's · unable to do this, He is not omnipotent in the real sense of the term. It is worth pointing out here that, like Trueblood, some other protagonists of theism-such as Hastings Rashdall, William James, E. S. Brightman and P. A. Bertocci-have denied the omnipotence of God in this sense. They support (in some sense or other) the Doctrine of Divine Finitude by saying that God knowledge and power are limited, therefore, He is not omipotent in the sense of being able to know and do anything H wants to. On this view, even God cannot conquer evil, although He is Himself all-good and wants to overcome it.

Now, if we accept this doctrine of the limitation of God a This is because true, then we shall have to abandon monotheism. in that case we shall have to admit that in addition to God the is some other power which, if not superior to, is at least co-equiwith God and which necessarily imposes a limitation upon Him This, indeed, is not monotheism but dualistic theism; and it has its own difficulties which I do not propose to discuss here, it their discussion is beyond the purview of my paper. I only was to stress the fact that the rejection of God's omnipotence neces sarily entails the total abandonment of monotheism. We continue the same abandonment of monotheism. thus conclude that the presence of evil in the world is rational irreconcilable with the monotheistic conception of God, at therefore it may be regarded as a conclusive evidence again this theory.

Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi.

Ved Prakash Varmi

NOTES

Bernard Bosanquet, "The Value and Destiny of the Individual" 217. 1. F. H. Bradley, "Appearance and Reality", p. 412. 2.

pp. 209, 217. 3. William Temple, "Mens Creatrix", p. 268. CC-6. In Public Trueblood "Philosophy of Religion", p. 246. Toda tics. that in sp tics 1 realiz phica critic

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THE ARTS, CRITICISM IN INDIA AND AESTHETICS

The subject posits some relations which are not alike obvious. Today, nobody questions the relation of art to criticism and aesthetics. Philosophers even insist that 'the fact of creative art is that upon which all criticism and all aesthetics depends'. But, in spite of their common linkage with art, the relation of aesthetics to criticism is not so manifest. Yet it is being increasingly realized. It is now possible to regard aesthetics as a philosophical study of the problems of criticism; and some eminent critics hazard the view that, though every art needs its own critical organization, its theory of criticism may well get assimilated in aesthetics as soon as the latter 'becomes the unified criticism of all the arts instead of whatever it is now'.

A thorough discussion of this triple relation is not here possible. The warrant of this essay is rather its viewpoint, its continual concern with the Indian scene. Yet, partly by way of justifying the manner of my attempt, I have to open with some remarks on the problem in general.

I. The Problem Generally .

(a) It is today common to regard aesthetics as the study of aesthetical discourse. I do not think this conception does due justice to the importance, in aesthetics, of the fact of art experience. But the point that I wish to press here is that aesthetical discourse admits of a distinction which should be drawn. It is not merely the public critics, scholars and men of general culture who speak of art. The artists themselves do so; and their language, though often quite unclear, is generally closer to the fact of art as a creative something than that of the others. Their words refer to details of fact and effect from the viewpoint of making; and are often cryptic. They do not directly cater to the need to understand. Yet, if they are attended to, they often come to convey very vital sense. How exactly this happens will be clear only when the reader turns to my discussion of some concepts of Hindustani music. And, for the present, we have to be content with a general stress on the requirement that, if

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aesthetics be regarded as 'logic of the talk about art', the discourse of the artists themselves must be given due heed. It is certainly true, but not enough to say that 'the character of the language used by the critic is different from the character of the language used by the philosopher of aesthetics'. The word and imagery that the artists use about art make a third disting kind; and are of vital moment to aesthetics.

(b) As for criticism, I think its aim is to reveal in discursing prose what the critic finds embodied in the work itself.

This, however, is true only of what I may call 'first order criticism: that is, of criticism which is concerned directly, and as a rule merely, with singular works of art. Critics, here, recont their reactions in episodic forms like the daily 'critical' write-up or the periodical survey of 'the cultural stream'. But criticise has also been regarded as a systematic dealing with the base concepts, theories and problems relating to a particular art. Its concern with individual works is not so direct and unremitting as that of the other kind.

Here, one can easily see the critic's link with aesthetic. But I must first explain, and partly justify the meaning I have given to criticism.

The critic, I insist, reveals what may not be evident to the untrained eye; and he does that in language which convent understanding. What he says is of course grounded in, but does not seek to duplicate his own experience of art. Criticis is, therefore, a distinct activity. To have an experience is on thing; to seek to explain the details of its object, is quite another. In the latter case, the manner is frankly discursive; and there is a necessary use of language with a careful eye on its apunct to the apprehended character of fact.

But here, at once, we must mark two necessities:

First, what we find in the work is 'embodied'. The actual tic and the perceptual, the virtual and the actual, are both his fused. The words of the critic, on the other hand, can new bodily capture what is directly given,—say, the heard lilt of melody or the seen recessiveness of colour. No criticism fore, is a substitute for art; and, like real prayer, direct contemplation of art necessarily steps out of the world of mere talk in the private and secret presence, of the Other.

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Secondly, though he cannot but notice them with utmost attention, the critic does not merely borrow the words the artist uses in speaking of his art. Critical attention is at once a stress towards analysis; and the routine 'talk' of the artists is, by the critic, necessarily thought out, revealing new neanings or linkages of concepts. I hope to make it clear a little later in this essay.

As for the critic's basic criteria I get at them thus:

Art is 'creative' in at least three senses. As activity, it is a kind of making; 10 and, as a product, art is *emergent* in the sense that its net character can never be wholly forethought. Further, as activity, it is not the mere construction of a useful object, but the creation of an intense and organic 11 unity for mere contemplation. It is not *meant* to be used. 12 But it has a life of its own, its own world of semblance and magic; and this can be manifest only to him who views it truly,—in depth, to be sure, but without denaturing, so to say, its details into fragments.

If this be true, and I have purposely chosen the least questionable 'truths' about art, the critic's main task, it would seem, is to explain what a work of art 'says' and how it has been structured into its uniquely significant form; and his basic *criteria* can only be unity, complexity and intensity of regional unity. To look for these features in our response to art is to follow a viewpoint that is truly aesthetic. 14

Is criticism important? It obviously is. As expert commentary on individual works, it makes us see what we may otherwise easily miss. This enrichment of perception is by itself no trivial matter. And as scholarly attention to the basic concepts and problems of the arts, criticism makes for a systematic and growing body of knowledge. Nor can we deny that critics sometimes bring to light young artists of promise, even new forms of art; and may unceasingly work for a better awareness of the value of the older ones. 15

Our answer could in brief be as follows:

The main task of the public critic is of course to attend to individual works. Yet, in writing on them he cannot avoid using words like form and expressiveness. True, he is not

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bound to discuss their meaning in detail. But, implicit though it is, his use of such words can only benefit from a careful study of what they mean in aesthetics.

The scholarly critic, on the other hand, pays explicit attertion to the key notions of an art; and so often does the same work as is done by aesthetics, though perhaps a little less intensely. This happens, for instance, when Frye discusses symbols meaning and rhythm.16 We must, therefore, remember that whe is opposed to the aesthetician's emphasis on general categoris is not such systematic criticism, but only criticism of the 'fix order'17 At the same time neither criticism of the general kind nor aesthetics can overlook for long the fact of art-experience.18

About This Essay: II.

These are the generalities which this essay seeks to illustrate Its warrant is clear. Two features of our cultural life since the attainment of independence have been an increased interest i the arts and frequent art-criticism. But aesthetical thinking relation to these has been very unsatisfactory. It is this dela which I here seek to remedy, of course quite imperfectly. We have five rich styles of classical Indian dance; quite a few gharánti of vocal music; and considerable activity in the field of dram and painting. But these are yet to receive aesthetical cognisant though most of our art and music colleges have rightly made aesthetics a part of their syllabi.

From this total viewpoint, however, my venture is qui inadequate. It takes no notice of our literature, sculpture architecture today. But, on the other hand, it does pay serious though limited attention to contemporary Indian painting rhythm, music and dance; and also to specimens of our colling and also to specimens o cal' writing today. Some notice of the contemporary art Bangla Desh is another redeeming feature. Above all, nowhere in the article do I say anything that is ungrounded in my experience of art; and only such works of art have been referred to as are accessible.20

There is a larger relevance, too, of some parts of this experience ernationalism in a second control of the se 'Internationalism in aesthetics' is not a mere cry. The department of the cry. arises from the quite proper awareness that the more numbers and dissimilar the and dissimilar the art that we survey, the greater will be the CC-0 in Public D

THE ARTS, CRITICISM IN INDIA AND AESTHETICS

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advance in our grasp of the subject, of its concepts and problems; and the fuller the curb on the urge to generalize. How this is in fact so should become clear when we turn, in this essay, to some select features of the Indian arts.

On the other hand, I am heavily indebted to Western aesthetical theory and critical writing today. This should be generally manifest in my attempt to be clear about the meaning of concepts, instead of merely quoting from our own ancient writings on the arts. And in my very appeal, towards the end of this article, for attention to the Indian arts, I am prompted by an utterance of a modern aesthetician:

"...Aesthetic categories now in operation are not a procrustean bed to which the products of the creative...artist must be fitted at all costs."²¹

III. Our Arts and Criticism .

(A) Dance:

On criticism in relation to our dances—of which I choose Kathak²²—I may only make some quite general remarks:

- 1. A few clear types can here be distinguished. Of the extracts cited below, referring to the same danseuse, the first is somewhat analytic and elaborate, but the second is just a single, quintessential insight. The third, by contrast, is (in the main) mere praise, though not, therefore, necessarily untrue:
 - (a) "The opening chaturanga, a rich blend of various elements of dance and song, impressed us with a recurring posture of opulent beauty portraying Saraswati. The Meera bhajan and Radha-Krishna nritya, which followed, were not mere...spectacle. Rani Karna has a striking ability to embellish the bhajan with a variety of beautiful and expressional postures, so rare in Kathak. Her amad of the Chandrakans²³ abhinaya composition, and... communication, through subtle abhinaya, of such difficult ideas as 'ek prand dou swarup' were...perfect. The movements were throughout effortless, unhurried....

 The ang²⁴ though... (articulating) in great detail...the meaning and imagery inherent in the song, was appealing due to it.

(b) "Rani Karna was dainty and lucid".26

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(c) "....Is not only one of our most graceful Kathak dancers,.... (but) is.... known for having considerably enriched and beautified this system.... It is doubtful whether (in this respect) any single person has achieved as much in a quiet and unostentatious manner, as Ram Karna ".27

The first, I explain, is aesthetic because it speaks of the 'unity and complexity' of the dance. The various elements—like ang, amad, abhinaya and posture—are here not only identified in respect of their beauty and significance, but are shown as related, in terms of concordance, recurrence and relief. The second critical notice too seizes two features; but these relate to the overall manner, rather than to inner details. The third one, I fear, is not even truly 'critical'; for 'the real concern of the evaluating critic is with positive value (of the work) rather than with the greatness of its author'.28

2. As a systematic attempt to fix and inter-relate the meaning of the basic concepts, criticism here is however generally poor. My own first venture in this direction—though it sought to discuss the art's very bases, like that, amad and nikas, if only from the viewpoint of rhythm—was, at places, heavy and obscure. Consider for instance, what I said there about layakari: 29

"Layakāri is the temporal representation of the diverse as articulating, vivifying,....variegating and manifesting—but by no means exhausting or disrupting—the original continuum." 30

And now compare this with the following characterization of layor reached through the analysis not only of our alāpa as it appears, but of such phrases of our common rhythmic discourse as laya ki chukkur and laya ki kāt tarāsh:

"Laya is musical duration which is controlled—but not necessarily with the (objective) aid of beats—in respect of its speed; and which permits such a variety of pace, emphasis and arrangement that it seems utterly removed from what recommonly mean by time. In alā pa (we must add) the regulation of laya is much more subjective than in the case of rhythmore rhythmically organized singing." 31

This should be quite intelligible to those who are even fairly familiate with the broad features of the music of India.

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B. Rhythm:

Though (as regulated duration) it permeates all music and dance, laya belongs mainly to rhythm; and so I may next invite attention to criticism in relation to rhythm.

1. Meeting a doubt

But first a doubt must be faced. Is rhythm an independent and important art at all? For, if it is not, it has little right to separate attention.

Now, in so far as its core is the problem of the very nature of art, this question is not only an aesthetical, but a metacritical one.³² The thoughtful critic is certainly sometimes moved to reflect on the key terms that he uses in his daily work,—say, art, form and content; and it would therfore be no digression if I here deal with the question just posed. Now, in defence of our rhythm, my argument is briefly as follows:

In the West, it has been held that an art is eminent if its medium of communication is not commonly used for non-aesthetic purposes. Consider, for instance, the following comment of Herbert Read on Schopenhauer's well-known thesis that all arts aspire to the condition of music:

"....Almost in music alone, it is possible for the artist to appeal to his audience directly without the intervention of a medium of communication in common use for other purposes. The architect must express himself in buildings which have some utilitarian purpose. The poet must use words which are bandied about in the daily give-and-take of conversation...."33

I comment that, if we admit the test, here hinted, rhythm should be ranked higher than music; for whereas musical notes are in fact employed, say, by quite a few roving sellers in their typical voices, or may be heard as a bell chimes the hours—uses which are both inartistic—the mnemonic syllables or bols of rhythm³⁴ are never employed for any non-aesthetic purpose.

Again, our rhythm seems quite true to the ideal of pure art. The syllables of tala do not refer to anything external. A good solo rhythmic recital charms us mainly with the excellence of its counts. Of course, if he so decides, the drummer can produce bols that resemble everyday sounds and familiar happenings—such

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as the movement and noise of a train as it steams out, accelerates and comes to a halt; but whenever this is attempted, those who understand rhythm only feel amused.

I may add that a full length exposition of our rhythm can be so winsome that it may induce in knowledgeable listeners a state of intense absorption or tādātmya35 with the winged, variform beauty of rhythm.

Finally, rhythm may be said to be a distinct art in so far asia has its own independent criteria of evaluation. In perhaps no other art is the precise point or region of organization-or the dominant motif or movement—so clearly identifiable as in the region of our rhythm. Our reference here is obviously to sama, and to the shapely ā mads36 that make it seem unmistakable.

A clear deficiency

Our rhythm is indeed remarkable for its subtlety and richness and the music of India is grounded in long and impressive tradition of rhythmic practice. Yet 'critical' reaction to expositions of rhythm has so far been very superficial, confined, as a rule, to the merely perceptual features of fluency, sharpness and softness I have never seen in such criticism any intelligent reference to details of rhythmic structure.

In respect of a serious study of rhythm's basic concepts, however, a start has been made. Elsewhere, as already hinted, I have sought to fix the meaning of laya after examining most of the popular phrases of our rhythmic discourse; and here I may briefly indicate how such basic criticism may be done—a little differently, that is, by emphasising details of rhythmic practice and of content plation of rhythm rather than mere rhythmic discourse—in respect of SAMA, which is perhaps the most important word in the region of our tala.

3. 'Criticism' and a Concept: SAMA

To facilitate discussion, I begin by proposing a definition though in fact I have reached it only as the end-term of enquiry.

SAMA is the first or focal mātrā (or beat) of the rhythical cycle as treated musically, spoken or merely contemplated idea 38 In a side a 18 idea.³⁸ In principle, it is to be kept in mind continually in the major continually in the maj the major accent of an even flow of *laya*; and is, in fact, of sought designs the sought designedly to work up effects of beauty.

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Let me now explain this definition by attending to its key words, and making the necessary distinctions:

(a) As the source of rhythmic design:

As the first mātrā, the 'sama' is a stimulus. It impels and enables the mind to get tuned to what is to follow. But, we must note, it is the first beat not merely numerically, but as the pace-setter. The time taken in articulating the sama-bol itself directly fixes the speed of the flow that follows. Putting the two ideas together, we may speak of sama as the source of rhythmic design. The flow of the cycle not only begins from, but is determined by sama.

(b) As focal beat:

The sama, however, is not merely the first, but the focal beat of a cycle. From it we set out, and to it we return.³⁹ This is quite common knowledge. But we are prone to forget this, and often say merely that the sama is the first beat, ignoring the necessary complement: 'of the cycle'. The flow which it initiates and completes is really implicit in what we mean by sama.

It is, I may add, sama as the focal point of a cycle which lends to rhythm, and to music which repeats a cycle clearly, 40 a suggestion of self-completeness. This is quite missing in alāpa where we only have laya, no tāla. Alāpa works up an atmosphere which may well seem infinite. But it never appears self-complete.

(c) A beat or a mātrā?

Yet the sama is a beat or mātrā too. As such, it enables us to measure the flow, to steady or vivify the laya whenever necessary as after the execution of intricate patterns—and to keep it generally under control.

Such talk, however, is a little glib; and we must make it clear what it means to say that the 'sama' is a beat or a 'mātrā'. A beat is a recurrent stroke, or its sound or moment. Repetitiveness, so clear in rhythm, is implicit in the very meaning of the word. A $m\bar{a}tr\bar{a}$, on the other hand, is a measured quantity. This word is closer to measure than to recurrence. It does not, however, signify complete separateness. In fact, to speak of a measured quantity is at once to imply the complement—'of something'. The $m\bar{a}tr\bar{a}$ here is a measured accent of a chosen stretch of laya.

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To sum up, as a *beat*, the 'sama' means that it is to be repeated as the end of the cycle—a point that we have already emphasised; and considered as a *mātrā*, *sama* is the measure of a flow.

The second idea is, in my view, important. The essential function of the sama, I insist, is not merely to mark or divide, but to measure. I do not deny that it serves as a mark too. Failure to notice it would weaken our awareness of both the character and speed of the cycle. Also, the sama may serve to divide one rhythmic pattern from another. What is more, it must freely be allowed to appear doing this. This is indeed important. In order to enable a rhythmic pattern to have its full impact on the listener. and to appear self-completed, it is often essential not to begin the second pattern immediately on the finish of the first one, when the sama reappears. Here the little quiet that follows it allows the sama to flower as desired; and it seems duly to sever the form of one pattern from that of the following one, though not of course the flow of laya. This is often ignored in Kathak dancing with the result that the presentation becomes exessively flowing, and deficient in clarity.

Yet, I insist, the *full and basic* function of *sama as mátrá* is to measure, not merely to mark. This can be argued as follows:

The marking or dividing just referred to is no radical splitting. The proper awareness of rhythm is, so to say, bifocal. Directly, of course, we notice and follow the patterns⁴² of the drummer. But this mere confluence will itself be quite unrhythmical if we loosen our deeper hold on the underrunning laya. So the same which divides patterns as spheres of rhythm does so only when it serves to measure and steady, as a guide-beat, the flow which it itself articulates.⁴³ What is divided, we have seen, is not the basic laya, but only the patterns; and the sama's activity of marking of dividing still remains subject to its function of measuring.

And this, I believe, is important aesthetically. Art articulates. Its parts are not merely mixed, like paints rubbed indistinguishably into oneness. Nor are they only put together like pebbles in a heap. They are of course distinguishable. Yet they also nourish, and are rooted in some common significance. In the region of rhythm, what keeps the 'mātrās' at their proper places—and so truly distinct from, yet also rightly related to one another.

their common grounding in *laya*; but, if only implicitly, *laya* itself rests on awareness of *sama*. So I conclude: the essential articulateness of rhythm as art is in part⁴⁶ due to *sama*.

Even apart from the points just argued, it is easy to see why measuring' has to be regarded as the *full and basic* function of sama. Measuring includes marking and dividing in a sort. To measure is at once to insert distinctions into what is measured; and the latter is one unit distinct from the rest.

This is, however, a bit too general, though by no means untrue. What is important here is to mark the *special* nature of the measuring involved. To measure rhythmically is not to portion something given as mere inert extension, as in plotting a stretch of land, but to hold onto the *flow of laya* which is, in the main, grasped by the mind. What is more, in fixing and keeping to this flow—or even in merely following it⁴⁷—one has to remain steady, sometimes even to try to do so, may be with some actual felt discomfort. The inter-mētrā interval must be kept⁴⁸ throughout even. The measuring here is at once a *self-steadying*. If, in attention to rhythm, the listener wavers in this balance even for a second, the mātrās may wobble, unhinging the very basis of rhythm's flowing fabric. The steadiness here demanded, we have seen, is helped greatly by sama. Hence I insist that measuring of the kind just indicated is the sama-bol's basic function.

(d) Sama as destiny:

Yet, it would be wrong to suppose that the function of sama is never essentially to mark. I say so with an eye on the use of sama as destiny, in opposition to sama as the source of rhythmic design. Where it begins rhythmic work, the sama may well seem definite; and, as played, deliberative. But I wonder if here it can ever appear sharp. We aim, in such cases, at fixing a speed; and the sama is therefore admittedly a measure, suggesting by its own extent the laya to be followed. But where it occurs as the climax of a shapely rhythmic upsurge, its function is, as a rule, quite plainly to mark. And it could hardly be otherwise. For, as we follow the rhythmic movement approaching its terminus, we only think of the 'sama'; and as thus apprehended, it cannot seem And when it ends at the sama accurately, we just nod at the fusion

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rather than judge how long the *sama-bol* lasts. It does in fact occupy some time. But it now *seems* instantaneous, like all acutal reaching at *and as* the end of a journey. We do not measure time when a tension is relieved, or a target just attained.

C. Music .

From rhythm I may now turn to music which, as a rule, includes the former as a necessary element. Here, because of the limitations of space, I choose only a few major points for very brief discussion:

1. Music criticism too, as done in present day India, is distinguishable into types. Besides the ones already mentioned in the context of dance, the approaches that are here seen follow different ways of rising to the general from attention to the particular. Thus, as in the following 'review' of the late Ustad Dabeer Khan's bilāskhāni⁵⁰ alāpa on the veenā in his National Programme of May '56, the mere perception of one subtle detail may lead to an attempt to explain why svaras of one kind differ (in effect) from those of the other:

"...a consistently immaculate rendering of 're' as emanating from within the ground 'sa'—...deeply bestirred, sweet and soulful...Here at once one feels impelled to compare the veena-alāpa with the quivering sensuousness of touch seen in sitar-playing, as (sometimes) in the hands of a Wilayat of Halim. The secret of the difference seems to be this. A note which turns and twists before it has steadied itself seems flippant..., and is prevented only by its sweetness from appearing...vulgar. The vibrant trail of a steadily rendered svara, on the other hand, produces—specially when the tone is deep—an irresistible impression of deep inward feeling (and) power..."51.

Criticism of this kind is obviously a blend of phenomenological fidelity, some understanding of the 'why' of effects, and a measure of generality.

2. Alternatively, the 'critical' notice of an individual recital may seek to fix, though implicity, the essence of the type of performance represented. As an illustration, the following remarks on Ravi Shankar—Ali Akbar jugalbandi⁵² should here serve:

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recital perfor effects by matching playing in one octave with similar or simultaneous playing in the other; and by trying to articulate audibly what the partner's playing, as it ends, demands by suggesting, either as continuance or as a repartee. The one reinforces, completes, or just caps with the dainty individuality of a single note, the meaning or the manner of the patterns of the other. Sometimes it appears as if one heaves a sigh and the other lends a tear to it."53

The criterion here suggested is that jugalbandi is music which is not merely conjoined, but complementary.

3. Another distinct kind may be identified where the critic's reasoned objection to a single defect of playing at once fixes and inter-relates the meaning of some concepts of music. See, for instance, what 'a music critic' once wrote on a recital of Ravi Shankar,⁵⁴ today our best known musician:

"I come now to an evaluation of his gatkaari⁵⁵ in general. What is the aesthetic character or significance of a gat? I think the gat is to instrumental music what the sthayi⁵⁶ is to singing. It is the basis of the creativity which follows.... If that is so—and I am convinced it cannot be otherwise—the gat must have a character of its own. It must have some centralized significance; it must appear as a continuity with a distinctive centre. That centre is the sama....

But, I hasten to add, the aesthetically central is a fount of value; it not merely is, but determines the beauty of that which encompasses it. Now, if the sama is to retain its true character as an aesthetic centre..its..place in the economy of the tune, it must..first..have an unmistakable sharpness about it; and secondly, it should appear not merely as the last note of the tune, but as the logical culmination of a self-evolving pattern. Putting the two together, it may be said that the sama should not merely come, but emerge, The entire manner in which the gat gathers up its loveliness and finally delivers it, as it were, to the sama, is the amad..It is this fact of amad which makes the old masters say that the approach of the sama should be visible from a distance, as it were. Now, in..gatkāri last night, the distinct sharpness of the sama was,

as a rule, there, but the impression of amad was generally missing, so that (the) gat would appear as a mere succession of notes that..had..no aesthetic necessity about them, no compelling purpose taking them all towards a common goal."57 Three concepts are here thought out, in relation to one anothersama, amad, gatkaari; and analysis is germane to the ultimate finding.

The most important kind of criticism—here, as in relation to the other arts-is however that systematic attempt to fix the meaning of concepts⁵⁸ which is not subject to the stress of submitting the 'copy' to the Press soon after the recital. In this context, I propose only to explain how, as already said, the critic not only avails of, but at once interprets the language that the artists use about art;59 which is, in my view, partly what Free means by saying that 'the axioms and postulates of criticism... have to grow out of the art it deals with '.60 The concept that I choose is : amad, a word which is used (in music) for a particular part of the sthayi or gat; and I reproduce, very briefly, the gist of my argument developed elsewhere.61

The cue is here provided by a vocalist's remark that 'from there, higher up, the amad should seem to come, directed at this point'.62 This 'point' here referred to is the sama; and the other italicized words, at the very first impact of critical thought, deliver (correspondingly) the following distinct ideas; point of emanation, self-activation, orientation or design, and terminal propriety.63 The moment this ideal material is referred to the evidence of actual listening, thought is enabled, with surety, to characterise āmad as:

"that identifiable section of the flowing form of a sthap (or gat), in and through which the flow seems to activate of regulate itself perceptibly at a particular point of the rhythment cycle, and therefrom to move towards, and attain the same in a well-designed way; which attainment at once seems a selfcompletion of the entire bandish as a dynamic design. I have so far found this definition quite adequate to niceties of

amad in actual good singing.

The artist's talk, I repeat, is built around insight and imagerly The critic analyzes it. But the step to verbal meaning, if calls taken in the step to verbal meaning, if calls taken in the step to verbal meaning, if calls taken in the step to verbal meaning, if calls taken in the step to verbal meaning, if calls taken in the step to verbal meaning, if calls taken in the step to verbal meaning, if calls taken in the step to verbal meaning, if calls taken in the step to verbal meaning, if calls taken in the step to verbal meaning, if calls taken in the step to verbal meaning, if calls taken in the step to verbal meaning, if calls taken in the step to verbal meaning, if calls taken in the step to verbal meaning, if calls taken in the step to verbal meaning, if taken in the step to verbal meaning in the step to ve fully taken, is neither a caricature of fact nor an unrewarding

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the 'aw I.P.Q. duplication of it. It is a quite proper supplement of sense to sensibility. And there is no reason why analysis that unknits insight, and traces intimations in its own self-consistent way—without yet shutting out the breath of further fact—should not at once enrich, though it cannot replace, our response to beauty; and aid, quite visibly, evolution of concepts that are not only helpful to critics, but acceptable, if only made intelligible, to those who practise art.

D. Painting .

1. In my treatment of criticism relating to our painting I propose to *emphasise* what has so far been implicit; I mean the supreme importance of noticing minutely what is there in the work, Failure to meet this requirement at once makes 'critical' writing a bit too general, unhelpful to the reader; and, may be, itself rather indefensible.

The critic's right to generalize cannot as such be disputed. But its exercise must be responsible; and this calls for a close observation of details. Where this balance is observed, as in Herbert Read's following comments on Vermeer, criticism is not only respectable—partly because of the aptness of its words to what is in fact there—but at once a tempting invitation to art:

"Every painting of Vermeer's is bathed in...serenity....
There is no violence in his work, of thought or action. There is an eternal stillness, of music that dies on the echo, of the mind entranced by a message of love, of fingers that gently guide a thread of lace, of a tiny pearl suspended in delicate scales. Even Clio's eyes are downcast, as if embarrassed by the symbols of Fame she is compelled to hold."65

What one 'finds' in a painting, after hours of reverent watching, may well overrun what first meets the eye. But it should yet be traceable, naturally, to the work, from which we set out, and warranted by what is found therein. This is the crux of the painting 'means' is inseparable from, though not tied down to what it shows.

the 'award-winners' at the National Exhibition of Art held in 1973:

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"....We have, for example, Satish Gujral whose Cons. truction I' typifies sophistication thematically and in the use of materials which are very contemporary and modern. On the other side, we have Ramachandran's 'Kali Puja' which is uncompromisingly figurative, metaphorical and humanistic G. R. Santosh's painting is a phenomenal exaltation of the sensuous to the super-sensuous region, in contradiction to Anupam Sud's superb surrealisic composition which breaths the thematic eclecticism of yesteryear. Jeram Patel's 'Black III', superb drawing that it is, is the crystallization of subconscious and observing imagery."66

Now, I do not deny that these remarks are mostly applicable to the works in question. But do they at all try to reveal inner detail? And in suggesting that a work is good because its them is 'sophisticated' and its materials 'contemporary', is any appeal made to aesthetic criteria, any insight given in relation to structure any tempting cue provided for the eye?

The Commissioner's 67 comments are relatively better. Yet I do not think they are throughout true to the 'award winners or quite adequate to their richness. 68 But I must turn to the work themselves, 69 which can all be seen at the Akademi:

(a) Construction I. (57 Satish Gujral):

It struck me as a rich and powerful, but by no means example. ggerated image of the main features of our life today—of its domi nation by mere literacy and the mechanical, perhaps also of its neat division of functions. There is here no interfusion of elements and it is—if we think of the materials used—an 'assemblage'd quite diverse materials. But it would be wrong to say that appears to contemplation a mere juxtaposition of the various. its geometry of designs does not merely dominate and organize in centre—where it certainly persists, for the eye, in spite of the ship fickle surface—but permeates the work, so that the details see akin by just characteristics. akin by just sharing shapeliness. The lines here define what the fringe, circle or run through; there is no fuzzy detail; and a cell tude of manner and index tude of manner and design here overtops everything. is why the many 'things' lifted bodily from life—say, the letter and the one room and the one peg—only seem true rather than trivial. contemporary in feeling, the work is a sure solid work of precisions assembly. So have the assembly. So here I agree with the Commissioner unreserved

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One reason why he commends the work is that it advances the possibilities of the use of varied materials such as aluminum, copper.. wood in the making of an artefact.'70 Now, this is true. But I want, in this context, to point to a detail of manner. The materials have all been used, in this work, with such subtle restraint that their innate suggestion of the third dimension is kept quite subdued, though the whole construction does not seem a flat surface either. (The first part of this finesse was not so manifest in the adjacent No. 58, Construction II, by the same artist).

(b) Black 3 (268: Jeram Patel):

What the Commissioner here says utterly bewilders me. He admires the work (also) for the 'profound awareness' it embodies 'of growth and development in nature'. Now, I realize that what is profound is not only true, but deep or difficult to get at. But I have failed so completely to blink the shrunken carcass that the drawing at once shows, and to find in it any real suggestion of growth and development, that I remain unconverted. This detail recalcitrates the reason for the judgment.

(c) Composition (283: Anupam Sud):

To the Commissioner this Composition suggests:

"....the constrictions of claustrophobia and the fractured

attempts of humanity to overcome this."⁷³
I partly disagree, and once again on the basis of what the work really shows. Some constriction is of course here suggested. But the print is, on the whole, too well lit to generate the impression of a morbid dread of closed places; and if we attend, as we should, to the composition as a whole, the constriction in question would seem to relate to the deeper darkness of loneliness. This singleness, I believe, is a want of communion—see the figural estrangement; and no mere solitariness. It is not numerical, but of spirit further shows, are hardly any filling. (I notice that the balls in work, quite aptly, as 'The Mystery and Melancholy of Loneliness', 74

Only invites, but holds attention, by virtue of its sheer visual loa patient, watchful eye. Thus the pivotal oval shape is no CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Rangin Collection, Handwar

opaque 'lingam' but an orb of light, which reflects-its on self-completeness. (The feeble inner shapes are not to be missed I regard the work as a beautiful symbol of the subtle idea that the Spirit is Beauty and a Light self-luminous. One could add It is free too; for the orb seems suspended, not really put on the pedestals. Yet, it does not seem to hang in a mere void either For, the propulsive red of the rim framing the orb is deftly held back by the blue of the bigger outer border; and a plane is duh created for the light to illuminate, but not to rest on. (I find difficult to think of a better visualization of the Upanishadic ide that Pure Consciousness illumines, but does not depend on the objective).75-a

That, as the Commissioner says, the significance of the works both 'sensual and supra-sensuous' is perhaps true; but hi suggestion that it refers to 'the generative principle (and) embodies also a vision of life forms'75-b is more what one may decide to read into the work, than its own direct language.76 Nor dol here find any 'emanation' '77 symbolized. Both theologically and otherwise, the word means that which issues or proceeds from some source. But what one here finds is an oval light just nestling securely within, not coming out of the darkness, not even illumining the latter,—a suggestion that is visibly there in the second painting of the same artist, the adjacent⁷⁸ No. 127, which has seemed 1 superior work to many partly because of its better handling of black.

(e) Kali Puja (112: A. Ramachandran):

This too is a painting that grips us with its power and skill As the Commissioner tells us, the draughtsmanship and composition tion are both here excellent. The lines that bound the figure have been made somewhat fuzzy, so as to match the work's spilling fervour; and the artist almost says so by providing some relief unmistakable linear clarity, as in drawing the nearer forearms the two figures that people either end-side.

Nor can one miss the work's inner tensions. I get them the The design of the background colours favours, in the middle clockwise movement of the eye. By their vertical convergent they draw attention to the mid and make it seem central. What more, the quiet blue strip that tops the garish rear imparts a slip

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hackward tilt to the upper, richer background; and as we follow. horizontally, the fine line cleaving the yellow from the rest, it may seem there collapsible-and possibly upwards, as if tending to sweep off the figures, of which the three larger ones themselves seem somewhat pulled up.

What is here admirable is no 'mere arrangement of figural motifs',79 but the creation of such varied forces; and what the whole work images is no 'cold terror' but the hideousness-and. one could add, the exhaustion-of sacrificial worship and frenzy. The addition is perhaps warranted by attention to postural manner. but I am surer of the other word hideousness. It includes ugliness, which 'cold terror' does not. And 'the telling glint's of which the Commissioner speaks-referring, I suppose, to places where the figural pigment looks a little worn off-if taken together with the protrusive, ribbed appearance of the figures generally, and with the raw-hide look of one overidden figure, would itself seem to warrant the word I have chosen.

- 3. Sometimes, and with this I turn to comment in a word, on the art of Bangla Desh, our critics' remarks provoke aesthetical questions that we are yet to pursue. See, for instance, the following comments on the panel, 'Bangla Desh'-70'82 by Zainul Abedin:
 - (a) "Zainul Abedin presents a panoramic view of humanity felled "83
 - (b) "Curiously, works on the birthpangs of Bangladesh-Abedin's big drawing and Aminul Islam's painting with a panel of skulls and bones at the base-fail to be deeply stirring.",84

The first of these is obviously too brief to be helpful. And it is the second one to which I invite attention, confining myself to the Work of Abedin. If in saying that it is not 'deeply stirring', only a fact is being stated, I have nothing to say. But if it is suggested that because it does not move us deeply, the work is not good art, a question may at once be put: Is the goodness of art to be judged essentially by considering whether it moves us?

And now see what the work itself is, and says—and does to a more intent eye. Its flowing linear manner is demanded by the bloated bodies, and also by the reference that it is a flood-

swept region. 85 It certainly did not move me to tears. But it made me think of the tragedy; and, on closer attention, realize its grimness. Its net meassge is that of a stark and lurid, not a howling tragedy. What conveys starkness, or almost stamps it on the eye, is the sheer protrusion of knuckles—of the end-figure on the onlooker's left; and lurid is the word for the lustreless light enshrouding the work,—an effect that I attribute, in part, to the artist's imaginative use of chalky lines.

What fills the work is silence, not mere atmosphere. But it is closer to pain than to peace, and may even deeply touch us if we survey the details. I think here of the row of corpses and carcasses—with some infants too, asprawl; and of the two tragic terminii,—the knuckles so bare, and the sole survivor with everything behind him, and a dear dead beside, in utter desolation. The briefest pause of fancy at any one of these may well make us grieve. That we do not do so is a compliment to the artist's own austerity. 86

It is a great work. To complain that it is not 'deeply stirring' is merely to forget that the artist here portrays, detachedly, the aftermath of a tragedy.⁸⁷

IV. Criticism and Aesthetics

The context now demands some attention to criticism and aesthetics. Some remarks on this aspect of the subject have already been made, though not quite explicitly; and here I choose simply to show how the conscious employment of an aesthetical theory—rather than the merely incidental use of aesthetic concepts—can enrich and vivify our response to art. The art I turn to consider is the sculpture of Henry Moore. And the theory that I choose is Langer's well-known view that 'sculpture... is essentially volume, not scene'; and that sculptural volume includes the surrounding void which the work seems actively to organize, in its own unique way.⁸⁸

The method I suggest can of course be avoided. One may rely simply on a concept, aesthetic or generally philosophical. This has in fact been done by a critic, perhaps our most regular writer on painting and sculpture, in his comments on the four original bronzes of Henry Moore exhibited last year at Lalit Kall Akademi, New Delhi :89

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"In the sculptures of Henry Moore...one encounters what might be termed the naked necessity. (They) are naked in the sense that they are simple and artless, that is, they appear to be what they are without affecting a stance or a situation... Our response is...of complete acceptance... Moore('s') proposition (is) that there is a call, and that life grows...only by a response to that call... This (naked) necessity...is to voice—in the volumes of the sculptures—the vision of that call..."

The key concept, here, is *naked necessity*. True, it has not been left wholly unexplained. But, my complaint is that even in the complete 'review' to which the extract belongs, there is so little mention of the details of the bronzes that no *insight* is provided into the magic of the art or into Moore's individual manner.

Now, let me 'look' at the bronzes from the viewpoint I have chosen: that is, of sculpture-space relation:

What distinguishes the eleven inches' Reclining Figure (done in 1939;⁹¹ No. 1 in the Catalogue)⁹² is its oblong aperture. It lends life to the figure not only by letting some light, but by inviting the eye to look through it recessively, so that the space therein seems to be showing us the inside of the figure. This space, here, is certainly no mere emptiness. It has been so organized that it actively determines our response to, and is really a virtual part of the work.

Of No. 3, too—I mean the seventeen inches long Reclining Figure⁹³—I could say something sensible, from the same point of view. The space, here, seems to meander in and through the work. As a result, the figure looks ethereal; and, to speak from the other side, the space here does not merely fill or encompass the work, but seems to carry it aloft. This effect is very different from what one finds in the case of No. 4, the three quarter figure (bronze: 1961)⁹⁴ which merely fills space like brute matter; and also from No. 2, the fourteen inches high 'Family Group' (1946) which seems wrapped in space.

This Family Group⁹⁵ (No. 2) is richer than the other bronzes. as one .96

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A measure of emotion is here quite manifest. The man's hands pledge both love and security—to the child that is settled in one, and to its mother assured by the other. There can be no doubt about this, partly because of the distinctness of the man's fingers. The parents, however, do not simply hold the child. They are themselves held as one by the love that they share; and to this semblance of feeling the work's formal features conduce quite directly. Thus, their knees tend to converge, and the effect of being-together gains visibly from the drapery that *enfolds* the mother.

Nor is the inside here any less organized. Close to the endfigures, the space so rounds its own empty form—and so carries attention—that the cavitied bellies do not disturb or arrest the eye; and we merely *sense* the ascesis symbolised.

The heightened protrusion of the (man's) elbows and knees adds to the effect, and the overall suggestion is that the couple have nothing to live by, and to face life with, except their own common love. The polished material too looks not only like flesh, but pared, as it were, to suit the fine sentiment. What is offered, on the whole, is not the mere beauty, but the power of expression—a quite clear instance of Moore's own avowed faith that a good work of art is:

"a penetration into reality, not just...the provision of pleasing shapes..., but an expression of the significance of life, a stimulation to greater effort in living." 98

V. Our Arts and Aesthetics

This brings us to the last section of the essay: our arts and aesthetics.

The need for aesthetical thinking in relation to our arts (and criticism) is, I hope, by now clear. The way to meet this need has also been indicated, though clearly imperfectly. So, here I may simply show, in brief, how deeper attention to our own arts is likely to have a vital bearing on our attitude to the problems, concepts and conclusions of Western aesthetical theory.

Consider just one problem, that of the key aesthetic concept. Mr. Reid chooses *embodiment*, and argues that it is preferable to expression. Now, we could here protest thus, on the basis of some well-known features of the music of India: 101

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(a) The importance of $al\bar{a}pa$ is to us well known. True, like every other kind of Indian classical music, it too has to conform to a $r\bar{a}ga$ or melody-type. But, as rightly contemplated, a good $al\bar{a}pa$ recital is (on the whole) neither 'expressive' nor a mere 'embodiment'. It is rather a kind of musical atmosphere which may seem quite disembodied from the 102 plural details of the $r\bar{a}ga$. What is embodied is confined to 103 that which embodies it. Here, on the other hand, what one experiences is a sweet, intense diffusion.

I feel implelled, at this point, to make two extra remarks:

First, alápa (at its best) is a good instance of what has been called 'uniform' and shows all the essential features of the sublime. 105

Secondly, alāpa (as we hear it today) does not quite square with the established Indian theory that every raga, as a rule, caters for a 'rasa'. To me, it seems truer to speak of the remarkable effects of alāpa. I say so in the light of my own experience as a listener. The two best alāpa recitals I have heard are: one in gurjari todi by A. Rahimuddin Khan Dagur¹⁰⁶ which seemed exceptionally sweet, tender, chaste and tranquil; and the other in soordāsi malhār by Dagar Brothers—the late Nasir Moinuddin, and Nasir Aminuddin Dagar¹⁰⁷—which was remarkably deep, spacious, at places awe-inspiring and even sublime. But I could not honestly associate any one rasa with either of these recitals.

- (b) Again, in small, intimate gatherings of knowledgeable listeners—where our artists, as a rule, feel freer to perform—the music does not merely occur 'before' us as a set, predictable movement, but grows directly under the stress of our response to it, which is often quite audible. To say of such music that it embodies, rather than creates significance would be only to miss its free, improvisatory character which is here its manifest essence.
- (c) All this is clearer in the region of our rhythm. Here, a solo recital which is not merely competent but aesthetically good, is one which teems with suggestions of creative freedom and vitality. Thus, some patterns may end a little before, and others slightly after the fixed location of the sama, not marking it directly—as is the common requirement—but suggesting it by the very designed quality of avoidance. One can speak of the coy, blushing quality

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S. K. SAXENA

or the ebullient self-assertiveness of such patterns, but as 'forms of feeling' they do not *directly* appear; and though 'form' is here suggested by the drummer's very refusal to be correct, the suggestion is—in the aesthetic contemplation of such patterns—throughout subject to our felt awareness of a sweet, *flowing* wilfulness.

Here, too, a side comment may be made—not on 'embodiment', but on the general relevance of our rhythm to aesthetical thinking on *form*. It is freely admitted that inspired artistic content may well burst, as it were, the bounds of prefixed limits,—heightening, in the process, 'form' as internal structure. 109 But it is not so easy to realize the other half of the matter,—say, the truth that our awareness of 'form' may be heightened even by the act of falling daintily *short* of the normal stretch, in response to the immanent needs of design. Yet this is exactly what is done by our patterns that are made to end a little before the *sama*. 111

Even generally—in the execution of any pattern—the drummer may, with guarded abandon and distinct aesthetic gain, shorten or withhold one syllable, or tarry at or displace another against their set speed and location, without of course failing to mark (or suggest) the sama. And when the playing quickens, he may unleash a torrent of patterns that climax at the sama brilliantly and are made to reach it variously. They are all themselves designed, it is true; and they keep to a measure. But the playing as it seems, directly and on the whole, is an upsurge of the very spirit of creative freedom, a flooding of embankments, as it were; and to speak of it as 'embodied' meaning would be to interject, quite wrongly, the attitude of analysis—and with it a suggestion of inertness—into the undivided dynamics of actual aesthetic experience. One might as well say of a waterfall that it 'embodies' a flow or is embodiment.

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NOTES

1. L. A. Reid: Meaning in the Arts, George Allen and Unwin. London, 1969, 27.

2. See, for instance, Monroe C. Beardsley: Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., Yew York, 1958.

3. Northrop Frye: Anatomy of Criticism, Princeton University.

Press, Third Printing, 1973, 3.

4. This is specially important in the region of Hindustani rhythm. where the language of our unlettered Ustada is, in respect of its subtler details, quite removed from the way the critics speak of rhythm. As to how such attention can actually help us in understanding the basic concepts of our rhythm, see my article: The Concept of Laya in Hindustani Music, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Poona, January, 1974, 124-143.

5. Reid: Meaning in Arts, op. cit., 22.

This is the sense chosen by Frye. See his Anatomy of Criticism. op. cit., 3.

7. Because of its bias for the general in our talk about art.

8. I accept this central meaning of Mr. Reid's thesis of embodiment, though not the way he argues that his chosen word is superior to 'expression'. For the disagreement, see my article: 'Embodiment and the Quest for Key Aesthetic Concepts' in Contemporary Indian Philosophy (II), George Allen & Unwin (in Press).

9. Frye: Anatomy of Criticism, op. cit., 27.

10. For the view that art belongs 'in the order of making', which is quite different from that of knowing, see Etienne Gilson's The Arts of the Beautiful, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1965, 9.

11. As to how the character of a work of art is 'organic', see S. K. Langer's Problems of Art, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1957, 134-35.

- 12. It can be used, but it is not meant for any utilitarian purpose. And if we merely use it-say, a small sculpture as a paper weight-we take no notice of its features as art.
- 13. For Beardsley, these are the 'general criteria of artistic goodness', M. C. Beardsley: The Possibility of Criticism, Wayne State University Press. Detroit, 1970, 100.

These criteria are surely different from the moral metaphors that Frye wants to keep away: sincereity simplicity, and the like. Frye: Anatomy of Criticism, op. cit., 21.

14. Cf. "....Gratification is aesthetic when it is obtained primarily from attention to the formal unity and/or the regional qualities of a complex whole "

Beardsley: The Aesthetic Point of View, published in Metaphilosophy, Vol. I, No. 1, January, 1970, 46.

15. Thus, in modern India, the recognition of Orissi as a distinct style of classical Indian dance came largely because of the efforts of the late Dr. Charles Fabri, an eminent critic. Again, after long years of comparative neglect, the *dhrupvapada* style of vocal *alapa* has reaffirmed itself partly as a reach as a result of the critics' repeated emphasis on its unique aesthetic features.

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16. Frye: Anatomy of Criticism, op. cit., Essays 2-4.

17. Reid seems to ignore this in his following sweeping utterrance:

"For the critic, the pull is towards the work, and this being so, he may forget his linkage with the ideas which lie beyond his work". Reid Meaning in the Arts, op. cit., 36.

18. It is by keeping this in mind that we are able to avoid the emptiness of a priori aesthetics. *Ibid*.

- 19. I entirely subscribe to the view that philosophy cannot "talk relevant sense about 'art' without first-hand, discriminating experiences of works of art." *Ibid* 21.
- 20. Though not all of them in India. I have Moore's bronzes in mind as I soften my statement. To them I turn in Section IV of this essay,

21. Reid: Meaning in the Arts, op. cit., 27.

22. The classical dance of North India.

23. A rāga or melody-type.

24. In Kathak dance, ang means bodily bearing, generally.

25. Link, New Delhi, 3-12-'67, 40.

26. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 15-2-'69, by Prof. Mohan Khokar, noted for his comprehensive knowledge of Indian dance generally.

27. The late Dr. Charles Fabri writing in The Statesman, New Delhi of 18-4-'64.

It may be that my protest applies only to the extract cited, and not to the total review.

28. Frye: Anatomy of Criticism, op cit., 27.

29. Layakāri means rhythmic manipulation.

30. S. K. Saxena: The Role of Rhythm in Kathak, Marg, Bombay, September, 1959, 48.

In a general way, this definition is true; but it is obviously not easy to follow.

31. S. K. Saxena: Aesthetic of Hindustani Music, Sangit Natak, Journal of the Sangit Natak Akademi, New Delhi, April-June 1973, 12.

For the details of how I reach this definition through linguistic analysis see my article: The Concept of Laya in Hindustani Music, op. cit.

- 32. It is of course aesthetical too. My suggestion here simply is that there are certain problems which are common to aesthetics and criticism of the basic kind.
- 33. Herbert Read: "A Definition of Art', in Aesthetic and the Arts, edited by L. A. Jacobus, McGraw Hill Book Co., 1968, 4.
- 34. The grammatical function of mnenomic syllables or bols—like ta, dha, dir, dir—is to enable us to identify the different sounds produced by the drums when their particular (skin-covered) parts are struck in specific ways.
- 35. Tādātmya is imaginative self-identification with the essence of the other.
- 36. An āmad is, quite generally, a well-designed access to the sama, the focal point of the rhythm-cycle. The ability to reach the sama beautifully, and with split-second accuracy is, I may add, an important criterion by which we judge the excellence of a rhythmic recital.

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37. Whatever I now set out to say about sama is part of a paper submitted to Sangit Natak Akademi, New Delhi.

Here, I must at once make a distinction. As played on the drum or as merely spoken, sama is at once a bol. But, this is not necessary when we mark the 'sama' merely in the mind. There, one is not bound to speak the sama-syllable: the marking may occur as an extremely light and merely ideal pecking.

39. In many cases, but not in all. A sthayi or rhythmic pattern may take off from any matra. But when we indicate the character of a rhythmcycle we begin from the sama. As for 'returning', one may end the patterning before khāli from where the āmad may build up its access to the sama.

40. This happens when a simple drut sthayi or gat is presented

repeatedly.

41. For instance, when the main peformer is weaving a specially intricate pattern, the tabla accompanist may try to be of help by playing the sama and the approach to it specially clearly.

42. Assuming that they are being played, and not the simple cycle.

43. This, however, is only half the truth. For, laya too determines the proper location of sama.

44. Cf. S. K. Langer: Feeling and Form, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Third Impression, 1963, 31.

45. The relation here—though also one of perceptual difference, if the matras be regarded as bols—is basically an is interval of time.

46. I say, 'in part', advisedly. For, besides sama, there are many other factors which ensure articulation in rhythm. What is articulate is (also) clear. Clarity, in turn, presupposes the right technique of executing bols; and their proper arrangement in relation to one another, for any two bols cannot be played close and properly. It also forbids very quick playing.

47. As in merely listening correctly to a rhythmic recital.

48. We cannot truly say: it is even. It is continually kept thus, though not necessarily with conscious effort.

49. To this general statement, al pa is a clear exception. Alapa is effective singing (and playing) without rhythmic accompaniment and language.

50. A melody-type, a kind of todi.

51. S. K. Saxena: Music Criticism-Nature and Norms, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 15.8.'56.

The citation is a slightly modified form of the original.

52. Jugalbandi is the Hindustani word for a duet.

53. S. K. Saxena: Essentials of Hindustani Music, Diogene, 45, Paris, 1964, 24. This quotation too deviates, at places, from as it was first written.

54. My concern, here, is only with the internal nature of the 'criticism' being quoted, not with its aptness to the recital in question.

55. Skilful playing of the basic composition on a musical instrument.

56. First line of the song.

57. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 14-8-'55.

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58. For any attempt to fix the meanings of concepts like $r\bar{a}ga$, $al\bar{a}pa$, sama and bandish, see my article: Aesthetics of Hindustani Music, op. cit. 6 - 20.

This language itself, we may note, shows differences of idion Thus, whereas Chand Khan, the khyaliya, speaks of the rishab in raga purity as a zarrā (or kan) the alapiyā, A Rahimuddin Khan Daguar calls the same note lajjit, that is, coy, not assertive.

60. Fryre: Anatomy of Criticism, op. cit., 6, My emphasis, here. is on 'grow'.

- 61. In my essay, The Fabric of Aamad: A Study of Form and Flow in Hindustani Music, Sangit Natak, 16, April-June, 1970.
- 62. This remark, I gratefully recall, was made by Ustad Chand Khan, the well-knwon vocalist of the Delhi gharānā, during the course of a casual conversation with me, in 1950. As I here put it, it is almost a literal translation of the original remark.
- 63. All these features were illustrated individually in terms of regular compositions at a Seminar on 'Science and Music' organized by the Sangit Natak Akademi, New Delhi, in 1970, in the morning Session of March 28. The 'compositions' are now a part of the Akademi tape recordings, 742-748.

64. The Fabric of Aamad, op. cit., 39-40.

65. Sir Herbert Read's 'Critical Appreciation' in Vermeer (The Masters, 2), Knowledge Publications, Purnell & Sons Ltd., Paulton, Nr. Bristol, 1965, 6.

66. The Statesman, New Delhi, 1-11-'75.

67. Wherever I speak of the Commissioner, the reference is to his comments on the award-winning works contained in the brochure: 'National Exhibition of Art 1973' brought out, for the occasion, by Lalit Kala Akademi, New Delhi. And what I set out to question, by and large, is not the choice of some works in preference to the others, but the way they are interpreted in the brochure in question, hereafter referred to as: The brochure.

68. Probably because of the limited space he could use.

69. In doing so, my purpose is simply an academic one,—that of showing how important it is to note the details of the works; and how if this requirement is met, the choice of apt words is facilitated.

70. The brochure.

71. Adjacent as placed in the Exhibition.

72. The brochure.

73. Ibid.

74. I may add that I was here reminded of Chirico's: 'The Myslet's and Melancholy of a Street. I attribute no borrowing to Miss Anupani but what put me in the street. but what put me in tune with her work has certainly been the art of Chirles with its well-known ample with its well-known emphases on the mystery of solitude and our recurring emptiness; and on the rapid obsoloscence of our everyday interests. it struck me that Chirico's painting in question shows a girl with a hoop and that hoop-croquet-balls is an easy mental glide.

75.a But I do not insist on this meaning.

75.b The brochure.

THE ARTS, CRITICISM IN INDIA AND AESTHETICS

76. At this point, the artist himself agrees with me, but I here go on by what I find in the work itself.

77. The brochure.

78. Adjacent, again, in the Exhibition.

79. The brochure.

80. The brochure.

81. The brochure.

82. This was No. 3 at the Exhibition of Contemporary Arts of Bangla Desh held at Lalit Kala Akademi, New Delhi, from Nov. 22 to 29,'73.

83. The Sunday Statesman, 25-11-'73.

84. K. C.: 'Abstracts from Bangla Desh', The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 29-11-73. My emphases.

85. The theme of this work is not the birthpangs of Bangla Desh, but the flood that devastated the land in 1970.

86. It is noteworthy that the panel does not show any face expressive of sorrow.

87. Cf. "....The lack of emotional involvement in Lycidas has been thought by some, including Johnson, to be a failure in that poem, but surely the correct conclusion is that Lycidas, like Samson Agonistes, should be read in terms of catharsis with all passion spent."

Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, op. cit., 67.

88. S. K. Langer: Feeling and Form, op. cit., 88-9.

Notice may here be taken also of *Moore*'s own view that the sculptor, as an artist, is concerned essentially with 'masses of varied size....cncesived conceived in their air-surrounded entirety, stressing and straining, thursting and opposing each other in spatial relationship'.

Henry Moore: Vol. One—Sculptures and Drawings, 1921-48, (edited by Percy Lund), Humphrites & Co., London. My emphases. This, and the following citations from this work, all are from pp. XXX-XXXI of the book

89. The reference is to the exhibition of Henry Moore's works—including 68 photographs of his sculptures—held at Rabindra Bhawan, New Delhi, from Dec. 6 to 15, '73, under the joint auspices of the The British Council and Lalit Kala Akademi.

90. 'R. L. B.' writing in Thought (Delhi) of 22-12-'73; 20. My

91. Bronze cast of lead original in the Victoria and Albert Museum London. Collection: British Council, London.

92. Distributed to those who visited the Exhibition.

93. Done in 1950. Bronze maquette for Reclining Figure 1951 (76 ins. long) commissioned for the 1951 Festival of Britain. Collection: The Artist, Much Hadham Herts.

94. 15 ins. high Bronze (Edition of 9) Collection: Miss Mary London.

This Bronze, No. 4, looks clearly brutal, and it is merely in space; which suggests the interesting idea that, as a general requirement, we should perhaps expect a sculpture to be rightly related to (its) space rather than to give a specific shape to empty space.

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95. Bronze maquette for Family Group 1949 (60 ins. high) in bronze commissioned for the Barclay School, Stevenage. Collection: British Council, London.

96. Moore himself insists that "if both abstract and human elements are welded together in a work, it must have a fuller and deeper meaning."

Henry Moore: Vol. One, op. cit.

97. The one resting on the mother's shoulder.

98. Henry Moore: Vol. One, op. cit.

99. So far as our music is concerned, a summary account of the main aesthetical problems relating to it has already been attempted in my article:

Aesthetics of Hindustani Music, op. cit.

Elsewhere, I have indicated how a specific aesthetic problem may be discussed in the context of a single Indian art. See, for instance, my essay: Form and Content in Hindustani Rhythm, Sangit Natak, 18, Oct.-Dec.,' 70, 5-19.

- 100. At least one clear point, in this direction, has already been made: I mean, the possibility of questioning Read's argument as to the (possible) supremacy of music, on the basis of the evidence of our rhythm.
- 101. What follows is a slightly altered version of some parts of my article: Embodiment and the Quest for Key Aesthetic Concepts, cit. op.

102. Though not opposed to.

- 103. Confined not inextricably, but originally, so that its release or unravelling is a *subsequent* matter.
- 104. Bernard Bosanquet: A History of Aesthetic, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1956, reprint, 276.
- 105. The neglect of the Sublime, in present day aesthetics, surprises me. Literary critics certainly do not hesitate to use the word (See: Frye's Anatomy of Criticism, op. cit., 66) and when philosophers give so much attention to the Janus-word 'good' there is no reason why they should ignor the Sublime.
 - 106. Radio Sangit Sammelan, New Delhi, 1956.
 - 107. In Vishnudigambar Jayanti, New Delhi, 1957.
- 108. I guess it is exigencies such as these—though probably not exactly this one—that compel Mr. Reid to add 'creative' to embodiment. His total formula is: Creative aesthetic embodiment.
- 109. Thus, see: "Form does not lie simply in the correct observance of rules. It lies in the struggle of certain living material to achieve itself within a pattern. The very refusal of a poet to sacrifice what he means to a perfectly correct rhyme, for example, can more powerfully suggest the rhyme than correctness itself would". Stephen Spender: World Within World, Hamilton, London, 313-14.
- 110. But I think here of a practice of Rodin. Once he had succeeded in finding the exact movement or expression in a figure or bust, he would often stop and leave, say, the hands and feet unfinished—without detracting from the seeming self-completeness of the works as contemplated.
 - 111. Such rhythmic patterns are called anogat.

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ON VIOLENCE

In recent years, political theorists and social have said a great deal about violence—especially in the context of socio-political transformations. Some of them accord a socially meaningful role to certain modes of violence in maintaining the stability of the social fabric, some others recognise it as an agent of socio-economic change, while many others decry violence and helieve that meaningful change is possible, or at least desirable. only through non-violent methods. Philosophers and laymen, by and large, simply express abhorrence for violence ostensibly because of the security-fear complex supported by their religious and, moralistic predilections. All this, of course, assumes that we have a well defined concept of violence and that there is a straight-forward demarcation between violence and non-violence. Here, I am not interested in either defending or denouncing violence as a means of change; nor am I concerned with an empirical enquiry into the causes or consequences of violence. There are significant conceptual and definitional questions attendant upon the notion of violence which deserve serious consideration. For example, what constitutes violence? What are the factors, if any, implied when we describe some action as violent? What distinguishes a violent act from a non-violent one? Apart from their academic worth such questions assume added relevance and an element of urgency about them when viewed in the conof the present socio-political reality of which inescapably We ourselves are a part. For example, the political drama being enacted in Bihar where competing forces with conflicting group interests have confederated essentially to fight for their own survival and maintain social status quo while exhorting the people at large for a Total Revolution through non-violent means such as strikes, 'bandhs', militant demonstrations, and 'dharanas' with the prings into focus the need for greater conceptual clarity with regard to the notions of violence and non-violence. It is to suggest as though we have no idea whatsoever of what violence" means. Indeed we know that if we were to see a Brutus slaying a Casesar, we would call it a case of violence; and indict p. Rut this is indict Brutus for having done something violent. But this is

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not the point. What is of interesting philosophical consequence is to see if it has some unique feature(s) which can be generalized so as to serve as the basis for defining violence and distinguishing it from non-violence.

That the notion of violence is complex is evidenced from the variety of contexts in which we employ the word "violence" and its adjectival form, "violent", We speak of individuals as violent, e.g. So-and-so is a violent man, and we also ascribe violence to their actions or behaviour. What is curious here is that we ascribe violence not only to a particular type of actions sharing similar behavioural structure but to a variety of actions apparently having no structural similarity. For example, we speak of violence in the context of acts such as murder or burning of property or other acts of physical aggression leading to actual or possible harm or damage. And also, we speak of doing violence to one's senses, dignity or sentiments, or doing violence to scriptures, and so on. Obviously doing violence to scriptures or to one's dignity or sentiments does not necessarily involve physical assault. One may do violence to scriptures either by doing something contrary to what is commanded or simply by not following the scriptural command. Likewise, one may do violence to some one's dignity in several ways, such as by physical cally molesting the person or by abusing or insulting him. On also speaks of violence in the context of natural and non-natural events or phenomena. E.g. 'a violent storm or river', 'violent pain or death', 'violent flow or motion', etc. Coupled with the fact of there being a wide range of things to which violence is ascribed, there is another extremely significant factor of strong emotive overtones that the words "violence" and "violence carry. Our emotive responses to violence are non-uniform and often conflicting. We abhor violence, but in certain contexts at thrilled by it. We dread violence but sometimes we welcome it. Consider for example, sports like bull-fighting or boxing For some, it is a matter of tremendous excitement to watch the games, whereas for many others, they may be revolting and discussions. The gusting. The emotive overtones import to them considerable persuasive force. In politics, particularly, "violence" acquing almost a new dimension where it is exploited as a symbol evoke desired response. evoke desired responses.

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The elusive character of 'violence' is eminently clear from the above. However, the elusiveness is not only because of the multiplicity of contexts of its use, it is manifested more importantly in the fact that on the one hand it subsumes so much, and on the other, leaves out so much more from its fold without any analytic reasons that it becomes increasingly difficult to spell out the descriptive conditions for the appropriateness of its use. Recently, there was quite a furore over JP's alleged permission to students to slap the legislators to force them to resign from the legislative assembly. The reason was that JP was bringing in 'violence' into his apparently "non-violent revolution". But, preventing a minister from leaving his house and obstructing him from performing his normal functions is, by most, not seen as an act of violence. Similarly, taking of hostages is considered as committing violence, while sitting on 'dharna' is not.

A little digression here would be useful in guiding our subsequent discussion. We use the adjective "violent" to characterize men as well as their actions. We say, "So-and-so is violent", and also, "Such and such is violent". There is one important difference, though. In saying, for example, that Hitler was a violent man, one is not referring to any particular instance of Hitler's actions. One is attributing to him a certain tendency or disposition to behave in a certain manner in certain kinds of situations. One's 'being violent' is in this respect different from One's 'becoming violent'. One may be provoked into violence without his really being a violent person. However, whether or not one is a violent person depends upon how he conducts himself in certain sorts of situations. One who behaves or is Prone to behave violently is said to be violent. A quarrelsome or kind or intelligent man must quarrel or do acts of kindness or perform intelligently if not always, at least often enough to Warrant appropriate characterisation. A disposition, in other words, must find appropriate expression in the behaviour of a Person if it is attributed to him and the attribution is to be pro-Now, if it is so, it would mean then that predication of violent, to actions is basic to its attribution to men. For knowledge of what constitutes violent behaviour is a preconthis pair being able to say that So-and-so is a violent man. This point perhaps is not very significant in itself; but it suggests

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a direction to what we are looking for. An analysis of the notion of violence would be gainful only in the context of actions.

An immediate important conclusion follows from the above The term "violence" or "violent" does not designate any property-for actions do not, strictly speaking, possess any property. They have a structure which lends them to interpretation Acts of courage, cowardice, humility are so characterized no because they have some property like courageousness, cowardlines or humbleness inhering in them, instead they are so characterized because they are so interpreted. And, what interpretation we give to an action, to a large extent, depends upon how we perceive it There are two points which seem to be significant. Firstly, such characterizations imply that the behaviour under description is a deviation from the normal. But there are no descriptive criteria to identify the normal. Consequently, where the deviation from the normal occurs in a given case cannot be defined. I am m implying that we do not recognize the non-normal behaviour. We do distinguish an act of cruelty from that of kindness. But what counts normal for one may not be normal for another. A certain behaviour may, for example, be considered as an expression of respect or regard whereas others may interpret that as demeaning conduct or a sign of a servile attitude. Similarly, what may appear to some as insolent or irresponsible behaviour, may just be normal to others. A violent action is considered destructive, injurious harmful or hurtful etc. But, an action so characterized is not confined to any particular behaviour structure. One can injure or destroy another in a variety of ways. Similarly, injury harm or damage cannot adequately be defined in terms of some specific physical or visible effects of an action alone. Injury damage is not always visible. It does not mean that the chair cterization and recognition of what is considered a violent active is totally subjective or that it is a matter of individual capping Beliefs, attitudes, socio-cultural norms and the like which individual all a second individual shares with his community condition the identification of what he considers as violent, injurious or harmful. Seconds such characterizations have an other equally important features, they function and the such characterizations have an other equally important features. i.e., they function evaluatively. When we say that such-and-such act is violent, it has in the act is violent, it has in it an element of, "Don't do it". take up this point later. Presently, it would suffice to say, on the

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ON VIOLENCE 387

basis of the above, that an analysis of the notion of violence purely in naturalistic terms would be totally inadequate.1

Ordinarily, for instance, we associate violence with the use of strong physical force by some person (s) leading to some injury or harm to another where the other could either be some beings (s) or some property. It is obvious that not every use of strong physical force constitutes violence. Snatching a person off the road from coming under an approaching car would hardly be considered as an act of violence, though it may require tremendous amount of physical force and may also result in injury to both or one of them. Whereas pushing a person off the railway platform with the Rajdhani Express steaming in may be a relatively simple matter as to the force required, yet the action would be considered patently violent even though it may not lead to any harm.

It is tempting to distinguish a violent action from an un-violent one in terms of the aim or purpose of the agent. A violent action would then be defined as one which is aimed at causing injury or harm. Therefore, the latter example in the above is a case of violence—for the purpose of pushing the person is to do him harm. As in the former case the agent does not aim at harming him, it is not violent. Effective though it might seem at first glance, a second thought would reveal how unserviceable it is. Not all violence is violence per se. Many a time one takes recourse to what is considered violence not to harm the individual on whom it is practiced, but as a corrective measure—to make him remove injustice, or acknowledge a right or to stop him from his misconduct. Revolutionary violence in particular has the ideal aim of creating a society free from exploitation of man by man. Here, one should not raise the issue of wrongness and rightness of violence. That is beside the point. I am only considering the definition of violence given above. And, on this definition, it seems to me, violence would only mean violence per se. But, that is not how We ordinarily use the word "violence". Alternatively, one may wish to define violence in terms of some mental-states 'behind' the overt behaviour. What a mother does when she thrashes her ening child, or a doctor when he performs an operation is not violence, because presumably such acts are done with love and care. But when a similar looking overt behaviour issues from

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'hatred' or 'ill-will', it is violence. Thus, for example Prof. Mohanty holds: "Merely inflicting physical pain on the other, or even injuring the other's body is not eo ipso an act of violence. It is not so much the overt act as the state of mind behind it which determines whether an act is violent or not.... The essence of violence, it may be said, is hatred and ill-will ".2 Taking recourse to 'mental state' in defining "violence" would not do any bellet either. Hatred, love or ill-will are dispositions which often manifest themselves in the overt behaviour of a man, but that is not to say that hatred or ill-will are necessary corelates of violent action Hatred and ill-will signify different sorts of dispositions towards the person they are directed to. To harbour ill-will towards a person is to nurse a desire that some harm may fall on that person, though the person who has ill-will may not do anything actively to make any harm befall him. Whereas hatred for a person need not be accompanied by such a desire, it may only mean a great dislike or contempt for the person. It does not have to express itself in any specific kind of behaviour. Furthermore, one may be led or provoked into violence without any feeling of hatred or ilwill towards the person on whom violence is done. A hired killer, for example, may murder a man simply because he is being paid for it. His action and that of a prison executioner are in this respect similar. Killing, for both of them, is a matter of job and that is all that there is to it. The point I am trying to make is that although violence may be accompanied by a certain kind of 'mental state', conceptually the two are independent. Therefore to understand the notion of violence adequately, one will have to look for something other than the aim or purpose of, or the 'mental state behind' the action characterized as violent.

It is important to distinguish between the two senses of the word "violence", i.e., normative and descriptive. The normative sense of "violence" implies violation with reference to what happens when an act of violence is done; whereas the descriptive sense of violence relates to the manner of doing violence. The etymology of the word "violence" is revealing in this connection. It suggests that the word "violence" is derived from the Latil word, "violentus", which has the sense of force, vehemenous fury, intensity and impetuosity etc. The word, "violentus is further qualified by another Latin word "violare" which means

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"to violate", "to break", "to transgress", "to infringe", and "to injure" etc. "Violentus", thus, signifies the manner of doing, the descriptive aspect; and "violare" relates to what happens, the normative aspect of violence. The two senses of "violence" can, perhaps, be better appreciated, if we consider its use in the context of natural and non-natural events or phenomena. When we speak of a storm or river being violent, it implies vehemence or force of some defining feature of a storm or river. A river is characterized as violent when its flow or current is very strong; similarly a strom is said to be violent when its turbulence is unusually high. There are, however, no descriptive conditions for such characterization for the same reason as mentioned earlier that what is usual is not definable. Although the characterization is predominantly descriptive, it would be absurd to speak of motion or explosion as intentionally violent. One may of course intentionally generate a violent motion; but intentionality is not attributed to motion. Consequently, the use of violence is normatively neutral here. Similarly, phrases like "violent death" or "violent pain" are also normatively neutral. As constrasted with the above, there are contexts where "violent" or "violence" is used predominantly in the normative sense. Being profane to a temple or church may do violence to some one's religious sentiments.

It may be said that I am confusing between primary and secondary uses of "violence", and that the primary or proper use of "violence" involves reference to physical harm or injury caused by bodily interference. The question as to which use of "violence" is primary and which is secondary, though not easy to settle, is not pertinent to the present discussion. What is essential to the primary use of a word must be shared by its secondary uses as well, for other wise the use would be plainly improper. And, if the dictionary is any guide to the ordinary usage, I can only report it here. The Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961), for example, speaks of violence as "exertion of any physical force so as to injure or abuse", "an instance of violent treatment or procedure", as well as, "injury in the form of revoking, repudiation, distortion, infringement or irreverance to a thing", and, intense turbulent or furious action "etc. Now, one may indeed define define violence in terms of physical harm or injury caused by bodily interference; but it would be arbitrarily too restrictive.

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Latin mence, ntus, Although, perhaps useful operationally, conceptually it would be unilluminating. If the claim is to be authenticated with reference to its usage, one cannot do it simply by citing those instances where it does refer to physical harm caused by bodily interference of which there are undoubtedly many. Injury to one's 'soul' can be much more painful and agonizing than injury to one's body.

Now, although the descriptive and the normative senses are not mutually exclusive, there are contexts, as we have seen, where only one of them is emphasised or is of significance. Crimes of physical assault are obviously such that they involve descriptive as well as normative aspects of violence. In contexts where it is the normative sense of violence which is of significance, presence or absence of strong physical force is relatively of less importance. One may, for instance, commit a murder in a variety of ways. e.g., by strangulating, by stabbing, by shooting or by administering poison. Each of these requires varying degrees of force; but starving a person to death hardly requires any noticeable physical strength. Nonetheless, starving a person to death is not doing any less, if not more, of violence than strangulating him to death Indeed, in a trivial sense, almost any action employs some measure of physical force, and to that extent it is present in a violent action too. But it would be erroneous to think that the use of physical force, much less, strong physical force, is a determining factor in violence.

The undue emphasis on the presence of physical force and physical injury seems to result from the fact that street crimes such as burning of property by a rioting mob, looting, raping or killing, because of their sudden, conspicuous and shocking character both in terms of the force employed and the resultant damage done tend to dominate our attention when we think about human violence. However, even with regard to such conspicuous cases of violence, it is not merely the observable features of these acts and their consequences which constitute violence. Damage of property, say of jhuggi dewellers' huts by ruffians is considered violence, but the same thing when done by the municipality is not violence. A gherao of unscrupulous management by industrial workers in support of their demands, howsoever legitimate they may be, is violence. But, a lathi-charge

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or firing by police on either an unruly or an orderly demonstration is establishing order and peace, no matter how many people die or are injured. George Sorel, for example, while distinguishing violence from un-violence remarks: "the term violence should be employed only for acts of revolt; we should say, therefore, that the object of force is to impose certain social order in which the minority governs, while violence tends to the destruction of that order. The middle class has used force since the beginning of modern times, while the proletariat now reacts against the middle class and the state by violence".3 Prof. Riga makes the distinction somewhat differently by introducing the notion of rational power. He says, "We simply cannot identify physical force with violence, for force can be defined as that measure of rational power to accomplish a reasonable end ".4 Therefore, for Prof. Riga, the use of force by the police is not violence but the exercise of "rational" power to establish reasonable ends, which in the above case presumably are law and order.

In referring to the above definitions my purpose is only to emphasise that the use of force should not be confused with violence. I should, however, not be understood to imply that I accept those in their entirety. I do not for instance, consider that the concept of violence can be adequately explicated in terms of any particular socio-economic class as Sorel does. Nor do I think that force can appropriately be defined as "rational power". Inadequate though they are, they seem to suggest an extremely important factor in violence which is generally overlooked. That is the factor of violation of norms of conduct set by an authority. The use of force by police or other state agencies has the sanction of state authority. Theirs is not thus a violating act. Hence, what the police does is not violence. The state by virtue of its authority, has the power to enforce its decisions, even by employing force, if necessary. Whereas a similar act when done by private individuals in violation of state authority, constitutes violence. This does not, however, mean that every violating act is an act of violence. The violating act must be potentially injurious, hurtful, or destructive.

It might appear as though I am restricting violence to what is commonly known as political violence. Political violence on the

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above account would imply adoption of legally unauthorized or illegitimate modes of action or protest to achieve political ends. However, I am not using "authority" in the limited sense of legal or political authority alone.

Perhaps a few brief remarks with regard to the notion of authority would help clarify matters in this connection. Usually we think of authority in terms of some individual or organization which has the right to take any decision and command their obedience. The Oxford English Dictionary speaks of "authority" as "power or right to enforce obedience; moral or legal supremacy; the right to command or give ultimatum", and also, as "power to influence the conduct and actions of others, or power over the opinions of others". The idea of an "auctor" in possession of some peculiar sort of "power" to exercise influence on others seems to be implicit in our ordinary use of "authority". Here, however, I am not laying much emphasis on the idea of the "auctor" in authority; instead what seems to me of importance is the peculiar function of authority to regulate human behaviour in different spheres of human interactions. Acceptance of authority does not mean submission to an 'auctor'. Rather, it is to participate in a rule governed activity. To participate in a rule governed activity is to accept, as Peter Winch says-to whom I owe much of what I am saying here, that there is a right and worng way of doing things "...there is an intimate conceptual connection between the notion of authority on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the notion of there being a right and wrong way of doing things. It is the rules of the game that determine whether or not a given move on the chess-board is right. Similarly, in areas of characteristically human activity, the decision as to what is right of wrong in any given case is taken by appeal to established practices and norms. The sphere of authority extends to all those areas of human conduct where there are established ways of doing things. "...the notion of an "established" way of doing things is essential to the notion of authority as such."6 Therefore in speaking of authority I am not referring to the legal sanctions alone, but also to other socio-cultural norms in a society. For the legal, the moral, the religious, and the social systems of ideas as a totality constitute a regulative framework within which an individual conducts himself.

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In conclusion, I shall briefly restate the main theme which I tried to develop in the above discussion. "Violence" or "violent" does not designate any property. To characterize some action as violent is to consider it a deviation from the normal. Recognition or identification of a violent action is, however, not determined by its observable correlates alone; instead, more importantly, it is a matter of interpretation. A violent action is considered as injurious. harmful or destructive etc., but these are not definable in terms of their observable features alone; nor are they confined to the physical. They themselves are interpretative notions. To characterize an action as violent is not to describe it, it is a veiled evaluation. Therefore, violence cannot be defined in naturalistic terms. Further, "violence" has two senses: the descriptive and the normative. The descriptive sense of "violence" relates to the manner of doing violence. It implies, force, vehemence, impetuosity etc. The normative sense of "violence" signifies what happens when violence is done, meaning violation, injury, harm or damage etc. When employed in human contexts, it is the normative sense of violence which is of significance. And, in this context, "violent action" involves two factors: one, that it is potentially injurious, destructive etc., and, two, that it is a violating act.

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GURUS, GODMEN AND GOOD PEOPLE

Editor: Khushwant Singh

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KANT'S THEORY OF THE SYNTHETIC APRIORI

The basic problem before Kant was the problem of knowledge. The rationalism which resulted in dogmatism and the Empiricism which resulted in scepticism and probabilism both failed to solve the problem of knowledge. Rationalism could very well explain the necessity and universality of knowledge but it failed to account for its novelty. Empiricism, likewise could explain the novelty of knowledge but it showed an utter inability to account for its necessity and universality. The critical philosophy of Kant combines the Baconian ideal of the extension of knowledge with the Cartesian ideal of certainty in knowledge. It is the synthetic judgment apriori which can account for the necessity and universality of knowledge, on the one hand, and also for its novelty on the other.

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Now I would like to examine and clarify this problem of synthetic apriori knowledge in Kant. In all judgment there is a relation between subject and predicate. An analytic judgment merely analyses an idea—without, at all, adding any new thing to it whatsoever. It does not extend knowledge. Take 'Body is extended'; here 'extendedness' is already contained in the very definition of 'body' and the entire judgment says nothing but to repeat the same thing in another form. A synthetic judgment, on the other hand, enriches our knowledge—it tells us someting new. 'Earth is a planet'-here a new idea is addded to the concept of 'earth'. The idea 'planet' is not contained in the definition of 'earth'. While the analytic judgment is illustrating, the synthetic judgment is expanding. While in the former the predicate is contained in the subject, it lies outside the latter. The analytic judgement simply elucidates the meaning of the term and is consequently uninformative. A judgment whose denial would be a contradiction in terms and whose negation would be logically impossible, would be analytic. And a judgment which is not so is synthetic.

Apriori knowledge is that which is absolutely independent of all experience. And a posteriori knowledge is grounded in and is an outcome of experience. Aposteriori knowledge, because of its empirical origin, can never account for its necessity and universality whereas an apriori judgment is absolutely universal and

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necessarily valid. The aposteriori judgment increases and extends our knowledge but lacks necessity and certainty. The apriori judgment accounts for the necessity and universality but it is unable to increase our knowledge. It is the judgment synthetic apriori which, according to Kant, can account simultaneously for universal certainty and increase of knowledge. The synthetic apriori is the 'hybrid proposition' which combines the merits of both the parental propositions—i.e. synthetic and analytic. Like a synthetic proposition, it says something about the world, meaning thereby it explains the novelty of knowledge. Like an analytic proposition, it explains the necessity and certainty of knowledge.

The fundamental problem of Kant's first critique is: How are judgments synthetic apriori possible? Almost the whole of mathematics consists of such judgments and they also constitute the indispensable precondition of the natural sciences. I would like to reproduce a few examples given by Kant. Kant² took it for granted that Arithmetic is a pure science—that arithmetical judgments are established apriori and not as empirical generalisations. Kant also believed these propositions to be synthetic. "7 + 5 = 12", he argued, does not just explicate the meaning of "7 + 5" the way "All triangles have three angles" just explicates the meaning of 'triangle'. Indeed it could not be maintained that "7 + 5" is synonymous with '12' the way 'triangle' is by definition synonymous with 'closed rectilinear figure with three angles'; nor would it be plausible to hold that anybody who understands the expression 'the sum of seven and five' threre by already knows the equation to be true, for undoubtedly he first had to learn by counting that seven and five add upto twelve. 'every event has a cause' is both apriori and synthetic at once. It is synthetic because the idea of cause is not contained and implicit in the idea of something that happens—which is known as event. This judgment is not only universal but also necessary and consequently cannot be derived from experience. So it is apriori.

To sum up, Kant replaces the positivist dichotomy of judgments into empirical and logically necessary by the trichotomy of (i) analytic apriori (ii) synthetic aposteriori and (iii) synthetic apriori judgments. In so far as metaphysical judgments are meaningful—they must fall within this third class.³

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the of vie Kant made the discovery that there are judgments which are both apriori and synthetic, and that they are the presuppositions of science. To ask what are the conditions which have made science possible, we have only to ask how apriori synthetic judgments are possible in pure mathematics and physics and, then, to ask whether such judgments are possible in metaphysics. In the first case, they are not only possible, but actual and even indispensable, as Kant has shown, for the growth of mathematics and physics. The divisions of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' are related to these three questions respectively:

- (i) The Aesthetic is an attempt to answer the question about the possibility of mathematics as a science.
- (ii) The Analytic is an answer to the question about the possibility of physics or a pure science of Nature.
- (iii) The dialectic is concerned with the possibility of metaphysics as a natural disposition.

Kant is really concerned to show that analytic judgments, as the rationalists described them, give no increase in knowledge and synthetic aposteriori judgments, as the empiricists described them, give no universality and necessity; while he has discovered certain judgments which give both, i.e. the synthetic apriori. But he has incidentally discovered something of much more importance, i.e. the new type of judgment is the pattern of all judging. In all experience there is an apriori element. Judgment involves analysis as well as synthesis.⁴

To be more specific, the distinction between the empirical and the apriori is not a distinction between two kinds of synthesis or judgment, but between two elements inseparably involved in every judgment. Experience is transcendentally conditioned. Judgment is in all cases the expression of a relation which implies an organised system of supporting propositions; and for the articulation of this system apriori factors are indispensably necessary. The apriori is not that which is absolutely independent of all experience but that which is independent of any particular experience.

In order to understand the merits of Kant's contribution to the solution of the prevalent controversy and thereby to the solution of the problem of knowledge, it is necessary to discuss briefly the views of those thinkers who differ from Kant on this issue. Let

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judgny of hetic are us start with the analysis of J. S. Mill. Mill may safely be des. cribed as representing the extreme type of empiricism. Mill maintains that there is only one type of knowledge. And here he is opposed to those who believe in a dichotomy of necessary and empirical knowledge. In his opinion, no such dichotomy is tenable. Even the judgments of mathematics and logic are according to Mill, only products of 'inductive generalizations based on an extremely large number of instances.'6 Mill holds that even the so-called necessary and certain truths are only factual in nature. The impossibility is only factual impossibility. The evidence in favour of necessary truths was so strong that it seemed incredible to us that a contrary instance should ever arise. We have always observed the same thing occurring repeatedly, nay, even our ancestors have experienced the same course of events. Thus the continuous repetition of the same facts generates the feeling of certainty. But the ground of our belief in necessity is, according to Mill, only inductive generalization which always leaves room for the possibility that events may take a different course from the one we have always experienced. That is to say. it is always possible in principle to meet the cases that go contrary to the established order of experience. It is possible in principle for such generalizations to be confuted. They were highly probable, but being inductive generalizations, they were not certain. According to Mill, the difference between the so-called necessary truths and contingent truths of natural sciences is a difference in degree and not in kind. The truths of mathematics and logic appear to be necessary because they have worked well in the past but workability is not the criterion of truth.

If Mill's view is correct, Kant's distinction of analytic and synthetic knowledge crumbles down. But it is to be noted that even contemporary empiricists are not prepared to follow Mill's approach. Professor A. J. Ayer in his book 'Language Truth and Logic' has taken Kant's side on this issue and has attempted to refute Mill's views. In his opinion, Kant's doctrine that though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience, is fundamentally correct. Professor Ayer accuses Mill of confusing the question of validity with the question of genesis and development of the necessary truths of logic and mathematics. He maintains "that they are independent

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of experience in the sense that they do not owe their validity to empirical verification." We may come to know the necessary truths of logic and mathematics through experience but once we have grasped them we know that they are true independently of the process of knowing. This point is sufficient to compel us, according to Professor Ayer, to make a distinction between judgments of facts and judgments of mathematics and logic. Not only the knowledge but even the validity of empirical truths is necessarily tied to sense-experience, while the validity of the necessary truths is independent of experience. Thus Professor Ayer accepts the necessity of distinguishing analytic propositions from synthetic ones.

But Professor Ayer accuses Kant for not giving a clearcut criterion for distinguishing between the analytic and synthetic propositions. He says that Kant has given two criteria instead of one. They are logical and psychological. When Kant says that the judgment "All bodies are extended", is analytic, he applies the logical criterion. This judgment is analytic because its denial amounts to a self-contradictory statement. But when he says that the judgment "7 + 5" is equal to twelve, is a synthetic proposition, he applies the psychological and not the logical criterion. The judgment is synthetic in the opinion of Kant because the concept of twelve is not included in the concept of 'seven plus five'. But in the opinion of Professor Ayer this judgment is analytic when the logical criterion is applied to it. That is to say, the judgment '7 + 5 = 12' cannot be denied without involving us in a self-contradiction. If so it means any judgment can be proved to be both analytic and synthetic by applying different criteria. Kant's mistake, according to Professor Ayer, consists in supposed identity of the logical and the psychological criteria. They are actually entirely different in nature and their identity should not be taken for granted. According to Professor Ayer, two terms can be synonymous even though the subjective intension of one is not comprised in the subjective intension of the other. The fact that the subjective intension of twelve is not comprised in the subjective intension of '7+5' does not warrant us in saying that '7 that '7 + 5' and '12' are not synonymous terms. Acutally

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speaking '7 + 5 = 12' is true by virtue of the principle of contradiction alone. Professor Ayer recommends that we should adopt the logical criterion given by Kant and dispense with the psychological one.⁸

Professor Ayer's analysis is really enlightening but it should not prevent us from noticing the marked difference between Kant's conception of the principle of contradiction and that of contemporary logicians. While contemporary logicians including Professor Ayer base the principle of contradiction on the concept of synonymity, Kant explained it with some psychological elements. Professor Ayer's merit consists in making it explicit that Kant's logical criterion is tinged with some psychological elements. The principle of contradiction, as used by Kant, is narrower and restricted, because it involves the conception of subjective intension. The denial of the judgment '7 + 5 = 12' is not self-contradictory in the same sense in which the denial of the judgment 'All bodies are extended' is, since the concept of body includes the concept of extension, but the concept of '7 + 5' does not include the concept of '12'. Moreover, the crux of the problem lies in the nature of mathematical judgments. Kant's firm belief was that mathematical judgments are intuitional in nature. This has been challenged by most of contemporary mathematicians. But it will be wrong to say that the controversy has been finally settled. The intuitionist school of mathematics represented by Brouwer still continues to favour the Kantian doctrine that mathematical judgments are not analytic.9 Thus Kant's opinion about the mathematical judge ments represents an alternative which cannot be hastily set aside. Our conclusion is that Kant has given only one criterion and not two as Professor Ayer thinks. But his criterion is not strictly logical and is coloured by psychological considerations.

We maintain with Kant that there are synthetic apriori propositions. Let us see now what is their nature and in what sense they are necessary. Kant says that a synthetic apriori proposition is one which is both about the nature of reality and necessary. For example, the proposition 'every event has a cause' informs us about the behaviour of events and at the same time it is universally valid. In order to understand Kant's real meaning it is necessary to examine briefly Professor Ayer's views regarding necessary propositions. He maintains that only analytic

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gopositions can be necessary, while all synthetic propositions are mosteriori. That is to say, any proposition whose truth condiions are determined by empirical facts can only be probable and not certain. Since all synthetic propositions are tied to empirical facts, they cannot be necessary. Hence in his opinion, there is no nossibility of synthetic apriori propositions. But he makes room for necessary propositions within the empiricist frame-work of knowledge as opposed to J. S. Mill who reduces all the propositions to the status of empirical generalizations. In the opinion of. Professor Ayer, all analytic propositions are necessary and their validity is independent of experience. But they are true, says Professor Ayer, simply because they give us no information about the world of facts. They record simply our use of terms. They have nothing to do with experience. Thus only logical propositions are apriori. They express only formal truths. To quote his exact words, "It is to be noted that the propositions "Either ants are parasitic or none are" provides no information whatsoever about the behaviour of ants, or, indeed, about any matter of fact. And this applies to all analytic propositions. None of them provides any information about any matter of fact. In other words, they are entirely devoid of factual content. it is for this reason that no experience can confute them."10 account may suggest that analytic propositions, because they are devoid of any factual content, are senseless. Professor Ayer is aware of this objection and hastens to refute this charge by saying that, "when we say that analytic propositions are devoid of factual content, and consequently that they say nothing, we are not suggesting that they are senseless in the way that metaphysical therances are senseless, for, although they give us no information about any empirical situation, they do enlighten us by illustrating the way in which we use certain symbols. We see that there is a sense in which analytic propositions do give us new knowledge. They call attention to linguistic usages, of which we might otherwise not be conscious, and they reveal unsuspected implications in our assertions and beliefs. But we can see also that there is a sense: Sense in which they may be said to add nothing to our knowledge. or they tell us only what we may be said to know already."11

The aforementioned view of Professor Ayer has been shared of the contemporary logicians and philosophers. According

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to them only analytic propositions are apriori or necessary and they are explications of symbols, meanings and definitions. The also say that no proposition having factual content can dist necessity.12

They confine apriori to analytic propositions simply became they fail to understand the sense in which Kant has used synthesis apriori. They use the term 'necessary' too narrowly. We Kant says that some synthetic propositions are apriori, he is m using the term apriori to convey the same sense which this le expresses in conjunction with the analytic propositions. In the latter, apriori means logical necessity'. For example, the prove sition "All bachelors are unmarried male adults" is logical necessary, because it can be converted into the tautology "A unmarried human adults are unmarried human adults". But proposition "every event has a cause" cannot be converted into tautological statement. Hence it cannot be apriori in the sen sense in which the proposition "all bachelors are unmarried human adults" is. Obviously it is not logically apriori. If Kant inless that the term apriori conveys the same sense in both the analytic apriori and synthetic apriori propositions, he is mistaken. synthetic proposition can be necessary in the sense in which analytic proposition is. But Kant has used the term aprioris the 'synthetic apriori' propositions to express a different sense necessity. When it is said that 'every event has a cause' Kar means that though its denial is not self-contradictory, yet it inconceivable that an event can be uncaused. Causation is necessary principle for human experience. The necessity Kant has in view may be described as 'transcendental necessity "He calls this type of necessity", says Mr. W. H. Walsh, "trust cendental, employing that term in a purely arbitrary way to dent that which precedes experience as its apriori condition. A life cendentally necessary truth is a synthetic proposition, but neither leading neither logically necessary nor in any way self-guaranteeing necessity is prescriptive rather than factual, and perhaps appropriately to the standard factual and perhaps are standard factual and perhaps appropriate and the standard factual and the standard ximates to the necessity of the Laws of logic itself." Unwin in this way there is no absurdity in the conception of synthesis apriori propositions apriori propositions.

Kant would also oppose the view that the distinction belief analytic and synthetic propositions is ill-conceived. Recently

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view has been advocated by Professor W. O. V. Quine in his article ary and 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' 14 and Professor J. L. Austin in his S. They article 'The Meaning of a Word'.15 Kant would maintain in in clair opposition to these thinkers, that there are both analytic synthetic propositions. An analytic proposition is one whose because meaning is determined by the laws of logic alone and a synthetic goposition is one that requires something more to determine its . When muth. He would also oppose those who maintain that ne is m analytic propositions are necessary as we have seen above. this ten creates a third category which is both synthetic and necessary. In the It will be a premature and hasty conclusion to deny the possibility e prope of such propositions. To deny the possibility of synthetic apriori propositions is to deprive us of the necessary knowledge of the real gy "A world. If the claims of science and morality are to be defended against the attacks of scepticism, we should take Kant's doctrine of synthetic apriori propositions seriously. The denial of synthetic the same apriori propositions in the realm of moral and scientific experience d hum would deprive them of their firm and secure ground and reduce it intend them to unjustifiable conjectures. e analyti

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. "The Third category of propositions brought to light by Kant, so speak, seem to be the result of the marriage of empirical and analytic pro-Position a cross-breed which combines virtues separately possessed by the parent proposition. Lilke an analytic proposition a synthetic apriori pro-Milion is true by 'inner necessity', or has 'inner truth', and like an empiriproposition it is such that its predicate is not a conjunctive component of its subject." Lazerowitz: Studies in Metaphilosophy, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964, P. 31.

2. An Introduction to Philosophy of Science by Arthur Pap. P. 80.

3. S. Korner-Kant, Penguin Books, PP. 21-22... 4. See H. J. Paton's "In Defence of Reason", 1951, George Allen & Unwin, London, P. 35.

5. N. K. Smith's "Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason"

5. N. K. Smith's "Commentary Company, 1918, pp. 39–40. 6. Edwards, Paul and Pap. Arthur: A Modern Introduction to 6. Edwards, Paul and Pap. Arthur: A Modern 2005 Philosophy: Readings from classics and contemporary sources, P. 63.

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8. "I think that we can preserve the logical import of Kant's discretion between analytic and synthetic propositions, while avoiding the consistence which mar his actual account of it, if we say that a proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it comes and synthetic when its validity is determined by facts of experience". All Ayer, in Edwards Paul and Pap. Arthur: A Modern Introduction to Proposition in Proposition of the Proposition o

9. S. Korner, Kant, Pp. 40, 41.

10. Edwards, Paul and Pap. Arthur: "A Modern Introduction? Philosophy": Readings from classics and contemporary sources, P. 61.

11. Ibid., Pp. 67, 68.

12. See Norman Malcolm: "Are necessary propositions reverbal?" Mind, 1940, Pp. 189–203 and also see "The Linguistic Throf 'Apriori Proposition" by A. C. Ewing; Pp. 147–169 of 'Clarity is a Enough' (Essays in Criticism of Linguistic Philosophy), Edited by H. Lewis, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London.

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I take some delight in recollecting that I have had a role in the arrangement for the present symposium on the nature and value of philosophy. The proposal was put forward by me. although it might have been in the minds of many, and my intention was, I believe, not too unobvious. Even though, as far as I can see, there has not been too much of serious philosophizing in our country (or in this part of the globe), there has, after all, been some amount of philosophizing, and with some sort of continuity and global affiliations. It, therefore, appeared to me to be worthwhile to stop for a while, as it were, and to reconsider the very fundamental question in any serious philosophical activity, namely: 'What is philosophy all about?' It was, actually, a proposal for putting our heads together and rethinking the question of the real nature of philosophy, as well as its real value and relation to our actual living. It was hoped that thereby it would be possible to dig out prejudices and misconceptions, if any, to keep our study and teaching of philosophy on the right track, and thus reap the best out of the resources at our disposal.

In fact, rethinking the nature of philosophy is nothing uncommon in the history of philosophy. Sorcrates and Plato did it; so did Bacon and Descartes, Hume and Kant, the positivists, the Marxists, and, most recently, the linguistic analysts. This rethinking is still going on, as even an average student of current philosophical writings is well aware of.

Let me put the matter rather more bluntly. If philosophy is really a useless pursuit, as many people in our country (and some people in any country, perhaps) seem to believe, it is high time for us to bid good-bye to it.

If not, it is, I think, important that we understand the job as clearly as possible and do the job with all the seriousness it deserves. It is no use murmuring, complaining, or groping in darkness.

The Nature of Philosophy:

The problem of defining the nature of a theoretic pursuit be approached from three different perspectives—its subject-

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matter, its method, and its goal. It should not be too useful to approach the problem of defining the nature of philosophy from the perspective of its subject-matter for several reasons.

First, there is no one subject-matter of philosophy, but an indefinite jumble of subject-matters. Indeed, almost anything is or can be a subject-matter of philosophy when looked at from the latter's peculiar point of view. The scope of philosophy, as commonly understood, ranges from God to the electrons, and from meta-mathematics down to gymnastics and advertisements There is hardly any province of human experience with which philosophy has not been or cannot be concerned. During the Greek period the so-called ultimate reality was the dominant subject-matter; during the middle ages, the reality was replaced by God and His paradise; during the modern period, both God and the reality were shadowed by the problems of knowledge, and, during the recent and contemporary times, the problems of logic and language have been dominating the field. Moreover, we now hear of the philosophy of economics, philosophy of games, and even of "the basic philosophhical issues posed by the controversial subject of abortion."1

If philosophy is, at least in theory, a study of everything, it cannot be defined in terms of what it studies, just as a person (or perhaps a demon) who eats everything cannot be defined in terms of what he eats, but only in terms of how he eats, or when he eats, or something of that sort. Sometimes, an attempt is made to define or at least to identify philosophy by presenting a list of problems and calling them philosophical, but it is not explained why they are philosophical rather than otherwise.²

A strict definition would require philosophy to have both a generic and a differential aspect in respect of what it studies, but this condition cannot be fulfilled, as it could be fulfilled in the case, for example, of such natural sciences as physics and biology.

It has been said that, in the main, philosophy aims at giving a general description of the universe as a whole.³ But this is not what a philosopher always does. He may be doing this when, like Spinoza, Hegel or Alexander, he is aiming at a speculative, synoptic view of the whole, but not when, for example, he is considering whether it is possible to have synthetic a priori judge.

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ments. It has also been said that philosophy differs from all special sciences in that its problems are of the highest degree of generality. It is, indeed, true that its problems are usually of a general nature; but it is not clear what could be meant by the highest degree of generality in each case. When, for instance, a philosopher considers how colours are to be distinguished from their physical correlatives, it is not clear whether his problem is more fundamental than the question how time may be considered to be the fourth dimension of space.

The truth seems to be that it is only in its method and point of view that we can expect to discover the differentia referred to above. Why it cannot be discovered in its subject-matter, we have already seen. It is also not difficult to see why it cannot be discovered in its goal. If we call its goal theoretic, so is that of pure science; if we call its goal practical, so is that of stenography or gastronomy; if we call its goal both theoretic and practical, so is that of mathematics or hydrography. In so far as philosophy is concerned with the ultimate reality, the aim of philosophy is perhaps entirely theoretic; but problems concerning morals or bare existence are not surely entirely so.

It seems true to say that the only sure way to identify a problem as philosophical is to show, first, that it is theoretic (though not necessarily without a practical bearing in every case), and, secondly, that it is such that it can be and should be solved only by a certain method. This is the method of reflection, the method of argument and analysis, to put it in a nut-shell.

But here we may have gone too far. Even if one were prepared to accept that philosophy can be defined or distinguished only by its method, its procedure and point of view, one might still ask if this characterization of its method, was, indeed, final. Let us, therefore, consider this point in some detail.

There are four possible methods of investigating a theoretic problem: the method of authority, the method of experience (observation and experiment), the method of reflection (argument and analysis), and the method of intuition. The method of authority is fundamental in theology, and widely used in common sense and science, although it is never a final court of appeal in the latter. The method of experience is fundamental

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to all natural sciences, and so on. But philosophy does not recognize any authority except insofar as it ventures into metaphysical or cosmological reflections based on scientific discoveries, or, more. generally, into any inquiry which involves reflection on scientific data of any variety. Russell's analysis of matter, for example, has much to do with modern physics, or Ryle's philosophy of mind makes an extensive use of psychological findings. But philosophy accepts the authority of science only in this sense, and only insofar as it believes that science is, at bottom, non-authoritarian.

The method of experience is foreign to philosophy, because if philosophy were based on obvervation and experiment, it would have been a search after the kind of knowledge which the natural sciences investigate. In that case philosophy would have been only one among other sciences, retaining its difference, not in essence, but perhaps only in the degree of generality or just in name. Natural sciences study observable facts, aiming at discovering fresh observable facts, but, whether philosophy aims at discovering any kind of fact or not, it at least does not aim at discovering any kind of observable facts. Observation, therefore, cannot be the proper method of it. Moreover, observation cannot be the method of philosophy because philosophical propositions, even when they are explanatory hypotheses concerning facts of a certain kind, are not confirmed or confuted by a discovery of further facts, as it is the case with scientific hypotheses.

The option now remains only between reflection and intuition. Historically, it is true that there have been exponents of intuition, and the intuitionists have indeed been called philosophers. But if they have been called philosophers, they cannot be excluded from the class of philosophers straightway. This exclusion can be justified or proved desirable only in either of the following ways:—

- (1) It may be shown that, whereas philosophy aims at definite, impersonal, and verified knowledge of whatever subject it may be concerned with, intuition, because of some intrinsic limitations, is not a dependable instrument for such a purpose.
- (2) Even if intuition is a dependable instrument and compares well with reason, it is so different from reason that both

cannot be the methods of the *same kind* of inquiry (it remaining understood that philosophy has to be defined with reference to its method). To continue to include both as methods of the same kind of inquiry would in that case be purely artibrary and a matter of choice.

Let us take them up one by one. One might even question whether philosophy is, indeed, a search after definite, impersonal, and verified knowledge. But it cannot be denied that many or most of the philosophers look upon philosophy as something of that sort. It is well known that Descartes took up the mathematical procedure and initially doubted all sources of knowlegde only in order to arrive at knowledge that was beyond all question. If this point be not granted, we would have two theoretic aims—first: definite, impersonal and verified knowledge, and second: indefinite, personal and care-free conjectures (or feelings)—and would be obliged to consider whether both the aims should be called philosophical.

Let us, however, assume that this point has been granted, that philosophy is, indeed, a search for a kind of knowledge which transcends personal conjectures, personal feelings, and is prepared to subject it self to reasonable tests. But if so, intuition is at once discredited in the first of the two ways. It may be recalled here that the reflective procedure does not and cannot exclude intuition as a kind of direct, immediate perception of truths. Reflection as a method of argument and analysis should welcome correct intuitions as delightful short-cuts. Moreover, argument or analysis must begin with something already there, on pain of losing itself in an infinite regress. The ultimate premises or basic data must be obtainable in some direct way; and indeed sensations and feelings are intuitions in this ordinary sense. What discredits intuition is that it claims to stand by itself, not necessarily subjecting itself to rational examination or reasoned proof. It is not necessarily unprepared to be corroborated by experience or reason, but if the latter comes into conflict with it, so much the worse for them. It is this which renders intuitionism so fundamentally different from the logical procedure, with the result that the two procedures cannot be taken to be methods of the same kind of inquiry.

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Moreover, argument, test and proof are inter-personal public affairs, whereas intuition is essentially private. It is especially clearly so in the case of the mystic who claims to have intuitions with 'inexpressible' contents. The intuitive procedure thus permits its practitioners to adopt private criteria of testing beliefs, while it is logically impossible that there are any such criteria. To claim to have an absolutely private criterion of test is actually to decline to put one's beliefs to test.

Suppose, however, that intuition is, indeed, able to furnish us with a knowledge of philosophical truths, that it has a strange kind of ability for entering, as Bergson would say, into the very heart of mysteries which sense or reason is (a) quite unable to fathom, or (b) only equally able to fathom. But in either case it is still legitimate to ask whether intuitionism should be included in philosophy. If (a), were true, it only would follow that reason as an organ of philosophy is worthless, that philosophy, insofar as it claims to be based on reason, is impossible. It would not follow that the search for the said kind of truths, based on in tuition, would be pihilosophical, unless 'philosophical' were definable in terms of subject-matter (which has already been found to be impossible). This search would be a commendable one, but would require to be called by a different name unless we were prepared to be arbitrary in naming. But, what is more interesting the same conclusion would follow even if (b) were true. Unless it is legitimate to characterize two travellers in terms of their place of arrival, one travelling by air is not of the same kind as the one travelling on foot. A soothsayer is not the same kind of person as one making scientific predictions, even if the pronouncements of both are equally correct.

In fact, intuition, of whatever variety, is the same in form as sensation (or any other actual or possible kind of immediate awareness) and just as sensing is not doing philosophy, however important a matter sensing may be, so also intuiting is not doing philosophy either. Sensing is not investigating; so also intuiting. Of course, an analytic description of either sensation or intuition would be philosophy; and if intuition were really a special kind of acquaintance, it would be a statement (an important statement) in philosophy to say that. But intuition is not the same as this statement, or any statement, for that matter.¹

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The General Nature of Philosophical Assertions

With this in mind, our next question would naturally be: What, precsisely, do we aim at knowing by the reflective method? If facts be the answer, the pertinent question would be: What facts? Are there two kinds of facts, say, observable and nonobservable, and are the later kind of facts revealed in philosophy? Well, we hear of a distinction between particular facts and general facts. That I am mortal is a particular fact, but that all men are mortal is a general fact. We hear even of a distinction between positive facts and negative facts. Even though the existence of negative facts is a question-mark, we still somehow understand the distinction. But what about the distinction between observable and non-observable facts? What kind of fact would be a non-observable fact? A non-observable fact, let us say, would be one which we could only think of but never be acquainted with. But why is acquaintance in this case impossible? Possibly because none of the sense-organs we possess is good enough for the purpose. But if it is alleged that no sense-organ or, for that matter, no organ of direct acquaintance, however, powerful, would be good enough; if, in other words, an acquaintance with such facts were impossible in principle, then one could perhaps reasonably doubt the existence of any facts of this kind. Aware of the possibility of a purely verbal dispute, we may define a fact as whatever is the case or as whatever there is, and it is not clear why, while the special sciences are engaged in discovering various kinds of facts, there should be a leftover of so-called non-observable facts for philosophy to dig out.

The special sciences study things and events of different categories, but these are all natural categories in the sense that they are defined solely on the basis of an observation of nature. Water is a natural category, so is sulphur, vertebrates are a natural category, so are mammals. The function of a special science is to assign the things and events within its field to different categories and to formulate the uniformities that are discoverable in them. The things and events are the facts it studies; the uniformities are the models into which these facts are thrown; they are not facts of a fresh kind; they are not what constitutes the

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Universe, but only the regularities displayed (or rather taken as being displayed) by facts that really constitute the Universe.

A philosopher, working in the field of metaphysics (precisely, constructive or synoptic metaphysics) takes over these uniformities and tries to bring them under broader uniformities. He is thus only a further step away from facts—engaged, not in discovering fresh facts (namely, unobservable facts, or something of that sort) but only in rearranging the facts of the scientists under wider generalizations or more fundamental categories. But still there is something that makes all the difference.

The categories which scientists work with are *natural* or factual categories for the reason indicated above; but the categories a metaphysician works with are not natural in this sense. They are supplied by reason a priori. While water and sulphur are natural categories, substance and quality are not; reality, being, becoming, one, many are not all the more. Sulphur is seen, discovered, experimented upon; but substance and reality are nothing of that sort. But if the categories of a metaphysician are not natural or factual, in all plausibility, they could only be *logical*. We could also say that while the categories of special sciences are descriptive, those of a metaphysician are essentially prescriptive or normative. A metaphysician, unlike a scientist, proceeds with some basic a priori norms or standards in hand, and seeks to reconsider and rearrange facts in the light of them.

The facts, for the metaphysician, are already there. Hisquestion, for example, would be: When or under what conditions, should we call a fact real, and when only an appearance? As I look at the paper-weight on the table, it displays or seems to display perfect constancy of position and character. I, therefore, call it a real paper-weight. If, instead, it has started appearing and disappearing without any apparent reason, I would tend to call it ghostly. But when I call it real, it thereby does not gain in quality; it remains just the same paper-weight as it was before. Just as a thing does neither gain nor lose in size when it is called large or small (or larger or smaller than something else), so also facts neithter gain nor lose in quality when metaphysical categories are applied to them. Metaphysical thinking

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about things is like shelving books in order of classification, like calling a person the father-in-law of Mr. Khan, of Mrs. Sengupta (and definitely not of Miss Thomson).

And the same is true of philosophy in its other fields. In epistemology the categories of belief, knowledge, opinion, certainty. probability, etc. are all a priori, supplied by reason. The facts to be categorized, in this case, are the facts of perception, thought. intuition, imagination and inference, and what the philosopher considers (in addition to discovering and formulating these categories) is which cases of perception, for instance, are knowledge. which judgments of perception are only probable, and so In ethics, as is well-known, the philosopher's procedure is thoroughy normative. In the philosophy of language, including meta-ethics and other meta-theories, the philosopher proceeds to rearrange facts of language by applying certain logical norms such as those of the criteria of meaningfulness, ambiguity, synonymy, and so on. Even when the philosopher is engaged merely in clarifying the meanings of basic expressions used in other disciplines, he is applying norms of clarity definable in terms of ordinary idioms, direct observation, or something of that sort. In brief, whatever area of facts or experiences philosophy may be concerned with, its aim, unlike that of science, is essentially not to discover further facts in the area, but to clarify or rearrange the facts already known according to certain a priori logical models.

The Value of Philosophy

In considering the value of philosophy, the point of reference is often left unclear, if not altogether understood. Value with reference to what? If human life in general be the answer; philosophy undoubtedly has a value. The argument is simple enough. At least the philosophers themselves enjoy their business; hence it has a value in their life; therefore, it has a value, because philosophers are after all human beings. It would be useless to argue that philosophers constitute only a small minority, since pilots too are a small minority; or to argue that philosophers are an exceptionally peculiar class of beings, since the mountain-climbers are also a peculiar class.

In all probability, when philosophy is set aside as a worthpursuit, the point of reference is what is known as practical 414 ABDUL MATIN

life. But what life is practical? I have so far come across no formal definition of 'practical life', but have come to hold that by practical life is generally meant the life in which we take care of the body and work for its continuation through generations. Besides intake of food, dressing, shelter, and things of that sort some light amusement may also be involved, such as may be essential for the good care the body itself; but that is all.

If philosophy is condemned as worthless because it contributes little or nothing to practical life so defined, we may proceed by asking two questions: Is it necessary for philosophy to contribute to practical life in order to be worthy or valuable? Does philosophy really contribute nothing to practical life?

A person may be interested in activities which have little or nothing to do with practical life as defined above. In fact, poets and artists are often so interested. There does not seem to be any argument by which such people could be prevented. If physical pleasures are worth having, there seems no reason to doubt that intellectual pleasures are at least equally worth having; if the care of the body is desirable, care of the mind seems at least equally so. Persons caring for the mind (precisely, the philosophical mind) cannot be stopped unless their interests unjustly interefere with the interests of those caring for the body; but the converse is equally true.

Furthermore, there is a fundamental difference between being valuable and being merely useful. A thing can be valuable without being useful at all. A person may enjoy looking at the Taj absolutely for the sake of the enjoyment itself, just as he may enjoy the same because he wants it to help him in his convalence. In fact, to be useful is to be a means to some end, and the end is really what is possessed of value. 'Useful', therefore, is not necessarily a word of commendation. Something that is valuable may of course, be useful at the same time, but it need not be; while what is useful may be entirely without any intrinsic value.

Aristotle, long ago put forward two main arguments in defence of the superiority of philosophy and its freedom from the bondage of utility. (1) One of the arguments is logical—rather, analogical. A free man is superior, in the sense of being more hopoly rable or more admirable, than a slave; so also is philosophy,

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which we pursue for its own sake, than those branches of knowledge that we pursue for the sake of some utility. (2) Philosophy as a study of first principles is not bound to utility because "it is when almost all the necessities of life and the things that make for comfort and recreation had been secured that such knowledge began to be sought.⁵

These arguments are worth considering. Even if pure knowledge be not, as Aristotle thought, superior to useful knowledge. there is no reason why it should not be equal in merit as long as there are people to enjoy the pleasures that accrue from both. Again, it is only natural that people will search after the pleasures of pure knowledge only when they have been able to meet their bare physical needs. It is nothing surprising if pure wisdom, just as pure poetry or pure art, cannot grow in an empty stomach. At the same time, it must be clear that, since there is no priori reason for considering theoretic pleasures as superior to other kinds of pleasures, lovers of pure philosophy should not consider themselves to be intrinsically superior to other classes of people; nor have they any right to feed on the labour of the latter. Unless, therefore, philosophy makes any contribution to the 'practical' life of the common people, it can live and thrive only under the private initiative of the philosophers themselves.

It may now be considered whether philosophy does or is able to make any contribution to practical life, after all. This is a question which, naturally, puts a philosopher in an awkward situation. If he answers it negatively, he may not be telling the truth; if affirmatively, he may look like an impudent self-advertiser. The question, however, may be approached historically or a priori. The historical approach, obviously, should be left to the historian on the sociologist. Still I may venture to speak a few words.

What is most important here is a general truth which seems boastful and high-sounding but is, indeed, a fundamental fact. As any student of the history of science knows, towards the beginning of man's intellectual culture any theoretic inquiry was only gradually stemmed out of philosophy at different stages the latter's development. Thales, who is known in history 1.p.Q. 4.8

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as the first scientific theorist, is also known as the father of philo. sophy in the West. No history of science can be written without mentioning such philosophical stalwarts as Pythagoras, Aristotle, Avicenna, Descartes, and Leibniz, not to speak of numerous other major or minor figures. Philosophers have inspired investigations not only in the field of mathematical and natural sciences but also in other fields.—The ancient Greeks emerged out of the mythological period only through the persistent activity of their philosophers; the relative darkness of the middle ages fell upon the Western world when the philosophical spirit of the Greek lost its original vitality. It does not seem that the social and political thinkers such as Hobbes, Rousseau, and Voltaire, and later, the most challenging figures such as Marx and Engels would have been the kind of thinkers they were if their minds had no been nourished in philosophical culture. I do not think the Russell would talk about politics, religion, and life in the way he did unless he was the kind of logician and philosopher he was or that his suggestions regarding morals and the conquest of happiness would be the same as they were, unless he was the kind of philosophical personality he really was. In short, it could be said in a general way that the factors that have been mainly responsible for the growth of civilization and culture are the freedom of thought and action, systematic opposition to religious fanaticism as well as such absurd political theories as the Divine Right theory of Kings, and rational investigation of nature, and that philosophers have been the champions of all these, sometimes even against oviours hazards.

Coming to the priori approach, it seems true to say that a serious study of philosophy or any serious philosophizing is likely to have a wholesome effect upon the nature of a person mainly in the following ways.

(1) As a result of thinking, searching and reflecting, his power of thinking is likely to improve considerably. Practice makes perfect, and it is not clear why this epithet should not hold good in the case of philosophy.

(2) As a result of critically considering problems which are popularly taken in a naive care-free spirit, he is likely to develop a critical attitude, i.e., an attitude of taking almost anything in a spirit of unbiased deliberation and scientific examination;

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usefu Lack pract only naturally should this attitude be transferred from theoretic to practical life. A person who has improved his muscles by doing gymnastics can and does use them beyond his gymnastic arena, and, conversely, a person willing to make a good use of his muscles in his work-a-day life cannot but spend some time 'uselessly' in a gymnasium.

- (3) Being seriously concerned with apparently useless problems and abstract, general concepts, he is likely to be partially withdrawn from petty superfluities of ordinary life and view things in a spirit of moderation, thoughtful sacrifice, and calm contentment. Through the greatness of the Universe which a philosopher contemplates, as Russell remarked long ago, his mind is also rendered great, so that he can more or less be above "narrow and personal aims", and have a life which, in comparison with the instinctive life, is "calm and free".6
- (4) Last of all, a person engaged in free and impartial contemplation, which is what philosophy is, is likely to be impartial in his practical and emotional life, and nothing, obviously, could be more urgently wanted in a system of practical life which is to be upright and happy. To quote Russell again: "The mind which has become accustomed to the freedom and impartiality of philosophic contemplation will preserve something of the same freedom and impartiality in the world of action and emotion. The impartiality which, in contemplation, is the unalloyed desire for truth, is the very same quality of mind which, in action, is justice, and in emotion is that universal love which can be given to all and not only to those who are judged useful or admirable." This, I hope, needs no comment.

The social effect of all these should be wholesome, and this wholesomeness is something which is not only important but indispensable in any good and happy society. For there to be a good society, there must be good individuals; the former presupposes the latter and not conversely; and this, I think, should throw enough light on the kind of importance philosophy enjoys even in our so-called practical life. It, of course, remains true, and this is significant, that philosophical activity can be immensely Lack of earnestness in doing philosophy will, in turn, contaminate practical life and do all the damage it is able to do.

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It may be recalled here that we have so far been considering the utility of theoretic philosophy (in which knowledge is sought for its own sake). But a department of philosophy remains, called the philosophy of life, which is directly concerned with what we have defined as practical life. When the Pythogoreans prohibited the eating of beans, when the Stoics preached and practised the principle of austerity, when Plato conceived his Republic, when Rousseau expounded the gospel of equality, and when Russel pondered over the conquest of happiness or the principles of social reconstruction, they were all delivering fragments of this philosophy of life. It seems true that this department of philosophy is not only inescapable but immensely profitable, and at least a great deal of our sufferings is due to a neglect of this.

One word of caution, however. Even though in the philosophy of life a philosopher is directly concerned with the question of well-being, he cannot lose sight of the philosopher's peculiar method and point of view. Here also he is after the true or the rational—though mainly the true or the rational concerning the best means of promoting human welfare—and his method is logical reflection, as elsewhere, and not authority or intuition Moreover, his interest in welfare does not entitle him to distort or bungle with facts, although his theory may not completely exclude the desirability of distorting or suppressing facts to a certain extent in very special cases. It is odd to believe that, at the level of theory, our interest in truth and our interest in welfare can ever come into conflict; rather, while it is absurd to believe that welfare can ever determine the nature or degree of truth, it is reasonable to expect truth to help determine the nature and degree of welfare. If a proposition were known to be true beyond all doubt, no interest in welfare could demand that it be denied in a theory of life. if the truth of a proposition is still a matter of debate (e.g., that there is a life after death, or that God exists, or that mind is a different substance from matter), a theory of life may assert, dender or emphasize it according to its advantage. A so-called tender minded philosopher of life may meddle with facts in this sense, whereas a solution whereas a solution is the sense whereas a s whereas a tough-minded philosopher may not feel any such queer theoretic requirement.

If this respect for truth or rationality is essential in the case of the philosophy of life, it is obviously more so in the case of pure

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philosophy. In the oriental tradition (as also sometimes in the western tradition) a general tendency is to demand that truth cannot lose sight of the problem of human welfare. It is believed that philosophy is primarily interested in human welfare-rather in human salvation—and, therefore, a correct philosophical theory must somehow satisfy our interest in happiness and progress just as well as our theoretic quest. But it seems proper to say that philosophy, except in what is known as the philosophy of life, is not primarily interested in progress and welfare but in truth and knowledge (or at least the 'rational' or the 'reasonable'); nor does it seem at all clear how philosophy, in handling every particular problem, could take the practical interest into consideration. How, for example, in considering the nature of causal relationship or the criterion of meaningfulness could philosophy incorporate the practical interest? It is not clear how the practical interest is even relevant in such cases.

It may be possible to conceive of a study of philosophical problems in which the theoretic and the practical interests will somehow be combined; but such a study will not be the same as philosophy, just as a mixture of honey and milk is not the same as honey, or milk either.

One could argue that we can *call* such a study philosophy; but then we should have a separate name for what we now call philosophy. The point at stake is not a verbal one; what needs to be emphasized is the difference between pure honey and the mixture.

In sum, whatever else philosophy may be, it is not preaching or lecturing, or delivering sermons from a pulpit of dogma; nor is it to be confused with science or its reverse, poetry. Nor should Bradley's ironical remark, "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct" mislead us, i.e., lead us to believe that in philosophy pretending to argue is as good as arguing. Philosophy is essentially an activity of arguing—thinking, meditating, analysing and weighing evidence—about whatever problem it may find in its way. Enjoyment of arguing, so long as one can afford it, is no more silly than watching a magic show or

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attending a dance drama. But history seems to have amply shown that it is, even from the so-called practical point of view, more than 'sheer enjoyment.

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Abdul Matin

NOTES

Note:—This is the first paper read in a symposium on the nature and value of philosophy arranged by the Bangladesh Philosophical Association during its second annual conference held at Rajshahi, Bangladesh, in March 1975.

It is published here with the kind permission of the Bangladesh Philosophical Association.

1. Vide- the back page of *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (Princeton University Press; Vol. 3, Fall, 1973).

2. Vide- H. Titus, Living Issues in Philosophy (American Book Co. 1964). Also G. E. Moore, "What is Philosophy?" Some Main Problems of Philosophy.

3. G. E. Moore, "What is Philosophy?", P. 1. B. Russell, An Outline of Philosophy, P. 2: Philosophy is concerned with "the harmony of the whole body of special sciences."

For a criticiem of this view see A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, pp. 47-48.

4. Of course, the method of argument and analysis, which we have called the method of reflection, need not necessarily assume any single form indeed, it does not. A reflective argument may proceed in various ways. It may proceed like a mathematical demonstration, or a reduction ad absurdum, or by conceptual analysis resulting in a definition, and so on.

5. Mackeon, R., ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (Random How, N. Y. 1941), p. 692.

6. Problems of Philosophy, p. 156–57

7. Ibid., p. 161.

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USE OF HYPOCYCLIC CURVES IN ART

It is said that mathematics is an art. The origin of mathematics is a physical reality. So is that of Art. The legendary Leonardo-da-Vinci used mathematics in his attempts to represent reality on canvas and thus even laid the foundation of a branch of mathematics called Projective Geometry.

Very often, mathematical curves have been used by artists. Beautiful art-forms are obtained from a given curve by successive variation of a constant called parameter of the curve, in a uniform manner. The uniform change in the parameter brings about an uniform change in the shape of the curve and creates some art-form.

One of the most interesting family of curves is that of the Hypocyclic Curves. These curves have very beautiful shapes and moreover the curve strongly depends on certain constants called parameters of the curve. A slight variation in a parmeter can bring an unexpected and aesthetic change in the shape of the curve.

In this article, we give an account of the change in the shape of hypocyclic curves as the parameters change. We have avoided many laborious calculations and many statements which are just stated can be justified by rigorous mathematical proof.

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When a circle rolls inside a steady circle such that the totating circle is always in contact with the steady circle, then the curve traced by any point within the rotating circle is called a hypocyclic curve.

In figure (1) let 'O' be the center of the steady circle and 'a' be its radius. Let 'A' be the centere of the rotaing the smaller circle. So that AP=Rb ($o \le R \le 1$). We will find the equation of the curve traced by P.

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


Fig. 1

Let Q be the point of contact of the two circles at an instant. Let $\hat{QOT} = \theta$ $\hat{PAQ} = \phi$, Let 'K' be a point on the circumference of the smaller circle so that P lies on the line AK. Let initially K and T coincide.

Then we have Arc KQ=Arc QT.

Hence
$$a\theta = b\phi$$
 $\therefore \phi = \frac{a}{b}\theta$

Let
$$P = (x(\theta), y(\theta))$$

Then
$$x(\theta) = 0D - DC$$
 $y(\theta) = AD - AF$
Now $\phi + (90 - \theta) - \alpha = 180$ $\therefore \alpha = \phi - \theta - 90$
Hence $X(\theta) = OA \cos \theta + AP \cos [180 - (\phi - \theta)]$
 $= (a - b) \cos \theta + AP \cos (\phi - \theta)$
 $= (a - b) \cos \theta + Rb \cos (\frac{a}{b} - 1) \theta$
 $y(\theta) = OA \sin \theta - AP \sin [180 - (\phi - \theta)]$
 $= (a - b) \sin \theta - Rb \sin (\phi - \theta)$
 $= (a - b) \sin \theta - Rb \sin (\frac{a}{b} - 1) \theta$

Hence the equations of the hypocyclic curves are :-

$$x(\theta) = (a-b) \cos \theta + \text{Rb} \cos (a/b-1) \theta$$

$$y(\theta) = (a-b) \sin \theta - \text{Rb} \sin (a/b-1) \theta$$

These are called the *freedom equations*, of the family of Hypocyclic curves. Since as the paramaters a, b, R change, the curve changes its shape.

The nature of the curve depends very much on the ratio a/b and interesting properties of these curves are derivable from this ratio.

Initially, we have assumed that K and T coincide. At this position the point P is at minimum distance from O.

The next maximum of OP will occour when P is nearest to Q i.e. after one complete rotation. And the sucessive maxima will also occur similarly.

The first maximum occurs when Q and T coincide i.e. when $\phi = 0 = 0$. The next maxima occur after complete rotations of the smaller circle, i.e. when $\phi = 2\pi$; $\phi = 4\pi$; $\phi = 6\pi$;....etc. the maxima will be formed. i.e. when $\phi = 2n\pi$ $n = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$. The curve attains maximum for OP.

Now since $\phi = (a/b) \theta$ Hence when $\theta = 2n \pi b/a$ the maxima are formed. If β maxima are there in the curve which is completed in γ revolutions of the smaller circle,

then
$$\theta_{max} = 2 \pi \gamma$$

hence $2\pi \gamma = 2\pi \beta b/a$. Hence $\gamma = b/a \beta$
i.e. $\beta/\gamma = a/b = \frac{\text{number of maxima of OP}}{\text{number of revolutions.}}$
Similarly, minima of OP is attained at $\theta = (2n+1) b/a$
 $\eta = 0, 1, 2...$

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
Obviously, there are β number of minima and again, number of minima of OP = a/b

number of revolitions


Thus the curve fluctuates between maxima and minima the number of which is completely determined by the ratio a/b.

Hence by using circles with different ratio of radii we can have hundreds of types of the

have hundreds of types of these curves.




(Fig. 2 (a), 2 (b), 2 (c) show some of these curves)



In figure 2 (a),
$$\frac{a}{b} = \frac{32}{15}$$

in 2 (b) $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{12}{7}$
in 2 (c) $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{8}{7}$



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Moreover the number of maxima or minima of OP does not depend on R. i. e. the position of point — P.

For this reason a/b is called the characteristic ratio of the curve. It determines the nature of the curves which can be drawn by using two circles with given radius a, and b.

Now OP
$$(max) = a - (1-R) b = G max$$

OP $(min) = |a - (1+R) b| = G min$

Thus the curve lies within two circles with radius a - (1-R)b and |a - (1 + R)b|.

As R decreases to zero then G max decreases to (a-b) and G min increased to (a-b).

Thus as R decreases the curve decreases in size and ultimately merges into a circle with radius (a-b)

Some special Hypocyclic Curves

When R=1 i.e. point P is on circumference of the rotating circle, then the curve is a Hypocycloid; when a/b=3/1, we get a Deltoid

$$x(\theta) = 2b\cos\theta + b\cos 2\theta$$

$$y(\theta) = 2b \sin \theta - b \sin 2\theta$$

When a/b=4/1 we get an Asteroid

$$x(\theta) = 3b\cos\theta + b\cos 3\theta$$

$$y(\theta) = 3b \sin \theta - b \sin 3\theta$$

When a = 2b

then
$$x(\theta) = b(1 + R) \cos \theta$$

 $y(\theta) = b(1 - R) \sin \theta$

This is an equation of an ellipse with major axis b (1 + R) and minor axis b (1 - R) when R = 1 Then y (θ) \equiv O

Hence the hypocyclic curve is a straight line, when $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{2}{1}$ and R = 1

(In the sequel maximum and minimum will allways refer to maximum and minimum of OP.)

Variation in the curve due to change in R

We will consider for simplicity two curves when $(1) \frac{a}{b} = \frac{3}{1}$ and $(2) \frac{a}{b} = \frac{3}{2}$. The results obtained for those curves can be generalised.

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(1)
$$\frac{a}{b} = \frac{3}{1}$$
 Then $x(\theta) = 2b\cos\theta + Rb\cos 2\theta$
 $y(\theta) = 2b\sin\theta - Rb\sin 2\theta$

(2)
$$\frac{a}{b} = \frac{3}{2}$$
 Then $x(\theta) = \frac{b}{2}\cos\theta + Rb\cos\frac{\theta}{2}$
$$y(\theta) = \frac{b}{2}\sin\theta - Rb\sin\frac{\theta}{2}.$$

Now when R = 1 both the curves, (1) and (2) are very much similar in appearance. They have 3 cusppoints (maximas).

But as R changes, both the curves evolve in a very different manner. Consider the curve (1)

$$x(\theta) = 2b \cos \theta + Rb \cos 2\theta$$

$$y(\theta) = 2b \sin \theta - Rb \sin 2\theta$$

The curvature ρ of this curve can be easily shown to be


$$\rho = \frac{1}{2b} \frac{1 - 2 R^2 + R \cos 3\theta}{(1 + R^2 - 2R \cos 3\theta)^{3/2}}$$

When $\theta = \frac{2}{3} \pi j$ (j=0,1,2,....) i.e. at the maxima, we have

$$\rho = \frac{1}{2b} \frac{1 - 2R^2 + 2R}{(1 + R^2 - 2R)^{3/2}} : \rho = \frac{1}{2b} \frac{(1 + 2R)}{(1 - R)^2}$$

When R = 1 then $\rho = + \infty$ and ρ decreases,

as R decreases and ultimately $\rho = \frac{1}{2h}$ when R = 0. (See graph 1)



Graph I-Change in the curvature at Maxima as R changes,

USE OF HYPOCYCLIC CURVES IN ART

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At minima i.e. when
$$\theta = (2 \pi j + 1) \pi/3 \ (j = 0, 1, 2, ...)$$

We have
$$\rho = \frac{1}{2b} \frac{1 - 2 R^2 - R}{(1 + R^2 + 2 R)^{3/2}} = g$$

$$g = -\frac{1}{2b} \frac{2 R^2 + R - 1}{(1 + R^2 + 2 R)^{3/2}}$$

Hence $\rho = 0$ when $2 R^2 + R - 1 = 0$

i.e. when
$$\frac{R = -1 \neq \sqrt{1+8}}{4}$$
 i.e. $R = \frac{1}{2}$

(Since R = -9/4 is not possible).


Hence when $R = \frac{1}{2} \rho = 0$ at the point of minimum.

If
$$R > \frac{1}{2}$$
, Then $2R^2 + R - 1 > 0$ Hence $\rho < 0$.

The negative value of the curvature indicates that in this case the curve is concave outwards. If $R < \frac{1}{2}$ then $\rho > 0$ hence the curve is concave inwards (i.e. towards the origin) and finally

when
$$R = 0$$
; $\rho = \frac{1}{2b}$

which is the maximum value of p at this point.



Graph II—Change in The cutvature at Minima as R changes.

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When R=1, ρ is negative for all values except for those values for which maxima is attained.

(Since
$$\rho = \frac{1}{2b} \frac{\cos 3 \theta - 1}{(2 - 2\cos 3 \theta)^{3/2}}$$
 and since $\cos 3 \theta - 1 < 0$ for all θ Except $\theta = \frac{2\pi}{3} j$; $j = 0, 1, 2, ...$ we have $\rho < 0$).

Similarly it can be shown that the curvature of the curve when $R = \frac{1}{2}$ decreases from $\frac{4}{b}$ to zero as we go from point of maximum to point of minimum along the curve.

Further it can be shown that when $R < \frac{1}{2}$; $\rho > 0$ always. Hence it can be easily concluded and indeed, can be proved rigorously, that when $0 < R < \frac{1}{2}$ then as we go from maximum to minimum, curvature goes on decreasing and is zero somewhere between maximum and minimum and then becomes negative and as R decreases the portion of the curve with negative curvature goes on decreasing and it vanishes when $R = \frac{1}{2}$.

The above discussion is sufficient to explain the behaviour of the curve as R changes. This type of behaviour is shown by all hypocyclic curves.

We shall now consider the second curve i. e.

$$X (\theta) = b/2 \cos \theta + R b \cos \theta/2$$

 $Y (\theta) = b/2 \sin \theta - R b \sin \theta/2$

We consider the first intersection of the curve with X axis, Near $\theta = 0$.

Equating Y (
$$\theta$$
) = 0 we have $\frac{1}{2}b\sin\theta = Rb\sin\theta/2$ i.e.

 $\sin \theta/2 (\cos \theta/2 - R) = 0$. Let θ_0 be the solution of this equation.

Hence
$$\theta_0=+2\cos^{-1}R$$
 and Y (θ_0) $=0$ when Y (θ) >0 i.e. \sin ($\theta/2$) (\cos $\theta/2-R$) >0 then \cos ($\theta/2$) $>R=\cos$ $\theta_0/2$ now max ($\theta_0/2$) $=\pi/2$. Hence $\theta_0/2<\pi/2$ always. Now if $\frac{\theta}{2}\!<\!\frac{\theta_0}{2}$ then \cos $\theta/2>\cos\theta_0/2$

Hence $Y(\theta) > 0$. For every θ such that $0 < \theta < \theta_0$. Hence within the range $(0 < \theta < 2\cos^{-1}R)$ $Y(\theta)$ is positive and decreases to zero.

Similarly when $\theta_0 = -2 \cos^{-1} R$ i.e.

 $(0 > 0 > 2 \cos^{-1} R)$; Y (θ) is negative and increases to zero.

When $\theta_0 = + 2 \cos^{-1}R$ and $\theta_0 = - 2 \cos^{-1}R$,

we have $X(\theta) = \frac{1}{2} b \cos(2 \cos^{-1} R) + b R^2$.

Hence in the region $-2 \cos^{-1} R \leqslant \theta \leqslant 2 \cos^{-1} R$

the curve forms a 'Loop' at $\theta = 0$ (i.e. the maximum length of the loop is along X axis.)

Similarly curve forms loops, for other values of θ for which the maximum is attained.

Let $P = (x_0, y_0)$ be, (figure 3), the lower point of the loop and $Q = (x_1, y_1)$ be the point at which maxima is attained.




Fig. 3

Then at
$$\theta = 0$$

 $P = (b/2 \cos \{ 2 \cos^{-1} R \} + b R^2, 0) = (x_0, y_0)$
 $Q = (a + R b, 0) = (x_1, y_1)$

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• Now since x_0 decreases faster than x_1 when R decrease, PQ will increase as R decreases i.e. the loop will increase in length as R decreases.

Since PQ is independent of θ hence the length of loop will be same for all loops for given R .

When $R = \frac{1}{2}$ then P = (0, 0)

i.e. the loops are formed at the origin.

When $\frac{1}{2} < R \le 1$ then $x_0 > 0$

When $0 \le R < \frac{1}{2}$ then x_0 is negative hence the origin lies within the loop. (In fact within every loop).

When R = 1 then P = Q = (a + b, 0) hence no loop is formed.

It can further be shown that when R decreases TS goes on increasing i.e. the loop goes on thickening. (Figure 3)

The phenomenon of formation of loops is shown by all curves having a/b < 2 and not by the curves for which $a/b \ge 2$ (since if a/b < 2 then the second maxima (first at $\theta = 0$) is formed at $\theta > \pi$. Hence the curve intersects X axis before the formation of second maxima which is not the case for $a/b \ge 2$, since in this case the second maxima is at $\theta < \pi$.

This phenomenon of loops when it is essentially due to the parametere R, makes the curve more interesting from the point of view of art.

Let us consider the example when $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{35}{24}$ and R = 0.9 (nearly) then the loops touch each other and we have a curve whose shape is like a flower with 35 petals. (See figure 4-a)

For the same curve when R=0.7 (nearly) the loops increase in thickness and mix up with each other and we get an entirely different shape. (figure 4-b)

When R = 0.4 the loops are so much mixed with each other that it is not easy to distinguish them separately (figure 4-c).

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



Fig. 4-(a), 4-(b), 4-(c)



Combination of the curves to form new patterns

Till now we have considered how the hypocyclic curve some simple methods, to combine these hypocyclic curves.

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(1) Rotation of the curve :-

In the discussion above we have assumed that first maximum is on X i.e. at first maximum $\angle POT = O$ (Fig I). But if we relax this condition and draw a hypocyclic curve repeatedly (a, b,r are fixed) by changing $\angle POT$ uniformly then we get very beautiful patterns. For example see figure 5 (b). Here a/b=7/4 and $\angle POT$ is increased each time by 3.75°. (R=0.75 nearly).

(2) Changing the value of R:-

We know that the curve goes on becoming small and more and more 'convex inwards' as we decrease R. This can be utilised to draw beautiful patterns.

Figure 5 (a) shows a pattern [here $a/b = \frac{32}{25}$ R = 9 and R = .5

(3) Rotating the curve and changing the value of R:-

This method is illustrated in 5-D. Here /POT is increased and at the same time R is changed (here decreased) with each incriment in (/POT Here a/b=6/5)

Easy generaliation of the above methods can be done.

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


Fig. 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), 5(d).

Many interesting patterns can be obtained in this manner by rotating the curves in different manner.

We have discussed uptill now about the curves with same characteristic ratio. But we can combine curves with different characteristic ratio and obtain beautiful art forms. For example Figure 5-c. [Here two types of curves one with $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{2}{1}$ and

With
$$\frac{a}{b} = \frac{4}{3}$$
 are used].

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Moreover this is not the end of the story. We can combine the patterns formed by using the above methods and obtain beautiful pieces of Mathematical art. (Two of them are given here)

Eg. Figure 6 (a) is drawn by using the curve with $\frac{a}{b} = 5/6$ and Figure 6 (b) is drawn by using the curve with $\frac{a}{b} = 3/2$.




Fig. 6(a)

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


Fig. 6 (b)

Thus we conclude that hypocyclic curves provide us a very big domain for the formation of art-forms.

If the patterns formed by the hypocyclic curves are combined properly, we can get millions of marvellous pieces of Mathematical cal art and it will not be an exaggeration to say that by using these curves one can begin an entirely new branch of Drawing.

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Canadian Philosophical Review—Revue canadienne de philosophie Vol. XIV, No. 2—Juin/June 1975

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REVIEWS

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Kulkarni, T. R.: Upanishads and Yoga: an empirical approach to the understanding (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay-400007, 1972) pp XII+160.

'Upanisads' and 'Yoga' have a charm of their own for a student of Indian thought. The upanisads, are treasure-houses of philosophical wisdom. Similarly the 'Yoga' system has aroused a good deal of contemporary interests. It is but natural, therefore for one to have curiosity about Dr. Kulkarni's book in which both 'Upanishads' and 'Yoga' are approached empirically for their understanding.

The book consists of seven chapters. The over-all objective of the book is to contest the common belief that "Indian thought is anti-rationalistic and even a-social". According to the author this wrong view is due to a basic methodological error of never studying the texts "in their own right, that is to say, in terms of the contexts provided by themselves" (Preface). The objective of the book therefore is two-fold-(i) to put the ancient material in some organized form with a view to uncovering the basic frame of reference which could be expected to generate sets of propositions for experimental verification, and (ii) to prepare a case for a more systematized and organized research on the above lines.

Taking only the internal evidence of the Upanisads into consideration the author reaches certain conclusions. The negative conclusion is that the Upanisads do not hold that the phenomenal world is unreal or illusory as the prevailing tradition understands. On the positive side the author claims that the upanisads hold that there are two kinds of reality, an inferior one comprising of the phenomenal world, and a higher one defined simply as 'Ātman or Brahman. This dual nature of reality is basic to four special dichotomies concerning (1) path of life, (2) knowledge, (3) action, and (4) the nature of the self. There are two paths, Sreyas and preyas; two kinds of knowledge (vidyā)—the higher (parā) and the lower (aparā); two kinds of action—action with attachment and action with detachment; and two kinds of self—the bodily or empirical and the intelligent or inner. Of these pairs, the higher path of life, higher knowledge, and superior

action are inseparably linked up with the higher form of reality which is Ātman. Ātman however, is not a metaphysical abstraction but a full-fledged biological reality as it is defined in terms of the unqualified mass of consciousness localised within the body itself and activating all living processes. In conclusion, the author accepts Deutsch's view that it is neither cosmology nor metaphysics, but "pure phenomenology of consciousness that seems to be the primary sphere of the upanişadic universe of discourse". (p. 34).

According to the author, there is a distinct trend in contemporary psychological literature which shows complete agreement with the upanisadic view of the distinction between the two kinds of reality. The upanisadic proposition that the objects in the world, as we see them, are the creations of the self (Atman) finds a close parallel in Polanyi's view that "The object as I see it is the meaning I give to the responses the object—evokes in my body".

Similarly, in the section on Yoga the author finds ample scope for empirical investigation and corroboration from contemporary findings in psychology. "Yoga as taught by Patanjali is neither a religion nor a philosophy but purely a psychological process which is basic in all perceptual phenomena" (p. 64). Yoga, consists in the suppression of mental states. There is no doubt that the author is 'anti-traditional' in his interpretation of the Yoga-Sutras. For example, from the description of the distinction between the asamprajñāta and Samprajñāta Samādhi, (similar 10 what he calls spiritual and non-spiritual yoga), he builds up a theory that wherever there is a consciousness, i.e. perceptual aware ness of an object or object-quality or any subjective feeling, there is necessarily involved the samprajñata, i.e., yoga conscious-ofobjects. The two kinds of Samādhi are most probably not two kinds but two applications of Yoga. It is with such a fresh empirical approach that the author discusses other topics like seer-seen-distinction, gunas, klesa, Samāpatti, Citta and its Vitus and so on. In this endeavour he also takes the support of Vyasa the commentator. The central theme of the author is that Yoga propounds a theory of perception in particular, and of knowledge in general, wherein yoga or Samādhi is the key-concept. Samādhi consisting of the three chained processes of suppression, pointedness' and steadiness, is necessarily involved in every case of perception, and always remains the same in spite of the changing

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modifications of the mind. Kaivalya or isolation means the attainment of an identical form with the perceiver and it is what the Upanisads speak of as the knowledge of the Ātman. Such an attainment is possible only through 'asamprajñāta' or what the author calls 'spiritual yoga'.

According to the author "what the upanisads seem to present as a 'phenomenology of consciousness' is seen distinctively given a psychological background and transferred into a psychology of perception at the hands of Patanjali". The key-concept here is nirodha i.e. suppression or inhibition.

In the last three chapters the author uses the contemporary theories in Psychology to bear upon the understanding of the Yoga, and also brings out the implications of Yoga for Psycho-Pathology and personal efficiency. He suggests (P. 103) that perhaps a more suitable frameowrk for an understanding of the Patanjalian concepts would be what the Russians call 'orientation reflex or reaction' or what is known in the West as 'arousal response'. Yoga is well-known for its therapeutic uses. The author tries to bring out their theoretical basis, e.g. the yoga view that man's ills or sufferings are due to faulty perceptions or non-discriminations. This view, according to the author, comes close to the currently accepted view which explains health and disease in terms of efficiency or inefficiency of what is known as 'homeostasis'. Patanjali's view, in this respect, may be called 'Psychological homeostasis' which consists in maintaining its steadiness by the mind by creating order in perceptual chaos through the formation of related conceptual structures. This is made possible by the operations of the subsidiary factors of Samādhi. As for personal efficiency (which seems to be the author's phrase standing for 'Siddhi'), through the proper use of Samyama, human, perceptual and the other, abilities can be developed beyond the range of what is conceived to be humanly possible.

The author can claim that he has broken new ground in the field of Upaniṣadic and Yogic studies. He has been able to show that the traditional approach to the understanding of these important texts is not the only approach, and that these texts can be fruitfully understood empirically. It is necessary to understand

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these texts in the light of contemporary developments in the field of knowledge. From this point of view, Dr. Kulkarni has rendered a great service to the Upanisads and the Yoga Sūtras.

However, an attempt of this kind is bound to suffer from certain limitations. As the author himself accepts, 'the study has necessarily been selective—' (p. 153), and the selection, in such cases, is necessarily determined by the approach one takes. As a result, one tends either to ignore or to explain away those aspects of the teachings which are not favourable to the accepted approach. The thesis of the author that the Upaniṣads accept the reality of the phenomenal world is only partially true. According to the Upaniṣads, the world is not real in the same sense in which Atman is real. The same is the case with his view that Yoga gives us purely a psychology of perception. The point is that the author's approach, however important it may be for the understanding of the Upaniṣads and Yoga, can be accepted only as one of the possible approaches.

I may mention two other difficulties. One is terminological. On page 9, the author uses 'anti-rational' as synonymous with 'transcending reason'. But 'against reason' and 'beyond reason' are different concepts. The other difficulty is about his view that 'a-sociality' of Indian doctrine is an *implication* of its 'antirationality'. This is questionable on factual as well as logical grounds.

However, the book is a valuable addition to the existing literature on the Upanisads and the Yoga. The extensive bibliography at the end will be of great use for the students and scholars

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Sharma, Dhirendra: The Negative Dialectics: A study of the Negative Dialecticism in Indian Philosophy, 1974: Sterling publishers Pvt. Ltd., Jullunder (India) pp. XVIII + 155. Price Rs. 11.00.

The book by Dr. Sharma is an attempt in the direction of a partial fulfillment of the urgent need of reinterpretation and representation of some of the important doctrines propounded by philosophers in India. It has illuminatingly brought to the notice of the readers the different senses and ways in which the notions of abháva and anupalabdhi have been employed by the philosophers of the schools of Nyāya, Buddhism and Mimāmsā. Further, it is extremely important that Dr. Sharma points out that it was not Kumarila who introduced Anupalabdhi as an independent Pramāna. It was Pārthasārathi Miśra who used Anupalabdhi as an independent Pramana and the background for it was prepared by the faulty edition of the Śāśtradipikā. This important claim deserves serious consideration by scholars. Lastly, it is again very important, on the part of Dr. Sharma, to have pointed out that although the philosophers of the schools of Nyāya, Buddhism and Mimāmsā make use of both abhāva and/or anupalabdhi, the context (and therefore the significance) of the use varies. It is, therefore, both confusing and misleading, as some of the traditionalists have done, to maintain that they are facing the same problems. All these points are important not only for the historian of Indian Philosophy but also for a student of the history of the Indian Philosophical Ideas. It is again for this reason that many such works are badly needed so far as Indian Philosophy is concerned.

The book intends to undertake a 'study of the negative dialecticism of India' (p. XIII) and attemps to show the manner in which Indians have applied negation to their dialectics in many cardinal doctrines....' (p. XIII), the two main types selected for a detailed consideration being the negative dialectic of Non-Violence (ahimsa) and the negative dialectic of summum bonum (mokṣa) (pp. 127-136). The programme, the book sets before itself for a fullscale consideration is important indeed! But except for the sporadic reverberations of such expressions as 'negative dialectic' (p. 44), 'dialectical basis of the renouned Indian doctrine of Ahimsā (p. 59), 'apoha or dialectical theory of meaning (p. 60) etc. there is hardly any consideration of 'dialectic' anywhere in the entire book. If Dr. Sharma presumes that what is meant by 'dialectic' is obviously clear to everbody, I am afraid, he is surely mistaken, since the term 'dialectic' is understood in at least half

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a dozen different senses. Further, what is meant by either positive or negative dialectic? Since every 'dialectic' is called 'dialectic' by Dr. Sharma simply because it makes use of the notion of negation in one or the other form, how are we to understand the distinction between positive and negative dialectic? Is positive dialectic bereft of the notion of negation? If so, can it be 'dialectic' if not 'positive dialectic'?

Secondly, Dr. Sharma wants to explain Ahimsā and Moksa in terms of dialectic. It is next to impossible to understand what he means by it. Does he mean to say that Moksa as well as Ahimsā are dialectical? It so, was it not necessary for him to show how they are so? Is it because in each some notion of negation is involved? But then if that is so, would Dr. Sharma be prepared to extend the notion of 'dialectic' to every consideration where negation is involved?

This is not, however, the only, although major, shortcoming of the book. In the treatment of the subject Dr. Sharma also raises certain issues that are at least misleading. We shall focus our attention on four such points: (i) What is meant by Padartha? Are they predicables (p. 5), realities (p. 12) or categories (p. 14)? Mixing of these considerations is, to say the least, confusing, (ii) How many kinds of meaning are there? How are we to distinguish between these on the one hand and logical meaning (p. 57) and dialectical meaning (p. 60) on the other? What is meant by saying, for example, that meaning is dialectical? How are we to understand the expression dialectical theory of meaning (p. 60)? (iii) We are told that reality is twofold—existence (bhava) and non-existence (abhava) (p. 12).—But we are also told that reality is divided into two categories—existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva) (p. 116). We are further told that these are parts of reality (ibid). (iv) What is 'apoha' precisely? Sometimes it is differentiation or dichotomy (p. 53), sometimes theory of meaning (p. 57), sometimes dialectic (p. 110), sometimes dialectical theory of meaning (p. 60) while sometimes it means just discrimination (p. 79).

Although the book has some shortcomings like these yet from the point of view of its worth both for history of Indian Philosophy and history of Indian Philosophical Ideas such attempts are very much to be welcomed.

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THE SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE BANGLADESH PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

The second annual conference of the Bangladesh Philosophical Association was held from the 9th to the 11th March, this year, under the auspices of the University of Rajshahi. The conference was inaugurated by Mr. Sayed Nazrul Islam, the Vice-President of Bangladesh, while Dr. Mafizuddin Ahmad, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy, University of Rajshahi, acted as the General President. In his inaugural speech, the Vice-President highlighted the important role of philosophers in any civilized society, and urged upon the philosophers of Bangladesh to help their motherland grow and prosper with their thoughts and considered views. In his presidential speech Dr. Ahmad outlined the main currents of philosophical thinking in Bangladesh and expressed the hope that, if due patronage is provided, philosophy can definitedly see better days in this country and play a significant role in its national life.

Prof. S. Rahman, the President of the Philosophical Association, in his address, drew the attention of philosophers to the problems of human welfare and exhorted them to work for the eradication of human sufferings without being solely concerned with abstract theoretical problems.

About a hundred delegates from different parts of Bangladesh attended the conference. The occasion was also graced by three distinguished delegates from abroad, viz., Dr. S. S. Barlingay from the University of Poona, Dr. S. K. Nandy from the Presidency College, Calcutta, and Dr. Hiltrud Rüstau from the University of Humbold, GDR. In a special session arranged for the foreign delegates, Dr. Barlingay and Dr. Rüstau read illuminating papers, on metaphysics and Marxist philosophy, and Dr. Nandy gave an excellent talk on aesthetics. Both the papers and the talk, which were attended by other persons besides the delegates, were received with great enthusiasm.

The other special features of the conference were two symposia on "the nature and value of philosophy" and "social justice" and sectional meetings on logic and metaphysics, moral, and Political philosophy, and Bangladesh Darsan. Discussions in all the sectional meetings were all lively and illuminating.

ABDUL MATIN

On the whole, the conference was a great success, which of course, was largely due to the Local Organizing Committee, and specially due to the personal interest the Vice-Chancellor of the Rajshahi University took in the matter. The academic aspect apart, other arrangements were excellent. The whole conference was a clear testimony to the fact that the people of Bangladesh have a genuine interest in philosophy as a high stratum of intellectual culture and as an integral part of their individual as well as national life.

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NOTES

The article entitled "A Note on Truth-possibilities" which was published in the Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. II, No. 3, April, 1975, is by Dr. B. Richards, 19, King's Road, Richmond Surrey, U.K.

The article entitled, "Some Problems in Sankara" by Dr. W. S. Barlingay, which was published in the Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 3, April, 1975 was the "Gurubhakta Siromani Dharmatma Vaidya Shri Subrahmanya Ayyar Shashtyabdapoorthi Endowment Lecture" given by him under the auspices of the Shankara Vidya Kendra, New Delhi. It was published with the kind permission of the Shankara Vidya Kendra, New Delhi.

Shri S. M. Chingle: An Obituary

We regret to announce the sudden passing away of Shri Shreeram M. Chingle on 2nd April, 1975. He was connected with the Institute of Philosophy (now Pratap Centre of Philosophy), Amalner, for more than 35 years. He was a devoted student of Indian and Western thought and had many philosophical papers to his credit. Shri Chingle lived a simple and austere life. By nature, he was unassuming, affectionate and always ready to help any one in need. He was in charge of the Pratap Centre, after it was taken over by the University of Poona. His death, hence, is a great loss to the Centre. We share the deep sorrow of the members of his family.

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PHYSICAL THEORY WITHOUT PRAGMATICAL IMPERATIVES

I. Introductory:

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Modern physical theories of relativity and quantum mechanics are of deep philosophical interest in so far as they seem to have farreaching methodological and extra-methodological consequences for the entire tradition of scientific enquiry. Some of the philosophically significant features of these theories involve a radical departure from: (1) the mathematical foundations of classical physics by introducing non-Euclidean geometry into the foundations of modern physics (general relativity theory); (2) the absolutistic assumptions of classical physics by showing most of the fundamental physical concepts such as space and time to be of a relative character and statements concerning them to be of a definitional character (special relativity theory);2 (3) the 'perceptibility' of classical physical theories by introducing essentially non-perceptible concepts of incomparable theoretical power (relativity theory and quantum theory); and (4) the entire deterministic structure of classical physics by rejecting strictly deterministic laws in favour of statistical ones in the micro-physical Universe of the very small (quantum theory).3

Thus with the fundamental assumptions and essential structure of classical physics as their point of departure, these theories may be viewed from the methodological point of view of 'theoretical pluralism' as opposed to that of 'theoretical monism'. Their revolutionary contributions to the growth of the system of scientific knowledge may indeed be seem as confirming the methodological value of theoretical pluralism for science. Points of methodological interest apart, the question which we wish to ask and consider in some detail in this paper may be formulated in very vague and general terms thus: What are the extra-methodological consequences, if any, of modern physical theory? The problem, in a nutshell, is one of investigating the nature of such consequences which modern physical theory may be said to have for science on the one hand and philosophy on the other. The following section

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is devoted to a precise specification of the problem for purposes of present discussion.

II. The Problem:

One of the many interesting, and indeed revolutionary, features of modern physical theory is its non-perceptibility in a sense to be considered in the next section. This is best illustrated by the mathematical character of the relativity theory on the one hand and quantum theory on the other. In the discussions on the nature of these theories a lusion to this particular feature is frequently made by describing the physical concepts and laws they employ as ones which, unlike their classical counterparts, cannot be visualized in terms of pictorial models based on more or less familiar objects of our experience. It is true that the character of these concepts laws is instead described mathematically.⁵ The immense theoretical advantages of this essentially non-classical mode of description violating some of the fundamental imperatives of classical physics is generally acknowledged by the physicists and philosophers of science alike.

Quite the opposite situation prevailed in classical physics where Newtonian mechanics dominated as 'the paradigm of a causal theory' and "causal' and 'mechanical' became identified with 'picturable'". Throughout its history, one notices in operation what may be called the perceptibility requirement as a general (pragmatical) imperative dictating the type of structure that a physical theory must possess. Frequent criticism of physical theories for their failure to possess the perceptibility feature was therefore characteristic of its methodology. For example, this is precisely how Maxwell's field equations for electrodynamical phenomena were criticized and sought to be supplemented by a mechanical model.

In effect, the classical perceptibility requirement set definite limits to the scope and mode of physical description. A clear recognition of this fact became possible only in this century in the light of modern physical theories of relativity and quantum mechanics. Contemporary physicists seem to have lost no time in ruling out the possibility of a return to this mode of physical description. Indeed there are reasons to believe that there is built in to the very foundations of modern physics a general requirement

capable of replacing the classical requirement of perceptibility. One of the aims of the following discussion is to identify the distinct positive content of this alternative requirement. To begin with, we may simply call it the requirement of non-perceptibility, if only to emphasize its non-classical, revolutionary character.

The problem that emerges for discussion here centers around the question of the nature of these two opposite requirements and their place in the field of physical science. The point of view needed to make such a discussion seem worthwhile and interesting is provided by the modern semiotic analysis of language in the sense of R. Carnap and C. W. Morris. Such a discussion becomes necessary also if the general philosophical implications of the requirements under consideration are to be seen clearly.

III. Perceptibility and the Pattern of Scientific Explanation:

All branches of empirical science aim at precise and systematic explanation of experimentally confirmed, more or less general relationships between properties of natural phenomena. It may be quite reasonable to require scientific explanation to follow some general objective, uniform pattern. Such a pattern is, e.g., readily available in physics in the history of atomic explanation, from Democritus to modern elementary particle theory. 10 The pattern here may be said invariably to involve the postulation of theoretical entities with those explanatory properties which are needed to explain the problematic properties of observable phenomena. Or, in the words of N. R. Hanson, to offer a scientific explanation is to offer 'an intelligible, systematic, conceptual pattern for the observed data'. 11 'The value of this pattern lies in its capacity to unite phenomena which, without the theory, are either surprising, anomalous or wholly unnoticed'. 12 The same idea may be alternatively expressed in terms of the explanans-explanandum distinction. The pattern of scientific explanation is thus always a pattern of logical relationship between the explanans (in the form of a theoretical system) and the corresponding explanandum (in the form of the statement of more or less general relationships holding between observable properties of natural phenomena). In effect, it involves a pattern of organization of more or less general empirical statements describing observable aspects of natural phenomena in terms of theoretical systems describing unobservable aspects of natural phenomena.

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As is generally recognized, the perceptibility of classical physical theories consists in the fact that 'they describe nature by models formed analogously to things that can be perceived by the senses', is More precisely, they are perceptible in an extended sense of the term in that they can be shown to be attempted representations of non-perceptible (non-observable) physical processes in the image of the perceptible '.14 This is best illustrated by the classical planetary model of the atom, which was first proposed by Ruther. ford and later adopted by Bohr for his theory of the hydrogen spectrum.15 In the beginning Bohr 'postulated that Coulomb's law and Newton's law of motion hold for such an atomic system."16 It is clear that such a pattern of physical description at the level of atomic phenomena could have been dictated only by the perceptibility requirement through which the task of a physical theory was generally conceived to reduce all ntural phenomena 'to forces of attraction and repulsion '-i.e., to the laws of Newtonian mechanics.17 To quote Hanson: '.... the criterion for determining whether a physical theory was causal or mechanical was whether it could be pictured '.18 In this way, in classical physics, describability came to be identified with picturability or perceptibility.19

The violation, in modern physics, of the perceptibility requirement and a consequent adoption of a non-classical pattern of physical description is beautifully illustrated by the modern elementary particle theory, whose equations do not lend themselves to any mechanical model on classical lines. For in this theory "phenomena are 'encountered' which are neither causal, nor picturable, nor even mechanical in any classical sense."²⁰

Einstein's general relativity theory provides an equally, interesting example. Thus, like a photon or an electron, Einstein's finite, spherical (and hence non-Euclidean) universe, whose properties can be accurately described mathematically, cannot be represented by a model in terms of familiar, perceptible objects of ordinary experience. This is so precisely because this theory employs a group of gravitation laws which describe the field properties of the space-time continuum, and which violate the perceptibility requirement.²¹

An interesting example of a rather general violation of the perceptibility requirement is provided by the unifying field concept

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and the field laws of science. The field concept was first introduced into physics when Michael Faraday proposed an alternative formulation of Coulomb's law of electrostatic force in terms of the concept of the electric field.²² In physics, such a conceptual innovation became necessary in order to explain diverse phenomena of so-called action-at-a-distance, which, as was realised, could not he subjected to a mechanistic explanation.²³ The departure from the classical pattern of physical description and a gradual geometriration of physics on the pattern of Einstein's general relativity theory, both the processes were initiated through this conceptual innovation. As is generally true of all non-mechanistic explanation, physical explanation in terms of fields is possible only by violating the classical perceptibility requirement. To different types of forces that are known to physics there correspond physical fields which are vector quantities and hence measurable with respect to their direction, strength, etc. But it must be admitted that they are essentially non-perceptible in character; although it is still customary in physics text-books to associate with fields of various type pictorial models/visualizations in terms of the socalled lines of force.24

This situation in modern physics permits a generalization over all other branches of science including social sciences. For the current scene in these sciences seems to be set for conceptual innovations more or less on the pattern of modern physics. Recent attempts to employ the field concept in developmental biology, e.g., should be of great philosophical interest in this context.²⁵ In general, the current scientific scene seems to be witnessing an increasing involvement of science with the problem of explaining phenomena of organized complexity, which are describable only in terms of non-classical concepts of systems-behaviour, multivariable interaction, organization, self-regulation, feedback control, and the like. Such phenomena are exemplified by natural systems ranging from atoms, through biological organisms to psycho-social systems of different orders of organized complexity.

The situation, it would seem, could not have for long been other than what it is now. Indeed it turns out that the essential nature or role of scientific explanation has no necessary connection whatever with imperatives of the type formulated by the perceptibility requirement. Incorporation of such an imperative into the

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foundations of classical physics can be traced to a certain confusion rather than any warranted considerations concerning scientific explanation. It may thus be admitted that 'only when the quest for picturability ended was the essence of explanation within all natural philosophy laid bare'.²⁶

IV. Perceptibility Requirements as a Pragmatical Imperative

From the viewpoint of modern semiotic analysis it is worth while to look at the structures of classical and modern physics afresh. First of all, it is noteworthy that classical physics as a semantical structure came into being by way of a divergence from and not by way of an extension of, Aristotelian physics on the one hand and the ordinary thing-language27 on the other. It is this divergence which accounts for the distinct and relatively independent semantical structure of classical physics. Thus the type of physical processes, magnitudes, relations and forces which the theories like Newtonian mechanics and Maxwell's electrodynamics admitted to explain observable properties of physical phenomena can have no place whatever in the semantical structure of the descriptive framework either of Aristotelian physics or of ordinary thing language.28 Revolutionary conceptual innovations of modern physics involve still more interesting strides in the direction of a progressive divergence-shift in respect of its semantical as well as pragmatical structure.

Again, it is a distinguishing feature of classical physics that, in spite of its relatively independent semantical structure, it borrowed its pragmatical matrix in large measure from the obeservationally committed descriptive framework of Aristotelian physics.²⁹ The latter may reasonably be regarded as an extension of the descriptive framework of the ordinary observational thing language and hence as embodying a far stronger version of the perceptibility requirement. We may now turn to a discussion of his requirement itself.

The classical perceptibility requirement assumes quite dogmatically that the 'non-observable' or the 'non-perceptible' as postulated by a physical theory 'must have, at least basically, the same properties as the objects of perception'. This shows that this requirement is bound to conflict with the general pattern of scientific explanation considered above. Rendered in precise

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semiotic terms, it expresses a pragmatical imperative which requires the semantical structure of a physical theory to be embedded in a pragmatical matrix of the type that operated most uncritically in Aristotelian physics and that is also in a sense characteristic of the ordinary observational thing-language. In effect, it requires the semantical structure of a physical theory to be determined or restricted according to a certain pragmatical matrix dogmatically assumed from the very beginning. In doing so it assumes mistakenly a certain logical order of precedence of the pragmatical matrix over the semantical structure of a physical theory. It is not surprising to see how this assumption gives rise to another equally mistaken assumption that the relationship of inseparability holding between a theory in the making and its natural pragmatical context extends upto its semantical/methodological contexts of description, explanation and theory-testing. Whatever may be the detailed nature of the underlying reasons in classical physics, such assumptions do not find any place in modern physics.

Both 'observability' and 'perceptibility' are in their usual and present senses pragmatical terms which are applicable to complex situations involving an intimate interplay between concepts/ theories and their authors/users including their performances in applying them to concrete suituations. Such situations of interaction between a language and its users are clearly of primary interest only to pragmatics and therefore demand pragmatical analysis. It is true that such situations of interaction invariably accompany those situations in which language is employed for purely theoretical purposes of description and explanation. But, from the point of view of semiotic analysis it is of crucial importance that relations governing the pragmatical aspects of such situations are not extended to or confused with those that govern their semantical aspects, and vice-versa.

It may be more clear now that to require a physical concept or a theory to be perceptible in the extended sense considered before and to do so without necessary qualification is to commit the error of requiring the semantical structure of the throy to be determined according to an assumed pragmatical imperative, which in the present case is borrowed from Aristotelian observational physics. It is also clear that such an imperative derives its

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apparent plausibility from the unstated, mistaken assumptions that (a) the pragmatical matrix of a physical theory must enjoy an overall logical precedence and dominance over its semantical structure, with the latter always embedded in the former in a crucial manner; and (b) the relations true of the former must also hold true of the latter.

The classical perceptibility requirement stands exposed now as a pragmatical imperative borrowed from Aristotelian physics and extended from its appropriate pragmatical domain to that of semantics. The relevance of such an imperative and some of its accompanying assumptions to psychologically investigative, inventive or creative situations is not so much in doubt. Relations true of such situations of interaction provide whatever justification is possible for it. But these pragmatical relations have no relevance whatever to contexts of scientific description, explanation and theory-testing. The pragmatical elements usually accompanying such contexts are a matter of contingent fact and hence dispensable in principle. The replacement of the human performer of these essentially non-pragmatical contexts by a sophisticated machine with all the desirable devices for it to operate is at least conceivable.³¹

That in classical physics the semantical and methodological questions concerning physical theory were frequently mixed up with the pragmatical ones is amply evident from the dogmatic manner in which it was subjected to a pragmatical imperative by requiring it to be perceptible. Non-perceptibility of modern physical theory can be explained only as a consequence of a rejection of this imperative in favour of an alternative which is appropriate to the general logical pattern of scientific explanation. In modern physics, the proper placing of the prgamatical and semantical appropriate of the proper placing of the proper placing of the proper place o tical aspects of a physical theory has become more necessary than ever before. The very idea of physical theory without perceptibility is instructive in instructive in the perception of bility is instructive in pointing to a general methodological rule that whatever may be the natural prgamatical setting of a scientific theory (in the making), its semantical structure cannot be, without serious error, required to be determined or restricted according to the essential features of that setting.

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PHYSICAL THEORY WITHOUT PRAGMATICAL IMPERATIVES

V. Operationism, Empiricism and Alternative Pragmatical

In this century, the most interesting attempt ever made to embed physical theory in imperatives of a pragmatical kind is Bridgman's 'operationsim as advanced in his Logic of Modern Physics (1927). It is necessary to note that Bridgman never intended his doctrine in the sense of a prgamatical imperative. 'Historically', writes Frederick Suppe, 'the operational imperative was introduced to explain how theories legitimately could employ parameters which could not be directly observed or measured, and how theories describing phenomena in terms of such parameters could be tested and confirmed observationally'. 32

On Bridgman's own formulation, operationism requires the meaning of a physical concept to be specifiable in terms of the 'operations' which the physicist performs in applying the concept to a concrete situation; 'the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations'. The operational implications of a concept that are required to define its meaning are conceived of as involving an indispensable human performer of the operations. Thus, assuming explicit definition in terms of observables of some suitable kind to be the only legitimate method of introducing non-observable, theoretical concepts into science, operationsim requires the observables in question to the 'operational' in character.

The resulting pragmatical character of the operational imperative is open to the criticism that it seeks to absorb the semantics of aphysical theory into its pragmatics.³⁴ Here it is relevent to mention a more recent observation on the nature of the operational imperative by F. Suppe, who writes: '... the operational imperative is a prescriptive thesis about formulations of theories which implies restrictions on the sorts of theories science may employ'.³⁵ Other recent criticisms showing that operationism does not serve the purpose for which it was originally introduced do not concern us

What is true of operationism can be shown to be equally true of the more general principle of contemporary logical empiricism. Like the former, the latter was also intended as a semantical imperative requiring the restriction of the semantical structure of the language of empirical science in accordance with the empiricist

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criterion of empirical significance.³⁷ The problem of accounting for the empirical significance and testability of scientific theories employing non-observable, theoretical parameters was construed as a problem of restricting these theories to those that would satisfy the empiricist criterion. In their turn, successive formulations of the empiricist criterion all sought to solve essentially a semantical problem by invoking pragmatical imperatives in terms of the pragmatical concepts of verifiability and observability.

Rejection of operationism and the principle of empiricism as pragmatical imperatives is warranted by the same considerations as warrant the rejection of the classical perceptibility requirement. For, as their analysis reveals, each invokes a pragmatical imperative to restrict the semantical structure of scientific theories in a crucial, though dogmatic, manner. Each is bound to prevent rather than promote the progress of conceptual innovation in science.

Two questions arise at this point for further consideration:
(i) What is the proper place or role, if any, of pragmatical imperatives in science?; and (ii) What other pragmatical imperatives appropriate to the nature of modern physical theory may be admitted to replace in some sense the ones that must be rejected? To take the latter question first, there are reasons to ansewer in the affirmative. Violation of a particular pragmatical imperative must sooner or later lead to some alternative or another. For a physical theory or a scientific theory in general cannot be denied its pragmatical setting involving distinct pragmatical relations between it and its authors and users.

In his Principles of Quantum Mechanics (1930) P.A.M. Dirac suggested the 'extending' of the meaning of the word 'picture' include 'any way of looking at the fundamental laws which makes their self-consistency obvious'. When he made this suggestion, he had in mind the laws of the quantum theory which violate the pragmatical imperatives of the type considered above. On this suggestion, then, to acquire a 'picture' of atomic phenomena is to acquire a sufficient degree of 'familiarization' with the laws of this theory in Dirac's sense. It seems that the point of this valuable suggestion can be appreciated better if it is interpreted as attempted replacement of the older pragmatical imperatives by an alternative which is appropriate to the nature of modern physical

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theory. For, it may be argued, any way of looking at the laws of the quantum theory which makes their self-consistency obvious will be essentially a non-classical way of the required familiarization process. Dirac's suggestion may thus be reformulated in the form of a pragmatical imperative requiring the structure of a physical theory to be susceptible to a familiarization process in the sense of Dirac.

It is of some interest to compare this formulation with the usual formulations of the classical perceptibility requirement whose essential pragmatical character remained almost burried under the confusion characteristic of classical physics—the confusion between the pragmatical and semantical aspects of physical theory. This may explain why it was always invoked in the non-pragmatical contexts of physical explanation and theory—testing. It is clear that the only legitimate aim of introducing such a requirement could have been the familiarization process in a much stronger sense than Dirac's. But this is precisely what was lost sight of by its staunchest advocates within science. Operationsim and the principles of contemporary logical empiricism both repeat the same mistakes all over again.

We may now turn to the more general question of the proper place of pragmatical imperatives in science.

VI. Consequences for Science and Philosophy

In the light of the general pattern of scientific explanation considered above it is clear that the pragmatical imperatives of the perceptibility requirement, operationism and the principle of empiricism all put physical science into fetters. For each seeks to restrict the type of theory which physical science may employ for purposes of explanation. In each case, the principle according to which this restriction is sought to be effected turns out to be essentially an imperative of a pragmatical kind. It would thus seem that at present, Dirac's pragmatical imperative provides the most liberal and suitable alternative to them.

The non-perceptibility of modern physical theory together with its mathematical character is an important advance in the growth of scientific methodology, at least from the viewpoint of the kind of objectivity science generally aims at.⁴⁰ The revo-

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lution in physics in this century would not have been possible without violating the classical perceptibility requirement. The situation in modern physics is thus instructive in that it throws some valuable light on the nature of pragmatical imperatives and their place in empirical science. It cannot be denied that pragmatical and extra-pragmatical imperatives are always in operation in a science. But it is mistaken to suppose that the former enjoy any logical precedence or dominance over the latter, as was supposed in classical physics. Thus the situation in modern physics warrants the view that : (a) the proper function of pragma tical imperatives is to take care of the pragmtaical relations that emerge after a more or less confirmed, newly discovered theory sets a fresh and useful pattern of explanation for some set of problematic phenomena; and (b) the development and formulation of such imperatives must take into account, and proceed in ways appropriate to, the semantical structure of the new theory. On this view, pragmatical imperatives are relative to the general scene of semantical relations41 characteristic of a particular field of science at a given time and not vice-versa. They are thus variable with variations taking place in this scene. Both (a) and (b) seem to be satisfied by Dirac's pragmatical imperative as reformulated above.

The consequences of our discussion for philosophy seem equally interesting. Historically, there has been an intimate conncetion between epistemology on the one hand and the pragmatical imperatives of the type expressed by the classical perceptibility requirement and operationsim on the other. From the customary formulations and discussions of the problems of knowledge it is quite clear that, whatever may be their major differences, philo sophers of both rationalist and empiricist traditions employ a common concept of epistemology. Thus epistemology is invariably conceived of subjectivistically by formulating its central problems in pragmatical terms like 'experience', 'perception', 'belief', 'reason', 'doubt', 'certainty', 'intuition' and so on endless! In this way epistemology has remained tied to the pragmatical aspects of the theoretical use of language even to this day. matical imperatives operating in empirical science from time to time have had their own share of contribution in reinforcing the subjectivist tradition in subjectivist tradition in epistemology. This is clearly illustrated by epistemologies associated and a subjectivist tradition in epistemology. by epistemologies associated with the eighteenth century British

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PHYSICAL THEORY WITHOUT PRAGMATICAL IMPERATIVES

empiricism on the one hand and contemporary operationism and logical empiricism on the other.

With the changed situation in modern physics, the philosophical implications of science generally turn out to be of a non-classical nature. Whatever may be their historical interest and importance, the classical empiricist and rationalist theories of knowledge have no relevance whatever to the contemporary scene. Modern physical science set the scene for a complete break with classical epistemology which has concentrated on the pragmatical aspects of the theoretical use of language. Such a changeover entails its replacement by an objectivist epistemology which would instead concentrate on the semantics and methodology of science. Important beginnings, forming an important part of contemporary philosophy of science, have already been made in this direction. It must be recognized that the credit for preluding the departure from classical epistemology goes in large measure to modern physical theory.

VII. Conclusion

Imperatives requiring empirical science to employ one type of theory rather than another have always accompanied the body of general assumptions with which it, as a rule, operates from time to time. The variety of these imperatives is evident from the fact that they range from general requirements of a pragmatical and semantical kind to those of a methodological kind. Depending on the specific complexity of the subject-matter and the degree of theoretical organization characteristic of a science at a given time, some of these imperatives may vary from one field of science to another. It is not surprising that the rate and direction of the growth of the system of scientific knowledge should in large measure depend on the specific nature of these imperatives and their effectiveness in actual scientific research. What seems to have escaped notice, however, is the fact that powerful hindrances in the way of this growth have often arisen from within science through dogmatic elements operating in the guise of these very imperatives. The reason why this has actually been so with science (e.g., classical physics) may plausibly be sought in the fact that there is always the possibility of confusion between dogma and legitimate imperatives of science on the one hand and between

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type-distinct imperatives of science on the other. Such a situation clearly warrants a detailed philosophical study of the nature of such imperatives and their respective legitimate roles in empirical science. The main purpose of such a study must be the development of a general theory of imperatives, which would enable one to distinguish improper imperatives from imperatives which are proper to science.

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G. L. Pandit

NOTES

1. Cf. K. Menger, "Modern Geometry and the theory of Relativity", in P. A. Schilpp (ed.) Albert Einstein: Philosopher Scientist, New York, 2nd ed., pp. 464-65.

2. Cf. W. Heitler, "The Departure from Classical Thought in Modern Physics", op. cit., p. 181.

& H. Reichenbach, "The Philosophical Significance of the Theory of Relativity", op. cit., pp. 293-95.

3. Cf. D. Bohm, Causality And Chance in Modern Physics, London, 1957, pp. 68-69.

& A. Eddington, The Philosophy of Physical Science, Cambridge University Press, 1949, pp. 63-64, 90-94.

4. The former requires science to employ mutually inconsistent theories simultaneously as a means to promote the discovery of ever better alternatives to the existing theories in different fields. Whereas, the latter 'demands that at any time only a single set of mutually consistent theories be used'. For details see P. K. Feyerabend, "Problems of Empiricism", in R. G. Colodny (ed.) Beyond the Edge of Certainty, Prentice-Hall, INC., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965, pp. 149-153.

5. See E. L. Hill, "Quantum Physics and the Relativity Theory", in H. Feigl, et al. (eds.) Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science, Holl, Rinehart and Winston, 1961, pp. 429-30.

& N. R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, The Scientific Book Guild, 1962, p. 126.

6. N. R. Hanson, Ibid., p. 91.

7. See: *Ibid.*, p. 91
& A. Einstein and L. Infeld, *The Evolution of Physics*, ^{2nd ed,}
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1961, pp. 152-53.

8. Cf. N. R. Hanson, Ibid., pp. 119, 126.

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9. See R. Carnap, Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications, New York, 1958, pp. 78-79.

& C. W. Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs, University of Chicago Press, 1938.

10. Cf. N. R. Hanson, op. cit., pp. 119, 121.

11. Ibid., p. 121.

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12. Ibid., pp. 121-122.

13. See C. F. V. Weizsacker, *The World View of hysics*, (Transl. by Majorie Grene), London, 1952, pp. 13, 29-31, 93.

14. Cf. Ibid., p. 30.

15. For details see F. W. Constant, Fundamental Laws of Physics, London, 1963, pp. 69, 311.

16. Ibid., p. 311.

17. Cf. N. R. Hanson, op. cit., p. 91.

18. Ibid., p. 91

19. Ibid., p. 91.

20. Ibid., p. 92; See also W. Heisenberg, "Fundamental Problems of Present-day Atomic Physics", in P. P. Wiener (ed.) Readings in Philosophy of Science, New York, 1953, pp. 91, 96.

21. See A. Einstein, *Relativity* (Transl. by R. W. Lawson), Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1960, pp. 108, 113-114; E. Whittaker, *From Euclid to Eddington*, Cambridge, 1949, pp. 10, 116-17, 188.

22. See F. W. Constant, op. cit. p. 204.

.3. See Ibid., p. 204; A. Einstein and L. Infeld, op. cit., pp. 151, 244.

24. For example, the lines of force of the sun's gravitational field that is said to radiate 'out in all directions away from the sun'. See F. W. Constant, op. cit., p. 69.

25. See, e. g., C. H. Waddington; "Fields and Gradients", in Michael Locke (ed.) Major Problems in Developmental Biology. New York, London, Academic Press, 1966, pp. 105-123.

26. N. R. Hanson, op. cit., p. 126.

Meaning and Necessity, Phoenix Books, Chicago, 1956, pp. 206-208

28. Cf. P. K. Feyerabend, op. cit. pp. 155, 232-233. To quote Feyerabend (lbid., p. 155): 'Aristotelian physics is quite explicitly observational, constitutive forms of physical objects are required to be observable...The harmony'.

29. Cf. P. K. Feyerabend, *Ibid.*, pp. 155, 232.

30. Cf. C. F. v. Weizsäcker, op. cit., p. 95.

- 31. Cf. P. K. Feyerabend, "Science Without Experience", The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXVI, No. 22, Nov. 20, 1969, pp. 792.
- 32. F. Suppe, "Theories, their Formulations, And the Operational Imperative", Synthese, Vol. 25, Nos. 1/2, Nov./Dec. 1972, p. 135.
- 33. P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics, New York, 1927, p. 5.
- 34. See A. Grünbaum, "Operationism and Relativity", in P.G. Frank (ed.) The Validation of Scientific Theories, New York, 1961, pp. 83-91.
 - 35. See F. Suppe, op. cit., p. 159.
 - 36. See, e. g., Ibid., pp. 129-164.
- 37. For example, Carnap's ("Testability and Meaning", Phllosophy of Science, Vol. III. 1936 and Vol. IV, 1937) explicit reformulation of the principle of empiricism as a general requirement precisely in this sense is noteworthy. See R. Carnap, Testability and Meaning, New Haven, Connecticut, 1954, Part IV, p. 33.
- 38. P.A.M. Dirac, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics. revised, 4th ed., Oxford, 1958, p. 10.
 - 39. Cf. Ibid., p. 10.
- 40. Cf. M. Born, Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance, New York, 1964. p. 214.
- 41. For a recent provoking theory of these semantical relations See F Suppe, op. cit., pp. 136-144.
- 42. For an excellent discussion of the problem of 'subjectivist's objectivist epistemology' see K. R. Popper, "Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject", in B. V. Rootsellaar, et. al., (eds.) Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science III, Amsterdam, 1968.

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SANKAR'S DOCTRINE OF ADHYASA: DIFFICULTIES OF PROPOSITIONAL SYMBOLISM

The doctrine of Adhyasa is a logical doctrine and not a psychohoical one. The error that is discussed here is logical and not nsychological. In this logical doctrine, Sankara wishes to point out that the logical subject and the logical predicate belong to two different categories with distinct and opposite characteristics and their coupling in propositional symbolism is logically unsound. Ignorance of the category difference between the two leads to this kind of coupling in propositional form. In the propositional symbolism such as 'A is B', 'I am a Brahmin', 'This is a rope', the subject is a unique particular and the predicate is either a sortal universal (visaya) or a characterizing universal (vişayasya Dharmah). In every proposition, a particular is collected under a universal either of the sortal type or of a characterising type as this is a rope or this is strong. But there is a type difference between the particular and the universal of either the sortal type or of the characterising type.

The particular (visayee) to which a visaya is attributed or predicated is self complete whereas the universal is dependent and incomplete to that extent. We are never mistaken about the particular but there is always a possibility of bieng mistaken in respect of the universal. Every judgment is corrigible in respect of the predicate that is asserted of the particular. judging a thing as of this or that sort the possibility of misjudging can never be ruled out. But the particular which is being judged is never infected by this possibility at all. In this respect, the Particular is real (satya) and for this very reason the universal is the opposite of it namely unreal (Anruta). In the proposition sition this is a cow' or 'I am a Brahmin' the particular signified by the hed by the subject expression is firmly rooted in fact. If the speaker are subject expression is firmly rooted in fact. speaker and the hearer do not know what is the point of reference there is no judgment at all. They are never mistaken as to what the thing is they are referring to. But in judging it to be a cow, the asserter might be making a mistake. 'Is a cow' or

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'am a Brahmin' are not complete expressions. Further these expressions can appear only in assertive style in a propositional context, whereas expressions like 'this', 'that', '1' can function independently outside the assertive context. Subject expressions in this sense introduce particulars which have a kind of independent existence which is absent in the case of universals introduced by the predicate expressions. Being a cow does not carry the existential import which always attaches to the partcular introduced by the subject expression. For this reason Strawson following Frege calls the particular as saturated and universals as unsaturated. When something is judged as a conit may not be a cow. In this respect, the universals are free floating. The introduction of the universal does not carry the supposition that it is instantiated. But the instance which we are trying to judge as of this or that sort is there identified both by the speaker and the hearer. Because of this type difference between the two, according to Sankara, this coupling in any judge mental or propositional form is a case of logical error. (Mithyell Bhavitum Yuktam). The falsity or (Mithyatva) that is pointed out here is logical and not factual. The universal is not of the same sort as the particular and their coupling in the propositional context is non-relational This is the reason why Sankara denies the reality of the relation of inherence (Samavaya).

Sankara's rejection of the notion of inherence is not point less. If the universal were inseparably related with the particular there will be no occasion for our coupling them in an illogical way. Elements of thought which are distinct and different should not be coupled. If we do couple them we land out selves in illogicality. Vivarana Prameya Samgraha points out that different things cannot be combined as a matter of fact with out producing non-sense. Nobody would say that a cow is a Similarly where there is no difference there is no point in identifying. It makes no sense to say that this is this, elements of thought this is this, elements of thought which are distinct may be combined in thought or in judge. thought or in judgment which is called identity in difference (Tādātmya Adhyasa) (Tādātmya Adhyasa). So if the two elements of the judgements were already inspected in were already inseparable in judgement there is no point in coupling them in judgement there is no point in the coupling them in judgement there is no point in the coupling them in judgement there is no point in the coupling them in judgement there is no point in the coupling them in judgement there is no point in the coupling them in judgement there is no point in the coupling them in judgement there is no point in the coupling them in judgement there is no point in the coupling them in judgement there is no point in the coupling them in judgement there is no point in the coupling them in judgement there is no point in the coupling them in judgement there is no point in the coupling them in judgement there is no point in the coupling them in judgement there is no point in the coupling them in judgement there is no point in the coupling them in judgement the coupling the coupling the coupling them in judgement the coupling t coupling them in judgmental form and since we do couple them we have to admit that the we have to admit that there exists no inseparable relation between

the two. Nyāya admits the idea of inseparable relation in judgmental symbolism and Sankara rejects the idea of inseparable relation because he has reasons to find fault with judgemental symbolism. So what Nyāya is asserting and what the Vedānta is denying is logical entities and not factual entities. They do not assert that inseparable relation is or is not an article or furniture of the earth. Nyāya asserts that the category of inseparable relation has got to be admitted since the predicate rightly belongs to the subject. Similarly, Sankara asserts that the category of inseparable relation cannot be accepted as there is no necessity for it because what is signified by the predicate expression can in no circumstances belong to what is signified by the subject expression. Before leaving this point, I wish to draw the attention of the readers to a point which is worth noticing. Professor D. M. Datta in his book 'The Six Ways of Knowing' says that according to the Advaitins all propositions are relational (Samsargavagahi). He wishes to point out that Russell's claim that overlooking the distinctive character of relational propositions and accepting the universality of the subject predicate ones leads to absolutism is not correct. According to Prof. Datta even though the Vedantins accept that all propositions are relational yet it establishes an absolutism far more radical than the West. But it is evident that Prof. Datta has made a mistake. To characterise judgements as Samsargavagahi is not to characterise them as relational. Samsarga means, to be in contact to be brought to be existing together. It signifies the conjoining or coupling of elements of opposite character which is the same thing as non-relational tie. It signifies tying together what are not related. So according to Samkara and his followers all propositions are due to a coupling of a logical predicate to a logical subject. For the Vedantins, not all propositions are relational but none is. Every proposition is for the Vedantin of the subject predicate type.

The assertive tie is a non-relational tie. To say that it is a non-relational tie is to say that universals are not like caps or straight-jackets made to fit into one particular as opposed to another. Their very essence consists in their capacity to be applied in any instance does not carry the implication of being uniquely

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fitting into the instance at hand and not being mistakenly or loosely being fitted in. Their open texture rules out the possibility of unique possession. For this reason, Wittgenstein so characteristically pointed out that language was never designed to reveal the form of reality. In this respect and for this matter every synthetic jugdgment is corrigible in character. This corrigibility is due to the open texture of the predicate expression and not due to unmistakable self complete and saturated particular introduced by the subject expression. Every judgment contains two elements of opposite character, an existent and a non-existent, a real and non-real coupled together. (Satyanrute Mithuhi Krutya) in a non-relational manner.

All propositions including those which are counted as true and those which are counted as false at the factual level are based on a logical error which Sankara names as Adhyasa. Adhyasa in the context of Sankara Vedanta stands for the logical error of coupling two different elements of thought with categorial differences of fundamental type in case of all predication involving an ascription of either a sortal or a characterising universal to a particular which is its locus. The opponent points out that right judgments like "The animal before me is a cow", will be a case of logical error according to the definition given by Sankara. To this, Vachaspati replies that the Vedanta doctrine of logical which are correct error condemns equally these judgments judgments, those that are called incorrect ones. A logical distinction cuts across and goes deeper than the ordinary distinction of right and wrong judgments. A judgment which states a fact is called true and a judgment which does not state a fact is called false. But every judgment whether true or false in combining two elements which cannot and should not be combined be combined by bined becomes on that account logically erroneous. It does not mean superimposition of one object upon another like placing a piece of silver on a shell or a snake upon a rope. Tradition in rendering Adhyasa as superimposition is carried away by the example used in the Vedanta literature of shell silver or rope snake illusion. Since a man who mistakes a shell for a piece of silver is in actual of silver is in actual case of illusion, traditional interpreters have understood the doctrine of Adhyasa as a doctrine of illusion.

But Sankara and him But Sankara and his contemporaries have used these examples

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as illustrative of a logical point and nothing else. They are not discussing it at the factual level but by way of illustrating what they mean by logical error. They wish to point out by the use of these examples how a predicate may be misapplied but never to assert that every body does misapply whenever he applies a predicate in actual case. That Sankara is only concerned with pointing out the logical relation among concepts or ideas and not with discussions of matters of fact is clear from the first part of the first sentence of his doctrine of Adhyasa which reads as follows. "The sphere of the application of ideas of subject and objects are mutually exclusive as those of light and darkness and any coupling of them is ruled out by the settled points of logic.." In this context one has simply to point out that to mistake a logical doctrine of a philosopher for a factual doctrine is to do maximum disservice to philosophy. A philosopher is concerned only with making logical points and he is not busy with detecting factual cases either of this world or of any other world. Metaphysics even in the days of Sankara was openly and avowedly concerned with linguistic and logical analysis—analysis of logical concepts or mapping out the entire conceptual frame work and with nothing else. Sankara's doctrine of Adhyasa preaches a philosophy of language and not an account of the illusory character of the world in which we live, move and have our being. This doctrine is a case of revisionary metaphysics and not a descriptive one, a distinction validly pointed out by Strawson in contemporary philosophy.

When pressed to state his new doctrine of predication involving the corrigibility of every judgment on account of the unstable character or the floating nature of universals Sankara states his position as thus; 'A judgment is like a memory but is not exactly a case of memory. In the case of a judgment we apply concepts to present case on the assumption of its similarity to other members of the class signified by the concept. Every judgment, therefore, while judging a thing to be of a sort carries the possibility of having misjudged it. This statement only signifies that universals are of a free floating character and that single-signifies that universals are of a free floating character and that since they are capable of being applied to different instances on different occasions they are capable of being applied both rightly and wrongly. In other words, this statement signifies

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that predicates in our language are not straight jacket. Because of their loose fitting character they may get attached to a body to which they do not fit. The statement by no stretch of imagi. nation can be construed to assert that there is only one thing ie a Brahman whereas we the human mortals of the earth are in a perpetual state of illusion falsely believing that there are many things when actually there is only one thing on earth Sankara's statement only asserts that merely apprehending a particular, i.e., the point of reference of the subject expression there is no possibility of error. But in judging this as of this or that sort of having this or that characteristics we land ourselves in the land of mistakability or falsifiability. It is 50 because there is a type difference, a category difference between the particular and the universal. The logical error to which he draws our attention and which is involved in every case of predication is due to our ignorance of fundamental difference between two logical categories of the logical subject and the logical predicate; the particular and the universal. The two categories are of opposite character and when we couple them in a judgmental form we apply the character of one to another to which it cannot belong. Here we agree with Sankara that there is a category difference between the particular and the universal; we also agree that the particular is saturated in the way the universal is not, that the one is complete and the other is incomplete and further that one carries existential implication while the other does not. We further agree that being a Brahmin cannot significantly occur except in combination with particulars like Deva Datta in a propositional context. But the particular Deva Datta can occur in many other contexts in addition to judge mental or propositional context.

We agree with Sankara that the category difference between the particular and the universal is fundamental. The manner of the occurrence of the particular is different from the manner of the occurrence of the universal. Logicians have raised a doubt as to the validity of this distinction. In the proposition, Datta is wise' these logicians point out that there is no reason to suppose that Deva Datta is the particular to which the universal wisdom is attributed. According to these logicians, this proposition is an assertion about Deva Datta as much as it is about

SANKAR'S DOCTRINE OF ADHYASA

wisdom. The proposition may be validly taken to imply that wisdom is instantiated in Deva Datta. According to them, wisdom, therefore, is the subject of which it is said that it is instantiated in Deva Datta logically speaking. We do not have valid ground to hold that, Deva Datta is the particular and wisdom is the universal which is ascribed to it. In this rendering, there is no difference between wisdom and Deva Datta. Both the things are self-complete. No one can be said to be dependent upon the other. But as Strawson points out, this argument is invalid. If I say that wisdom is instantiated in Deva Datta, wisdom still occurs as the universal and Deva Datta as the particular. Wisdom still becomes the principle of collecting individuals of like nature as will be seen from the list of following propositions. Wisdom is instantiated in Deva Datta, wisdom is instantiated in Vishnu Datta. So when the question of occurrence is discussed, the reference is not to the grammatical occurrence of the expression but to the logical occurrence of it. Wisdom may appear to be the grammatical subject in these sentences but at the level of logic and meaning, it occurs as universal, the principle of collection of particulars, not as a particular. If the logician is concerned with grammar at all, he is concerned with depth grammar. In all these propositions, Deva Datta, Vishnu Datta etc. are the particulars to which the universal wisdom is attributed. So we have no option but to agree with Sankara that the distinction between the particular and the universal is a valid one and can never occur except as being dependent on or attributed to particular. The particular has a kind of independence which the universal does not possess and the universal has a kind of dependence which does not inhere in the particular. Strawson rightly points out that the distinction between the logical subject and the logical predicate is of a fundamental character and can on no account be blamed or overlooked. This point has been more clearly and forcefully elaborated by the author of the Vivarana Prameya Samgraha in the following way. The universal either of the sortal or of the characterising type is a mere idea, a meaning cut loose from concrete fact where as the 'that' of which it is predicated is real and is rooted in fact. So even when you reformulate the judgment so as to mean that the particular is a predicated is real and is rooted in fact. cular is attributed to the universal by putting the universal in the subject place and the particular in the predicate place as in the

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Deva eason niver proabout case, a goat is this; what is signified by a goat is a mere idea, a meaning a (Kalpanā). Your regarding the subject as the predicate does not make it so. (Yadyapyātmānatman-oranyenya sminnyonye Tādātmyādhyasaḥ Samanstathapyatmanah samsrustarupenaibādhyase na svarupeneti satyatvam).

In Vedantic language, the universal cannot exist except in the locus. In the two correcting and corrected judgments like 'this is silver' and 'this is shell' both the predicates depend upon and exist as being attached to the locus 'this'. The Vedānta Paribhāsā, a later work in this field, rightly points out that the universals like being silver and being a shell are of the same type (Sama Sattāka) and both of them are different from the particular 'this' being of a different nature. (Visam Sattāka) The replacement of one universal by the other does signify a change (Parinama) but their change in no way affects the particular or is only apparent change (Vivarta). To a possible objection that if the correcting cognition namely being a shell is validly ascribed to a particular 'this' the corrected cognition of being a silver could not be ascribed to the same locus, the author replies by saying that he is not concerned with the question of which cognition is correct and which cognition is incorrect as a matter of fact. He is only interested in making the logical point that both the cognitions are of a dependent character and that they cannot occur except as being attributed to a particular and further that the substitutability of one predicate for another shows where corrigibility lies and where it does not lie. A change in the significance of a proposition is due to the dependent character of one part and not due to the other element which is self complete and remains unaffected and does not contribute to this change. This is colourfully expressed in the Vedanta literature that Brahman does not undergo any real modification.

That Sankara is interested in making a logical point and not a factual one becomes clear from another line of discussion which occurs in the same doctrine of Adhyasa. A conscientious objector points out that illusions occur only in the case of perceptible objects. One may mistakenly identify a rope which is present before him as a snake. But there can be not illusion in respect of imperceptible object like the self (Pratyagatman). To this, Sankara replies that there is no such scope

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sense repro in my discussion that only a perceptible object may mistakenly be identified. My discussion does not relate to actual cases of illusion in which one object is mistaken for another. Mine is a logical distinction of a thing of one category being attributed to a thing of another category for do we not attribute the dimness of the earth to the ether which is imperceptible? I am only saying that whenever a predicate is attributed to a subject of whatever kind there is a logical error. Because subject and predicate are of different sorts. In saying that I am a Brāhmin, I am attributing the sortal universal of being a Brāhmin to a particular designated by the expression 'I' and this sort of ascription of a universal to a particular, a principle of collection to what is collected, an incomplete entity to a self-complete one is logically erroneous.

Of course; Sankara does not regard proper names like Deva Datta as suitable expressions for introducing a particular. For him unmistakability is the most essential criterion for regarding something as the particular and proper names like Deva Datta do not carry this mark. In the statement Deva Datta is a Brahmin there might arise a mistake both with regard to the thing identified and what is ascribed to it. The person before me may not be Deva Datta and he may not also be a Brahmin. So in such statement the distinction between the particular and the universal, the logical subject and the logical predicate is rather blurred. Sankara, therefore, chooses to classify ordinary proper names along with class names or common names. For him this', 'that' and 'I' are the only proper names in the logical sense. They alone can be regarded as logical proper names because there we can never be mistaken. In their case use and unmistakable use coincide. They can never be used except correctly or rightly used. Conditions of use and conditions of right use are identical. One cannot occur without the other Occurring at the same time. One can doubt whether what one is identifying as Deva Datta is really Deva Datta. But one can dever doubt whether the 'this' is the 'this' or anything else and whether the 'this' is the 'this' or anything else and whether the 'I' is the 'I'. Ganeswar Mishra is not alive makes sense but I' is the 'I'. sense but 'I am not alive' does not, except as a joke or as a self

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So far Sankara is giving only a description of the manner of occurring and the functional difference between the two cale. gories but immediately after this he enters upon the role of a revisionary metaphysician in declaring that the two can never be coupled without violation of the rules of logic. Particulars like 'Deva Datta' and 'this' or 'that' or 'I' may occur independently outside the judgmental context. But in the judge mental context they seek their fulfilment looking for a predicate, When I assert that Deva Datta is lame, the assertion is about Deva Datta and not about universal lameness. In this respect Deva Datta is the subject, the locus, (Adhisthana) of being lame What is signified by being lame has a dependent character. Particulars are granted a status in our conceptual system which is not granted to what is asserted of them. But from this it does not follow that they cannot be combined in propositional symbolism. Corrigibility of judgment is in the sphere of predicate expressions. Their misapplicability in particular instances does not involve a whole sale condemnation of them at all. The logical error which Sankara points out in the case of predication is itself, therefore, erroneous.

Having made the mistaken point that the particular that we introduce in our judgment are bare particulars with which no universal can be coupled Sankara now embarks upon a whole sale revision of our conceptual system. He recognises like Strawson that persons are basic particulars for explaining and making intelligible a large number of particulars of a secondary nature like knowledge, perception, inference, etc. but he imme diately declares that this concept is a hybrid one and so all the secondary concepts which are to be made intelligible by the help of this concept are not intelligible at all. A person like myself and Deva Datta can know a thing by perception through the help of senses. He can make inferences about the existence of fire in the hill from the presence of the smoke in the hill provided the is a consent. he is a concerete person continuing in space and time and that the hill is a motorial in • the hill is a material body located at a particular point of space and continuing for a located at a particular point of space and continuing for a located at a particular point of space and continuing for a located at a particular point of space and time and continuing for a located at a particular point of space and time and continuing for a located at a particular point of space and time and continuing in space and time and ti and continuing for a duration of time capable of being identified and reidentified. But since according to him the mountain is located in space it is 1. located in space, it is high, tall, smoky, are illegitimate judgments and since judgments in and since judgments like 'I have eyes', 'I see him' are both

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out of a kind of ignorance of the nature of the logical subject and logical predicate, 'I know that the mountain is smoky' and I infer that the mountain is fiery' are illegitimate being vitiated by the logical error of predication, 'I see the mountain' is an illegitimate logical child and so also the cognition that the mountain is smoky and the mountain is fiery.

But since we agree with his distinction between subject and predicate but disagree with valid reasons with his conclusion that all judgments are logically erroneous we cannot accept his subsequent deduction that knower, knowledge, known, person, material bodies, inference, perception are logically untenable concepts. Sankara never asserts that our judgments are factually mistaken. He also never asserts that in fact I have no body or any one of us is in fact a Brāhmin, or lame or blind and here we cannot have any quarrel with him in this respect. He raises a logical point; part of what he asserts in the logical level is quite acceptable to us but another part which he asserts on this level is not acceptable to us. The logical subject and the logical predicate signify two moments of cognition. There is a category difference between the two in some sense. But we do not agree that they are so opposed, that they cannot be combined in any judgmental form or propositional symbolism and that every judgmental form involves a logical error.

Here Sankara appears in the role of a sceptic who is dissatisfied with combination of two cognitions of different sorts in the unity of a propositional form.

We have here only to point out that Sankara seeks to achieve what he wishes to achieve by quietly overlooking the principle which is the basis of his entire discussion. The saturated and the unsaturated character of the particular and the universal can be made clear only in the context of a propositional form. It is, therefore, illogical for Sankara to say that the two elements could not be combined in propositional symbolism. It is only their coupling in the propositional symbolism which helps us to distinguish the dependent and the independent character of the two dent or independent. If their combination illustrates their difference, it is illogical to say that such different things cannot be

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ntified ain is ments born combined. We have only to conclude that the sceptic does not deny any obvious fact but he only covertly throws over board the principle upon which he has built his castle.

Further, even though we accept that the words like 'this' 'that' and 'I' can never be misidentifyingly used it does not give them a special status, a mystifying character. Sankara is making much of what may be regarded as a trivial point. They cannot be mistakenly used because they are no part of language they are mere substitutes for the physical act of gesticulating In merely pointing at I cannot mistakenly point at. True or false, mistaken, and nonmistaken occur at the level of language and not at the level of physical gesticulation. These purch referring expressions are mere pointers since they have no descriptive content at all. They can neither be mistakenly used no correctly used for that matter. They are instruments of repre sentation but do not represent anything at all. Sankara very nearly comes to realize this point when he says that how can that by which every thing is known be known at all. They are necessary in order that we may make significant statements by means of them. But they fall outside language. Therefore, Sankara's statement that Brahman is indescribable is a mrere tautology. It only asserts that what does not belong to language cannot be described in language. In other words, it merely asserts that those words which do not have descriptive content have no descriptive content. It is logically illuminating to point out that refer ring expressions have no descriptive meaning and that only descri ptive words can be misdescribingly used. But the statement that words with no descriptive content cannot be describingly or misdescribingly used in a trivial one.

Utkal University, Bhuvaneswar.

Ganeswar Mishra

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Vivarana Prameya Samgraha. Tr. Pramathanath Tarka Bhusana Sahitya Mandir Colomb Vasumati Sahitya Mandir, Calcutta. P. 129.

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JAIN VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE : NATURALISTIC OR NON-NATURALISTIC ? *

Dale Riepe, in his book entitled *The Naturalistic Tradition* in Indian Thought, maintains that the Jaina view of knowledge is 'highly non-naturalistic'. He has, evidently, based this judgment on the Jaina view of knowledge as presented by one H. M. Bhattacharya through two of his papers published in the July 1938 and January 1939 issues of the Philosophical Quarterly. Bhattacharya thinks that according to the Jainas all knowledge is innate. To know is to remember and recognise or knowledge is nothing other than recognition and reminiscience. "Knowledge" in the context of Jaina thought, he says, is, "the self-functioning of the self."

But Bhattacharya's is not the isolated view-point. There are very many competent scholars who seem to share the same. Speaking about the highest kind of direct knowledge called 'Kevalajinana' in the system S. N. Dasgupta has observed that it is "transcendental knowledge arising from within the soul". Jadunath Sinha, another historian of Indian Philosophy, obviously echoes the same view when he says that "the jaina doctrine of knowledge as revelation from within the self is hardly tenable."

To me the remark seems to be a typical case of "call a dog mad and kill it" insofar as I think that to interpret Jaina view of knowledge as 'revelation from within the self' is to misinterpret it. In all fairness to Sinha and to Dasgupta, I must, however, acknowledge that they do not seem to be as emphatic on the point as does Bhattacharya. There is, on the other hand, some ambiguity in the views of the two scholars.

Contrary to what has been referred to above, Dasgupta also observes that "both logically and psychologically the validity of knowledge", according to the Jainas, "depends upon outward that in accordance with facts." Sinha argues, in another book of his, without an object."

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His quotation from Syādavādamañjari-Nirviṣayāyājñaplera. ghaṭanāt⁹—in this connection is quite interesting. He seems to hit the nail on the head when he approvingly quotes the following statement of A. B. Dhurva: "There is the external world in which things have their definite places; our anubhāva (perception) obeys external facts, and our Vāsanās (subconscious impressions) are determined by the anubhava (perception). Thus the final delermining agent in our prema (valid knowledge) is the external world"." The last sentence needs to be especially marked.

Now, the question is: Can these conflicting opinions be reconciled? One may say, in a lighter view perhaps, that there is no conflict that cannot be (said to co-exist) reconciled following the Jaina attitude of extreme intellectual tolerance—as represented by their famous doctrines of Anekāntavāda and Syādavāda. Ever contradictions can co-exist. The ambiguity reflected in the thoughts of the scholars is really that of the Jaina thought itself. I, however, do not think that this is the right line of approach.

It is my considered opinion that the Jainas do not maintain 'innateness of knowledge' and as such there is no basis for holding that the Jaina epistemology is non-naturalistic. Though, I am 101 unaware that there is some support to the contrary view point in some Jaina texts. Take, for example, a statement as the 'shining of the self in its own splendour on the destruction of Jnanavamiya Darsanāvarnīya and Antarāya Karmas. 11 Further, in Parties mukhasūtra, 12 we have an interesting argument minimising the importance of object in knowledge and suggesting that the sense organs are the causal factors in knowledge. 13 If we combine the with the view expressed by Siddhasena, an accredited Jaint scholaist, that 'after the removal of Karma the self itself is the sense-organ proper and not any other' (Jivapradesa Karmaksopasamatvād indriyān-nānyat Ātmā ca indriyam) the way to the conclusion that the Jainas accept knowledge to 'revelation from within the self' is clear. Besides the very name 'Kevalajñāna' too sounds indicative of such a view.

I am inclined to think otherwise, because I am conscious of the Jaina insistence on the realistic character of knowledge. definition of knowledge as offered by the Jaina thinker Hemachandra in referring to 'arthabodhakṣamatā, surely points to the objects

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being an essential factor in knowledge generation.¹⁵ Further, the Jaina criticism of the Yogācāra-Bauddha thesis is entirely based on the importance of object in knowledge.¹⁶

It may be argued that the Jaina insistence on Realism is only initial and not final. They do maintain a distinction between empirical perception—covered by Mati which along with Sruta is actually called in the system as parokṣajñāna—and transcendental perception—which consists of Avadhi, Manabparyāya and Keval-jīāna and is characterised in the system as pratyakṣajñāna. The realistic and naturalistic view is correct about the former and not the latter. To this I am to say that there is no support for the contention in the Jaina philosophical thought.

A dualism in epistemology is through out maintained by the Jainas. The object of knowledge is not just a perspective of the self. It is independent of the subject and does make its contribution in knowledge. The self is not modified by the object through knowledge. The same is true of the object, i.e. it too is not modified or appropriated by the subject. Knowledge being an external relation between the self--the sense-organ (Indriya) and the object (Viṣaya) does not affect its terms. Kevalajñāna or so-called transcendental knowledge is not without any objective basis. It, on the contrary, has all objects in its range and is thus sakalajñāna. To the sentence "knowledge is not mere knowing but the self as knowing. We must add, "some object or the other". The word 'some' in accordance with the usual logical convention should mean 'at least one, may be all'.

The levels of experience are not different from one another in terms of one having an objective basis and the other having none. The self at the level of Mati and Śruta comes into contact with the objects through the agency of sense-organs—which serve as-if as windows. At the level of Avadhi and manabparyāya it does come the opening caused by the objects and their modes because of With the total removal of the veil and resistance of karma the self at the level of Kevalajñāna becomes—as—if all—windows and

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is the sense-organ proper (Ātmā ca indriyam, as referred to by Siddhasena)²⁰ and as such is capable of coming into contact with all that is.

The controversy, on whether or not the Kevali (one who has attained Kevalajñāna) is capable of having two conscious activities at a time, that we find the Jaina thinkers indulging in, is clearly indicative of the fact that the majority of Jaina thinkers do take a realistic and naturalistic view of knowledge. Umāsvāmi²² and Jinabhadra²³ suggest that no one other than a Kevalī can ever intuit an amūrta (immaterial) object. Further, both Bhagavaii Sūtra²⁴ and Tattvārtha Sūtra²⁴ speak of Upayoga (attention or consciousness) as the very defining property of the self and both of them²⁶ draw a distinction between Sākāra (determinate) and anākāra (indeterminate) upayoga. Such a distinction can be only justified if the Jaina view of knowledge is taken to be realistic and naturalistic.

There is yet another source of misinterpretation of Kevalajñāna as 'absolute and transcendental knowledge obliterating all
distinctions and the plurality of the world of objects'. In
Acārānga Sūtra (1.3.4) we find a statement to the effect that 'one
who knows one knows all and one who knows all knows one'—
Je egam Janai, se Sarvam Janai; je Sarvam Janai se egam Janai.
This can be taken literally and misinterpreted to support Absolutistic point of view. But, if we do so we would be contradicting
the over all Jaina position represented by their anekāntavāda.
The Jainas are non-Absolutists. The simple way of understanding
such a statement must be in line with the Jaina thought. It simply
means that while one knows one thing he knows everything
insofar as nothing can be said to be completely known if it is not
known as distinct from everything else and vice-versa.

Deptt. of Buddhist Studies, University of Delhi, Delhi-110007. Kewal Krishan Mittal

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NOTES

- * Presented at the Golden Jubilee session of the Akhil Bharativa Sanskrit Sammelan-Oct. 1967.
 - 1. See pp. 91-113.
- 2. The papers are titled as "The Jaina view of Knowledge and Fror"; and "The Jaina Theory of Pratyabhijna." respectively.
 - 3. See Philosophical Quarterly (Amalner) January 1939, p. 1.
 - 4. See Philosophical Quarterly (Calcutta) July 1938, p. 122.
 - 5. S. N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I., p. 184.
 - 6. Jadunath Sinha, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 275.
 - 7. Op. cit., p. 188.
 - 8. Jadunath Sinha, Indian Realism, pp. 65-72.
- 9. See Syadavadamanjari of Malisena edited by A. B. Dhruva, p. 111 Quoted Ibid., p. 65 fn.
- 10. A. B. Dhruva's notes, his edition of Syadavadamanjari p. 199-Quoted Ibid., p. 70 (My/underlining).
 - 11. Cf. Tattvartha Sutra x. 1; Sthanaga Sutra 226.
 - 12. Sutra ii. 6, 8, 10.
 - 13. Cf. Jadunath Sinha, op. cit. Supra note 6, pp. 186-7.
 - 14. Cf. Ibid., p. 187, fn.
- 15. See Anyayogavyavaceheda-dvatrinsika of Hemacandra stanza XIII.
- 16. See their arguments as summed up by A. B. Dhruva in his Introduction to (his edition of) Syadavadamanjari pp. cxv-cxvi.
 - 17. Cf. K. B. Jindal, The prefaces, p. 45.
 - 18. H. M. Bhattacharya, op. cit. (Supra note 4).
- 19. 'Kama' in the context of Jaina thought does not mean 'deed' or some 'mysterious unseen force (Adrsta) but subtle matter (in the the lastin...)—See my paper iii. "The Jaina view of Karma"—Bulletin of lie Institute of Post-Graduate (Evening) Studies, University of Delhi, 1965.
 - 20. See page 3 above.
- 21. Cf. Bhagvatisutra XVIII.8; prajnapanasutra pade 30; Sarvartha-Siddhi on Tattvarthasutra ii.9; Jnanabinduprakarna of Yasovijaya p. 30; Visesanavatigathas—184-280 etc. See Nathmal Tatia Studies in Jaina Philosophy pp. 74-79.

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- 22. Tattvarthadhigama Sutrabhasya 1.24.
- 23. Visesavasyakabhasya 814 and Brhadvrtti on the same.
- 24. Sutra ii.10
- 25. Sutra ii.8.
- 26. Sutras xvi.7 and ii.9 respectively.
- 27. P. C. Nahar and K. C. Ghosh in their Epitome of Jainism make an attempt at such an interpretation. They compare the Jaina view with the Hegelian Absolutism See especially pp. 106-109.

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HUME ON NECESSITY

Readers of Hume appear in most cases to have found two main strands of thought in his philosophical writings, one operating at the level of logic, the other at the level of psychology. This general perspective has allowed his readers to delineate two senses of "necessity" with respect to his important theme on causation: Logical necessity and psychological necessity. Yet one can still discern another important sense of necessity that played a significant role in the philosophy of Hume. This third sense of necessity is strictly an extension of logical necessity. However, unlike Hume's understanding of logical necessity this particular use is manifested in causal inferences. But before elaborating on this third sense of necessity in Hume's philosophy, let us discuss the central themes that are embodied in logical necessity and psychological necessity.

In the Treatise¹ as well as the Inquiry², Hume provides us with various criteria in support of his logical use of necessity. Some of these criteria are:

- (a) Whatever objects are different are distinguishable and that whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination. And whatever objects are separable are also distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguishable are also different (Treatise, p. 18).
- (b) .. Nor is it possible for the imagination to conceive anything contrary to demonstration (Treatise, p. 95).
- (c) Were a proposition demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind (Inquiry, p. 40).

Hume's distinction in the Treatise between relations that depend entirely on the ideas, which we compare together ", and are invariable, as long as our idea remains the same ", (p. 69) and those relations which "may be changed without any change in the in the ideas" (p. 69) coupled with his further distinction in the Inquiry between "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact" are

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sm make w with the carried out in an explicit way in order to shed light on how we can employ the logical criteria in comprehending the two main areas of reasoning. These two areas of reasoning are : demonstrative reasoning which is conversant with relation of ideas propositions is properly manifested in examples drawn from geometry, algebra, and arithmetic, especially those mathematical proposition which deal with "propositions of quantity or number" (Treatise, p.70) for .. " algebra and arithmetic [are] the only sciences, in which we can carry on a chain of reasoning to any degree of intricacy and yet preserve a perfect exactness and certainty " (Treatise, p. 7]) Probable reasoning is concerned with matters of fact propositions and is different from demonstrative reasoning in that the method of ascertaining matters of fact propositions is not applicable to those relation of ideas propositions. Whereas propositions expressing relations of ideas are "discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependance on what is any where existent in the universe (Inquiry, p. 40), matters of fact propositions.. are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction." (Inquiry, p. 40) And given, according to Hume, that reasoning concerning matters of fact is founded on the relation of cause and effect, the conclusions arrived at in causal inferences are not necessary but probable.

Hume's logical characterization of the two realms of reasoning is the equivalent, with some slight modifications, of the following. To label an argument demonstrative means that its premises logically entail its conclusion, (It should be kept in mind, however, that Hume's characterization of a demonstrative argument requires the use of only necessary premises – i.e. propositions dealing with "propositions of quantity or number"). To label an argument non-demonstrative (probable) means that its premises are all non-necessary (contingent).

What comes to the fore, so far, is Hume's contention that the logical use of necessity is confined to the realm of demonstrative propositions, i.e., those propositions that are arranged in such a way that they "cannot be changed without changing their ideas" for any attempt to do so would result in a contradiction or would

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he "inconceivable to the imagination". The psychological use of necessity, to Hume, is evident in reasoning concerning matters of fact. As he states it in the Treatise.

'Tis evident, that all reasoning from causes or effects terminate in conclusions concerning matters of fact; that is, concerning the existence of subjects or of their qualities (p. 94). And again the Inquiry tells us that "all reasoning concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect" (p. 41). In other words causal inferences do not lead us to necessary truths but only to matters of fact. Given that to Hume the paradigm of reasoning concerning matters of fact is from cause or effect and furthermore given that the notion of necessary connexion in causation has no objective validity but rather is based on habit, custom, instinct, expectation, one is ineluctably driven to entertain that the use of necessity in matters of fact amounts to asserting that what grounds causal inferences is a feeling of certainty. And such a feeling for Hume is not to be found in sensation. Rather it is an impression of reflection (and such impressions are nothing but feelings, sentements, passions). This Itake it is Hume's psychological use of necessity. His assertion of it is succinctly summed up in the Treatise as:

Upon the whole, necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor it is possible for us to form the most distant idea of it, considered as a quality in bodies (pp. 165-66). In the Inquiry, he asserts the same point by saying that "When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connection in our thought and give rise to this inference by which they become proofs of each other's existence " (p. 86).

II

This completes, terse as it is, our discussion of Hume's distinction between logical and psychological necessity. The logical use of necessity is directly tied up with Hume's explanation of demonstrative strative reasoning. The psychological use of necessity, however, is indirectly is indirectly tied up with probable reasoning. I say indirectly because because probable reasoning, strictly speaking, has nothing to do with personal variable reasoning, strictly speaking, has nothing to do with psychology, but with the nature of the premisses, which are usually synthetic statements. Only when one wonders how we

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arrive at the truth of causal laws which serve as premisses in proofs (as opposed to demonstration) that we invoke the psychological sense of necessity. It is this, so argues Hume, which makes us assimilate proof to demonstration.

To a great extent I think that Hume has not confused the two senses of necessity. However, when one reads "Of Skepticism with Regard to Reason" in his *Treatise*, things seem to be different as the following passages indicates that perhaps there is just one sense of necessity:

In all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible; but when we apply them, our fallible and uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them, and fall into error (p. 180).

A few paragraphs later Hume rejects his former claims about the certainty of mathematics by saying:

I had almost said, that this was certain; but I reflect, that it must reduce *itself*, as well as every reasoning, and from knowledge degenerate into probability.

Since therefore all knowledge resolves itself into probability, and becomes at last of the same nature with that evidence, which we employ in life (p. 181).

Indeed, these quoted paragraphs do present us with some stumbling blocks. Is Hume reducing the logical sense of necessity to the psychological one? Or is the argument at the end of Book I of the Treatise non-sequitur? I do not subscribe to the view that Hume in this section of the Treatise is reducing the logical sense of necessity to the psychological sense; neither, I should add, is the main argument non-sequitur. Rather I think that Hume in this particular section of his Treatise is providing us with a key distinction between the tion between the necessity of a proposition and our ability to know that a proposition that a proposition is necessary. And the fact that one doubts his ability to know necessary truths does not mean that there are no such truths. At least the text does not support this latter claim. For he tells us that "In all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible." (T certain and infallible " (Treatise, p. 180). As we know by now, in Hume considered propositions dealing with "propositions number or quantity." number or quantity" as necessary ones. However, he contends that errors uncer error and o and i sectio

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that doubt arises with respect to such propositions, and hence errors might arise: "But when we apply them, our fallible and uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them and fall into error" (Treatise, p. 180). Thus, the necessity of a proposition and our ability to know that it is necessary are two different things; and in no place that I know of does Hune, not withstanding his section on "Skepticism with Regard to Reason", intend rejecting the necessity of a certain kind of propositions, i.e. mathematical ones; for they are, to Hume, essential to demonstrative reasoning.

III

Now, let us consider the third sense of necessity that one encounters in Hume's philosophy. In order to unravel this sense, let us take a look at the following arguments:

- I. S drank arsenic Therefore, S is dead.
- II. Anyone who drinks arsenic will die S drank arsenic Therefore, S is dead.

According to Hume, neither I nor II is a candidate for demonstrative reasoning, for their premisses are not necessary. Whereas Hume could proffer a psychological explanation for the inference drawn in I, i.e. from the idea "S drank arsenic", we can infer "S is dead", this explanation if extended to argument II will not be adequate. Why? let us at the outset concede to Hume that We cannot perceive or experience "causal connexion". But does it follow then that necessity in causal inference is to be found only in the "expectation born out of habit, custom or inclination" as Hume expressed it? I am willing to concede that one can psychologically explain the origin of ideas in causal inferences without subscribing to the view that necessity is altogether absent. That is to say, one can get a notion of necessity in causal inferences that is a subspecie of logical necessity. In this case I can then say of argument II that "S is dead" follows necessarily from the premisses. Yet the statement "S is dead" is not a necessary truth, and is deduced from premisses that are not necessarily true, i.e., do not conform to the ones that were admitted by Hume. And if asked if asked to account for the origin of this idea, i.e., the association

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of drinking arsenic with death, I can retort by saying, as Hume did, that it is born out of the habit of expectation. That is to say, this sense of necessity in causal inferences admits of the demonstration of matters of fact by showing that some conclusion of fact is a logically necessary consequence of some factual premiss of premisses.

Hume does indeed have this notion of necessity in his philosophy. Whereas he assimilates it to psychological necessity—and thus concludes there is no logical necessity in causal inference—the claim we are presenting renders it an extension of logical necessity without denying it of causal inference. To render this claim plausible, one would have to appeal to the distinction between demonstration (proper realm of knowledge) and proof, a distinction that was familiar to Hume as well as to other philosophers in that period. Hume explains the two-fold distinction by claiming the following:

By knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas. By proofs, those arguments which are derived from the relation of cause and effect, and which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty (*Treatise* p. 124).

In this connection it should be kept in mind that Hume upholds the traditional view of knowledge which focused on the distinction between knowledge and belief. Briefly stated, to say "I know X is Y is to say that X is Y is necessarily true"; and to say "I believe X is Y is to say that X is Y is probable "i.e. "X is not Y is compatible with X is Y". Thus proper knowledge, for Hume is demonstrative in that it utilizes only necessary premisses, such is those dealing with "proportions in number or quantity".

Clearly argument II is not what Hume would call a demonstrative argument in that its premisses are not necessarily true. Yet it is the kind of argument that would fit the characterization of Hume's explication of proof. First, it is an argument based on cause and effect statement. Second, it it entirely free from doubt and uncertainty, for by utilizing the canons of logic one can deduce its conclusion from its premisses. Thus, what I am contending its conclusion from its premisses.

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that given Hume's definition of proof, one then can plausibly entertain the view that arguments based on proofs would lend support to this third sense of necessity.

IV

It might be asked at this juncture whether the claims presented in the preceding section are not in contradiction with Hume's central thesis that no conclusion of fact can be demonstrated, for "the contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction" (Inquiry, p. 40). It would be so only if we are dealing with an argument whose premisses are necessary, such as the ones he cites in the Inquiry; "That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides". and "that three times five is equal to the half of thirty" (p. 40). But argument II does not contain necessary premisses, but it still corresponds to Hume's explanation of human reasoning that is based on proof, i.e. "those arguments which are derived from the relation of cause and effect..". All this entitles us to say, so far, is that there cannot be logically necessary conclusions in arguments based on proofs; and for anyone to claim that there is such a thing, he would be then not properly using the distinction between arguments based on demonstration from those based on proof.

Another point for consideration is whether this third sense of necessity would commit one to the view that there is causal necessity, i.e. events are necessarily connected in nature. Evidence for such a view could be gathered from Hume's writings, for at times he writes as if there is a necessary connextion between objects. In the Treatise there is talk of "The uniting principle among our internal perceptions is as unintelligible as that among external objects, and is not known to us any other way than experience" (p. 109). Elsewhere in the Treatise, he speaks of "..the power by which an object produces another," (p. 69), and "that energy of speaks of the "secret connexion which binds them (events) and insists that causation is in need of necessity, notwithstanding his insistence that necessity consists simply of constant conjunction

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douvi deduct ding is Some of these passages in the *Dialogues* refer to "the spings and principles of the universe" (p. 147), "nature in possession of an infinite number of spings and principles" (p. 206). In addition to these references, there is a long passage in the *Dialogues* that brings out Hume's commitment to causal necessity in nature:

How could things have been as they are, were there not an original, inherent principle of order somewhere, in thought or in matter. And it is very indifferent to which of these we give the preference. Chance has no place in any hypothesis, sceptical or religious. Everything is surely governed by steady, inviolable laws. And were the inmost essence of things laid open to us, we should then discover a scene, of which at present, we can have no idea (pp. 174–75).

The above discussion does indeed lend support to the view that events are necessarily connected, a view that is at variance with the one that Hume vied for in his works. I must admit that I do find such an interpretation feasible, and deem it appropriate to invoke the notion of causal necessity as a unifying principle for "the unity of successive events that would keep them from forming chaotic or non-lawful series".7 I think my discussion of the third sense of necessity does give support to the causal necessity thesis, provided the "necessity" that qualifies the inference in arguments based on proofs is extended to apply to the non-linguistic part of our world. By this reasoning I can say then that two objects are necessarily connected through a "secret principle", or if you like, an "inherent principle" operating in the universe. But the claim that was presented does not assert that there is a necessary connec tion between events, but rather it asserts that a particular matter of fact statement follows logically from a set of non-necessary premisses. This corresponds indeed to Hume's claim that causal inferences do not yield necessary truths but only matters of fact. However, it deviates from Hume's position in acknowledging the formal demonstration of matters of fact by showing how evidence and conclusion can be related, thus avoiding Hume's requirement that their connection is a by-product of one's imagination, or something that exists in the something that exists in the mind " (Psychological necessity is obviously invoked by II. obviously invoked by Hume). It is, as said earlier, only when one HUM

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wonders how we arrive at the truth of causal laws which serve as premisses in proof (as opposed to demonstration) that we invoke the psychological sense of necessity.

The third sense of necessity is then an extension of logical necessity, and we argued that one can plausibly provide a formal demonstation of matters of fact statements from factual premisses at least this is forced on us by Hume's explanation of human reasoning based on proof. There is no need to justify matters of fact by an appeal to our subjective make-up. Thus, one can legitimately argue that causal inference is logical and not psychological. To do otherwise would involve one in confusing the validity of arguments with accounting for the origin of our ideas.

Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida 32306. R. E. A. Shanab

NOTES

- 1. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1960).
- 2. David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Charles W. Hendel (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1955).
- 3. In the *Treatise* Hume considers only arithmetic and algebra as the sole province of demonstration, contending that geometry is empirical (See geometry, and contends that the former lends itself to demonstration (See Philosophy of Belief (New York: The Humanities Press, 1961, pp. 61-3); pp. 238-44).
- 4. For an elaboration of these points, see D. Stove, "Hume, and reprinted in Hume, ed. V. C. Chappell (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966) pp. 187-212.

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- 5. For a discussion of this, see N. K. Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1941), pp. 349-63; J. A. Passmore Hume's Intentions (Cambridge University Press, 1952), Ch. 7; R. Zabech, Hume: Precursor of Modern Empiricism (the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), Ch. 5.
- 6. David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, ed. N.K. Smith (New York: The Library of Liberal Arts, 1947).
- 7. Everett J. Nelson, "Causal Necessity and Induction", Meeting of the Aristotelian Society (1964), p. 299. For a discussion of some of the problems, see W. A. Suchting, "Hume and Necessary Truth", Dialogue, Vol. V (1866), pp 47-60.

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I

AN EXAMINATION OF THE SAMKHYA ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PURUSA

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The Sāmkhya philosophy has advanced a number of arguments for the existence of puruṣa. These arguments are, no doubt, important in the context of the Sāmkhya philosophy because by the help of these arguments the Sāmkhya philosopher attempts to establish one of the basic metaphysical entities in his philosophy, namely, Puruṣa or the pure conscious subject. In what follows, I shall make an examination of these arguments. These arguments are presented in different forms by different Sāmkhya writers. For the purpose of authentic presentation, I shall take up these arguments as advanced by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in his Sāmkhya kārikā. However, these arguments of Īśvarakṛṣṇa will be also taken up along with the commentaries of both Gaudapāda and Vācaspati Miśra. The arguments are as follows:

Samghātaparārthatvāt, triguņādiviparyayādadhişṭhānāt I Puruṣo'sti, bhoktṛbhāvāt, kaivalyārtham pravṛttesca II

The translation¹ of the above passage is stated as follows: "Because all composite objects are for another's use, because there must be absence of the three attributes and other properties, because there must be control, because there must be some one to experience and because there is a tendency towards isolation or final beatitude, therefore, the Spirit must be there."

The Sāmkhya, like other systems, aims at liberation or final release. It recommends a discriminative knowledge of the Vyakta, Avyakta and Puruṣa (Kārikā-2) which would put an end to all sorts of sufferings and the cessation of all sufferings is itself the final beatitude (Kārikā-44)². Vyakta being evident does not require any further rational support. Arguments are already advanced for the existence of Avyakta (Kārikā-15). Now further orthodoxy, Sāmkhya does not defend its doctrine by an appeal but always attempts to explain the system by independent

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logical arguments.³ This is, no doubt, a merit on the part of the system. But, as we shall see, all the arguments (at least in so far as the existence of *Puruṣa* is concerned) are faulty because of certain fundamental linguistic confusions.⁴

This first argument (Samghātaparārthatvāt) suggests that all composite objects (Samghātas) are for another. Here the word 'another' (para) is to be understood in an absolute sense. That means, the para must be necessarily non-composite. Since Prakti is composite in character, it is meant for some non-composite being which is no other than Puruşa. Both Gaudapada as well as Vācaspati, while commenting on this argument, talk about the analogy of bed and its user. 5 Gaudapada says that as the bed which is composed of the bedding, props, cords, a covering cloth of cotton and a pillow is meant to serve the purpose of another and not of its own, so also the composition of Mahat and the rest is for the sake of Purusa. But here one important objection is anticipated by Vacaspati (Kaumudi-121). The user of the bed is a composite psycho-physical organism and hence a non-composite Purusa need not be inferred from the composite character of Mahat and the rest. Vacaspati himself replies to this objection by pointing out that regressus ad infinitum (and vasthā) would result if something composite is inferred from another composite thing. Logically one is bound to admit from the composite object, the non-composite Spirit (asamghista Purusa).

The purpose of this argument is to prove the existence of Puruṣa. Puruṣa is argued to be independently existing apart from Mahat, etc. But the purpose of the argument fails when it merely states a formal truth, viz., something composite cannot logically be meant for another composite but must ultimately be meant for something non-composite. Regressus ad infinitum is a formal fallacy which does not warrant anything of material significance. Supposing that the composite things of the world are meant for another composite being then at once a question may legitimately be asked in the formal level about the basis of the composite being. But if one cuts down this possibility of questioning from the very beginning just by defining the user of composite things as a non-composite being then every thing goes alright. This is formally cogent since the twist in the language is done by

verbal manipulation. But this, it seems to us, is mere avoidance of further questions and not really proving non-composite Spirit as existing. It appears that this argument is due to the confusion of material and formal levels.

The second argument (Triguṇā diviparyayāt) says that Puruṣa must exist because it is the reverse of that which has the three attributes and the rest. From the nature of the non-composite character of Spirit it necessarily follows, argued Vācaspati, that Puruṣa must be devoid of the three attributes and the rest (Kaumudī-121). In Kārikā-11 Prakṛti is said to be triguṇam (of three constituents), avivekī (non-distinguishable) viṣaya (objective), sāmānya (common), acetanam (non-intelligent) and prasavadharmi (productive). Puruṣa is explained as just the reverse of all these, i.e., it is nirguṇa (devoid of three constituents), vivekī (distinguishable), aviṣaya (non-objective), asāmānya (uncommon), cetanam (intelligent) and aprasavadharmi (non-productive).

It is not clearly an independent argument. Following Vācaspati the best that one can aftribute to this argument is that Puruṣa being non-composite is also devoid of three attributes and the rest as when somebody is not a 'Brāhmana' he cannot be a 'Katha'. We would not like here to argue out the thesis whether being devoid of three attributes and the rest are necessary accompaniments of Puruṣa being non-composite. The main point is whether a non-composite Puruṣa being devoid of three attributes and the rest exists. Unless some further light is thrown in this direction the argument does not seem to serve any purpose. It may at best be said as a corollary to the first one which is already shown to be untenable.

Some times it is argued that Puruṣa being $vivek \overline{i}$, avisaya and cetana cannot be neutral $(m\bar{a}dhyastha)$ $(K\bar{a}rik\bar{a}-19)$ and indifferent $(ud\bar{a}s\bar{i}n)$ $(K\bar{a}rik\bar{a}-20)^6$. By differently interpreting these three terms, however, it is pointed out that these are quite consistent with neutrality and indifference. But all these debates appear to be quite pointless in so far as the existence of Puruṣa is concerned. How does the absence of the three properties and the rest prove Puruṣa's existence?

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The next argument (Adhiṣṭhānāt) argues that as a chariot is controlled by a charioteer so also the triguṇātmikā (i.e., Pradhāna) requires an adhiṣṭhāna (i.e., Puruṣa). Gaudapāda suggests that chariot can function only in so far as it is controlled and run by a charioteer. Pradhāna functions only when controlled by the Puruṣa. Now here it can be pointed out that the charioteer as a controller is a living person who is an aggregate and is not free from pleasure, pain and delusion. But how can Puruṣa of the Sāmkhya system which is already said to be noncomposite and devoid of three attributes, etc. be said as controller? Vācaspati, anticipating this objection replies in his usual manner saying that if the controller is samghāta or triguṇātmaka then it will lead to regressus ad infinitum. Hence in order to avoid this difficulty Puruṣa must be 'beyond the three attributes and independent' (Kaumudī-122).

All this shows that this argument too like the first argument suffers from the confusion of formal and material levels. It is argued that the controller of unitelligent *Pradhāna* must be pure intelligent *Puruṣa*. This is, no doubt, formally true. If somebody argues that matter, by definition, is moved by non-matter, i.e., mind then this formal reasoning in hardly disputable since there is nothing to dispute. But the Samkhya is not at all interested in exhibiting this formal reasoning. It has the further tendency to bring out the implication that this formal reasoning justifies the existence of pure intelligent *Puruṣa* as a matter-of-fact. And it is precisely here that the whole argument becomes weak.

The fourth argument (Bhoktrbhāvāt) attempts to establish Puruṣa as enjoyer. Sāmkhya suggests that the different things of the nature, which are the products of the trigunātmikā pradhāna, are neither aggreeable or disaggreeable as they contain within themselves pleasure, pain and delusion. But to whom are they aggreeable or disaggreablee? Who is to experience of enjoy them? Sāmkhya here insists that the experience of enjoyer cannot be Buddhi, etc. since they themselves are all composed of pleasure, pain and delusion. Here the ultimate experiencer or enjoyer must be the pure Spirit which is said to be devoid of pleasure, pain and delusion. To put it in another way, from the enjoyable characteristics (Bhoktrbhāva) of the world the enjoyable characteristics (Bhoktrbhāva) of the world the enjoyable characteristics (Bhoktrbhāva) is inferentially deduced. If a thing is enjoyable

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then it is argued, there must be somebody who is to enjoy it. Enjoyability, it is made out, necessarily implies enjoyer and hence if we grant the things of the world to be enjoyable then we are constrained to admit that there must be some (other than thingsor the world, of course) who is to enjoy these things (either actually or possibly). This inference is, however, not un-challangeable. Since it is not self-contradictory to suppose that these things of the world are enjoyable though there is none to enjoy. Rut even if the two expressions, 'enjoyable' and 'enjoyer' are not logically related like that of 'enjoyed' and 'enjoyer' the Samikhvaites insist on an inference of 'enjoyer' from 'enjoyable'. This shows that according to them these words are formally relative and therefore belong to one type. As one correlates 'enjoyable' and 'enjoyer' in such manner the correlation between 'enjoyable' and 'scrutiniser' for example, is not possible. Supposing one agrees with the Sāmkhya about this formal relationship between these two expressions then also the situation is not much improved. Because materially at least the relation is not proved to be valid. Here the question may be raised why at all the Samkhyaites insist on a definite inference from the enjoyable to enjoyer? Vācaspati argues that the observer is to be inferred from the visible9. This is alright in 50 far as 'observer' and 'visible' are derived from the common linguistic root 'see'. But this linguistic commonness need not lead to the factual conclusion in which Sāmkhya is interested. I think, the Sāmkhyaites are here victim to linguistic confusion when they press from the visibility of the things the visualiser or observer. There is merely a common origin between the two terms so far as syntax is concerned. It does not indicate anything regarding matter-of-fact.

Moreover, as it has been pointed out elsewhere, the Samkhya philosophers, in this context, are also victims to certain in different objects of the world. One distinguishes between pleasure. In the first case, it is perfectly meaningful to say means his giving money to me implies that he had money with the last of the world.

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him. Whereas 'It gave me pleasure' does not likewise mean that it had pleasantness with it. Since in both the cases one uses 'gave' the Sāmkhya philosophers are misled to argue that meaning in both the cases must be understood in the same way, i.e., 'giving pleasure' is analogous to 'giving money'. The man who gives money must have possessed money prior to giving it. Similarly the object which gives pleasure must have possessed pleasure in some way, however, mystical it may be. From all these it may be well seen that there is much oddity in ascribing pleasure, pain, etc. to the things of the world.

The last argument (Kaivalyārtham Pravṛtteh) does not also seem to have any strength. It says that because "there is a tendency in all scriptures and among all intelligent persons to wards 'Isolation', there must be something beyond (pleasure etc., and hence) the Great Principle and the rest, and this is the Spirit'.' Now one can immediately retort by following Kanti refutation of ontological argument that merely because there is a tendency for 'Isoloation' this does not necessarily prove that there is actually a state of 'Isolation' which is said to be the state of the Puruṣa. From the idea of 'Isolation' the existence of 'Isolation' need not be validly inferred. In fact this argument unlike its predecessors even fails to keep up the formal tone and thereby ends in absurdity.

Thus all these arguments which are advanced by the Sāmikha philosophers fail to establish the existence of Puruṣa. Their failure is mainly because they have become victims to the illusions of both logic and language. While they seek to prove the actual existence of Puruṣa they employ most of the arguments which are merely formal in character and do not yield any conclusion regarding matter-of-fact. Further the type of Puruṣa that is sought to be established by means of these arguments may not be the type of Puruṣa which is described in other places (kārikā-lā). But to go into that is, I think, beyond the scope of the present paper.*

Utkal University, Bhuvaneswar.

Bijayananda Kar

NOTES

- 1. The translation is made by Prof. G. N. Jha.
- 2. Jūūnena cā'pavargo viparād işyate bandhaḥ-īśvarakṛṣṇa Jūūnam mukti-Bhikṣu (Sāmkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya, 3/23).
 - 3. Na hyūpta vacannabhāse nipatanti mahūsurāh-Aniruddha in his Vrtti.
- 4. I have analysed else where the arguments for Satkāryavāda and the arguments for the existence of Prakṛti and have come to the conclution that in both the cases the arguments are due to faulty logic and certain fundamedial linguistic confusions. Vide: "Satkāryavāda and Asatkāryavāda". The Journal of Philosophical Association. Vol. IX, No 35. 36, July-October, 1962; "Vācaspati on Satkāryavāda", Bharati-Utkal Univ. J. Humn. Vol. 3, No. 5, Dec. 1969 and "Sāṃkhya Arguments for Prakṛti", Bharati-Utka Univ. J. Humn. Vol., I, 1967.
 - 5. Vide: Tattva-Kaumudī (120) and Gaudapāda Bhāsya on Kārikā-17.
- 6. Prof. D. D. Vadekar: "The Sāmkhya Arguments for Puruṣa" The Philosophical Quarterly, (Amalner) Vol. XXXII, No. 4, Jan. 1960, pp. 252-59.
- 7. Jagannath Das: "Logical and Metaphysical Arguments For Puruşa la The Sāmkhya" The Philosophical Quarterly (Amalner) 1961, pp. 187-92.
- 8. Purusa Adhisthitam Pradhānam Pravartate (Gaudapāda Bhāsya on Kārikā-17).
 - 9. 'Bhoktṛbhāvāt dṛṣtabhāvāt,.....iti arthaḥ' Kaumudī-124.
 - 10. See my "Sāmkhya Arguments For Prakṛti" op. cit., p. 52.
 - 11. 'Tasmāt kaivalyārthamātmeti sidham' Kaumudī-125.
- * Here I have adopted some of the materials of my earlier paper "Sāmkhya arguments for Puruṣa'' read and discussed in History of Philosophy Section of the 44th session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Poona in 1970.

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A NOTE ON TRUTH—POSSIBILITIES

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A black and white (silent) television film is made up of a number of separate pictures, each picture of a number of lines, and each line of a number of light and dark spots – light where an electron hits the screen, dark where none does. Patterns of black and white spots make shades of grey.

Multiplying these three numbers – number of pictures x lines per picture x spots per line – gives the total number of spots, white or black, in the film – say 'n'. We can give a name or number to each spot position and each picture, and now, by saying of each spot during the film whether it is white or not, we can describe the film completely.

This would be only one of 2^n possible arrangements of white and black spots or possible 'films' of the same duration (most of which would look like nothing on earth).

Now imagine for the sake of argument that the whole history of the universe is like such a television film, with one time and three space dimensions. So its size and duration, though huge, would be finite; and it would not be infinitesimal but consist of a finite though enormous number (call it 'n' again) of space-time positions (perhaps millions in the space of an electron).

And suppose each such position—each place at any one moment—is in one of two possible states: let us call these states 'positive' and 'negative' (whatever that may mean); and whatever happens in the universe—eveny phenomenon or event (movements of stars or atoms, colours, sounds, ...)—corresponds to some space—time pattern of positive and negative positions.

Such a universe could, in theory, be described *completely* throughout all time, by saying of each space-time position if it miverse - 'possible worlds' or *Truth Possibilities*. Only one of these would be the true description of the actual universe.

(Finite complete description of the actual universe.

Cases, for an infinite or infinitesimal universe, where the boundformulae and negative regions are given by mathematical
general rules.)

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What statements could be made?

Let us represent the whole set of Truth Possibilities by a dotted line: each point on the line indicates one T.P. and one of these pointed represents the whole truth.

The oblong, 's', shows a completely defined statement which is compatible with the possibilities under its white pan, incompatible with those under its black part.

S:	
T. P's:	

(For simplicity the T.P's compatible with S are here put the right of all the incompatible ones. Otherwise S might show a complicated alternating pattern of black and white.)

Possible logical relations of statements can be shown with such a diagram. Assume black where white is not outlined.)

R:	R:
S: [S:
(a)	(b)

- (a) R and S are logically independent. They may both true or both false, or either true and the other false.
 - (b) S logically implies (entails) R.

R:		R: [
S :		S:	
	············ (c)		(d)

- (c) R is the contradictory of S.
- (d) R and S are incompatibles: " \overline{RS} " is logically true.

S:	S;
(e)	(f)

- (e) S is logically true: a 'tautology'.
- (f) S is logically false: a 'contradiction'.

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A NOTE ON TRUTH—POSSIBILITIES

A complete description—a truth possibility—is expressed by an oblong white at one point, the rest black.

For simplicity's sake I took all statements above as completely defined, but there can be possibilities for which the truth value of some statements is determined and of other not. Uncertain areas can be shown in lined & Quares.

Q:	
R:	
S:	
T P's	

Here R is completely defined while Q and S, having doubtful areas are not.

On the line of T.P.'s the postition of the one that is actually true lies under the white areas of all true statements and the black areas of all false statements. A statement shown grey at this point connot be said to be true or false—it has no meaning here.

But can we know anything of such 'absolute' possibilities? Are there some, not dreamt of in our philosophy, for which the truth value of no statement of our language is determined? Perhaps it is safe to ignore them: certainly they are indiscribable. If one of these were actual, actual our whole language would be useless. We should need to build a new language from scratch, whoever 'we' might be in such a situation.

We can evade these problems by abandoning our model of the universe and approaching truth possibilities from the statements possible in our language. Two possibilites are distinguished if and only if we can make statements true of one false of the other. A truth possibility is what entails all statements logically compatible with it within a given language or set of statements (with all their truth functions). Life will be still simpler if we ignore, for now, ill-defined statements (with 'grey' area)).

We cannot now claim that a truth possibility gives a complete description of the universe, which would almost certainly not be possible in, say. English-even if the universe were finite.

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We can still use the same kind of diagrams to show logical relations of statements. And each statement can be defined by listing all the compatible truth possibilies (or all the incompatible ones), provided their number is finite.

One point of all this was to introduce the notion of synamum

R:	The state of the state of the state of
S:	
T.P'S	:

Here R and S are the same statement. Two sentences are synonymous, however different their wording or the symbols used in them, if they are compatible with the same truth possibilities and incompatible with the same truth possibilities; that is if they express the same statement. Synonymous sentences are formally equivalent; each entails the other; in no conceivable circumstances could one be true and the other false.

Many sentences are variable: I mean that different utterances (usually spoken or written) of the same sentence, in different contexts may express different statements. So we can speak of synonymous utterances of sentences. And, in a slightly modified sense, we can say synonymous sentences can express the same statement as each other in any context.

(I define a sentence by the words symbls in it and their arrangement; a statement by what makes it true. So a sentence may vary its truth-value with context; a statement, in my sense, does not.)

I symbolize "is a synonymous with" by the sign " \approx". This sign is used to show a relation between expressions-symbols or sets of symbols. For instance: "Somebody doesn't like cheese \approx Not everybody likes cheese" means the same as (or: is synonymous with) "Somebody doesn't like cheese" is synonymous with "Not everybody likes cheese". So quotation marks are to be understood round the expressions on each side of the sign " \approx".

Any two expressions are synonymous if (and only if) in any sentence containing one of these expressions this can be replaced by the other expression producting (in the same context) a sentence synonymous with the first.

Thus: bachelor a unmarried man.

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Since, e. g.: My only son is a bachelor \approx My only son is an unmarried man. The qualification about context is important; here the parent of the son must be the same, and roughbly the same time meant-since a bachelor may marry in time.

Are some ideas logically simpler than others? Are axioms different from other logical truths or a definition from what is defined? If so, how?

In the model universe, if a is one of the space-time positions, "a is positive" is an elementary proposition in the Tractatus sense. It is logically independent of the other elementary propositions: it can be true or false while all the rest remain thesame. And all statements are truth functions of the elementary propositions.

Suppose there are four 'elementary propositions' or independent statements, p, q, r and s.

		q	~	q	
No of one of	p	~p	p	~p	
s { r	1	2	3	4	
(~ r	5	6	7	8	
$\sim s$ r	9	10	11	12	
(~ r	13	14	15	16	
u ~u					
	- 1	1	~1	1	
outh or has	\sim	1 ~t	~\t	$\sim t$	
w	~	~	~	~	
$\mathbf{w} \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \mathbf{v} \\ \sim \mathbf{v} \end{array} \right.$	t	~t	t	~t	
$ \begin{array}{c} v \\ \sim v \\ \sim w \end{array} $	t 11	\sim t	**************************************	~t	
w {~ v	t 11 2	~t 1 16	8 10	~t 13 6	

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In fig, (i) the small numbered squares represent the Truth Possibilities. Truth Possibility No. 1 = D6, p, q, r, s. T. P. No. 6 = D6. p, q, r, s, and so on. Now each argument (p. q. etc.) denies half of the total number (here 16) of T.P.'s – e. g. p denies the eight even—numbered ones. And each denies half of the T.P.'s denied by any other given argument (end half those not so denied) – so q denies No. 4, 8, 12 and 16 (i. e. half those denied by p) besides Nos. 3, 7, 11 and 15 (half those not denied by p). This is a necessary and sufficient condition for the logical independence of the arguments.

Next, using the 16 Truth Possibilities, we can define a quite defferent set (in fact many such sets) of independent arguments, such as t, u. v and w in flg. (ii). So, e. g., w is defined here as; LV 2 V 6 V 8 V 10 V 11 V 13 V 16. Here again each of t, u, v and w denies half of the truth possibilities and half of those denied by any other argument of the set—i.e. they are independent. And any truth function of p, q, r and s (including p, q, r and s themselves) can be expressed as a truth function of t, u, v and w.

Is there any logical reason for regarding p, q, r and s as more 'elementary' than t, u, v and w, or some other set? (There might be good non-logical reasons – for instance natural laws such as those of physics might be easier to state with one set than another. For instance a law: $p \equiv q$. V r V s: $p \vee q \vee r$ could be expressed more simply as: $v \vee w$.)

Taking a simpler case, suppose that $p = q \not\equiv r$ is a logical truth (that is: $p \approx q \not\equiv r$). Here any two of the three, p, q, r, can be taken as 'elementary' and used to define the third. There are four truth possibilities.

P	q	r		P	≈	1	V	2
T	T	F	1					
Т	F	Т	2	q	*	1	v	3
T	T	T	3					
F	F	F	4	r	*	2	V	3

A NOTE ON TRUTH—POSSIBILITIES

Logically, the three are on exactly the same level and the choice of any two as 'elementary' is quite arbitrary.

In general a set of independent arguments has a unique set of 2^n (exhaustive and naturally exclusive) truth possibilities, just one being actually time. But corresponding to 2^n truth possibilities there are many 'elementary' sets of independent arguments.

There are in fact 2^n ! ways of distributing the truth possibilities through the squares (Cf. figs. (i) and (ii). But simply interchanging arguments say p with q – does not give new sets it is just changing the names. This can be done in n! ways:

This is the number of different sets of n independent statements, each set with the same lot of 2" truth possibilities.

 $2^n ! \div n !$ sets are left. And if we also disregard sets formed by switching arguments with their negations – P with vp and so on. We can further divide by 2^n , giving the formula

$$2^{n}!(n!\times 2^{n})$$
 or $\frac{(2^{n}-1)!}{n!}$

For this reason it seems natural to regard the unique set of truth possibilities as the hypothetical foundation of a language at any rate one with a finite number of different statements—other than some arbitrary set of 'elementary' independent statements. But in practice it is, of course, much more convenient to give your definition in terms of a set of n statements than a set of 2ⁿ

If it is truth possibilities that are fundamental, why should we suppose that the number of them in the (finite) universe or language is an exact power of 2? If, say, there are more than 8 but fewer than 16, some of the 16 squares in the diagrams would have to be left blank. Combinations of truth values of the arguments eorresponding to these blank squares would be logically impossible.

The negations of these combinations would be logical truths (axioms or theorems) Generally, these are between 2ⁿ and 2ⁿ +1 truth possibilities then all statements can be given as

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truth functions of some set of n + 1 arguments, but because of these axioms the arguments would not now all be independent.

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SOME PROBLEMS IN SANKARA

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Adi Shankara was born at a time when Buddhism appears to have been at its zenith in this country. The Shankara Digvijaya of Vidyaranya mentions that Shankara was sent on the earth to demolish the false philosophical doctrines of the Buddhas which were then prevalent. Tradition also confirms the fact that Shankara travelled on foot through the length and breadth of this country discussing the basic questions of religion and philosophy with learned men and giving discourses wherever he went; and that he was thus mainly responsible for the exit of Buddhism from this country. It is unquestionably a remarkable fact that Buddhism which was born in this country should have been prospering in the Eastern Asian countries like Siam, China and Japan but should have completely lost its hold on the people of the land of its birth. For this remarkable achievement no other person was responsible than the great Adi Shankara.

There are several stories prevalent about Adi Shankara. Vidyaranya Swami through his Shankara Digvijaya has familiarized us with the great philosophical controversy between Mandana Mishra and Adi Shankara; and how after defeating Mandana Mishra he was challenged by Saraswati his wife, who asked him questions about Kama Shastra the Science of Erotics, how by his yogic powers he entered the body of King Amaruka, and having attained the knowledge of this science also, how he defeated Saraswati.

Two stories of Adi Shankara, however, bear repetition even in this age. One is the story of the Chandal and the other is the story about how he performed the last rites of his dead mother.

It is said that one day at Banaras, finding that a Chandal, i.e. an untouchable, was in his way, he asked him to move away from his path. The Chandal immediately asked him who he was thus asking to move away—his body or his soul. Shankara quickly understood the implications of this rebuff. It was clear to him that this action of his was inconsistent with his own philosophy. Shankara then fell at the feet of the Chandal as if, he was which is contained in the line.

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W. S. BARLINGAY

Cāndāloslu Sa vā dvijostu guru rityesā manīsā māma,

The other incident is regarding the funeral of his mother. On the ground that (Adi) Shankara was a Sanyasin and could not, according to orthodox religious injunctions perform any karma, the Brahmans of his village refused to give Shankara any help in performing the last rites of his dead mother. Shankara was help less and contrary to orthodox practice, he cremated the body of his mother in one corner of the compound of his own house. All this is a testimony to the fact that Shankara was not only a humanist but had no blind faith in mere religious forms.

So much has already been written on the philosophy of Adi Shankara and so much praise has been bestowed on the logical subtleties of his arguments and the depth of his thought and reasoning that it is difficult to make any original contribution in regard to the interpretation of his philosophical teachings; and yet we shall find that merely because the literature on the subject is so vast and the teachings of Adi Shankara have so much influenced the life, the mode of thinking and even the speech and literature of the Hindus that we are apt to get lost in a mere maze of words. In the Yoga Sutra, one of the vrittis with which the chitta is supposed to be enveloped is vikalpa. Vikalpa means a state where we get merely the knowledge of words without there being anything real corresponding to those words. It seems to me that some such thing appears to be true of the vast literature that has grown up around the philosophy of Shankara. All manner of words have been used signifying concepts which are not always mutually exclusive and have overlapping areas of meaning and significance. Philosophy is a subject which suffers most from a riot of words. The only subject which has got an exact language appropriate for its understanding is Mathematics. One of the problems with which philosophy is faced to day is how to evolve a symbolism appropriate for the expression of philosophic thought. It will be my endeavour in what follows to express in simple language some of the main tenets of Shankara's philosophy so as to make it understandable to the ordinary man.

It is a curious fact in the history of philosophy both of the West and of this country that by an analysis of the epistemic process in and through which men get to know the external world, philosophers have come to conclusions about the nature of this

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process which make all knowledge of the external world and other knowing minds impossible. It is true that all knowledge of an individual must in some sense be private to himself. But there must be an epistemic process by which we get to know physical things and communicate our knowledge of those to our fellow beings, however imperfect these means of communication may be. How all this happens, how we perceive things, how we infer the existence of things we do not perceive and how we communicate our information to others is unquestionably a fascinating subject. As it happens, however, philosophers have, by an analysis of the cognitive situation, questioned the reality or the existence of the very physical things and other minds which was the basis or the postulate of their philosophical analysis. They began with the external world and ended in solipsism—in a closed world of ideas without any access to the outer world.

In England this process began with Locke. Locke's theory of perception was a very simple one—one which every commonsense man must hold in some form, that perception of physical things begins with an impact of physical things on our sense organs. Our mind, which, according to him, was a tabula rasa, gets an impression of the physical things which is the object of perception, and it is this impression or photograph which conveys to us the knowledge of the physical thing concerned.

Locke was followed by Berkeley; and Berkeley argued that if this impression of the so-called physical thing is all that we can really be aware of in perception, then we simply do not perceive physical things which must, therefore, be a mere figment of our imagination. What we call physical things are merely a series of such impressions or ideas which have a certain order; and beyond and apart from these series, there is no separate physical thing. Berkeley was followed by Hume who applied the same logic even to mental phenomena. Whenever he looked into his own mind he found only a succession of mental states. Descartes before him had found that he could doubt everything but not the existence of the self. According to him, it was correct to say that cogito, ergo sum—I think, therefore I am. Hume suggested that all that Descartes proved on the examination of inner experience was merely the existence of a succession of mental states. But where was the I? What was there, he argued, to show that one state of thinking was in any way related to another state of thinking, in the same individual? Hume, therefore, doubted even the very existence of the self or the knower. A particular type of analysis of the congnitive situation, thus, led the English Empiricists to complete scepticism.

On the European continent also, having more or less accepted this analysis of the cognitive situation, Malebranche was led to his doctrine of Occasionalism. It was for him a hard intellectual pill to swallow that there were no minds other than his own, with whom he could communicate. One could well get rid of physical objects, he thought, but what would become of minds other than our own; and if there are other minds then there must be a possibility of communication between them. How was that possible on such a theory as that of Berkeley? He, therefore, argued that corresponding to and on the occasion of the perceptual series in one mind, there was a corresponding appropriate perceptual series in another, and in this way communication was possible. The great mathematician-philosopher Leibniz arrived at a similar conclusion. The whole world according to him consisted of monads, independent of one another, each unfolding its own series of successive mental experience and there was what he called pre-established harmony amongst these independent unfoldings of the monads by virtue of which communication of one monad with another became possible.

It was obvious that these philosophers had to have re-course to these various devices and philosophic concepts because they felt an inherent hesitation in supposing that all that existed was their own selves and their mental states. They were unable to pursue their logic relentlessly which would have landed them only in solipsism. The modern representatives of this theory are Bertrand Russell and the Logical Atomists. With them physical things are merely logical constructions out of the material of sense which they call sense data.

In this country too, there have been several schools of Buddhistic philosophy which hold the same or a similar view. Shankara calls them Vainaśika or Vijñānavādin and he has discussed their theory in his Commentary on Nābhāva Upalabdheh B. S. 2.2.28. This subject, however, would itself be a subject matter of another article.

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Another line of argument against the reality of the physical world is from our experience of dreams. There is nothing, it was argued, by which we can truly distinguish between our dreams and the waking experience. Gaudapada, for instance, before Shankara appears to have argued in the same strain. He says. "Dream experiences are on a par with the waking ones. If the dream states do not fit into the context of the general experience of our fellow men or of a normal experience, it must be understood that it is not because they fall short of absolute reality but hecause they do not conform to our conventional standards. According to him life is a waking dream." Gaudapada does recognise that the objects of waking experience are common to us all while those of dreams are the private property of the dreamer. Yet he says "as in dreams so in waking the objects seen show the same characteristics, namely, that of evanascence "3.

There is yet another type of analysis of the cognitive situation which regards the knower, as an object of knowledge like any other object of knowledge. We have already seen how Hume looking at the knowing process from without, as it were, landed in a situation where he saw nothing but discrete mental states, unconnected with one another and questioned the abiding identity of the 'knower' through all these states. There are still others who treat the knower like any other physical object. The question of the pre-conditions of the possibility of all knowledge does not worry them. It is sufficient for them to say that knowledge of objects is merely a matter of the special application of the category of cause and effect. We shall have to refer to such views later as we proceed.

It is the great merit of Adi Shankara that he was not d victim to this analysis of our cognitive experience; nor has he failed to distinguish between our dream and waking experiences.

With regard to dream experiences, he says⁴: a dream experience is based on the memory of a previous experience. Not so a waking experience. A dream experience can be contradicted. Not so a waking experience. A dream experience can be com-dream a waking experience. Moreover, the distinction between dream and waking experience, is itself a matter of personal experience. The waking experience, is itself a matter of personal experience. ence. Therefore it is not proper that those who call themselves intelligent should conceal what is a patent fact.

In the same way with regard to the contention which is the same contention as that of Berkeley, viz., the esse of sensible things is their percipi, Shankara⁵ says that the objects of perception are there even if there is no perception. Nor does anybody confuse between the object and the perception of the object.

In the end, Shankara concludes by saying⁶ that the existence of the commonsense world which is proved by all the pramanas i.e., evidence, cannot be denied without having recourse to a higher principle, since where no exception exists a rule must be held to be proved.

The upshot of all this discussion is that but for a particular philosophical theory of the relationship of the commonsense world with the Being that creates it (Janmādyasya Yatah B. S. 11.1.2), Shankara would have been a Realist through and through like any other modern Realist. He takes the commonsense world for granted. He does not like Berkeley or the Buddhists resort to the philosophical analysis of the cognitive situation which must end in solipsism. He asks himself the great metaphysical question of all time as to the source or the primordial cause of the creation of this world. For obviously the Jagat or the world does not appear to us to be self-created. And if it does not create itself there must be something else that creates it. Shankara says, this principle is what the Upanishads call Brahman and that it is the same as the individual self.

It should be obvious that if it had not been Shankara's own view, that the individual self is identical with Brahman, he could have explained and commented upon the Brahmasutras in a different way as the other commentators have done. It stands to reason that he must have arrived at this conclusion by his own independent reasoning and must have interpreted the Vedic texts in a manner which would support his view. He explicitly says! Be that as it may, in any case it is possible for us as rational beings to treat this as a hypothesis about the mature of Reality and test truth in and through facts of experience and rational philosophic analysis.

What then is the grand Hypothesis which Shankara pull forward about the nature of Ultimate Reality and its relation to the world of commensense and the individual knowing self?

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Tarka of the use subject mation The hypothesis is this: (i) Brahman is the ultimate reality—it is Nitya-śuddha-buddha-Mukta-Svabhāvam, Sarvajñām—Sarvaśaktisamanvitam i.e., that it is eurnal, pure or homogeneous, conscious and free, that it knows everything and it is capable of doing anything. (ii) That this Brahman is the same as the individual soul and (iii) that the relationship of Brahman to the world of common sense is not that of cause and effect in the ordinary sense—that is, it is not a Vikāra of Brahman but is related to it as its Vivarta. And here we must clear up the distinction between Vivarta and Vikāra. Vivarta is defined as Atatvato Anyathā prātha while Vikāra is defined as Sa tatvato anyathā prātha. Vivarta is "that kind of causality where the cause without undergoing any change produces the effect". Vikāra or Parinamopadāma is "that kind of causality where the cause itself is transformed in producing the effect.

Shankara is all the while conscious that a mere statement like this cannot be forced down the throat of men who are rational. He says elsewhere—Na hi Śrutiśatām Śiło agniņ aprakāşo Vā iti bruvat pramāņam upaiti. (G. B. Adhyaya 18).

He, therefore, supports this hypothesis first by examining all the rational arguments that could be put forward against this view and secondly by an examination of all other possible hypotheses and showing by arguments that none of these hypotheses can hold the ground even for one moment. This he does in the first two Padās of the second Chapter of the Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya.

Shankara begins by saying that this Brahman is not known either through the senses by way of direct perception or by inference. Shankara is careful to point out that although in this sphere Sruti is the main pramāṇa i.e., authority or evidence, it is not true to say that reason or logic has no place in determining its nature. He says this in a long passage⁸. The subtaince of this passage is that Brahman or the ultimate reality is an that is to say religion which has merely got to be followed or acted Tarka or logic has a proper place. It is a different matter whether subject of Brahman—whether it will give us any positive information about it.

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Let us pause here for a moment and consider whether the attributes which Shankara ascribes to Brahman are in the nature of mere praise or Arthavāda or whether they are characteristics which reason must attribute to the primeval cause or the source of the universe assuming that the universe is not self-created.

Take first the characteristic nitya or eternal. Can we conceive of any moment of time when Brahman might not have existed, that it began to exist at a particular point of time-that it was not there or did not exist before that point of time? The fact that something exists itself presuppose that there must be something which precedes it and so on. That is to say, in the series of existence there can be no member of the series which can truly be said to be its first member. It is sometimes said of mental events that they just make their appearance at a certain moment, for a certain span of duration and then disappear. In the same way, in dreams we come across things which merely occupy a span of time. They are there neither before nor after. In saying this we tend to forget that in these circumstances we always conceive of them as fleeting against some background which has got a larger temporal span and that this background is always related to some thing that precedes it. So much then can be said to be known to a rational mind a priori if this phrase is al all appropriate in this context.

Take now the characteristic of being shuddha or put or homogeneous. It may be said that here there is some difficulty. Why must Brahman have only one characteristic namely that of purity or homogeneity? Why could we not priori conceive of the Ultimate Reality as having more than one quality or a complex of qualities? The answer is that in the present context we are not thinking of what characteristics. Brahman may have but the irreducible manimum which it must have. Even if there are other characteristics which Brahman has, we cannot know them. But we do know that it must have at least one quality or characteristic in order that we may at all distinguish Brahman from mere Space and Time. If Brahman did not have even one such quality then it would be impossible to distinguish it from Space and Time.

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Moreover, we have in our own experience something which appears to be pure or homogeneous in this sense and this is the Pratyagatman or the inner self or the knower. The Pratyagatman or the knower appears to be a mere sāksi an observer of all that goes on in our inner experience. He is nure self-consciouseness which retains its purity and unchangeability, while there is an incessant whirl of mental events, all moving around it, as it were. If, as it is postulated, Brahman is identical with the individual self—it stands to reason that it should have at least that quality or characteristic which distinguishes the individual self from all that is known, namely, the objects of knowledge.

Let us now turn to the third characteristic viz.—Buddha. If Brahman is the source of all that we perceive as Jagat, can we think of it as not having the characteristic of self-consciousness? We attribute to the animate world intelligence and consciousness. Can we reasonably say that its source nevertheless must be unitelligent and devoid of consciousness? As Dr. Radhakrishnan puts it, "Surely the non-conscious cannot be the cause of the conscious. If anything, the conscious must be the cause of the non-conscious". This characteristic then must be attributed to Brahman or the ultimate reality.

In the same way we must conceive of the Brahman as Mukta, i.e., unconditioned by anything else simply because there can be nothing beyond it which can condition or control it.

It would thus be observed that in describing the Brahman or the ultimate Reality as Nitya, Suddha, Buddha and Mukta, Shankara is not saying something which is opposed to Reason. He is not attributing to Brahman what may be called a positive secondary quality such as can be known to us only by the senses. It is one thing to say that to exist at all, a thing must have a secondary quality and quite another to say that it has such and such specific secondary quality. It is clear then that, in describing Brahman as he has done, Shankara has not travelled beyond the legitimate limitations of reason.

Let us now take the other proposition that Brahman is the same as or identical with the individual self; and in this context the word identical must be taken to mean not only identical: identical in quality but existentially identical.

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hman ssible Now it must be admitted at the outset that there are obvious difficulties in this view. For instance, if all the individual selves are just one and existentially identical with Brahman then it should follow that all knowledge of the one should be knowledge of the other, and that they should share a common memory. This, however, does not appear to be the case. As Shankara himself puts it*, we do not in experience find that while one person has an experience, someone else can remember it.

Looked at from this point of view, there is a real difficulty in this hypothesis, and in fact this is one of the reasons why the Sānkhya system has to postulate a multiplicity of purusas. This is also the reason why Leibniz has in his philosophical system conceived of an infinite series of monads culminating in the monas monadum, i.e., a monad of the highest order.

Let us, however, examine this point a little more closely. If, as we have seen, in our everyday experience there appears to be no logical passage from the multiplicity of individual selves to the Unity of Brahman or the Eternal Consciousness, nor is there any such passage from the Unity of the Eternal Consciousness or Brahman to the existential multiplicity of individual selves. It will be observed that in pointing out the difficulty as stated above, we have already assumed the existence of physical bodies in Space which condition the Unities of the individual consciousness of individual selves with which they are associated. But in testing Shankara's Hypothesis, it will not do merely to argue from the nature of the actual world as we find it in Space and Time. To prove that the Hypothesis is untenable, it will have to be shown that in all possible worlds and even in a Spaceless world, along with the Brahman or the Eternal Consciousness must also coexist Unities of Individual Consciousness or Selves, apart from and independent of it, without being related to physical bodies in Space. In other words, it will have to be shown that even in a Spaceless world co-existence of the Eternal Consciousness or Brahman and Individual Consciousness was not only possible but necessary and inevitable. The question is, is it possible to show this?

Let us then start on the assumption that there does exist

Brahman which is pure Eternal Consciousness.

Gurther that other Selves also co-exist alongwith

Brahman.

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which are as pure, how will they come into being and what would be their relationship with Brahman? The one thing to note about this situation on the analogy of our own Conscious experience is that neither of Brahman nor of the Individual Selves could we significantly predicate that they have any relation to Space. What relationship then could exist between Brahman on the one hand and the Individual Selves or the Unities of the Individual Consciousness on the other hand? That relationship could not obviously that of a whole to its parts, for the simple reason that Brahman, not having any spatial quality could not be divided into parts. 10 We have to remember that in order to be divisible at all a thing must be in Space. Nothing that abides merely in Time can be divided into parts. It is true that in Time there can be a succession of mental states one following the other. But succession of moments of spans in Time is not a division of a span of Time into smaller spans or moments of Time; and what we are concerned with in this content is whether at any moment of Time this Eternal Conscious could be conceived of as having parts.

In a conceivable Spaceless world there could be otherness but no division into parts. But ex-hypothesi we have assumed that Brahman or Universal Consciousness is qualitatively the same as the Individual Consciousness. In this state of things could we distinguish or separate off the Universal Consciousness from the Individual Consciousness? The concept of division which pre-supposes that the thing to be divided must be in Space is fundamentally distinct from the concept of otherness in Time. It is true that a succession of moments in Time has some mathematical characteristics in common with a series of points in a straight line in Space. But we cannot say that a span of Time as being in a sense composed of smaller spans of Time, necessarily involves the division of the entities or events in Time. Mental events have a pattern but cannot be divided into parts in the same sense in which physical things in Space can be.

Even in the case of Space, a division of an entity into parts or an integration of parts into a whole are not just cases of arithmetical subtraction and addition. If we cut a brick into two, and the part of the brick begins to have an individuality of its own; and the putting together of these two parts again into one brick

is not just a sum of these two parts but an integration—something more than a sum. All things in space have got to be fitted into one integrated tri-dimensional pattern which is the characteristic of Space.

The same is true of Time As we experience them all mental events are woven into one Temporal pattern and they cannot be isolated from that pattern.

We must, therefore, distinguish between divisibility and otherness. Mental events are in a sense wholes which have no parts. Division involves and pre-supposes simultaneity, otherness does not. In a purely temporal Spaceless world, therefore it would be difficult, if not logically impossible to conceive of one individual pure consciousness as being a separate part of the pure Eternal Consciousness. Nor could we conceive of it as distinct from and other than another Individual Consciousness because ex-hypothesi there would be no characteristic which could distinguish the one from the other. If in the world as it is, we do distinguish between the consciousness of one person from that of another, it is because these consciousnesses are associated with particular physical bodies which are in Space. That is to say, it is only in the realm of the created or the Sopadhika universe that we can distinguish between the Consciousness of A from the Consciousness of B. Looked at this way the problem before us is not in a sense different from the third problem as to how the whole universe arises from the Brahman and what its ontological status is. Qualitatively, the inidividual consiciousness or the pratyagatman does not appear on Shankara's hypothesis to be different from Brahman, but if we pose the question whether it is existentially different from the universal consciousness then question must form part of a larger question namely the relationship between Brahman and the Jagat simply because the individual consciousness conditioned as it is by its association with physical bodies in Space must form a part of the Jagat or the Universe.

Moreover, it is difficult to see why in a purely Spaceless world the Individual Selves could not be an Amsa of Brahman with out being existentially separate from it, on the amalogy of cells in a multicellular organism.

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Let us now turn to a third most important question namely the nature of the relationship between the Brahman and the Jagat, i.e., the world of commonsense; here also we find that Shankara has not transgressed the limitations of reason. Here too he is a complete retionalist. He says in effect that this relationsip is neither the relationship of identity nor of otherness; and it is beyond the power of speech, or unique. and cannot be explained in terms of the categories of experience. If it is said that the world is an illusion, then it must be understood that the world 'illusion' here is used in a very special sense, in a sense quite different from the one in which it is used to explain common illusions such as seeing a piece of rope as a serpent or seeing silver where there is only the mother-of-pearl. At the commonsense level, illusion is just seeing a thing as something else with which we had previous acquaintance. Here both the objects, namely the real object and the object as it appears to us are matters of previous experience. But in the case of the relationship between Brahman and the world, the Brahman is not a matter of experience at all. How then do we know that the world is an illusion, if the reality is unknown to us either by direct perception or by inference? Shankara11 says that it is impossible to describe this relationship in terms of any categories of experience. The world is neither identical with Brahman nor can it be described as other than Brahman.

Had Shankara dogmatically said as other philosophers do that the relationship of Brahman or the primordial cause to Jagat or Nature or universe is explicable in terms of the known categories of experience like causality etc., that would be a different matter; but he is fully conscious of the fact that this relationship is, if anything, unique and here again he has shown himself to be a perfect rationalist.

The fact of the matter appears to be that Shankara was more concerned with his main thesis that Brahman was the primordial cause of the world, and that it must be regarded as having the characteristic of self-consciousness such as we experience in our cognitive experience, than with working out in detail the positive relationship of Brahman with the commonsense world, been to contradict his fundamental contention that this matter was

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beyond logic and reason. He was rather concerned with refuting the objections that could have been put against his view, and in my humble opinion there he has succeded to a remarkable degree. He has defended his thesis with such logical subtlety and with such wealth of illustrations that we can have nothing but silent and reverential admiration for his great intellectual power. It is obviously impossible in a short paper to do justice to the genius of the great thinker and to the original and ingenious manner in which he has defended his thesis.

Let us now turn to the alternative hypotheses that could have been put forward to explain the nature of the Ultimate Reality. These are of two main types—One set of philosophers begin with their own experience and find that it consists of a succession of mental states and that beyond these mental states there can exist nothing. We have already referred to some of these philosophers like the British Empitrcists and certain schools of Buddhistic philosophy whom Shankara calls Vainasikas or Vijnanavadins. Shankara has shown how these philosophers fail to explain the fact of knowledge. All knowledge involves the knower or self, who, in some sense, is the same at different moments of time. We have also referred to the intellectual uneasiness which some of these philosophers have felt at finding that on their theory solipsism was inevitable and that communication with other knowing minds was impossible. This was in fact a reductio ad absurdum of their theories; and to avoid it they had to have recourse to theories like occasionalism and pre-established harmony. These theories need not detain us now. We have already found that Shankara has rightly rejected them; and has stated unequivocally that the commonsense world does exist in the ordinary sense of the word; and that if it is to be regarded as unreal that could only be in relation to Brahman. Just as a dream experience is real to us so long as we continue to be in a dream but on waking we realise the unreality of the things experienced in the dream so, enveloped as we are by what Shankara calls Avidya which incapacitates us from knowing the Reality, the world is real to us. So long as Avidya stands as a sort of screen between us and the ultimate reality there can be no realisation of the nature of Brahman and of the Brahman and of the truth that Brahman is identical with the individual self or the knower.

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The other type of theories believes in the world of commonsense consisting of animate and inanimate beings and tries to explain even knowledge in terms of natural laws and the category of causality. It is true that the Parinamavada of the Sankhyas or the theory of emergent evolution is an improvement on the theory of the Vaisesikas who seem to explain every natural phenomenon in terms of the conjunction and disjunction of the atoms. The question, however, is whether the nature of the Illtimate Reality and its relation to the commonsense world can he explained on the basis of this theory. Even before such theories can be made applicable to these ultimate problems, these should be capable of explaining at least the known facts of everyday experience. Looked at from this point of view, it is plain that these mechanical theories cannot explain the fact of knowledge or the epistemic freedom that it involves. As we have already stated elsewhere, it was mainly because of these difficulties that the Sankhya system postulated a plurality of purusas. The fact of knowledge could not be explained as the Vikṛti of the Mūlaprakrti.

35. It should be obvious to every thinking mind that knowledge is not and cannot be a mere mechanical interaction between the knower on the one hand and the object known on the other. Knowledge is unique—it is sui generis. It if had been a mere mechanical product it could not possibly have given us any awareness of the characteristics of the objects which would produce it. It would then not be knolwledge at all of the object but something quite different like pain or pleasure. We would then not be in a position to assert negative propositions like—"This is not the case", or hypothetical propositions like—" If so and so is the case, then so and so would be the case ". Shankara was convinced that knowledge as a physical fact was something unique, sui generis, that it involved self-consciousness, and the identity of the 'knower' through the passage, of time, which could not be explained by any mechanical theory like causation. It was this uniqueness of knowledge that impressed Shankara and it was our cognitive experience that gave Shankara the clue to the nature of Brahman.

In fact, it appears to me that it was only on the basis of the analogy of the individual self and its relationship with the mental states as we experience them that Shankara conceived of the

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relationship between Brahman and the Jagat or the universe, He had to imagine not only what kind of Being Brahman must be but had also to explain what relationship such a Being must have with the commonsense world. What better analogy could he think of for this purpose than to compare the relationship between Brahman and the Jagat with the relationship in our own experience between the knower—the self and the whird of mental events. The individual self was not as such an object of experience. So was Brahman. The self was known only as I in our experience, though at one place Shankara does say that it was not absolutely the case that it was not an object of Experience: The self was only a Sāksin or observer unaffected by all the whirl of mental states that moved around it. It was moreover identical with itself through the passage of time. (See the commen ary on the Sutra Anusmrteh). It is significant that these are precisely the characteristics that Shankara attributes to Brahman.

Dr. Radhakrishnan says that Shankara arrived at this proposition through intuition. That may be so, provided we use the word intuition in a sense in which is it not opposed to reason; or we do not identify intuition with a faculty analogous to our senses as if it were a sixth sense which gives us immediate knowledge of existent things which are not known through the five senses. After all, existent things are known to us and are knowable only through senses or through inferences based on knowledge by acquaintance.

This is also perfectly legitimate from the logical point of view. I quote here a passage from an article which my brother Dr. Surendra Barlingay has written in the commemoration volume dedicated to Dr. Mahadevan. He says:

"The Indian Logic, including the Buddhist one, is essentially a metaphysical system, logical arguments are used only as a means of proving the categories of reality. The conclusions in such a system of logic are bound to have an existential import. Thus, it is quite in keeping twith the ideal of the metaphysical nature of the enquiry that only those logical principles which are consistent with the existential conclusions, positive or negative, are employed, and not the others... Merely the rule of implication must be turned into a rule of inference in order to make an inference

SOME PROBLEMS IN SANKARA

possible. This precisely seems to be the function of dṛṣṭānta in Indian Syllogism. Without dṭṣṭānta, vyapti would be merely equivalent to a hypothetical major, and the minor would be merely a member of the class." [Ref.: Essays in Philosophy presented to Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan pages 165 and 169.]

I have tried to give so far a bird's eye view of some aspects of the philosophy of the great Ādi Shankaracharya. I am one of those who believe that Shankara was a rationalist through and through and in this respect he was as modern as any Rationalist. of today. In truth, Rationality can be neither modern nor ancient It is unaffected by the passage of time. To my mind, there is little doubt that of all the various hypotheses with regard to the nature of ultimate Reality, Shankara's metaphysics is the most satisfying to the human intellect. It is true that according to Shankara his hypotheses cannot be tested by ordinary logic. Here of course he was right, and in fact as already shown above, it could only be on the basis of an analogy (Dṛṣṭānta) that we could conceive of the nature of Ultimate Reality.

It may, moreover, be the case that there are many truths which are known to us by what may be called instinct or intuition; and the proposition about Ultimate Reality may be known to us in this way. This instinct or intuition is not necessarily something other than or opposed to Reason. When the various steps in a system of reasoning are compressed, so to speak, so that the intellect can jump over the many intermediate propositions which form the link between the premises and the conclusion, the reasoning process shrinks into an instinct or an intuition. In the same way an instinct or an intuition in this sense could be expanded into a chain of propositions which form a reasoning process. We have known cases in actual life, as for instance, that of the great mathematician Ramanujan, to whom, it is said, remote mathematical conclusions were as immediate as the proposition 2 plus 2 make 4; and it may be that the nature of Reality is known to us through intuition in this sense.

The philosophy of Shankara, moreover, is of special significance to us. His metaphysics provides a true and positive basis for democracy. Democracy, to be real must be founded on the socio-political equality of all the citizens. What is the logical foundation for this proposition? It is true that John

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oyed, est be rence Stuart Mill did say that in a democracy, everyone was to count for one and nobody for more than one. By this he meant that everybody should have the same social and political value in a democracy. It is submitted, however, that in saying this he was merely giving an expression to his benevolent instinct and to the fact that if all men are not treated as equal in a democracy, that would lead to social conflict. Social justice in a modern Democracy appears to be based on the fear of the other fellow with whom we associate in a democracy. It appears to be based on the principle, Dvitiyāt dvai Bhayam bhavati. A second person is always a source of fear. The great Ādi Shankaracharya has provided a true metaphysical foundation for democracy inassuch as on his theory every person is an 'amsa' or part of the same eternal consciousness.

Few thinkers have had a greater impact on our social, religious and cultural history than the great Ādi Shankara. His teachings have influenced not only our literature and thought but have permeated our entire social life. It is no exaggeration to say that he has infused into Hinduism a life and a soul in the shape of his philosophy such as no other single person has done. It is difficult to say what survival value Hinduism would have had in modern times without the philosophic teachings of Shankara. There was hardly any saint in Maharashtra whose philosophic teachings were not founded on that of Ādi Shankaracharya. So was the case in Bengal and elsewhere. It is not an exaggeration to say that probably he has said the last word in speculative philosophy.

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NOTES

1. I have deliberately substituted $V\bar{a}$ for tu just before Dvijostu because in my view tu before Dvijostu is obviously a mistake.

2. This is the reason why Prof. G. E. Moore used to say that he believed that physical things did exist and that any analysis of the cognitive situation by which it was sought to prove that they do not exist, was likely to be more mistaken and unreliable than the belief that they do exist.

3. The argument of Gaudapada has been put by Jacobi in a very interesting manner. Things seen in the waking state are not true (Pratijna) because they are seen. This is the reason (Hetu) Just like things seen in a dream (Dṛṣṭānta). As things seen in a dream are not true so the property of being seen belongs in like manner to things seen in the waking state. This is application of the reason (Upanara) Thereore, things seen in the waking state are also untrue. This is the conclusion. (Nigamana) Cf. Dr. Radha-krishnan's Indian Philosophy Vol. II.

४. न स्वप्नादिवत् जाग्रत्-प्रत्यया भिवतुमर्हन्ति । कस्मात् ? वैधन्यात् । वैधन्यं हि भवति स्वप्नजागिरितयोः । कि पुनर्वंधन्यंम् । वाधाबाधौ इति बूमः । वाध्यते हि स्वप्नोपलब्धं वस्तु । ...नैवं जागिरितोपलब्धं वस्तु कस्यांचिदिप अवस्थायां वाध्यते । अपि च स्मृतिरेषा यत्स्वप्नदर्शनम् । उपलब्धिस्तु जागिरितदर्शनम् । स्मृत्युपलब्ध्योश्च प्रत्यक्षमन्तरं स्वयमनुभूयते । तत्र एवं सित न शक्यते वक्तुं मिथ्या जागिरितोपलब्धः उपलब्धित्वात् स्वप्नोपलब्धिः उपलब्धित्वात् स्वप्नोपलब्धिः उपलब्धित्वात् स्वप्नोपलब्धिः उपलब्धित्वात् स्वप्नोपलब्धिः उपलब्धित्वात् स्वप्नानिभिर्युक्तः कर्तुम् ।

- व्र. सू. भाष्य २.२.२९

५. ननु नाहमेवं त्रवीमि न कंचिदर्थं उपलभे इति । किन्तु उपलब्धिव्यतिरिक्तं नोपलभे इति ब्रवीमि । यतः उपलब्धिव्यतिरेकोऽपि बलात् अर्थस्य उपगन्तव्यः उपलब्धेरेव । न हि कश्चित् उपलब्धिमेव स्तंभः कुडचंच इत्युपलभते ।

- ब्र. स्. भाष्य २.२.२८

न ह्ययं सर्वप्रमाणप्रसिद्धौ लोकव्यवहारः अन्यत्तत्त्वं । अनिधिगम्य शक्यते अपन्होतुं अपवादाभावे उत्सर्गप्रसिद्धेः ।

-त्र. सू. भाष्य २.२.३१

७. श्रुत्यादयो ऽनुभवादयश्च यथासंभविमह प्रमाणम् अनुभवावसानत्वात् भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य ।

- ब्र. सू. भाष्य १.१.२

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ननु धर्म इव ब्रह्मणि अपि अनपेक्षः आगमः भिवतुमहिति ।
भवेदयमवष्टभो यदि प्रमाणान्तरानवगाह्य आगममात्रप्रमेयोऽयमर्थः स्थात्
अनुष्ठेयरूप इव धर्मः । परिनिष्पन्नरूपं तु ब्रह्म अवगम्यते । परिनिष्पन्ने व वस्तुनि प्रमाणान्तराणामस्त्यवकाशो यथा पृथिव्यादिषु ।

─त्र. सू. भाष्य २.१४

९. अनुस्मृतेः अनुभवं उपलिब्धि अनूत्पद्यमानं स्मरणमेव अनुस्मृतिः । सा व उपलब्ध्येककर्तृका सती संभवति । पुरूषान्तरोपलिब्धिविषये पुरूषान्तरस्य स्मृत्यदर्शनात् । कथं हि अहमदोऽद्राक्षम् इदं पश्यामि इति च पूर्वोत्तरर्दाश्चीन एकस्मिन् असति प्रत्ययः स्यात् ।

-- ब्र. सू. भाष्य २.२.२५

१०. रूपाद्यभावाद्धि न्यायमर्थः प्रत्यक्षगोचरःिलगाद्यभावाच्च नानुमानादीनाम् ।

- व्र. सू. भाष्य २.१.११

11. At this stage a distinction must be made between what may be called an Amśa-Amśī relation and an Avayava-Avayavī relation, which is very often overlooked. The Amśa-Amśī relation is homogeneous and appears to be possible in a Spaceless world, not so the Avayava-Avayavi relation which is heterogeneous and has reference to Space. I must add that I owe this distinction to my brother, Dr. Surendra Barlingay.

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INDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETATION

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which e this A distinction is sometimes made between the teaching of a text as it is and the one as is interpreted by some one. This distinction seems to amount to the distinction between understanding of a text and its interpretation. But to maintain it is to hold that we can understand the teaching of a text as it is without being required to interpret the text, or that interpretation is not at all involved in the understanding of a text. I propose to show in this paper that this position cannot be seriously maintained. In other words I shall advocate the view that understanding of a text does involve its interpretation.

Some important questions arise in this context. What is it to understand a text? Is there any difference between the meaning and the teaching of a text? What is interpretation of a text? What is the nature of traditional interpretation? What is a right interpretation? How to determine the rightness or faithfulness of an interpretation? and so on. The answers to these would bring out the necessity of interpretation for understanding the teaching of a text.

To understand a text, some one may say, is to understand its meaning. But the word 'meaning' is quite vague, especially in the context of a text as a whole. It is true that sometimes a word is taken to be the ultimate meaningful unit of language and hence we speak of meanings of words and have dictionaries. In a communication situation, however, we use words in combination so as to express what is technically called a complete thought. And this is a 'sentence' which really is the ultimate meaningful unit of language from the point of view of communication. A sentence may be said to be the organic unity of words such that words merge their identity in it and are, hence, to be understood only in its setting or context. To understand an isolated word is to know its meaning (or meanings) as fossilised in dictionaries; but to understand the meaning of a sentence is to understand the thought' expressed by it, where 'thought' stands for whatever the user or the author of the sentence intends to communicate L.P.Q. . 19

to the readers through it - a thought, a feeling or an intention. Words acquire their active meanings, so to say, only in the context of the sentence of which they form parts. However, what needs to be remembered is that what is true of words is also true of sentences themselves in respect of their meanings. When a sentence occurs as a part of a group of sentences which as a whole expresses some 'thought', its meaning needs to be understood only in the context of the whole of the group, that is, in relation to the other sentences of the group. A text is usually structurally divided into parts, chapters, sections and paragraphs. Semantically, it is found to be divided into subjects, topics, subtopics and points. There are, in a text, statements of views, expositions, explanations, justifications, arguments and so on often centering round some dominant theme or theory which it is the purpose of the text as a whole to propound. This dominant view or conceptual whole forms the central 'thought' of the text which semantically governs our understanding even of the sentences in it. This 'central thought' which the author intends to express and communicate through the text as a whole constitutes the teaching of the text. To understand the meaning of a text is really to understand its teaching. And to understand the meanings of sentences in a text is to understand the particular 'thoughts' expressed by them in relation to one another and to the 'teaching' of the text.

Now, it is true that to understand the real purport of a text is to understand its 'teaching' or 'thought' which its author intends to communicate. But, if we distinguish between the intended meaning of a text and its understood meaning and call the former its 'teaching', then the crucial problem is how to understand the intended meaning (or 'teaching') of a text? Strictly speaking the true purport of the teaching, as it is, of a text is known only to the author of the text. (In the case of a confused writer even this cannot be guaranteed!) For others, the only access to it is the text itself through which it is expressed. There is very often a gap between the 'teaching' of a text and our understanding of it. This is what we call misunderstanding or partial understanding. It is the permanent possibility of such a 'gap', or 'misunderstanding' that lends support to the distinction, mentioned in the beginning of this paper, between the teaching of a text as it is and the one as interpreted.

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The root of such misunderstandings lies firstly in the nature of language itself. Had the words had fixed, unchanging meanings, or had it been possible to use them for the same fixed ourpose in a language, the matter of understanding them would have been much simpler; in fact, there would have been neither misunderstanding nor any problem about them. But the matter is much more complex than it appears to be at first sight. have problem in understanding a text if the words used are ambiguous, or the views expressed are not clear. The matter is further complicated if the text to be understood is on a specialised subject. We need to know in such cases the technical terminology, phraseology etc. besides the ordinary knowledge of language. Further, the students of language distinguish between at least two kinds of meaning viz. Literal meaning (Vācyārtha) and suggested meaning (Vyangyartha). The latter goes beyond the former. There are a number of other ways like symbolisms, allegories, parables and fables etc. of going beyond literal meaning for determining which grammar, etymology etc. are useful. A text, again, may either be direct or indirect (i. e. suggestive) in its expression. The paradigm of a language which is absolutely clear, unambiguous and direct in its communication of 'thought' may be regarded as ideal language and the language of the statelaws is usually supposed to come closest to it. Even then, we know that the same laws are quoted in support by the pleaders of both the plaintiff and the defendant. The ideal language is perhaps destined to be either an ideal only or else a thoughtless (contentless) formal skeleton communicating nothing. As an example of suggestive language one may mention parables and fables. I think, it is here that the difference between understanding of the literal meaning of a text and that of its thought becomes evident. Vishnugupta of the Pancatantra could not have been able to make the dullards of Princes wise by telling them merely cock and bull stories! What is conveyed through them is something different. The literal meaning of the Pancatantra would give you the stories but not the thought which the author intends to communicate through them.

The problem is how to understand the 'teaching' or 'thought' directly express their 'thoughts' or 'teachings', the problem is

not so acute; but in the case of texts which are not clear, or use symbolisms, or again express the 'thought' suggestively and indirectly, or which use words in technical and special senses, or which contain 'teachnings' which are at least apparently diverse and contradictory, or which are ancient and use the modes of language which are not current, or the like, it is very much so. In case of any text whatever, what we have to do, for understanding its 'teaching', is to take recourse to what is called interpretation².

In order to understand the true purport of a text, we are required to interpret not only sentences but even words which express concepts that are central to its teaching. I shall illustrate this point with the help of an example. In the Isavasyopanisd the words $Vidy\bar{a}$ and $Avidy\bar{a}$ occur. Now, what is one to understand by these words in the context of the text? Their literal meanings are knowledge and ignorance. But to know this is not sufficient to understand the text. In the light of the whole text, therefore, they are interpreted as meaning $\bar{A}tmaj\bar{n}\bar{a}na$ and 'Karma' respectively. By no stretch of imagination can $Avidy\bar{a}$ be taken, by itself, to mean Karma. The context of the upanisad, however, almost forces this interpretation on us.

The necessity of interpretation is more obvious in the case of texts which are ambiguous or vague, or which use symbolic language and/or archaic expressions. The very fact that one system of Indian Philosophy-Mimāmsā-came into being to lay down the principles of proper interpretation of the Vedas³ for understanding their true purport, is more than sufficient to convince us of this necessity From this point of view, to understand a text is to interpret it properly. 'Interpretation' here means 'genuine interpretation' which follows a method like the one described earlier4 and has the purpose of understanding the true purport of the text. It may be noted that the term 'interpretation' stands for both the method of interpreting a text and the resultant understanding of it. Unfortunately, 'interpretation' has come to acquire yell because of the way some commentators another sense texts have used it for their own purpose. interpretation is used mostly to defend a particular understanding of a text which has been a particular understanding of a text which has been traditionally followed. Tradition rather than the text becomes the second of the second o than the text becomes decisive. What happens, some times, in the

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cases of such tradition-defending interpretations is that the text is twisted or the context ignored etc. to suit the traditional interpretation. This is done mostly in the face of criticisms from counter traditional interpretations of the same text. In extreme cases, the purpose of interpretation becomes to see one's own meaning in the text rather than to discover the meaning which the author intends to convey. We shall do well, therefore, to examine the nature of 'traditional interpretation' a little more closely.

Granting that interpretation has been historically used (misused!) in this way, let us see if this is a sufficient ground for contrasting genuine interpretation with traditional interpretation. This is important because it is in the context of traditional interpretations that the distinction, with which we started, between the teaching of a text as it exists in the text and the teaching as interpreted, becomes most relevant.

Now, the question we have to ask is, must the purpose of a traditional interpretation, qua traditionl, be to read one's own view or meaning into the text. In other words, cannot a traditional interpretation be genuine? Those who attack tradition would tell us not to answer this question theoretically but historically. And then they would give a number of examples of traditional interpretations of ancient texts where the texts are interpreted to suit interpreters' views of the texts. Granting for the sake of the argument that historically there have been interpretations of ancient texts, like the Upanisads and the Gitā, which tend to uphold tradition even at the cost of the texts, can we say that a traditional interpretation, as traditional, must do this and so can never be genuine?

The defenders of tradition would say that tradition alone helps us in understanding the real purport of texts. In other words, they would claim not only that traditional interpretation is genuine but also that it alone is genuine and correct. This amounts to saying that an interpretation is genuine because it is traditional. Thus, we have two opposed genuine because it is traditional and that an interpretation is genuine because it is traditional and that an interpretation is not the results of the same mistaken principle, namely that the genuine-

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ness or otherwise, of an interpretation depends merely on its being traditional, while in fact, it depends on the proper application of the scientific method of interpretation with a view to discovering the true purport of the text.

We may further try to bring the nature of traditional interpretation into clearer relief. We must remember that a tradition of interpretations does not come from the blue all of a sudden. There is some founder of the tradition who is the original commentator or interpreter of a text. In course of time, his interpretation of the text finds favour and acceptance with other thinkers and a following comes into being. The followers do not simply repeat or translate the founder's interpretation but clarify it, explain it, and if necessary, also introduce minor modifications in it. This process of the development of a tradition can be historically described. If so, and if we have no doubt about the intellectual capacities of the followers, then obviously we cannot charge them of being blind followers. Positively, this means that they have judged the founder's interpretation to be genuine and right in the light of their own understanding of the text and then accepted it for furtherence. I do not want to suggest that every follower does this. I want only to point out that this possibility cannot be ignored, and that we cannot declare that all the followers of a tradition are blind. Acceptance of another's views which are judged to be true or right need not be prohibited. If this is true of a follower, then it goes without saying that the founder might have interpreted the text genuinely, with a purpose to understand its true purport, he being himself out of the tradition. Moreover, a traditional interpretation, being an interpretation, cannot be said to be a purely imaginary of independent, original work; it must be based on the text itself. From this it should be evident that a traditional interpretation can be genuine and need not necessarily foist one's meaning or view on the text.

However, having said this, we cannot deny the possibility that a text can be used in support of one's own views independently arrived at. But, even here, only that text can be taken help of whose teaching is basically similar to one's own views. The differences are then either ignored or explained away or else are so inter-

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preted as to be shown to be no differences at all. In such cases, foisting' meaning or views on the text is possible. This may, however, be said to be only a special use of interpretation and not the essential nature of it. Moreover, it would be difficult to say that this kind of use is peculiar only to traditional interpretions. It is available to all. But even in such cases, it would be unfair, and even risky, to attribute motives to an interpreter by saying that he is not really, genuinely, interpreting the text, but is using it for his own purpose. It is unfair because he might not be having that motive, and it is risky because it is almost impossible to prove that he has this kind of motive. It would be more reasonable, therefore to tackle the basic problem of the rightness of an interpretation.

If we try to look for the practical situation in which all these questions arise, we see that they arise only where there are differing interpretations of the same text. Had there been only one interpretation, or had there been no difference between the conclusions of the available interpretations in regard to its teaching, the problems discussed earlier would not have arisen. In the face of differing, sometimes even opposed, interpretations, it becomes necessary to determine which one of them is correct. I have already described a genuine interpretation as one which uses a method of interpretation properly and intends to determine the true purport of a text. But then, an interpretation's being genuine is not the guarantee of its being correct. All the differing interpretions could be genuine, while only one of them can be correct. Hence the problem of determining the correct interpretation in such a situation becomes highly pertinent. A comparative study is necessary for solving this problem.

The real difficulty arises when the text itself lends support more than one interpretation. This is possible in the case of a text which contains, diverse, and sometimes, (at least apparently) inconsistent teachings. In such cases it is very difficult to maintain that one interpretation emphasising one leaching of the text is right, and the other emphasising another leaching is altogether wrong. What is possible to say is that both are only partially correct. If there is a third interpretation that satisfactorily resolves the apparent inconsistency in the teachings of the text, it would prove to be more acceptable than the other two. In almost all the cases of texts having diverse interpretations, we find that there is at least some evidence in the text that supports each one of them. Consider the famous example of the Bhagavdgitā of which there are at least three understandings, or interpretations, called Karma Yoga, Bhaki Yoga, and Jñāna Yoga, all of which find ample support in the text. It would be more appropriate, therefore, if we understand the concept of correctness (or rightness) of an interpretation in terms of its faithfulness to the text. And what we can and have to do for determining the 'faithfulness' of an interpretation, is to see whether a scientific method of interpretation is properly applied or not, whether all the relevant factors are taken into account or not. If this is found to have been done, we can judge the interpretation in question to be faithful. Applying the same procedure we can judge one interpretation to be more faithful than another, or to be the most faithful, in a comparative manner. But it should be remembered that this procedure itself involves interpretation of some kind.

If, however, even after following this procedure, we judge more than one interpretation of a text to be equally faithful, as in the case of the Gītā again, then the question remains as to which one of them is to be accepted as the right one. I think, the search for an interpretation, or understanding, which is the right one is misdirected. We may judge at the most its faithfulness; but in the face of more than one faithful interpretation of the same text, acceptance of one of them becomes a matter of individual preference.

there is a complex inter-relationship between 'understanding' and 'interpretation' especially in the case of conceptually poly-valent texts. The main concern of the analysis has been to bring out one particular aspect of this inter-relationship. It may be said that 'understanding' in the context of complex texts has two foci-the grasp of meanings and the articulation and structuring of these meanings in the form of a connected conceptual whole. The grasp of meanings constitutes 'understanding' as ordinarily conceived but in the case of conceptually complex texts, it is suggested that this mode of 'understanding' is to be supplemented by the grasp of the structuring of meanings into a conceptual whole. And it

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is this particular structuring that I refer to as the 'teaching' of a text. Now, the 'teaching' of a text is, I have suggested, accessible only by way of what is usually called 'interpretation.' Hence the claim of the paper that 'interpretation' functions as a constitutive element in 'understanding'.

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S. R. Talghatti

NOTES

- I. Vakturicchā tātparyam.
- 2. The Indian thinkers, especially the Mīmāmsakas, have laid down one such scientific method of interpretation. According to them, for determining the true purport of a text one has to take into consideration its six features, namely, (1) the introduction and eonclusion together; (2) the 'thought' or 'thougets' repeated and emphasised through out the text; (3) the originality and distinctiveness of 'thought', language, and method of expression; (4) the purpose of the text mentioned by the author; (5) the objects of praise (or blame) and hyperbolic expressions; and, what is important, (6) the arguments and examples used to support and explain the 'thought'. With the help of such a method there is a fairly good chance of arriving at a faithful and possibly true understanding of the 'teaching' of a text. It should be noted that such a method may serve as a method of justification also.
- In fact what are called the 'Sadangas' (six organs) of the Vedas, viz. Sikṣā (Phonetics), Kalpa (Code of rituals), Vyākaraṇa (Grammar), Nirukta (Etymology or Vedic Lexicon) Chanda (Prosody) and Jyotiṣa (Astronomy) are all to be used to understand the teachings of the Vedas.
- 4. See Note 2.

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Satyavan P. Kanal Nirishwarvada EK Adhayain (Deva Samaj Publicarions, Mega, Punjab, 1973) pp. 240, Rs. 15/-.

Professor Satyavan P. Kanal is the author of a number of books in English and Hindi. Nirishwarvada is an exposition of atheism in Indian and Western philosophy. This book, written in simple and lucid Hindi, makes a very pleasant reading because the general impression is that Indian philosophy is theistic.

Nirshwarvada is written from the point of view of the philosophy of Devadharma. And to understand Nirishwarvada it is essential to understand the philosophy of Devadharma. Devadharma is an atheistic religion which regards scientific method as the only way of acquiring knowledge. Professor Kanal says in Nirishwarvada that scientific method (P 127) "is the only method which can establish the existence of something external".

Professor Kanal tackles the problems of existence of God from all possible angles. He divides the book into four parts. In the first part he deals with the history of atheism and shows how Indian philosophy is essentially atheistic. We wish that the account had been more detailed on this topic. This shortcoming is more glaring with regard to Western philosophy where he limits his study of atheism to Existentialism and Analytic philosophy. Professor Kanal offers a new interpretation of Indian philosophy. According to him, Indian philosophy is soul-centred and not God centred. He shows that out of the six orthodox schools, in the first five, moksa is not identification with God. Consequently Professor Kanal concludes that God is a minor key in Indian philosophy. The study of these schools shows that, in the original sutras, either God is not mentioned or arguments are presented to refute his existence Thus Nyaya and Vaisesika, in the original sutras, do not mention God nor do we find a sutras the Sankhya. find a mention of God in the original texts of the Sankhya. And Yoga is more of a discipline of the body. Moreover the fact that it is associated with Sankhya shows that the aim of life is not identification with God. Thus in Indian Philosopy, God is either not mentioned or arguments are advanced to refute His existence.

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The II part deals with the historical aguments with regard to the existence of God. Each argument is dealt with at full length and the criticisms are offered in detail; throughout the common reader is kept in view. The technical language has been rendered into everyday language. The author accepts the phiosophical position that existence of God can neither be proved nor disproved. But since the theists have tried to prove the existence of God consequently he claims that his arguments are valid against the theists.

The III part deals with the method and broad conclusions of science. Scientific method has been so far the best method for acquiring knowledge. The theists themselves accept scientific knowledge as a true model of knowledge. Professor Kanal has shown that scientific knowledge dees not make room for the acceptance of God. This is so because the essence of scientific method is verification and the existence God cannot be verified. All arguments, according to Professor Kanal, either proceed from empirical facts or from the analogy of empirical facts to the supernatural. But no empirical fact requires for its explanation, the acceptance of a fact other than empirical. Analogical argument is ordinarily very weak but it becomes logically useless when we proceed from the natural to the supernatural.

Part IV tackles with question of the origin and the persistence of belief in God. Here the theories of Freud and Feuerbach, which show primarily the emotional root of the belief in God, are discussed. The origin of belief, in the existence of God, is explained in terms of men's frustrations in life. It is held that since man has certain frustrations which are beyond his tolerance he seeks refuge in God. The reason for the persistence of this belief, according to Professor Kanal, is our primitive mode of thinking. Man has not yet developed the scientific outlook. And the scientific outlook will result in the disappearance of the belief in God.

This book is the first full length study of the atheistic case in Hindi literature. It deals with the subject of God from the

BOOK REVIEW

301

historical, logical, scientific and sociological points of view. Thus it can claim an important place in literature on atheism in terms of its comprehensiveness. It is recommended both for the students of philosophy as well as for the layman.

Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi Suman Gupta

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SCEPTICISM, IDENTITY AND INTERRUPTED EXISTENCE*

(Consideration of Some Model Universes)

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While discussing the problem of reidentification¹ Professor Strawson uses what is described as a 'Transcendental Argument' against the sceptic. The argument in question refers to the presupposition of a single (as opposed to multiple) space-time system of particulars. According to Strawson, doubting the possibility of particular-identity, i.e., the possibility that this or that particular has continued existence, presupposes the existence of a single space-time system of particulars. But such a system of particulars is impossible if the possibility of particular-identity is denied. Thus, Strawson's argument against the sceptic is more attractive than the 'Common Sense' argument of Moore. For Moore's argument is only a dogmatic assertion of the common sense view, whereas Strawson is supposed to have discovered some sort of internal incoherence in the sceptic's doubt.

I attempt to show in this article that Strawson's argument fails to refute the sceptic, whether the sceptic in question is a solipsist or one who accepts a view similar to that of Hume.² By accepting the continued existence of oneself, a solipsist satisfies the condition of there being a single space-time system of particulars. An if the concept of 'identity' is different from the concept of 'continuity', as I have attempted to show in this article, then the sceptic, who has a Hume-like frame of mind, could also accept the existence of there being a single space-time system of particulars without being led to accept that the particulars of such a system continue to exist without being observed. In the course of this discussion I refer to after-images and halluninatory objects. But my purpose in referring to these objects is different from that of a phenomenalist like Ayer. For a pheno-

Paper presented at a Seminar on the Concept of Man held at Simla, Simla, under the auspices of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, teprint the paper in an abridged form (Ed).

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menalist refers to these objects in order to introduce, what he describes in his language as sense-data. But it is in connection with the distinction between the concept of 'identity' and the concept of 'continuity' that I bring these objects into this discussion. For these objects are very good examples of the sons of objects to which identity could be ascribed without ascribing continuity. Before taking up the main issues, I would like to explain what Strawson means by there being a single space-time system, and how such a system could be distinguished from other sorts of systems.

Strawson describes his single space-time system in terms of particulars, filling the space-time structure, and the relation of identity holding between some of these particulars. His system can clearly be distinguished from what may be described as multiple space-time systems. Consider the following model which exhibits the nature of multiple space-time systems.³

Model I:

$$(A)_{t-}^{s-}o, p, q....$$

$$(B)_{t-}^{s-}x, y, z,...$$

A and B are two different systems of particulars; o, p, q and x, y, z are the particulars in question. The arrangement of symbols s-/t- stands for the spatio-temporal frame of a system If the particular o of the system A does not have any spatial relation with the particulars x, y and z, either being at the same place as any of them or being at a different place from any of them and described and them, and does not either temporally precede or succeed of succeed a contemporary of any of them, then o does not have any spaint temporal connection with the particulars of the system B. this is also true of p and q that they can have spatio-temporal relationships with relationships with one another but not with a particular of the system R, then the system B, then the system A is wholly independent of the system B. There is no an another but not with a particular system B. There is no an another but not with a particular system B. There is no an another but not with a particular system but not with a particular system. There is no sense in which A and B could be considered by parts of one and the same spatio-temporal system of particular of such systems of particular and become of particular of such systems of such If such systems of particulars as A and B are possible, they would exemplify what it is a exemplify what it is for there to be multiple space-time system of particulars. What of particulars. Whether any philosopher has ever accepted the

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existence of such independent, parallel, space-time systems o particulars is to be seen later.

Now, imagine that some particulars of the system A are numerically identical with some particulars of the system B; then these systems could not be considered as those sorts of systems which are independent of one another. It is impossible for a particular of one system to be the same as a particular of another if these systems are independent of one another, if they are not parts of one and the same system of particulars. So it is the relation of identity, numerical identity, between particulars that converts two different systems of particulars into a single system of particulars. Consider the following model:—

Model 2:

(B)
$$\begin{array}{c} s-2 \\ t-2 \end{array}$$
 o, m, z....

(C)
$$_{t-3}^{s-3}$$
 o, p, z....

The differences between this model and the earlier one are that space and time have been distinguished into s-1, s-2, s-3 and t-1, t-2, t-3. And some particulars are common to these different systems. If we consider q, we fail to connect the system A with the system B and C, for q, is found only in A. Similarly, m is restricted to B. But if we consider o we find that it is common to all of them, and shows that the three systems of particulars in question are not independent of one another, that they belong to one and the same spatio-temporal system of particulars. Does it imply that at least one particular must be common to all those systems of particulars which are parts of one and the same system of particulars? There is no such implication. If we do not consider the presence of o in these systems (which is the only particular common to all of them), even then they are connected with one another. Since p is common to A and C, and z is common to B and C, therefore, A, B, and C are not independent of one another.

The denial of continued existence to particulars, according to Strawson, is the denial of the ascription of identity to them, and

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consequently, it is the denial of there being a single space-time system of particulars. For if continued existence is granted to a particular it could possibly exist in two different spatio-temporal sub-systems, could be identified in one of them and reidentified in the other. Consider the second model. The particular p in that model is identified in the system A and reidentified in the system C. But if p is deprived of its continued existence, i.e., its existence beyond the system A, then it cannot be the same p that is being identified (reidentified) in the system C. What is being identified in the system C is a different p. But if it is not the same p which occurs in the spatio-temporal system A and C, then so far as p is concerned these systems are independent of one another. If A and B are to be considered as sub-systems of the same system, then according to Strawson, we must accept "the identity of at least some items in one sub-system with some items in the other".4 And our ascription of identity to these items, Strawson presupposes, depends on our ascription of continuity to them. But why does Strawson insist on some items rather than all of the or only one of them? Why should there be more than one continuant? There seems to be no other reason than that his pluralistic ontology does not require that all particulars should have continued existence, a few of them will serve the purpose. To demand that all particulars should have continued existence is too much. For nothing in this universe is everlasting. And not all things have the fortune of existing for a sufficiently long time to be found in new company; only a few things have this privilege. But is Strawson concerned with only what happens in this world? Is his interest restricted to the conceptual features of this world? As a philosopher, Strawson is required to give a conceptual analysis of particulars with reference to their space time character. And his analysis should be applicable to any world of particulars which satisfied the requirement of being a single space-time world of particulars. The question which Strawson is posing about the requirement for there to be a single spatio-temporal system of particulars is a conceptual question, and therefore, demands only what is essentially required for such a system. There could not be such a system as the system in question unless this and this is present. And there could be such a system even if this and this is missing. For example,

Strawson should accept that there could be a single space-time system of particulars inspite of the fact that nothing in that universe is everlasting. Again, Strawson should accept that there could not be such a system if the universe is constituted out of fleeting things like sense-data, for there would be nothing in that universe which could function as a continuant, could be identified in one sub-system and reidentified in the other. A phenomenalist may have his own grounds for disagreeing with Strawson on this issue. But the phenomenalist's conceptions of space and time, and items occupying space and time, are different.

Consider the following model depicting the phenomenalistic picture of a universe:

Model 3:

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$$(A) {s-1 \atop t-1} o, p, q....$$

(B)
$$^{s-2}_{t-2}e, f, g...$$

(C)
$$\frac{s-3}{t-3}$$
 x, y, z....

This model is a slight variation on the first model. Though no sense-data or a complex of sense-data can recur, sense-data can have the relation of succession, one set occurring after the other. Thus, space and time can be sliced into s-1, s-2, s-3 and t-1, t-2, t-3, for the system C succeeds the system B, and the system B succeeds the system A. These systems are certainly not independent of one another as are the systems of the model 1. But our difficulty with Strawson's argument is not the same as that of a phenomenalist. Our question is: is it essential for there being a single space-time system of particulars that continuity should be ascribed to more than one particular? If we consider the second model we can easily discover that one particular is sufficient to connect the two different sub-systems. Though two particulars o and p are common to the sub-systems A and C, this does not imply that both of them are essential for a connection between these sub-systems. Either of them will do. But to accept that only one particular will do the job of connecting the two sub-systems is to accept that the solipsistic

picture of a universe could be the picture of a universe exhibiting a single space-time system of particulars.

Consider the following model depicting the solipsistic picture of a universe:

Model 4:

(A)
$$_{t-1}^{s-1}$$
 o, p, q....

(B)
$$\frac{s-2}{t-2}$$
 o, x, y...

$$(C)_{t-3}^{s-3} o, m, n...$$

This model is closer to the second model than the first or the third. Suppose a solipsist maintains, as perhaps he does maintain, that the only particular that is continuous in different space-time sub-systems is oneself, and all other particulars are fleeting. He ascribes a persisting existence to himself and a transitory existence to other objects. This is possible by applying sense-datum analysis to all other objects except oneself. He may be condemned on various counts. But how could he be condemned for denying the existence of such a system which may be described as a single spatio-temporal system of particulars? He is certainly not saying that no particular is common to two different sub-systems, he is simply saying that only one such particular is common. The objects other than oneself are transitory on the ground that their existence is restricted 10 the existence of one's observational stretches. But the fact that these objects are transitory does not imply that a person himself does not have a persisting existence.

However, a difficulty remains to be solved. The consideration of oneself as a persisting being presupposes the conception of a wider system of objects, a system in which a person has to put himself on a par with other objects. For it is in relation to objects other than oneself that one's own persisting existence has been considered. But how could a solipsist be prohibited from having such a conception? The difficulty arises only if he considers himself to be a bodiless spirit or a transcendental subject. For a transcendental subject could not be placed in this world, the world in which noises, smells and visual scenes

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But why should a solipsist take up such an extreme osition? Why should he consider himself to be a transcendental subject? 'If one is not a bodiless spirit or a transcendental subject, then it is not absurd to maintain that one occupies a position in the same visual scenes, same observational stretches, in which a chair or a table occupies its position. But why should this body, the body which I call as mine, be allowed to persist rather than the one occupying a position in the remote corner of my observational stretch? The answer is simple. This body, the body which is mine, has a unique position in the system of bodies. I am aware of it without observing it; and hence its existence is not tied to the existence of any observational stretches in which it occurs. I have not brought my body into existence by observing it, by having a visual glimpse of it, for I was already aware of its existence before I started observing it. Therefore, no inconsistency arises in refusing to apply the sense-datum analysis to one's own body, but continuing to apply such an analysis to things other than one's body. The fact that certain considerations lead me to put myself on a par with such objects as shoes and sealing-wax, does not mean that I have to assimilate myself to these objects. I am aware of my shoe because it pinches me, but I am aware of my body without its pinching me.

The consideration of oneself as the only continuant shows that the solipsistic conception of spatio-temporal reality is extremely restricted. His seclusion is supposed to be unlike the seclusion of Robinson Crusoe. For a solipsist cannot even hope or wish to be ever joined by a Man Friday. Crusoe not only identifies the spatio-temporal items of his world, but sometimes he also reidentifies them, i.e., ascribes identity to them. evening he returns to the same cave, recaptures the same visual Scenes. But a solipsist has no use for the concept of identity for the items of his experience. There is no doubt that the world of a solipsist lacks the richness and variety of Crusoe's world. But it is not so poor as to prohibit the solipsist from ascribing identity to some of the items of his experience. The fact that the visual, tactual and auditory items, out of which a solipsist constructs his universe, are not physical, simply implies that these items items cannot have physical continuity, that these items cannot produce a physical continuant. But their failure to have physical

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continuity cannot prohibit a solipsist from ascribing identity to them. Such a prohibition is possible only by equating the concept of identity with the concept of physical continuity. I shall take up the issue of ascribing identity to visual and auditory items while discussing Strawson's treatment of sounds.

Let us now consider Strawson's crucial argument, the argument which is meant to dispose of the sceptic having a Hume. like frame of mind, one who refuses to grant continued existence to items of observation, and hence, is supposed to have refused to ascribe identity to them. According to Strawson, if we are never willing to ascribe identity to items of observation then, "We should as it were have the idea of a new, different, spatial system for each new continuous stretch of observation. Each new system would be wholly independent of another.. There would be no question of doubt about the identity of an item in one system with an item in another. For such a doubt makes sense only if the two systems are not independent, if they are parts, in some way related, of a single system which includes them both."5 Are the systems of the model 3 wholly independent of each other? Though no particular is common to them, i.e., identity or continued existence has not been ascribed to any of them yet it cannot be said that the systems of this model are independent of one another. Had they been independent, then the particulars of one system should not have even the spatio-temporal relation of succession to the particulars of the other systems. But the fact that they have such a relation shows that the systems in question do not carry their own spatio-temporal frames, that they belong 10 the same spatio-temporal system of particulars.6 It is only the systems of the first model which are wholly independent of one another. But to deny the ascription of identity to particulars is not to subscribe to the first model. This implies that the issue of identity should not be confused with the issue whether a given system of particulars depends on the other system.

It may, however, be argued that the term 'dependence,' has more than one sense. It is only in one of its various senses that two different systems of particulars may depend on one another when they have some particulars in common. In this sense of dependence even the systems of the model 3 do not depend on one another. This sense of dependence is exhibited only by the

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systems of the model 2, for it is only in this model that the systems happen to have some particulars in common. (Let us forget the difficulties introduced by the model 4.) Strawson is not careful when he thinks that "each new system would be wholly independent of another" if the systems in question do not have some particulars in common. Granted that the systems of the model 3 fail to depend on one another, in this limited sense of dependence, how could they be prohibited from being "parts, in some way related, of a single system which includes them both"? They would be prohibited through a stroke of definition. If two different systems of particulars do not have any particulars in common, then it is a defining character of these systems that they are in no way related to one another, that there is no sense in which they could be considered as parts of one and the same system of particulars. So it is only the systems of the model 2 which satisfy Strawson's requirement. Would the sceptic, having a Hume-like frame of mind, accept the existence of a spatiotemporal system of particulars represented by the model 2? According to Strawson he would not. For if continued existence of a particular is a fiction, as Hume clearly maintained, then it becomes impossible for one and the same particular to occur in two different sub-systems of the same spatio-temporal system of particulars. The sceptic is clearly contemplating, according to Strawson, "the sketch of an alternative scheme", a scheme in which each spatio-temporal system of particulars is independent of another. But his doubt about the identity of a particular makes sense, according to Strawson, only if he accepts the existence of a single spatio-temporal system of particulars, a system which has its own sub-systems, in which particulars migrate from one sub-system to the other. But this implies that the sceptic "pretends to accept a conceptual scheme but at the same time quitely rejects one of the conditions of its employment ".8 The condition in question is the condition of continued existence, i.e., the condition of migration of some particulars from one subsystem to the other. In the absence of migratory particulars the sub-systems would claim independence from one another, they would claim self-sufficiency.

To elucidate Strawson's argument against the sceptic, let us take up the model 2. The different systems of particulars in that

model may be represented as the different stretches of observation, and the particulars as the items of these stretches. If one doubts that the item p in the observational stretch C is the same as the item p in the observational stretch A, it follows, if Strawson is right, that A and C are sub-systems of the same spatio-temporal system of particulars. But how does this follow? This follows from the logic of the verb 'to doubt'. To doubt that p in Cis the same as p in A is not the same thing as to accept that p in C cannot possibly be the same as p in A. It is to accept a neutral position with respect to p. May be p in C is different from p in A. May be it is the same. (A philosophical sceptic is unsure of the alternative, and one may find a loophole in the sceptic's state of uncertainty). But if one accepts that p in C could possibly be the same as p in A, one has accepted that A and C are sub-systems of the same spatio-temporal system of particulars. For if A and C are not such sub-systems, then it is impossible for p in C to be the same as p in A. Further, it is also shown that p in A is continuous with p in B. In the absence of continuity, Strawson assumes, identity is impossible. One may feel Strawson is right, that philosophical doubt about particularidentity which suggests the existence of independent spatiotemporal systems of particulars (model 1 or Model 3) is possible only within a single spatio-temporal system of particulars (Model 2), therefore, such a doubt is self-defeating.

However, there is a way out for the sceptic against the difficulties posed by Strawson, or a way out to pose a counter difficulty to Strawson's view. Consider the case of a murderer. After committing the murder, he is trying to escape detection. He turns his back to ascertain whether anybody is following him. And to his surprise he observes a policeman following him, a policeman somewhat like Macbeth's dagger, one who is the result of the murderer's guilty conscience. The murderer doubles his pace, and before taking a dive into the side lane he turns his back to ascertain the situation. He is shocked. The policeman is there, chasing him, the same policeman with his bulky figure and a cap on his shoulders. After diving into the lane the murderer hides himself and waits for the policeman. Though the policeman appears after sometime, the murderer is surprised. This cannot be the same policeman. This seems to be different

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from the one whom he observed earlier on two different occasions. This one is quite thin. But perhaps he is wrong. He may be the same policeman. Since he has removed his coat and cap to he looks thin.

Let us consider the implications of this story.9 When the murderer came to observe the policeman the third time, he doubts that he is observing the same policeman whom he observed earlier on two different occasions. So we have the case of a policeman. though a hallucinatory one, who occurs in the first observational stretch, recurs in the second, and who is being doubted in the third observational stretch. 10 Suppose that the item p in the second model stands for the policeman. We can very well imagine a further system F in that model in which the policeman occurs but his identity is doubted. Does doubting the identity of p in F with the identity of p in C and A presuppose the possibility that the same p occurs in the systems, A, C, and F? If it does, then numerically the same hallucinatory particular could possibly occur in diffrent systems of particulars. 11 If it does not, then doubting the identity of p in F, so far as p is concerned, fails to presuppose that A, C and F belong to the same system of particulars.

A solution of the above difficulty on Strawsonian lines would be something like this. Doubting the identity of p does not presuppose the possibility that the same p occurs in the systems A, Cand F, but does presuppose the possibility that some particulars other than p are the same in these systems. Unless some particulars which occur in F also occur in A and C these systems could not be the sub-systems of the same spatio-temporal system of Particulars. And unless they are such sub-systems, it makes no sense to doubt the identity of a particular in one of them with a particular in another. (The same argument repeated). But the difficulty remains. For the condition of recurrence, i.e., the occurrence of one and the same particular in different systems of particulars, is satisfied even by hallucinatory objects. The only them which is common to two different observational stretches of the murderer, in the example cited above, is the policeman-The elements of the observational stretches of the murderer exhibit the pattern of the Model 2, which is the model of a single spatiotemporal system of particulars. But if the presupposition of a

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single spatio-temporal system of particulars is satisfied even by hallucinatory objects then one cannot argue against the sceptic by referring to this presupposition.

An objection may be raised against the consideration that one and the same hallucinatory object may occur in two different observations. The condition for the recurrence of an object is its continued existence, its existence as unobserved no less than as observed. A material object can recur because it is defined in terms of its continued existence. But the concept of a hallecinatory object is obtained by denying continued existence to it In this respect hallucinatory objects are like after-images. Neither a hallucinatory object nor an after-image can exist without being observed, and none of them is open to public scrutiny.12 But if hallucinatory objects do not continue to exist, how could they be supposed to recur? How could one say that one sees the same hallucinatory object? If a hallucination has recurred, it is not the case that one and the same hallucinatory object has recurred. There are two different objects. The hallucinatory object observed on one occasion is different from the hallucinatory object observed on another occasion, though they may have close resemblance, so close that one may be confused with the other. The same analysis holds good for the after-images which on occasions one may have in one's observational stretches. This conclusion is the result of the failure on the part of a philo sopher to distinguish the concept of identity from the concept of continuity, to distinguish the question whether an object observed on one occasion is numerically the same as an object observed on another occasion, from the question, whether an object observed on one occasion is spatio-temporally continuous with an object observed on another occasion. It is impossible for one and the same thing to exist in a discontinuous fashion, for the concept of identity is the same as the concept of continuous nuity. But are they the same concepts? If they are, then the ash in my ashtray is identical with the tobacco-seeds. For, the ash in question is continuous with the tobacco in my cigarette, and this tobacco and this tobacco is continuous with the tobacco-plants, and tobacco-plants, and tobacco-plants plants are continuous with tobacco seeds.16

Consider how after-images occur in a discontinuous fashion Suppose one obtains a grey after-image of some object when the

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ashion ten the in such a fasion that two different white patches have a grey patch in between them. Now one gazes at the object in question. And when one moves one's eyes to have the after-image in question, one succeeds in having it when one's eyes are directed towards the white patch. But when one further moves one's eyes to the adjoining grey patch the after-image disappears, and comes back again when one's eyes come to take rest at the second white patch. If an after-image exists only when you see it, then it certainly does not exist when your eyes are directed towards the grey patch. Yet it is one and the same after-image that exists in two different places at two times. To demonstrate the spatio-temporally interrupted existence of an after-image it is not necessary to consider such manipulated situations. Consider the case of an afterimage seen with open eyes. Now close your eyes. You see the after-image again. But when you were closing your eyes, there is a time, though extremely short lived, when you do not see the after-image in question. It takes some time for the after-image to emerge in your visual experience, when your eyes are closed. And during this time the after-image exists neither in the visual space (of open eyes) in which chairs, tables and other such objects exist, nor in the visual space (of closed eyes) in which only 'stars', coloured splodges and after-images exist. Since an after-image exists only when you see it, the after-image in question does not exist when you were closing your eyes. Yet the after-image seen with closed eyes is the same as the after-image seen with open eyes. This implies that an after-image exists in a discontinuous fashion. One and the same after-image exists at different times without existing in the interval between these times. Similarly, it exists in different places without existing in the intermediate places. The interruption in the existence of an after-image is not contrary to its identity, and hence, it does not require even the fiction of its continued existence. The same analysis holds good for the identity of hallucinatory objects. In order to migrate from one spacio-temporal sub-system to the other, a material object must move, it must pass through the intermediate positions. But an after-image or a hallucinatory object can migrate from one subsystem to the other without passing through the intermediate positions.

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The usual argument that a hallucinatory object or an after image cannot recur is that there are no interruptions, holes and gaps, in one's experience of such an object. Consider Price's remark, "The after-image follows me wherever I go. Which ever way I look I still see it. The same thing happens in hall. cination."14 Thus, continuity in one's experience of an after. image or a hallucinatory object is never broken. But so far as material objects are concerned, our experience of them, according to Price, "is frequently interrupted, full of holes and gaps" !! The continuity of visual experience is "soon brought to an end by a blink if nothing else." Is it a logical truth about an afterimage or a hallucinatory object that continuity in its experience is never broken? The example of the grey after-image mentioned above clearly shows that there can be gaps and holes in one's experience of an after-image. The after-image follows me wherever I go, but with interruptions. And why cannot a blink introduce interruption in one's experience of a hallucinatory object? When I open my eyes I find the same hallucinatory object facing me which I saw before I closed my eyes out of fear. And if a blink is allowed to introduce interruption in my experience of a hallcinatory object, what would check me if I consider interruptions of longer duration? Why cannot a hallucinatory object play hide and seek with me? It cannot do so on account of the fact that philosophers have not given proper attention to it, or giving proper attention to it goes against their metaphysical constructions.

It may be awkward but true that Strawson's metaphysis cannot afford to have the presupposition which ties the concept of identity with that of spatio-temporal continuity. For Strawson believes, as a consequence of the question of ontological priority, that disembodied Mary is the same person, numerically the same person, who once lived in Oxford. The fact that the concept of disembodied person is a logically derivative concept, does not mean that the concept of numerical identity is also a concept which has two different senses, a primitive and a derivative sense. Mary of Oxford is spatio-temporally continuous with Mary who once came to visit Edinburgh. But Mary of Oxford is not, and cannot be, spatio-temporally continuous with Mary who is now a disembodied being. What is the distance between this world and

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the world of the disembodied beings? How much time does one take in reaching the world of the disembodied beings? These are senseless questions. Yet Mary of Oxford is numerically the same as disembodied Mary, and Mary who once visited Edinburgh. Are there two different senses of numerical identity? A primary sense in which Mary of Oxford is numerically identical with Mary who once visited Edinburgh. And a derivative sense in which Mary of Oxford is numerically identical with Mary who is a disembodied being. One could have the derivative concept of a person. But could one also have the derivative concept of numerical identity? Perhaps one could have such a concept if one succeeds in confusing the concept of numerical identity with the concept of spatiotemporal continuity. Since one ascribes numerical identity to spatio-temporally continuous objects, therefore it is only in the derivative sense of numerical identity that one can ascribe numerical identity to those objects which lack spatio-temporal continuity. But what this argument establishes is not that there are two different senses of numerical identity, a primitive and a derivative sense, but simply that the concept of numerical identity is different from, independent of, the concept of spatio-temporal continuity. The question whether an object is numerically the same as another is different from the question whether an object is spatio-temporally continuous with another. The fact that an object is not spatio-temporally continuous with another cannot be a reason for prohibiting us from ascribing numerical identity to it. The confusion of identity with spatio-temporal continuity is a prevalent feature of the present philosophical thought. This confusion has led philosophers to produce strange theories, the theories which they could hardly digest without this confusion. For example, this confusion has recently led Professor John Hick to introduce a temporal connection between this world and the Resurrection world. Since Resurrection Mary is numerically identical with Mary of Oxford, therefore, Resurrection Mary must be continuous with Mary of Oxford. But to be continuous, Mary of Oxford must occupy successive spatio-temporal positions between her present position in the Resurrection world and her earlier Position in Oxford. But the idea of successive spatial positions between Oxford and the Resurrection world is nonsensical. For the Resurrection world (Hick's sense) is not spatially connected

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with this world. The Resurrection world is not at such and such a distance from Oxford; the spatial position in the Resurrection world and the spatial position in this world are not positions in the same space. But Mary of Oxford could not be identical with Resurrection Mary if she is not continous with her. If spatial continuity is impossible then temporal continuity has at least to be retained. Thus Hick has been led to consider the possibility of there "being singular time and plural spaces", 17 to make it possible for Mary to occupy successive temporal positions without her occupying successive spatial positions. But could there he successive temporal positions between Oxford and the Resurrection world? Could a temporal position in Oxford and a temporal position in the Resurrection world be positions in the same time? How many seconds, hours or days has Mary of Oxford taken in reaching the Resurrection world? Could she have taken less time than the time she took in reaching the Resurrection world? May be if one dies in Oxford rather than New York, one takes more time in reaching the Ressurrection world. If all these questions and conclusions are senseless than it is senseless to talk of. the successive temporal positions between Oxford and the Resurrection world. Mary of Oxford does not, and cannot, occupy any successive spatio-temporal positions in reaching her position in the Resurrection world, But her failure to occupy such positions merely implies that she is not spatio-temporally continuous with Mary of the Resurrection world. It does not imply that she is not numerically identical with Mary of the Resurrection world. The fact that the Resurrection world is not spatio-temporally continuous with this world does not imply that a person of the Resurrection world could not be numerically identical with a person of this world. A philosopher can, if he wishes, scrutinise or reassemble the item of religious faith, but in doing so he is required first to remove those confusions which are inherent in his own conceptual apparatus. The connected with Hick's conception of the Resurrection world of Strawson's conception of a world of disembodied beings are not A religious difficulties, they are purely philosophical difficulties. A Christian does not have these difficulties, for they are the outcome of an attempt on the part of a philosopher to reconstruct the picture of our everyday world.

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A discussion of Hume's view may throw some light on our issue of identity. For Hume made an attempt to ascribe identity to an object (image) irrespective of the fact that there is interruption in its appearance. As he says, "The very image, which is present to the senses, is with us the real body; and tis to these interrupted images that we ascribe a perfect identity."18 What he means is that an image existing at one time has perfect identity with an image existing at another time, though no such image exists in the interval between these times. The interruption in the existence of an image should not prohibit us from ascribing identity to it. The only question is about the ground of such an ascription. For there is a sense in which the image existing at one time is different from the image existing at another time. If they are not apparently different images then there would have been no question of seeing whether they are the same images. Hume considers "resemblance" as the ground for the ascription of identity. As he says, "The smooth passage of imagination along the ideas of resembling impressions makes us ascribe to them perfect identity". 19 But Hume starts doubting his original view of identity. Not because 'resemblance' is different from 'identity' (for 'resemblance' is only a ground of the ascription of 'identity') but because of interruption in the existence of an image. As he further said on this issue, "The interruption of appearance seems contrary to the identity".20 There is no doubt that interruption in the existence of an image does seem contrary to its identity, but is it really contrary to its identity? For if there is a genuine contradiction between the identity of an image and its interrupted existence, then this contradiction cannot be resolved simply by the fiction of a continued existence, it requires a real continued existence. But the fact that Hume considered continued existence simply a fiction shows that there is no genuine contradiction between the identity of an image and its interrupted existence, that the contradiction is only apparent. How could there be a contradiction between the presence of identity and the absence of continuity? Such a contradiction is possible only if the concept of identity is the same as that of continuity. But saying that a is identical with b certainly does not mean that a is continuous with b. The particular a may or may not be continuous with b. I.P.Q. . 9

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Hume's difficulties on the issue of identity are rooted in his faulty analysis of the powers of Imagination. At times, when Hume was under the influence of 'vulgar' consciousness, he was led to think that the identity of an image presupposed its continued existence, and the later in its own turn presupposed the independent or distinct existence of the image in question. He allots all the three concepts to the Faculty of Imagination. And once this allotment is made, all these concepts stand or fall together. Hume had no desire to retain the concepts of continued and independent existence, therefore, ultimately he was led to deny even the concern of identity. As he said, "'Tis a gross illusion to suppose that our resembling perceptions are numerically the same; and it is this illusion which leads us into the opinion, that these perceptions are uninterrupted, are still existent, even when they are not present to the senses."21 The concept of identity has been taken as a gross illusion because it has led Hume to the opinion of continued existence. The question is whether Hume is right in considering identity as an illusion because he considers continued existence as an illusion? Is it impossible to retain identity without retaining continued existence? Hume surely did not consider resemblance as an illusion. He did not allot the concept of resemblance to the Faculty of Imagination. For we do not merely imagine that an image resembles another, we as a matter of fact find it so resembling. But if the ground or basis for ascribing identity is resemblance, then why should Hume trouble himself about the fact of continued existence? His troubles can be traced to his halfhearted scepticism, his half-hearted acceptance of the philosophical against the 'vulgar' views. He makes an attempt to revolt against the vulgar, but succeeds in only conforming to his standards. quote a remark of Professor Walsh on Hume's analysis of Imagination "Transition "Transition" nation, "The Humean imagination, in fact appears under the flags, rebel and conformist. Since one of Hume's pleasures is to the imagination turns out on examination to be the supporter of the status quo after all: for all the shortcomings of 'philosophes' it is on their side. it is on their side in the end ".22 An examination of Hume's view would disappoint the would disappoint the sceptic.

The above attempt to distinguish the concept of identity from that of continuity, however, remains objectionable. For Strawson

is struggling with the problem whether a material object could recur, whether we could observe the same material object twice. No argument has been provided for showing that we succeed in observing the same material object twice, the examples of the grey after-image and the hallucinatory policeman are meant for showing that we succeed in observing the same non-material objects twice. The objects which should fail in being observed twice have succeeded in being observed twice, and the objects which should succeed in being observed twice have failed in being observed twice. This is a surprising conclusion. But this objection is based on a wrong understanding of the above analysis. The examples of the grey after-image and hallucinatory policeman were meant for showing that Strawson's attempt to establish a connection between two different observational stretches, in the sense in which he requires such a connection, with the help of the weapon of doubt does not succeed. For no incoherence arises if one doubts the identity of a particular existing in one observational stretch with a particular existing in another without believing that these observational stretches have any material object in common. For what is presupposed by such a doubt is simply that some particulars which occur in one observational stretch must also occur in another. Unless such recurring particulars are possible the sceptic's doubt is senseless. But the condition of recurrence, as has been pointed out, is satisfied even by after-images and hallucinatory objects. But if doubting the identity of an item occurring in one observational stretch with an item occurring in another does not bind one to accept that these observational stretches have any material object in common, then these observational stretches fail to be connected in the sense in which Strawson requires them to be connected. For a connection between two different observational stretches, in Strawson's sense of this connection, is possible only by introducing material objects. In case the observational stretches are not "long enough or comprehensive enough", then according to Strawson, "most of the common concepts of material things that we have would not exist ".23 As a consequence, he concludes, these observational stretches would be independent of each other, for the condition of their connection, i.e., the presence of material objects, does not exist. The question is, whether Strawson has succedded in demonstrating the existence of such a connection, i.e.,

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the existence of a material world, which he has attempted to do. Has he succeeded in showing incoherence in the sceptic's doubt? For a sceptic could very well accept Strawson's view that there is something which is common to two different observational stretches of a person without accepting that what one observes is a material thing, a thing which continues to exist when one is not observing it.

A difficulty, however, remains to be solved. Granted that an after-image or a hallucinatory object could recur, how do I consider that it has recurred, i.e., what conditions or criteria lead me to say that I am seeing the same after-image or the same hallucinatory objects? For, according to Strawson's a condition of our having a single spatio-temporal system of particulars is "that there should be satisfiable and commonly satisfied criteria for the identity of at least some items in one sub-stystem with some items in the other."24 This implies that the position of the sceptic remains weak if he has failed to discover criteria for the kind of objects he supposes he happens to observe. It is possible that one may fail to discover what is technically called a 'criterion' of identity, for the reason that the concept of identity may not be a sort of concept which has any fixed condition of its ascription. Since the condition or ground for the ascription of identity may differ from case to case, therefore, there may not be any condition or ground which may succeed in performing the role of a crtiterion of identity. Even in such a situation, however, it is possible to point out that condition which generally, though not always, occurs when identity is ascribed to an object. According to Price the identity of an after-image depends on certain physiological conditions (strain on eyes, dazzle effects etc.). And the identity of a hallucinatory object depends on certain psychological conditions (expectations or wishes of fears). But Price is interested in discovering those conditions which are involved when we are considering the continued existence of these objects. As he says, "after-images, could continue in existence when unsensed, provided that the requisite physiological processes continued too."25 He makes a similar statement about hallucinatory objects that they "could continue in existence when unsensed, provided that the requisite psychological processes But if the sceptic is unwilling is grant unsensed existence to any sort of images, how could he grant such an existence

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to those images which are described as after-images and hallucinatory images. The sceptic's question is not what conditions are causally responsible for my observation of an image-or for its continued unobserved existence, but what conditions lead me to say, to believe, that I am seeing the same image which I saw before I had an interruption in my experience. Surely the condition of resemblance is a good claimant for the title. I ascribe identity to an image occurring on one occasion with an image occurring on another generally on the ground that these images resemble. This view obviously does not mean that all those images which resemble must be identical, but simply that those which are identical happen to resemble. And it is because they happen to resemble that resemblance could help one in ascribing identity. The sceptic does not equate the concept of resemblance with the concept of identity; they are different concepts. But the fact that they are different concepts cannot prohibit one from ascribing identity on the ground of resemblance. Suppose the image a occurs. Immediately after interruption in my experience, the image b occurs. I am persuaded to say that b is numerically the same as a, if b resembles a. In the absence of resemblance I would be prohibited from saying that these images are numerically the same. Hume failed to retain this view because of the fact that he confused the concept of identity with that of spatio-temporal continuity. Saying b is the same as a, for Hume meant the same thing as saying that b is continuous with a. Since continuity is an illusion, so identity is an illusion. Strawson has reversed the argument, since identity is not an illusion, therefore, continuity is also not an illusion. Except for his reservation on the identity of disembodied persons, in which case identity is allowed to be consistent with spatio-temporal discontinuity, Strawson's view of identity, in spirit, is the same as that of Hume. Neither for Hume nor for Strawson, is it possible to ascribe identity without ascribing continuity, that there cannot be one and the same object which may exist in a discontinuous fashion. There is no necessity of repeating the arguments against this view.

Strawson's attempt to prohibit the sceptic from dispensing fusions about identity which require further clarification.

Strawson does not deny the existence of after-images and hallucinatory objects. But in his ontology, they would exist simply as derivative particulars, depending on the existence of persons and material objects which are primary particulars. Strawson's argument is not causal, but metaphysical. To say about a particular that it is derivative means to say that its identity depends on the identity of some other kind of particular. Similarly, to say about a particular that it is primary, means to say that its identity does not depend on the identity of any other kind of particular, Thus, the idea of there being a derivative particular and the idea of there being a particular which exhibits identity-dependence are connected ideas. It is because of the fact that after-images and hallucinatory objects exhibit identity-dependence that they are simply derivative particulars. This implies that the sceptic could not ascribe identity to the sorts of objects he uses in constructing his universe without his having a prior conception of a material world, a world of primary particulars. For one's success in a ascribing identity to derivative particulars depends on one's success in ascribing identity to primary particulars. The force of this argument depends on the confused concept of 'identity dependence'. What does it mean to say that the identity of a derivative particular depends on the identity of a primary particular? Does it mean to say that there are two different senses of identity, a primary and a derivative sense? A sense of identity in which I ascribe identity to Mary seen in Edinburgh with Mary seen in Oxford. And another sense of identity in which the murderer ascribes identity to his hallucinatory policeman or I ascribe identity to the grey after-image when it appears after an interruption. How does the murderer ascribe identity to his hallucinatory policeman? The hallucinatory policeman whom he is seeing now resembles the hallucinatory policeman whom he saw earlier. Similarly identity has been ascribed to the grey after-image because it resembles the grey after-image seen earlier. Does it mean to say that the ascription of identity to certain objects on the ground of their resemblance is an ascription of identity to them in a derivative sense? But it is on the ground of resemblance that I ascribe identity to Mary. Mary, whom I am seeing now, resembles Mary, whom I saw in O. S. whom I am seeing now, resembles think whom I saw in Oxford. And this resemblance has led me to think that I am seeing the that I am seeing the same person. Does it mean to say that I

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ascribe identity to Mary in a derivative sense of identity? But how could it be a derivative sense, if Mary happens to be a primary particular? Of course, the ascription of identity to certain objects on the ground of resemblance, or on any ground what so ever, does not guarantee the truth of my identity-judgments. At times these judgments are false. But in order to ascribe identity to objects, I have not to wait for the truth of my identity-judgments. For the expression of an identity judgment does not precede the ascription of identity. It is because I do ascribe identity to an object that I could also be mistaken about my ascription.

However, accepting the possibility of ascribing identity to an object without accepting that it has a spatio-temporally continued existence, leads to a difficulty which the sceptic must solve. How could the sceptic discover that he has committed a mistake in his ascription of identity if the objects of his observation are deprived of their unobserved existence? Suppose I ascribe identity to Mary seen in Edinburgh with Mary whom I saw in Oxford. Subsequently, if I obtain evidence that Mary of Edinburgh is not spatio-temporally continuous with Mary of Oxford, I would be led to revise my judgment, I would be led to accept that I have committed a mistake in my ascription of identity. But no such evidence is possible if Mary is not a spatio-temporally continuous being, if the existence of Mary is restricted to the existence of my Observational stretches. Then, how would I discover that I have committed a mistake in my ascription of identity to Mary? The question depends on whether one could have conditions in which one would be led to revise one's identity judgment when one deals with objects which lack continued existence. Surely there exist such conditions. Suppose I ascribe identity to Mary on the ground of her resemblance. But subsequently I discover that I did not get the characteristic smell of her perfume. So I could not have seen Mary, I am surely wrong in thinking that I saw Mary. Since one could have hallucinatory smells, sounds and tastes etc., it is possible to co-ordinate the hallucinatory visual scenes with the hallucinatory smells, sounds and tastes etc. When I saw Mary the first time, i.e., identified her, she had a characteristic hair-style, a characteristic dress etc., and I got a characteristic smell of her perfume. But when I saw her again i.e., reidentified her, I failed to get the smell of her perfume. So I have surely misidentified her.

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The sceptic is prohibited from committing perceptual mistakes, or from making a distinction between qualitative and numerical identity, because of the fact that he has been treated by his opponents as a curious sort of creature. Some have treated him as a being who has a visual sense without having other senses, others take him to be a purely auditory being. Those who are quarrelling with a sceptic, are they quarrelling with a monster who is deprived of all other senses except one?

Strawson attacks the issue of 'solipsistic consciousness' by considering a purely auditory world, i.e., a world in which only sounds, and nothing but sounds, exist, i.e., a world in which a being with only the auditory sense exists. And this monster the auditory monster, has been asked by Strawson to make a distinction between qualitative and numerical identity. Could such a being say that he is now hearing the same, numerically the same, sound which he heard on an earlier occasion.²⁷ After an analysis of the limitations of such a being, Strawson concludes that no sense "could be given to the idea of identifying a particular sound as the same again after an interval during which it is not heard."28 For the simple reason that "we cannot turn to the particularidentity of the non-auditory setting of the sounds....for, by hypothesis, sounds have no setting but other sounds."29 Now, compare this auditory world with our familiar world, the world in which drummers and drums exist, in which people with all their senses exist, in which people smell flowers, hear sounds, taste their food and sometimes have visual glimpses of things. In such a universe it is quite possible to ascribe identity to sounds, to make a numerical and qualitative distinction between sounds. For the ascription of identity to sounds depends on there being the concept of an 'unheard sound', of a sound which continues to exist when I am not hearing it. A drummer is betting his drum, I observe him doing so, but from time to time the sound of his drum is drowned out by other sounds. So in the interval when I am not hearing the sound is the hearing the sound if his drum, the sound continues to exist, for the drum continues to be beaten. And if the sound continues to exist, then it is quite possible? then it is quite possible for me to hear the same sound, to reidentify it, to ascribe possible for me to hear the same sound, to reidentify it, to ascribe numerical identity to it. 30 Thus, Strawson has succeeded in proving many points, out of which two points must

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attract the attention of the sceptic. First, the concept of resemblance fails to function as a condition for ascribing indentity to sounds. The sounds in the sound-universe resemble one another, yet the auditory being fails to ascribe identity to them. Second, the ascription of identity to sounds depends on there being material bodies. It is impossible to ascribe identity to sounds in the universe which is contemplated by a sceptic, i.e., the universe which lacks the existence of material bodies. The sound-particulars cannot be treated as basic particulars.

The first point should not worry us long. The condition of resemblance could be rejected only if some other condition is accepted. Granted that the condition of resemblance does not work in ascribing identity to sounds in the universe of sounds. But Strawson has not provided any alternative condition to resemblance. For he has attempted to show that there are no conditions for the ascription of identity to sounds, that the concept of identity has no use in such a universe. So no special discredit can be given to resemblance for its failure to work as a condition for ascribing identity. The only question of interest is the question: Why does the auditory being fail to ascribe indentity to his sounds? He fails because of the fact that his universe lacks the richness and variety required for the ascription of identity.

In describing the structural features of his universe, a sceptic relies much heavily on such cases as the cases of after-images and hallucinatory objects, for they are very good examples of the sort of objects which occur only so long as they are observed, and to which identity could be ascribed without accepting their physical existence. But his reliance on these cases exposes him to Ryle's charge, that a sceptic dissolves the distinction between 'real coins' and 'false coins' by denying the existence of real coins. If there were no real objects, i.e., objects which continue to exist without being observed, then all the objects that exist are as good as hallucinatory objects. But the sceptic is certainly not dissolving the distinction between 'real coins' and 'false coins'. In questioning the existence of material objects, a sceptic is simply asking people to be careful about the use of their coins. If too many false coins come into currency, it is the real coins that will lose their value. The sceptic is not denying the concept of a material object, he is simply saying

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that such a concept is a derivative concept (a fiction, a false coin, a dodge) depending on the primitive concept of an observed object (a fact, a real coin, a real move). It is the frequency of recurrence of an observed object that leads us to form the concept of a material object, an object which is allowed to exist even if we are not observing it. But if there were no observed objects, or the recurrences of observed objects, there would not have come into currency the concept of a material object. Fictions can survive only in a world in which facts also occur. It is because I hear a sound, and hear again a sound resembling the earlier sound, that leads me to say that I am hearing the same sound. If the latter sound has not resembled the earlier sound, there would have been no question of my saying that I am hearing the same sound. Once I have the concept of the same sound, I could also have, if my metaphysical sense pleases me, the concept of an unheard sound, the concept of such a sound which continues to exist without my hearing it, which exists in the period of interruption in my hearing of it. In Hume's language, the ascription of identity to images "leads me to the opinion of continued existence". If I never heard sounds, and never ascribed identity to some of them, I could never have come to believe in the existence of unheard sounds. If I smelled no smells, and never ascribed identity to some of them, I could never have come to believe in the existence of unsmelt smells. Similarly, my having the concept of unobserved visual scenes depends on my having the concept of identity for the observed visual scenes. The concept of 'continued existence' of an object, i.e., of its unobserved existence, is a parasitical concept, parasitical upon the concept of identity. And being parasitical in its nature the survival of continuity is limited, it fails to survive in all the conditions in which the concept of identity survives.

In saying that the *continued* existence of a material world is only a fiction, the sceptic is attempting to remove certain confusions prevalent in our logical geography of concepts. The most prevalent confusion is the equation of the concept of identity with the concept of continuity. The second, no less prevalent confusion, is that which converts continuity into a primitive concept and allows identity to have only a parasitic existence. The later confusion sometimes lands a philosopher into the acceptance of strange views about the identity of objects. He wishes to ascribe identity

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to an object, but his metaphysical sense fails to provide continuity to it, and hence his conclusions on the subject become vague. One has just to see the variety of senses in which the term 'continuity' has been used by philosophers. Some of the most popular senses of 'continuity' are : physical, non-physical, hypothetical and fictional etc. In their attempt to retain continuity as a necessary condition or presupposition of identity, philosophers do not mind in talking about 'continuity' which has the same sense as 'discontinuity'. Thus, continuity has been ascribed to a drum, the sound of a drum, an after-image, a hallucinatory object, a toothache and so on. Nothing remains discontinuous, for the concept of continuity includes in its very meaning even the concept of discontinuity. The source of all these views is the same—the equation of identity with continuity. A sceptic attempts to reject such equations. Thus, the question whether the sceptic has succeeded in his mission depends on the question whether he has succeeded in clarifying confusions, conceptual confusions, in an attempt on the part on a philosopher to depict a picture of the world in which he is living.

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NOTES

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- 1. Individuals, p. 35
- 2. It is a matter of dispute whether Hume was a solipsist, for a solipsist must accept the persistent existence of oneself. And so far as the issue of 'identity' is concerned, Hume's views are dubious. Hume describes himself as a moderate sceptic, because he has a tendency to support the sceptic, and also a tendency to oppose him.
- 3. Perhaps there is more than one sense of a single space-time system of particulars. For Strawson says many things about such a system, that such a system is unique, comprehensive, primitive, unified, and so on. But I am concerned with only that sense of such a system to which Strawson refers while showing incoherence in the sceptic's doubt about indentity. In this sense, a single space-time system can clearly be distinguished from multiple space-time systems.
 - 4. Individuals, p. 35
 - 5. Op. cit. p. 35
- 6. If the succeeding system of particulars is *spatially* independent of the preceding system, then it would also be *temporally* independent of it. For the *new* stretch of observation does not occur at the same time as the *old* one. The fact that Strawson describes the systems in question as *spatial* may mislead one into thinking that he is troubled *only* about the spatial character of these systems? Is he troubled *only* about their spatial character? Why does not he feel any trouble about their temporal character? Does he mean to say that the systems in question would be temporally dependent and spatially independent of one another?
 - 7. Op. cit. p. 36
 - 8. Op. cit. p. 35
- 9. This story cannot be ruled out on a priori grounds. For Strawson attempts to show incoherence in the sceptic's doubt by considering an observational situation. And this story clearly describes a possible observational situation.
- does not observe anything. The murderer can be said to have observed the electric pole, the cat coming out of the window of a house etc. (for they are real), but not the policeman. This argument is not grounded in the legitimate analysis of the observational situation. For the policeman is the constituent of the same observational stretches which has the electric pole, the cat and the house etc., as its other constituents. If the murderer is allowed to have observed the electric pole, the cat and the house etc., he cannot be said not to have observed the policeman. The murderer has not imagined or dreamt of a policeman. The fact that the subsequent evidence might lead the murderer to discover that he was wrong about his observation of the policeman, that there existed no such policeman, does not imply that the murderer did not observe the policeman. If he did not observe a policeman then his observation could not be wrong.

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Such a possibility is not absurd. Though the hallucinatory objects do not exist without being observed, they can very well recur. The prohibition applicable to material objects is not applicable to hallucinatory objects. No material object can recur if it did not exist when unobserved. But a hallucinatory object is not a material object, hence it is free from this sort of binding. The question of recurrence shold not be confused with the question of unobserved existence. It is quite wrong to suppose that nothing but material objects could recur, because it is only material objects which exist without being observed.

12. The consideration of these objects cannot be ruled out on the ground that they are not open to public scrutiny. For Strawson, in this context, is concerned with the contents of two different observational stretches of the same person. So the argument that a hallucinatory object or an afterimage cannot occur in two different observations of two different persons has no tendency to show that it cannot occur in two different observations of the same person.

13. A sense-datum philosopher also shares the view of those who deny recurrence to after-images and hallucinatory objects. Though he accepts that in having a hallucination or an after-image one does not observe a material thing. What one observes is something which is non-material, a sensedatum. However, no sense-datum can recur, hence no hallucinatory object or an after-image can recur. But is it one and the same dagger or different daggers that followed Macbeth's path? The fact that the dagger in question was hallucinatory is no reason why the number of daggers be increased, with a new dagger being provided for each new observational stretch. The number can be increased only by confusing the concept of identity with the concept of continuity. If an object appears in a discontinuous fashion then it is not one and the same object but different objects which appear after some intervals. But what justification is there for equating the concept of identity with the concept of continuity? Even a sense-datum philosophar has failed to liberate himself from the Aristotelian prejudice of his opponents, the prejudice which leads to the dissolution of identity into continuity.

- 14. H. H. Price, Hume's Theory Of The External World, Oxford, 1940; p. 110
- 15. Ibid. p. 21
- 16. Ibid. p. 21
- "Resurrection Persons And Bodies", Mind, July 1973, p. 412
- Treatise, Edited by Selby-Bigge, Oxford, p. 205 18.
- 19. Ibid. p. 205
- 20. Ibid. p. 205
- 21. Ibid. p. 207
- W. H. Walsh, "Hume's Concept Of Truth", The Royal Institute Of Philosophy Lectures, Volume Five, 1970-71, Published by The Macmillan Press, 1972; p. 116.

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- 23. Individuals. p. 35
- 24. Ibid. p. 35
- 25. Hume's Theory Of The External World, p. 114
- 26. Ibid. pp. 114-115
- 27. One of the chief functions of Strawson's construction of a 'sound universe' is to construct a quarrel against the sceptic. This becomes evident when one examines his remarks on the 'solipsistic consciousness' on pages 72–73 of the *Individuals*. The very attempt to show that identity could not be ascribed to sounds without there being material bodies is an attempt to prohibit the sceptic from constructing his universe of non-material bodies. His conclusions about sounds are supposed to hold for all other derivative particulars.
 - 28, Ibid. p. 70
- 30. See pages 71-72 of the *Individuals*. I must thank Dr. Davie for drawing my attention to these pages.

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THE CONCEPT OF REFERENCE

(Russell-Strawson Controversy)

In the present paper, we shall discuss Strawson's criticisms of Russell's doctrine of reference, and shall try to establish the following three points:

- 1. Strawson's criticisms of Russell's doctrine of reference seem to involve some misapprehension of Russell's view.
- 2. Though Strawson has formulated his theory of reference as a criticism of Russell's theory, still it has some striking similarities with Russell's theory.
- 3. The difference of opinion between Russell and Strawson seems to be due to a difference in their respective points of view.

Let us start with the first point. We shall try to show that the objections that Strawson has raised against Russell's doctrine of reference do not really stand against his view; these criticisms seem to arise as a result of some misunderstanding of Russell's doctrine. It is this point that is sought to be established through out the entire essay. The first step to prove this is to show that Russell did not make the confusion between meaning and reference that he is alleged to have made.

Strawson has criticised Russell by saying that Russell has confused the distinction between referring and meaning. He says, "The source of Russell's mistake was that he thought that referring or mentioning, if it occurred at all, must be meaning.\text{1} This indicates that Strawson thinks that Russell made no distinction between meaning and referring, whereas in fact they are fundamentally different from one another. The difference between the two is stated in the following passage by Strawson, "Meaning is a function of the sentence or expression; mentioning and referring and truth or falsity, are functions of the use of the sentence or expression." So, according to Strawson, Russell mistakenly thinks that reference, just like meaning, is a function of the linguistic expression, while it is really a function of the use of such expressions. But it appears that Russell was not

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totally unaware of the distinction, and in his doctrine of reference, he was mainly concerned with the use of linguistic expressions, instead of the expression itself. Russell has made a distinction between names and descriptions, two different sorts of linguistic expressions; and has said that descriptions can not be regarded as referring expressions, names alone can be used as such. But. how to know whether a certain expression is a name or a description? The reply on behalf of Russell would be that, it is not from their outward form but from the functions the expressions are used to perform that they are to be regarded as names or as descriptions. That which in outward form seems to be a name will not be regarded as a name by Russell unless it is used as such Similarly a so-called descriptive phrase also might be regarded as a name if it is used in that way. So, whether an expression is a name or a description is to be decided from the use of that expression, not from the form of it. An examination of the theory of descriptions as presented by Russell, will make this evident. He regards those expressions as descriptions which do not denote any actual individual. It appears that Russell probably will not insist that this sort of expressions can never be regarded as referring expressions; if they are used in such a way as to fulfill the conditions for being a name, they might be regarded as names; but in that case, they would cease to remain descriptions, in Russell's sense of the term. So, 'names' and 'descriptions' seem to be the descriptions, not of the linguistic expressions themselves, but of the functions that they are used to perform. If the act of referring is really distinct from the act of describing, as is admitted by Strawson also, then, this classification of expressions into names and descriptions also is to be made.

That Russell did not put much stress on the use of expressions is perhaps due to the fact that he was thinking of constructing an ideal language. If the functions that the expressions are used to perform are really different, then why should we not construct our syntax and vocabulary in such a manner as to use different expressions for performing these different tasks? It will help us to avoid confusions and errors.

So, it appears that Russell is not completely unaware of the distinction between reference and meaning as he did recognise the fact that reference is not a function of the expression itself

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but of the use of the expression. Russell never thinks that an expression by itself can refer. It is of the use of expressions that he is formulating his theory. It might be said here on behalf of Strawson that though it might be true to say that both Russell and Strawson are concerned with the use and not the expression itself when they think of 'reference', still Russell's sense of 'use' is different from that of Strawson. In Russell "use of an expression" means a certain relation between the speaker who uses the expression and the object for which the expression stands. but in Strawson 'use' means utterance of an expression in suitable circumstances to mention an object. But, Strawson's conception of the 'genuine' and 'spurious' 'use' of expressions suggests that he also believes, like Russell that the speaker who uses the expression must have some relation with the object mentioned by the expression he uses. Whether the use is a spurious one, depends on whether the object referred to is a real one and whether the speaker thinks it as such. So there is also a relation between the speaker and the object.

Next, we shall discuss two further points; one is the doctrine of 'about' as formulated by Russell as well as by Strawson, and we shall try to show that in spite of the criticisms raised against Russell's theory, Strawson himself shares the common view with Russell in this respect. The second point to be discussed is the exact point of difference between Russell and Strawson.

One of the points that Russell has sought to establish in his theory of discriptions is this— descriptive phrases cannot be the real or logical subject of a sentence. The reason that he has offered for his saying so is that descriptive phrases do not denote any individual, and, hence if any such descriptive phrase becomes the subject of a sentence, the sentence could not be regarded as about anything and consequently could not be regarded either as true or as false and hence meaningless. Strawson has challenged this view and says that a sentence should not be regarded as meaningless only because it could not be regarded either as true or as false. He thinks that sentences containing descriptive phrases can be regarded as ordinary subject-predicate sentences, and in this very respect, he disagrees with Russell. But what I am trying to convey is this, that, Strawson himself does not

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actually think that a descriptive phrase that denotes nothing can still be regarded as the logical subject of a sentence. If expressions which do not denote any actual individual can be used as subjects of sentences then the sentences containing them could not be regarded as either true or false. The reason for such failure is sought to be explained by Strawson. He thinks that in these cases the act of referring fails and the use of descriptive phrases as referring expressions in such cases is not to be regarded as genuine or proper use, but as 'spurious' use. If Strawson really thinks so, then he might be requested to formulate the theory of the proper or genuine use only. It might be said on behalf of Russell that he has formulated his doctrine of reference with a view to explain the genuine or proper use of referring expressions only.

Strawson himself believes that in case of failure of reference, the person cannot be said to be talking about anything. He writes "And I will add, it will be used to make a true or false assertion only if the person using it is talking about something. If, when he utters it, he is not talking about anything, then his use is not a genuine one, but a spurious or pseudo use."3 So, using descriptive phrases that denote nothing a person cannot successfully talk about anything. How can Strawson still think that such descriptive phrases could occur as the logical subjects of assertions? That alone is to be regarded as the logical subject of an assertion, about which we are saying something. When we are not talking about anything, how can we still say that we are talking about something? C. E. Caton in his paper has criticised Strawson by saying that his conception of spurious use of referring expressions closely resembles Russell's concept of reference. Strawson also thinks like Russell that the linguistic expressions which denote nothing cannot be used to refer to anything while Caton himself thinks that failure or success of reference does not depend on whether there is any object corresponding to the referring expression, or not.

So, it appears that Strawson's concept of reference resembles that of Russell in some important respects. We shall mention some further points of resemblance between their views. Strawson feels a necessity for distinguishing between a speaker's sense

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of identification and the hearer's sense of the same. This is clear from the following passage "So we have a hearer's sense and a speaker's sense of identify" This fact of identification is important for understanding the concept "reference". In his conception of the speaker's sense of identity, Strawson holds a conception of referring from the speaker's point of view which resembles Russell's doctrine to a great extent.

For the speaker to refer is to make an identification, but what is meant by this identification in case of a speaker? To refer to a certain object, the speaker uses a certain expression, but the use of that expression will be a correct referring use only when the speaker is aware of the fact, who or what it is, that he is speaking of. In order to know this he must fulfil two conditions, one is that he must be in a certain relation to that object. He writes "And I will add it will be used to make a true or false arsertion only if the person using it is talking about something... it is the requirement that the thing should be in a certain relation to the speaker and to the context of utterance".6

This view of Strawson seems to have a striking resemblance to Russell's view that proper names, which are the only referring expressions, denote individuals alone with which the speaker is acquainted.* Strawson seems to think something more than this. He says that a name is always to be substituted by a description. This perhaps would not be accepted by Russell.

But we shall enquire whether this use of description is necessary according to Strawson, for the speaker to identify the object he refers to. A descriptive phrase consists of a combination of certain attributes; if this combination of attributes is to be used for the purpose of referring to something then for the speaker at least it could not be just an arbitrary combination of imaginary attributes, because such a descriptive phrase cannot possibly be regarded as a referring expression at least for the speaker, nor can it help him to identify the object referred to. In such cases the speaker is fully conscious of the fact that he is not talking about anything real with which he is in a particular relation and consequently he cannot regard such descriptive phrases as referring expressions. In such cases, the speaker will not believe in the truth of the presupposition which is considered by Strawson as

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a pre-requisite of any genuine utterance. So, descriptive phrases, if they are at all to be regarded by the speaker as referring expressions, must contain real descriptions of some objects, but in order to have such a description, the speaker must first be acquainted with the object he is describing and perhaps it is this acquaint-tance with the object that is considered by Russell as 'reference' of names. Presentation of the object is prior to the describing of it; prior in the sense, that describing pre-supposes this relation of direct confrontation with objects; but this relation itself does not pre-suppose description of the object. It might be objected here, "Why should we think that the speaker must be acquainted with the object in order to refer to it? We might refer to many objects about which we have just heard from others, and with which we ourselves have no acquaintance."

We must admit that it is difficult to guess what will be Strawson's own view as to such cases. He perhaps will be inclined to think that second hand reference could passibly be made by the speaker. But we wonder whether Strawson can plausibly hold such a view. The cases of second hand reference do not satisfy the condition of identification for the speaker, viz., the speaker must be in a particular relation to the object. Again whether the use of referring expressions in such cases is a genuine use or not, that also cannot be decided by the consideration of the case itself. Here the speaker may make use of such second hand reference, and might think that he is speaking about something as he has pre-supposed the existence of that object. But, if so, he is actually in the position of the hearer; and if so, then he is not to be regarded as the true speaker, hence the problem of reference does not really arise in such cases; it arises in case of those persons who are the actual speakers. Thus, we might say that when descriptive phrases are apparently used as the subject of some sentence, the sentence is not really of the subject predicate form, at least, not for the speaker. For the speaker, the real form of the sentences containing descriptive phrases as subject as for example, the sentence "The present king of France is hald" in of the present king of the containing descriptive philadelia. is bald" is of the following form: "That existing individual who is of such and the sentence "The present King of Problems individual individua who is of such and such nature has such and such other qualities, hence, the descriptive phrase really occurs not as the subject but as the predicate. In order to be used as a referring expression,

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the descriptive phrases pre-suppose reference in Russell's sense of the term. So, the logical consequences of what Strawson believes lead one to the conclusion that if reference is considered from the speaker's point of view, descriptive phrases cannot be regarded as genuine referring expressions, because the use of them as such pre-supposes the use of some other expression which directly denotes that object without describing it. In order to refer, or in other words, in order to speak about a certain object, the speaker must use some expression which directly mentions the object without describing at all. That word or expression would have no descriptive content, it would merely stand for the object, and hence what else could be the meaning of that word except the individual denoted by it? Strawson seems to be right in supposing that one can use any expression to refer to some object, but the important point to be noticed is that, he cannot use it as a descriptive phrase; its descriptive function is to be withheld.

So far as we are concerned with the speaker's point of view, the concept of 'reference' seems to be almost similarly understood by Russell and by Strawson.

Still it is to be admitted that Strawson himself does not think so. He regards descriptive phrases as referring expressions, and these expressions according to him can occur as the subject of assertions. This obviously cannot be accepted by Russell. Strawson's following statement also will perhaps not be accepted by Russell. He says, "so it may seem, in the non-demonstrative identification of particular we depend ultimately on descriptions." So, he seems to have some disagreement with Russell. We shall try to show that this difference in their opinions originates from the difference in their points of view.

Besides the speaker's sense of identification, Strawson speaks also of the hearer's sense of identification. We shall presently consider the concept 'reference' from the hearer's point of view.

Language is a means of communication. So, it is not enough for the speaker to have some relation with the object to which he wants to refer, he must follow certain devices so that his hearer might understand what particular individual he is speaking about. "What in general is required for making a unique reference is,

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obviously, some device or devices, for showing both that a unique reference is intended and what unique reference it is; some device requiring and enabling the hearer to identify what is being talked about." As the concept of identification is different for the hearer than it is for the speaker, so this brings a lot of difference in the concept, of 'reference' too.

According to Strawson there might be three different cases in which the speaker may be said to make identifying reference for the hearer. One is the case when the speaker is said to invoke identifying knowledge that the hearer is assumed to be in possession. The other is the case when the hearer is not actually in possession of any identifying knowledge of the individual referred to, but the use of the referring expression leads the hearer to presume the existence of one such individual. Both of these above mentioned cases are cases of non-demonstrative identification. There might be demonstrative identification also; in such cases, the speaker and the hearer both are acquainted with the object referred to, the object is in the present field of perception for both of them; in such cases when the speaker uses a referring expression he merely wants to draw the attention of the hearer.

It is to be noted here that in case of non-demonstrative identification, use of the descriptive phrases as referring expression is not only possible but is indispensable. It is by the help of those descriptions used by the speaker that the hearer is able to identify the object he already knows; or, to presume the existence of any such object. Meaningless symbols which lack any descriptive content can neither invoke identifiying knowledge in the hearer nor can they lead him to presume the existence of any such object refered to by the speaker.

In case of demonstrative identification, the speaker may use meaningless non-descriptive symbols as well as descriptive phrases to draw the attention of the hearer towards the object he is referring to.

So, it appears that considered from the hearer's point of view, descriptive phrases might be regarded as referring expressions; as Strawson rightly says "A name is worthless without a backing of descriptions which can be produced on demand to explain its application." But this is true for the hearer's language

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ew, ns; ing lain age only. And the controversy between Russell and Strawson is perhaps due to their emphasis on different aspects of language. Russell thinks that in an important discussion about language, its social aspect should not be emphasised. He says, "A 'logically perfect language, if it could be constructed, would not only be intolerably prolix, but as regards its vocabulary would be very largely private to one speaker." So, Russell has constructed his doctrine of reference with a view to explain the problems that arise in the speaker's language alone. Strawson, though he has made a distinction between speaker's sense of identification and hearer's sense of the same, is still primarily concerned with the hearer's sense.

So, it appears that the controversy between Russell and Strawson arises from a difference in their respective points of view.

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NOTES AND REFERENCE

- * They may differ as to the nature of the relation and of the nature of of 'individual'. Still the similarity is also to be noticed.
 - 1. Strawson: "On Referring".
 - 2. Strawson: "On Referring".
 - 3. Strawson: "On Referring".
 - 4. Caton: "Strawson on Referrnig" Mind, 1959.
 - 5. Strawson: Individuals P. 16.
 - 6. Strawson: "On Referring".
 - 7. Strawson: Individuals P. 29.
 - 8. Strawson: "On Referring".
 - 9. Strawson: Logico Linguistic Papers P. 79.
 - 10. Strawson Individuals P. 20.
 - 11. Russell An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth P. 177.
 - 12. Russell Logic and Knowledge P. 198.

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DISTINGUISHABLES AND SEPARABLES

All our philosophical investigations presuppose some kind of initial philosophical position which is merely the conscious or unconscious product of our beliefs and the attitudes that we form in this world. I can, for example, believe that in this world there are many things existing in their own right and that these things. have various kinds of characteristics which are dependent for their existence on the things. I can alternatively believe or suppose that Reality is one and indivisible. On the first set of beliefs, I would be able to think of the separation of things and the distinctions among them. On the second assumption, the question of either separation or distinguishing (amongst things) would not even arise. Thus, our philosophical concepts and hypotheses depend on our beliefs or rather on the set of initial beliefs which we take for granted without questioning their validity. Although, theoretically, there is nothing wrong in acceptting one indivisible reality, in our practical behaviour, we start with multiplicity of things and further believe or postulate that these things have certain characteristics, that these things act on one another or are acted upon. Again, this may further require us to presuppose concepts like space and time. For, without Space and Time, I might not be able to talk of things and their characteristics and imagine how or where they act. Thus, if in my investigation, I am analysing my experience, I must confess that I am already believing in, assuming a particular kind of picture of Reality. This is a common sense, pluralistic picture. In a way, I start my analysis of experience on the basis of this picture and so I am technically committing the fallacy of petitio principii. My only justification for this is that it is inevitable, for no investigation can start without some such assumption. Do we give the name presuppositions to such inevitable beliefs? I think we should make a distinction between initial beliefs and presuppositions. For example, that there is a multiplicity in the universe should not be regarded as a presupposition. It is my belief only. But if such a belief logically requires Space and Time, these should be regarded as presuppositions. It should be necessary to

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point out that all our beliefs and presuppositions of our investigations are generic in nature unlike the beliefs in ghosts and vampires which are characterised by certain specificness or particularity.

Let us see how the notion of plurality arises in our mind. If the phenomena that we experience were continuous and were not discrete or separated from one another, would we still treat them as many and independently existing? Suppose there is a person with two heads. Shall we regard this person as one or two? It is possible that if such a person has two different thinking or behaviour systems, it would create problems for us. In all likelihood, each of such systems will be determined by some physical structure or pattern, and a certain physical structure and a certain behavioural system will form one nucleus. Thus, if there are two behavioural patterns we would somehow or other demarcate the physical area of the behavioural patterns. The case of an earth-worm with two mouths would be simpler. We do regard it as one being just as we regard a mirror, before it is broken into two, as one thing. If the earth-worm is cut into two, then alone it would be regarded as two. It appears to me that actual separation or dividedness seems to be the basic notion by which plurality of objects is determined. From this basic datum, the notion of divisibility would arise. A stone can be broken into two, a branch of a tree can be broken into two, although neither a stone nor a branch of a tree may actually be broken into two. So from the actual separation or division, we go to the possibility of separation or division. The things which actually divided or which can be divided give rise to the notion of distinctness which is in fact presupposed by a thing which is capable of being divided into different elements. Very soon however, we find that we come across cases where there is definite distinctness but it is not possible to separate one distinct from another distinct. Such distinctness where the possibility of separating one thing from another is necessarily ruled out is distinguishability quadistinguishability distinguishability. The colour and extension of a thing for example, are distinct from each other but one cannot be physically separated from the other. It is not separated the other other but one cannot be physically separated from the other. from the other. It should be clear that whereas separability gives rise to the notion of plurality, pure distinguishability does not

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give rise to any such notion. However, separability and distinguishability play a very important role in our systems of philosophical beliefs.

Traditionally, philosophy, is primarily concerned with the explanation of reality. I believe the word explanation is very important in this context, for it is in relation to this word or the notion of explaining that one can distinguish philosophy from science which too, in some sense, is concerned with understanding reality. If we take a stone and divide it into parts, we understand that parts or particles of the stone can be separated, that the stone can be divided; we may also understand whether the stone is a graphite stone or iron ore or a piece of diamond. But if we have to explain what we understand, we require altogether a different kind of activity, a different kind of technique. When we divide a stone we are breaking it literally; when we are explaining (the nature of stone) we are not breaking the stone; we are only breaking, (expressing) the experience into language and concepts. of 'breaking' is communicating, distinguishing, conceptualising. When we explain, we re-arrange our experience in a linguistic form so that it may become meaningful or communicable.

But many a time, philosophers have treated this process of explaining on a par with a physical process. In a physical process, just as one can break, divide something into parts, in the same way, one can also join the parts. In philosophical analysis one can break the experience (into concepts). But the broken elements are not just physical units which can be reassembled. A flower is not made of fragrance, softness, a particular shape, a particular colour etc., just as it is made of petals, stem, pollens etc.. The philosophically analysed 'units' are distinguishable; they cannot be physically separated; they are characteristics, not things (or parts of a thing). And so they cannot be reunited in the way physical elements (e.g. mercury) can sometimes be reunited. Nevertheless, in their enthusiasm, philosophers, try to reconstruct or synthesise the world. Such an approach does not take into consideration the limitations of philosophers. Moreover, in so doing, the philosopher hypostatises i.e. unconsciously regards characteristics as things. Sometimes the characteristics are not even objective characteristics (as for example when we say the

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flower is pleasant). Sometimes in our eagerness to reconstruct reality, we speculate too, and this leads to some kind of anthropomorphism, as for example, when we say that the stone must be having pain, or when we say that God's form is like that of a man, Sometimes the different orders of the concepts are also confused, which leads to what Ryle calls category mistakes or what Śankara would regard as Adhyasa. However, my point is that all these errors arise out of the basic confusion of not distinguishing between pure distinguishables and separables. When I talk of two things or two parts of a thing, I talk of two separables. When I talk of two characteristics, I talk of only distinguishables. It is possible that I might talk of two characteristics of two different things. In such a case, the characteristics may appear as separables. But it is not by virtue of their being characteristics that they are separables. It is by virtue of the separateness of things to which the characeristics belong that they are separables.

Let us follow the distinction between separability and distinguishability qua distinguishability more closely. When some things are not only distinguished as different but can also be separated or divided, I call them separables. When they are purely distinguished but cannot be divided or separated, I call them distinguishables. I believe this is a very fundamental distinction and ignoring it, leads to several philosophical muddles. I believe this was the distinction which Vaisesikas first introduced when they made a distinction between Samyoga and Samavāya, although I am not sure whether the Vaisesikas were aware of all the implications of this distinction. One can easily see that separation properly applies to things in the physical world. I can separate one thing from another thing; I can physically separate one table from another table or a chair, or I can separate one piece of furniture from another piece of furniture. I can cut a piece of stone, a piece of metal or a piece of wood or a thing similar to it and separate the two pieces. I can also separate one heap from another heap. But I cannot separate the colour of the table of the weight of the table from the table, although I can distinguish the two. I cannot separate the mangoeness of the mango tree from the treeness of the mangoetree, although I can say that a class of mangoetrees is a proper subclass of trees and thus distinguish between the guish between the two. I can distinguish between emotions and

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hat a listinexpressions of emotions but it is doubtful whether one can actually separate them. Similarly, I can distinguish between the earlier moments of time and the later moments of time or the past mements of time and the present or future moments of time. We can distinguish between these moments in the sense that they are different (or we know that they are different). But we cannot separate them. According to me, even when two moments are not temporally contiguous, they are not separate. In order to be separate, there must be a possibility of their existing together in their own right although at different positions in space. When we talk of moments of time, this kind of divisibility is absent.1 The two moments of time do not co-exist, although philosophers have talked of the divisibility or even infinite divisibility of time. The moments of time only succeed one another. When two things are separate, they can also be brought together; that is, they can exist in close proximity, they can touch each other, there can be contact between them. The space between them is logically reducible to zero distance. In short, theoretically it should be possible to adjust the distance between two things which are separate. That is, it should be possible to say that such things are reversible.

But let us now come to 'objects' which are only distinguishable but not separable. Can there be any 'distance' between 'such objects'? Can each of such objects have independent existence? What will be the relation between them? Can we adjust the distance between them? Can we say that it is reversible? The answers to these questions seem to be negative. In other words, where objects can be distinguished but not separated—we cannot talk of them (the pure distinguishables) as existing by themselves. We can for example, distinguish between a logical substance and quality. But it will be incorrect to say that a pure substance exists by itself or a pure quality exists by itself. The first mistake was committed by Nyāya logicians who said that in the first instance of its existence (the produced) Dravya existed by itself without any quality.2 The second mistake was committed by a few sensum philosophers who thought of sense data or qualities as existing by themselves. It merely means that both these types of philosophers regarded some of the pure distinguishables as separables. That is, the Nyāya logicians regarded the substance and some sensum philosophers regarded the sense data or qualities as things.

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This was also the mistake of the Platonists who thought that universals were not only distinguishable from the particulars in which they existed, but that they could also be separated from the particulars, that they had a separate and distinct existence. In regarding sense data, qualities and universals or even classes as the philosophers were believing logically assuming, that qualities and universals and sense data and classes were existing in their own right. They thus thought that the qualities and substances or universals and particulars were related by the same kind of relations by which two things could be related. If two things were in some kind of physical space, then qualities and substances and universals and particulars were in some kind of mental or logical space, and they were related by the same kind of relations by which two separable objects could be related. In so doing, it appears that they were committing two kinds of mistakes, though these two kinds could be intimately related to each other.

First, two separables belong to the same 'category', and this category is the category of things (or loosely, substance). Two distinguishables which cannot be separated may belong to the same or different categories. But even if two distinguishables belong to one category, there is some uniqueness about each distinguishable. It cannot be thought of as having a separate, independent existence. So in treating pure distinguishables as separables we are (1) either mistaking objects belonging to different categories as belonging to the same category. or (2) we are treating distinguishables as things i.e. we are hypostatizing the distinguishables.

Amongst the distinguishables, there are different types. Thus the concept of the distinguishable qua distinguishable seems to be applicable even in the situation of knowledge. The knower and the known in the strict sense, are only distinguishable, but are not separable as knower and known. I am aware that this statement will be disputed, for certainly, the particular object that is known and the particular knower that knows the object exist as independent objects. But to exist as an independent object is quite a different thing from remaining unrelated (or related) in the knowledge situation. The same objects may play two different roles, one in ontology and the other in epistemology. In fact, my point is that we should distinguish between absolute terms and relational

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Relational terms are only distinguishable as relational terms, although their denotation may exist independently and therefore, may be separable. Some one, say, X, may be a mother and some other say, Y, may be a son. The role of a mother and a son is different from the role of woman and a boy. If these two roles are confused, one is likely to regard either (1) the relational terms as absolute terms or (2) the absolute terms as relational terms. Sankara, for example, has used the terms 'Visaya' and 'Visayi'. These are relational terms. They are related to each other and one cannot properly call some one as Visayi or something as 'Visaya', unless they refer to a common context. So even if in ontology. there is a possibility of a person corresponding to 'Visavi' and a thing corresponding to 'Visaya' as existing independently, in the realm of knowledge they are only distinguishables. Of course, distinguishables in respect of the knowledge situation and distinguishables on account of abstraction of a thing should not be regarded on par.

A common phenomenon that we see is the distinction between things and beings. Beings are distinguished from things on account of the fact that beings have characteristics, like automatic movement feelings, willing, reasoning etc. In short, beings are supposed to be 'conscious' as against things which are regarded as 'unconscious'. And even if someone regards things 'as having consciousness', my basic distinction is not affected, as the consciousness of things will have to be distinguished from the consciousness of beings. Again, some beings are not only conscious but they are self-conscious. However, beings have not only the characteristics pointed out by consciousness, but they have also the characteristics of things which are indicated by their bodies. So the principle of division would not be whether the substance has extension or it is extensionless.3 Of course, one can certainly distinguish, a spatial characteristic like extension from the characteristic like consci-But, can one separate consciousness from the body? The usual argument is that there is a time when the body exists and consciousness does not. From this people conclude that body and consciousness are separables. Even the Vaisesikas, who were the pioneers in making the distinction between separables and distinguishables qua distinguishables, regard consciousness as a separable Object and call it Atman. If our argument is properly understood

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then it would follow that there is no time when consciousness and 'body' exist separately. It may be that consciousness and 'body' co-exist for some duration and after a certain point, consciousness simply ceases to exist. So, when they exist together they are inseparable and after that only one exists and the other does not From these facts, it should never be concluded that both of them have separate existence, even after one of them has ceased to exist The situation is very similar to a thing with a particular colour e.g., a green leaf. If the greenness of the leaf is taken away by some chemical, does it mean that greenness and the leaf exist separately? The separate existence argument is the result of confusing distinguishability qua distinguishability with separability When the body is with consciousness, the 'body' is different from things like stones. It is only a distinguishable. When the consciousness is extinct, the 'body' behaves differently, like a thing (although in a very crude sense of the term).

I have argued above that when a person dies, consciousness simply ceases to exist. Had it been separable one would have to think of consciousness and its material counterpart generally called the body, to co-exist separately. Now, one may say that their separate existence cannot be disproved. This is true. But let us try to understand the problem in a larger context. Let us take the case of a tree. As an organic thing, its status is different from that of an inorganic one. If the tree dies, that is, becomes dry, we will, of course, say that it is no more living. Shall we say that consciousness or the 'soul' of the tree and its material conterpart co-exist although separately? And what happens if one branch of the tree dies? Does it mean that the consciousness of the tree has withdrawn from one part of the tree and is concentrating on the remaining part? or does it mean that part of the 'consciousness' alone exists separately from the tree? If we accept the first alternative that consciousness can cease to exist from one part alone, then it is possible that it ceases to exist from all the parts. This means that consciousness and body are simply distinguishables and are not separables. On the other hand, if we say the dead part separately exists from the 'conscious' part, then we will have to think that conscious to think that conscious is separable into parts such that one part lives independently lives independently and in its own right and the other part lives along with the remaining tree. Or we will have to think that

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t lives k that although consciousness itself cannot be completely separated. a part of the consciousness, although continuous with the total consciousness, can exist independently of the tree. I think some kind of absurdity is involved in these positions. A more legitimate hypothesis, though speculative, would be to regard consciousness as only distinguishable and not separable from the 'body'.

We have seen that two separables as well as two distinguishables are different from each other. But in the case of distinguishables, the difference is either because of the difference in quality or because of a category difference. For example, a particular colour may be distinguished from another quality, say, smoothness, or it may be distinguished from the thing which has that colour. Such is not the case when we talk of separables. The separables must primarily belong to the same category and further we believe that this category must be substance which we again presuppose, is capable of existing by itself. It is our belief that only things have this capacity i.e. the capacity of existing by themselves, although philosophical language, we do say that the category of substance exists by itself and all other categories depend on the category of substance. It must however, be said that the category of substance is as much an abstraction as any other category. And if we say that the category of substance exists by itself we are equating substance with a thing i.e. although we talk of a substance, we really mean by it a thing as we understand in our ordinary language. So we ought to have really distinguished between substance as a thing and substance as a category.4 It is not an abstract substance which is separable from another abstract substance. It is a concrete thing which is separable from another concrete thing. Such a belief about things presuppose a certain One cannot say that the conception of the nature of the thing. above description of a thing would fit a geometrical point, for example. It appears to me that such a description of a thing primarily presupposes the spatial characteristics of a thing. It is by virtue of these spatial characteristics that we are able to separate one thing from another. It is true that we do extend the use of the term 'thing' to non-spatial objects also; for example, we do talk of two societies or two minds. But when we extend our use of things to minds or societies, if we carefully look to our use of the

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words, we would see that in our use of the words we are actually presupposing some kind of metaphorical space. This is so even when we talk of separability in time. As Bergson would put it, unless we talk of time in some spatial way, it would not be possible for us to talk of separability in time. In fact, even the problem of infinite divisibility of time requires us to think of time as a length, even to think of non-existing future time as existing simultaneously with the present time.

But this raises two kinds of problems. (1) How are we to decide that such and such is the meaning of existence (and a thing)? For the kind of a thing that we have taken for granted in the above discussion is the macroscopic thing. How are we to suppose that by a thing we mean something like a table and not a molecule or an atom or an electron? How are we to apply the criterion of spatial characteristics at the microscopic level. And (2) How are we do decide about the spatial characteristics of a thing? Does this mean that the concept of separability applies strictly only to macro-physical objects? Do we think of the microscopic world of atoms, or electrons and protons as nonspatial? This is a mistake committed by many. But again, the question may arise: How do you distinguish between a thing that is actually in space and a thing that is merely imagined? Is not an imagined thing imagined with spatial properties? Is it not the case that whenever you imagine a thing you imagine it in space, in physical space. Here strictly we do not have any criterion by which we can distinguish the space in imagination from physical space. But we believe and presuppose that physical space is prior to imagined space and it is only on the basic of this belief that we workout our theory of space.

But now imagine that the characteristics which are true of separables are applied to pure distinguishables. If this is done, we would immediately think that the 'things' which belong to different categories belong to only one category; that although the distinguishables as such do not exist, on account of our mistaking them for separables we would require them to have thingness and spatial characteristics. We would regard pure abstractions as reals. We would regard qualities, actions, classes and universals as things and even non-existence would be thought of as having existence. We would begin to think that these distinguishables are in space,

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that they can be related to each other (externally) by the relation of physical contact. In short, we would be creating a pluralistic universe of pseudo-existents. One category would be mistaken for another category, an element in the knowing situation would also be mistaken for a being situation.⁵ In other words, as soon as we mistake distinguishables for separables, we would reduce all categories to things (or substances) and this would be a fallacy, for we would regard a real thing and a pseudo thing on par.

Can we, in our analysis, ignore the factor of time altogether and restrict our analysis only to spatial characteristics? I should confess that this will not be possible. All our experience is characterised by spatio-temporal characteristics. In human life too, as elsewhere, both these characteristics, the characteristic of space and the characteristic of time, are present. One cannot isolate spatial characteristics alone from the temporal ones. Space and time are distinguishables only, not separables. Let us understand the pecularities of temporal chatacteristics. To begin, with, we may say that time is concerned with the basic concept of duration or persistence. Where, in experience, do we find this duration? Where can this duration be verified? As regards the answer to the first question, one may not be certain. For it is very often said that things endure in time. But without doubt persistence is verified on the basis of human existence alone. The duration of things is verified only by contrasting it, measuring it against human existence or of human life. Awareness of duration in human beings is itself the source of the concept of duration. Persistence and 'life' thus overlap each other and the end of life, also becomes the end of persistence. If there is X length of life one cannot break this length into two parts, say, A and B. The first' break signifies the end of life and duration.6 In this respect, life or existence in time, is to be contrasted with existence in space. Existence in space consists of extension and parts and even if the existence is negated, the parts as parts, continue to be there. In fact, a thing in space can be destroyed by breaking it. A temporal existence, as I have suggested above, cannot be broken into two temporal segments. The end of temporal existence is signified by the end itself. No part of temporal existence remains beyond this end-moment. I, therefore, think that finally the basic concept of measurement of time is supplied by man's own life or

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experience. The clocks and the movements of the earth and the sun etc., are finally measured in terms of human life or experience. It is human life or experience which gives the awareness of duration. You must measure duration by duration and unless there is awareness of duration, duration could not be measured. I, therefore, venture to say that the concept of time—not time—itself arises from human life. Life and time are inseparable, one of the important distinctions between them being that life is finite, it comes to an end some time. But although one particular life ceases another life is continuing. This gives rise to infinite temporal continuity. And that is time.

Time and space are distinguishable. But they are not separable. In our experience we do not come across any pure temporal or pure spatial existence. This can be either on account of the fact that it is impossible for space and time to exist independently or it may be on account of the fact that the medium of all our experience is inseparable from human beings and the temporal nature of human beings modifies the nature of experience. Whatever it may be, whenever we think of a thing we always conceive of it as having spatio-temporal properties. Space and time, so to say, are the scaffoldings or frame in which we put all our perceptible experience. Space and time supply the forms of things.

It is indeed true that we conceive of space and time in relation to things. This is how they are called forms of intuition by Kant. They do not appear to be things in the sense things are regarded as things. But how are we to conceive of empty space and emply time? I believe that the limited notions of space and time carry us beyond the limitedness and we begin to think of unlimited space and unlimited time in which the 'limited space' and 'limited time' of our primary experience are 'parts' or constituents. We believe that it is all one space and one time (which can be divided). If something is supposed to have parts, the next step would lead us to the belief that it is a thing or rather a composite thing having parts. Perhaps for some such reason, Vaisesikas thought of space and time as independent things of substances. I, however, want to argue that isolated space of isolated time could be space of isolated time could not be regarded as things, even as the form of things. For ultimetals things. For ultimately the thing is mingled with the spatiotemporal properties. Space, Time and 'Thing' permeate one

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another. Simple space or simple time would give us distinguishables but not separables. Even space and time jointly or separately cannot give us separability. For it is only the thing in space and time which can be separated, neither space nor time. It is because space or time cannot be separated but only distinguished as different spaces or times in relation to things that things can be separated in space and time. Thus although we presuppose space and time, they are not separable from things. Space and time are only distinguishable from things.

Ever since the days of Plato in the West and the Vasiesikas in the East, people have been thinking of universals. Universals are supposed to be some common element possessed by (all) particulars. But I think this is an over-simplification. The problem of universals cannot be understood in this way. Let us take the case of an animal, say, cow. On account of certain similar properties found in different cows we may distinguish a universal cow from particular cows. But in this search for universality, we may distinguish two different kinds. We may for example, talk of cowness as some common characteristic possessed by all cows. This characteristic evidently does not have parts like legs, head, etc. But when I know something as a cow but do not remember whether it is my cow or somebody elses', I am not talking of cowness. I am very much talking of a concrete animal cow, although I am not talking of this cow or that cow. It means that when I talk of cowness, I am not talking of a thing, but when I talk of a cow, I am talking of a thing having spatio-temporal characteristics. What I am eliminating are the specific qualities which go with a particular cow. Thus, to regard cowness and cow on par should not be justified. Although one is likely to say that in both these cases abstraction or universalization is involved, I think the two operations are significantly different. When one talks of a cow (though not a particular cow) one is generalizing; when one talks of cowness, one is abstracting. For example, it would be possible for us to count different cows without recognizing each cow. It would not be possible for us to count cownesses. The Nyāya philosophers of India have distinguished between special (Visesa guna) and general quality (Samanya guna). When you know something with Samanya guna alone you would, for example, get a general cow.

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The distinction between a general cow and cowness is very similar to the grammatical distinction between a common noun and an abstract noun. A common noun may have a bearer in space and time. The abstract noun does not have any bearer. It appears to me that this distinction was at least vaguely present in the mind of Aristotle who distinguished between form and Idea. Similarly, the early Nyāya philosophers distinguished between Játi and Ākrti; Jāti corresponding to abstract characteristic or abstraction and Akrti corresponding to a general thing. If we apply our distinction of separability and distinguishability to phenomena, it should be clear that the possibility of separability arises properly in the context of Akrti. It is only the Akrti which gives the thing the potentiality for separation. Jātis can only be distinguished, but not separated. I think it was this distinction operating in the process of universalizing and abstracting, that was overlooked by G. E. Moore when he thought that there are some concepts which are complex and there are some concepts which are simple and further thought that horse was a complex concept and good or yellow was a simple one.

But I think universals can be distinguished in yet different ways. For example, when we see some cows, just as we distinguish some common characteristic cowness, similarly we also know the oneness of each cow. To say that we distinguish oneness and cowness in exactly the same way does not seem to be correct. For, then we are likely to discover 'oneness' in the search for cowness and vice versa. Again in the compresence of many cows, I do not simply distinguish 'oneness' common to all cows. We are also able to add different cows. We are, for example, able to say that the cows are ten in number. Ten is also regarded as an universal. But the concept of ten is not formed in the same way the concept of one is formed. The concept of ten is formed by adding different ones. Again, we can talk of cows as a group. When I am talking of ten, I am not talking of a collectivity. I am rather talking of some discrete numbers. It is by virtue of this discrete—character of numbers that I am able to count the cows. On the other hand, when I talk of cows it is merely grouping the cows. Now, when I abstract one from a cow it is from a cow it is certainly an abstraction. But it is a different kind of abstraction. kind of abstraction from the one wherein we talk of cowness, and

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abstract it from a cow. All these different kinds of universals are distinguishables. To put them under one category without further distinguishing them would be as much a fallacy as to regard distinguishables as separables.

There is yet another kind of the so called universal represented by values like beautiful and good. Do we get these values in the same way as we get other universals? When one says that something is beautiful or something is good, are we discovering either some common property, shared by different things which are either beautiful or good? Are we abstracting goodness and beauty the way we abstract either cowness or the number one? It appears to me that we do not do any of these things. (Again there is likely to be a difference between the way we get good and the way we get beautiful). To say the least, when we say that something is beautiful, we are passing a judgment on something. This cannot be done unless the thing and the one who judges somehow come together. So if good and beautiful are regarded as universals, it will be incorrect to say that all universals are of the same kind. In that case, to say that something is beautiful will be to say that 'beautiful' and the thing that is judged as beautiful are inseparable. But this too, would not be correct. The peculiarity is that the beautiful and the things that are beautiful are not even distinguishable just as the colour of a thing and the thing are distinguishable. 'Beautiful' is a characteristic of a certain situation in which a thing and the observer are constituents and the opinion or the judgment of the one who judges is somehow super-imposed on the thing.

One of the problems connected with our previous discussion is whether values exist. I think this problem is purely a linguistic one. We begin to think that values exist because we are able to say significancy that there are values. But a proposition that there are values and the proposition that values exist are not synonymous. The proposition that there are values is like the propositions, 'there is society', 'there is a technique'; 'this is socialism' etc. We have also seen that in the primary sense, we cannot say that something exists unless the thing has spatial characteristics. Let us contrast values with something which either exists or which we think exists. When I try to bring before my mind's eye, the concepts of 'value' or 'beautiful' I do not

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succeed as also in the case of 'nothing', in getting anything spatial before me, at least directly. I cannot imagine any spatial picture of these notions. Let us see what happens when we think of ghosts and souls. Do we have mental pictures of souls and ghosts? Do we think of them the way we think of tables and chairs? Let us see how we use these words. It appears to me that although we say that ghosts and souls do not have spatial properties, we do not think of them in any other way except in spatial terms. The souls is smaller than the smallest thing in the world or is bigger than the biggest thing in the world. It is plain that in this context 'smallest' and 'biggest' are spatial terms. Similarly, when we say the ghost is coming through the wall, although we do not attribute to the ghost a body like ours, we do attribute to the ghost some body, may be a skeleton body of geometrical length when we think of its transmission. So whether ghosts and souls exist or not. when we attribute existence to them we think of them only in spatial terms. Descartes failed here.9 Descartes' concept of extensionless substance has limitations. Although it is true that we cannot measure mind or soul with something that is spatial, the spatial nucleus of mind or soul is not negated obviously. This is not the case in regard to values.

Thus far, we have based our analysis on the presupposition that whereas two things (qua things) can be distinguished and separated, two categories can only be distinguished but not separated. But theoretically this distinction does not seem to be a absolute. If two things had infinite magnitude, would this distinction apply? Our analysis applies only in the context of things which have finite spatio-temporal characteristics. By any chance, if we begin to presuppose that there are some things which are all pervading, say for example, the all-pervading God, the notion of separability would be simply inoperative. The notion of separability would also be inoperative, if you somehow believe that space and time, which cannot in any sense be regarded as finite are things. If we start with the presupposition that there are things with infinite magnitude, then the criterion of separability (and with it the criterion of spatiality) simply fails. The criterion of distinguishability alone remains. But on this criterion one cannot distinguish between things and categories. Either the things are likely to be mistaken for categories or the categories for things. At least,

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in its rudimentary form, we owe the distinction of distinguishability and separability to Vaisesikas. But unfortunately, they are also responsible for its doom. Since they forgot to make a proper distinction between substance as a category and substance as thing. their substances were usually mistaken for things. And amongst such things they included Space, Time, Akāśa and Atman. Time and Ākāśa are non-separable, distinguishable and pervasive. All pervasive things can be distinguished but not separated. So it is easy, though not correct, to regard a thing which is non-separable but distinguishable as all-pervasive. Once Atman was given the status of a thing, it was thought necessary to regard it as all-pervasive. One cannot separate Space, Time, Ākāśa and Atman from one another. One cannot separate Space, Time, Atman and Akasa by actual division (although conceptually division or distinction of space may be possible). So once our logic proceeds in the above way, at some stage, the separability criterion for their being things is given up, e.g. by the Vaisesikas, and with it the clear line of demarcation between categories and things is also lost. We have seen that the notion of thing and the notion of separability go together. But when this itself is given up, the edifice of philosophical presuppositions tumbles down. Once the presuppositions vanish, what remains is only the 'anarchy of beliefs' and even if one tries to reunite the 'forces of beliefs', in the absence of proper or consistent presuppositions, one is surely rolled down the valley of fallacies. For our initial philosophical position which is formed on account of our practical attitudes, is already cracked and is difficult to repair.

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NOTES

1. I think this should also explain that two events cannot properly be separated, although they may occupy two different positions in time. I think the idea of seperability is intimately connected with that of reversibility.

2. In fact it is very clear that when the Nyāya philosophers made a distinction between Dravya and Guna, they did not regard it as a purely logical distinction. They did not regard Dravya as abstract. Like Aristotle, they also regarded it as substratum. But they forgot that the pure substratum could not be regarded as existing by itself as it was not a thing.

- 3. Perhaps the principle on which beings and things can be divided is that whereas a being procreates, a thing does not.
- 4. In fact it will be interesting to point out that amongst the distinguishables also we are unfortunately inclined to give greater existential weightage to some Continuants. We have a tendancy to think that substance is more important than qualities and thus think that the qualities in here in substance. Here we treat the substances as things and unconciously postulate that they are capable of existing by themselves. I think it is this kind of prejudice which has made the very pregnant notion of Samavāya of the Vaisesikas insignificant. Samavāya should have suggested inseparability where we are able to distinguish. But very soon the notion of pure distinguishability was substituted by that of substratum-superstratum relation. It goes without saying that we are unconsciously treating a substance as a thing.
 - 5. For example a *Know*-situation is merely a special case of an *Is*-situation. The is-situation is converted and distinguished into a knower-known-situation. As stated earlier, these are simply relational terms. But now we would start thinking that the knower, the logical knower itself is an existing object and thus convert a *subject* into an object. It need not be added that the knower has existence is formed in this way. (In the same way it is possible to mistake something which really exists as only idea).
- 6. Of course on the hypothesis that there is rebirth several such breaks are allowed!
- 7. Spatial objects can be divided. But such a division signifies the destruction or death of the objects.
 - 8. Anoraniyan Mahato Mahiyan.
- 9. His division of substances was based on the principle whether something is spatial or non-spatial. But if spatiality in common to all substances, the division would not be exclusive.

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SARTRE'S CRITIQUE OF KANT

The fundamental question governing all philosophic research. according to Sartre, concerns the relationship between the knower and the known. The polarity between what Sartre terms "being" and "consciousness", respectively, is nothing new, of course: discussion of it and of the requirements of discourse (tenses. polyadic predicates) in the light of it stretches back at least as far as Plato's Theaetetus and Sophist; but Sartre credits Hegel with the discovery of the "dialectic" and hence with the most profound methodological insight, if not innovation, in the field of epistemology. What Hegel saw has since pervaded philosophy; namely, that the problem of knowledge is both paradigmatic and unavoidable; paradigmatic in that all solutions to other philosophic problems can be traced, if not reduced, to their roots in the knowerobject of knowledge dichotomy, and unavoidable in the sense that the attempt to deal with the problem of knowledge systematically seems a, perhaps the, besetting sin of philosophic inquiry. The urge towards what Sartre calls "totalisation" demands that facts be transmuted into a priori necessities, in the interests either of a comprehensive science of man (psychology, history, anthropology) or a metaphysics of experience. Sartre is both too much of a Marxist and too much of an existentialist to countenance such developments. He rejects the view that complete prediction of human behaviour is possible, or complete understanding of the self, not only because the future is replete with indefinite but very much open possibilities, but also because man is defined, if he is to be defined at all, not in terms of his rationality or even his natural participation in the temporal chain of community (historicity, finitude), but as a creature or self who is free to shape that future, at least partly, to forge genuine alternatives for himself and execute in accordance with the responsible choices exercised at given times in the pursuit of goals and the formation of a life-plan. Man is not identified with his doings; he is his freedom, not the content which his freedom may at any one time dictate to himself.2

In this context, Sartre's appraisal of the contributions of Kant to the problem of knowledge may be understood and assessed.

Kant's a priori limitation of knowledge to sense-derived experience does not disturb Sartre, as it did Hegel; Sartre does not see in Kant's denial of supersensible knowledge either an implicit affirmation of such knowledge or any other attempt to place the agent outside or above nature, such as one might find in a Spinozan or Platonist spectator-theory. Rather, his criticism of Kant is much like one of Aristotle's (and Parmenides') famous objections to the theory of Forms. It will be recalled that a divorce between the intelligible world and the world of shifting, transient appearances undermines the very purpose for which the Forms are introduced. inasmuch as there can in principle be no contact between the temporal and non-temporal realms, lest the ontological purity and the abstract, conceptual nature of the intelligible realm be sullied. But in that case, how can the Forms be said to explain or be related to the unintelligible world of the senses at all, whether as universals or as concepts in relation to particular instances? There is no answer to this question.

Likewise, there is no answer to Sartre's question: if Kant is right about the conditions necessary in order for experience to be possible, then experience itself remains a mystery, an unintelligible residue unaccounted for in the explanatory scheme4; the "opacity of the fact" is left just as cloudy as it was before,4 or else is shifted from experiential to metaphysical ground. In particular, if our characterization of the world as one consisting of objects outside ourselves, as having an existence independent of particular states of awareness, and as existing in space and time, is said to be due (a) to the projection from our mode of sensibility, or a priori Anschauung (b) to the perceived stability or permanence of experience (c) to the mediation of (a) and (b) through the built-in interpretive mechanism of the self, then the question arises, what is the self? Kant's answer, couched in terms of the transcendental unity of apperception which Kant considers the highest principle of all knowledge, sexplains much but also leaves much unanswered. It explains how experience is possible, through the necessary attribution of experiences to an experiencer, to an agent capable of assimilating and organizing the data it receives, recognizing and identifying them (though not on all occasions) as its own; so that the problems of Berkeleyan and Cartesian hoth idealism simply do not arise, since experience presupposes both

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experiencer and subject-matter (outward sense, or spatial magnitude) of experience.⁶ But the famous "I think" which must possibly accompany all experiences is a nebulous, non-observable entity or activity; moreover, the metaphor of possession (my experiences) begs the question as to how experiences are classified as mine, instead of either not being categorized at all, or else being randomly attributed to someone else as owner. The "I think" sheds no light on the self because it is, in spite of Kant's disclaimers concerning transcendental psychology⁷ and the pretensions of ego-as-substance view points, a postulation, not an "empirical discovery", and hence is not, on Kant's terms, compelled to constitute or establish its own intelligibility.⁸

This critique, if taken seriously, veers towards one of the following: (i) Humean skepticism, skeptiscism about the self, for example, and reversion to a conscious-stream or "bundle-theory" of perceptions; (ii) insistence on a full-fledged, self-correcting empirical method of cognitive research and inquiry (Piaget, for example). It does not justify any of the aspirations of an old-time metaphysical solution to the problem of knowledge, because modern positivism, has, if nothing else, ruled that out as untenable, whether in monadological form as presented by Leibniz or in the version of the ego proffered by Fichte, nor those of Marxism. For Sartre is well aware that the very philosophy which in our own time is unavoidable because it most fully raises the question of the relationship between knower and known, at the same time precludes a solution of it;9 because, unlike Hegel, the Marxist is not free to suppose that his abstractions either reduplicate or render superfluous the examination of empirical historical detail. Hegel's Absolute Spirit is yet another in the long line of unwarranted a priori attempts to avoid dealing with the subject of man, through the positing of metaphysical science with special claims to intuitive insight and wisdom, an evasion which is saved from charges of through its astute recognition that complete incompetence "dialectic" is the cornerstone of philosophy.

Sartrean existentialism is at no time abandoned in favour of metaphysics of the soul, nor in favour of an uncritical acceptance of Marxist "group" psychology and historical systematization; it does not recognize the empiricist reduction of experience to discrete, unrelated episodes bound together by memory or time,

or the organism's endurance of occasions coupled with higher functions of mental interpretation of its own states, nor does it feel compelled to deduce knowledge in the form of rules, be they a priori theses about the march of Spirit in the world or would be a posteriori rules of meaning and significance (verificationism)¹⁰. The Sartrean position verges towards none of these extremes, but preserves its own integrity intact by denying the adequacy of previous solutions while pointing out the shortcomings inherent in any view which, as Kant's does, makes time a property of the self (inner sense), while failing to explain how this can be accessible either publicly or to the private consciousness of the agent.

What, then, is the answer to the problem of knowledge? Simply this: that transactions between knower and known, while they have a structure, are never finalized or terminated, except individually (e.g., by or in death), and that they are, as a consequence, best characterized as processive. This does not mean that they are not amenable to rational treatment (look at what Whitehead has done for the subject!), but it does mean that the knower and the known are in an unfinished association, a relationship which is on-going, one whose goals may in outline be discernible but which, like human freedom itself, is both open to genuinely novel possibilities (futural) and to the possible tragedy of non-completion, as a collective enterprise of sorts. The potential procedural rapprochement between the poles of subject and object demands surrender of the vain hopes of definitive treatment, predictability or "determinist" (causal) explanation. The model for construing and describing the relationship is subject to change, for the relationship itself is; to put it more bluntly, the form of man (freedom), his essential, unique and individuating property, precludes a stable, permanent form of reconstruction of the results of congnitive transaction, whether the product of such transaction be linguistic (affirmations) or of some other kind. 11 This does not mean that pretenders to the status of philosophic explanations of man in relation to his environment can do no more than engage in special ideological pleading; they can at least be gifted with the Hegelian insight of recognizing (and christening) the urgency of the issue and, like Kant, observing the (self-imposed) limitations on its dimensions that finite and fallible investigators are in principle and inescapably subject to.¹² And, like Sartre in his own work, her

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they can attempt again to rework the entire theme both conceptually and empirically from the ground up: but surrendering both the claim and the prideful boast to final understanding which has hitherto marred even the most restrained and unpolemical of philosophic treatments. That this claim has seemed a logical consequence of previous methodologies indicates a defect in the formulation of their attack on the problem of knowledge; what is entailed by previous failures, in the light of the reasons for them, is humility bordering on intellectual self-denial. For this reason Sartre contributes the unique perspective of an existentialist, both on the pressing matter of his own revision of Marxism and the ensuing criticism of Kantian a priori-ism which it engenders.

Roosevelt University.

D. A. Rohatyn

NOTES

- 1. Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique de la Raison Dialectique (Paris, 1960), Préface, p. 10. Hereafter referred to as "Critique."
- 2. This summarizes Sartre's teaching in L'Etre et le Néant (Paris, 1943), the ethical component of which bears a strong tinge of Kantian universalism, as the later Existentialism is a Humanism (English tr., London 1948) makes clear.
- 3. See for example Hegel's Enzyklopaedie der Wissenschaften (Berlin, 1816), paragraph 60. Also see P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London, 1966), p. 38.
- 4. Sartre, *Critique*, p. 136; on the opposite extreme, "dialectical hyperempiricism," see *ibid.*, p. 130.
- 5. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, ed. Raymuud Schmidt, ^{2nd} ed. (Leipzig, 1930), B 135; also B 131.
- 6. For an admirably lucid summary statement of Kant's principal tenets in this regard, see Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, esp. pp. 24, 93, 98, 101; Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, B 274-276.
- 7. Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernuft, esp. A 348, A 351, A 360, A 361, A 363 (the Paralogisms). Kant's own views on a priori Anschauung render the fact of his own denials especially acute, not to say paradoxical, in their original format.

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- 8. Sartre, Critique, pp. 135-137. Sartre, in a perplexing footnote (ibid., p. 136n2) contends that it is amply demonstrated (he does not say where, or by whom) that Kant in his late years moved towards a "dialectical" position on the subject of reason in light of the "exigencies of intelligibility" which Kant's own system confronted him with, or rather resisted. This is at best an undocumented assertion, if by it Sartre means that Kant moved in the direction of Hegel, Marx or possibly Sartre himself; but Sartre clearly intends it both as a compliment and as a sign of the breakdown of a priori-ism in the domain of knowledge.
 - 9. Sartre, Critique, Préface, pp. 9-10.
 - 10. Sartre, Critique, pp. 128, 132.
 - 11. For full and sympathetic study of this topic, see Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago, 1958) and The Tacit Dimension (New York, 1960).
 - 12. It is here that Heidegger antedates Sartre in observing the endemic weaknesses of the Kantian postulations with regard to space and time as components of the mind. For Heidegger's version of a priori anthoropology and his extensions (not indictment) of Kant's understanding and conception of human finitude, see Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tuebingen, 1927), and Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (Bonn, 1929).

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JAINA ETHICAL THEORY

It cannot be denied that human nature is essentially endoriented. This end-orientation of man implies that human life is a striving towards certain ends. In other words, "it is so thoroughly teleological that it can not be understood apart from what it is seeking to become." The discipline which deals with the process of seeking and striving in terms of good and bad, and consequently in terms of right and wrong is termed Normative Ethics and judgments like 'A was a good man', 'to harm some one is wrong' are known as normative judgements of value and respectively. Again, the discipline which aims at philosophical analysis of ethical terms or concepts like 'right', 'good' etc., which asks the meaning and definition of such terms, seeks justification of normative judgements, discusses their nature, and is concerned with the analysis of freedom and responsibility is termed Metaethics. Besides, there is descriptive historical inquiry to explain the phenomena of morality in the various periods of history. Thus, normative ethics, meta-ethics and descriptive constitute three kinds of ethical inquiry. In the present paper, I propose to look at Jaina ethics from the normative and metaethical perspectives, to the exclusion of its descriptive historical inquiry. In other words, I shall not be describing the Acara of the Householder and that of the Muni in the various periods of history, but shall be dealing with some of the questions regarding value and obligation and meta-ethics, from the point of view of Jaina ethics in order to bring out the contributions of the Jainas to the above ethical questions.

Let us start with the Jaina theory of value, and then go on to the Jaina theory of obligation and finally to the Jaina theory of meaning and justification of the judgements of value and obligation (Meta-ethics). The question that confronts us is: what is intrinsically desirable, good or worthwhile in life according to the Jaina? What intrinsic values are to be pursued according to him? The answer that may be given is this: What is intrinsically good or valuable or what ought to be chosen for its own sake is the achievement of Ahimsa of all living beings, the attainment of

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knowledge, the realisation of happiness, the leading of a virtuous life, and the experiencing of freedom and good emotions. Thus the criterion of intrinsic goodness or the good-making characteristic shall be the fulfilment of ends like Ahimsa, knowledge, virtues etc. and the satisfaction that attends the their fulfilment. We may say here that goodness is a matter of degree and this depends on the degree of fulfilment of ends and the resulting satisfaction therefrom. An altogether good shall be wholly fulfilling the ends and wholly satisfying the seeker. The Jaina texts speak of the partial realisation of Ahimsa and the complete realisation of Ahimsa and of other ends. This theory of intrinsic goodness may be called Ahimsa-Utilitarianism. This means that this theory considers Ahimsa and other ends to be the general good. But it may be noted here that this general good shall not be possible without one's own good. Thus by this theory of Ahimsa-Utilinarrow egoism is abondoned. This Ahimsa-Utilitarianism is to be distinguished from Hedonistic Utilitarianism of Mill, but it has some resemblance with the Ideal Utilitarianism of Moore and Rashdall.² The point to be noted here is that Moore distinguishes between good as a means and good as an end (good in itself). When we say that an action or a thing is good as a means, we say that it is liable to produce something which is good in itself (Intrinsically good). The Jaina recognises that Ahimsa can be both good as a means and good as an end. This means that both means and ends are to be tested by the criterion of Ahimsa. I may say in passing, that the principle that "the end justifies the means" need not be rejected as immoral if the above criterion of means and ends is conceded. It may look paradoxical that Ahimsa is an end. But it is not so. Perhaps in order to avoid this misunderstanding that Ahimsa cannot be an end, the Sutrakrtanga has pronounced that Ahimsa is the highest good. In a similar vein, Samantabhadra has also said that Ahimsa of all living beings is equivalent to the realisation of the highest good. This shows that there is a shown that the shown th shows that there is no inconsistency in saying that Ahimsa is both an end and a means. Thus, the expression Ahimsa-Utilitarianism seems to me to be the most apt one to represent the Jaina theory of intrinsic goodness.

Let us now proceed to the Jaina theory of obligation. The ultimate concern of the normative theory of obligation is to guide

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ns in the making of decisions and judgements about actions in particular situations. Here the question that confronts us is this: How to determine what is morally right for a certain agent in a certain situation? Or what is the criterion of the rightness of action? The interrelated question is: what we ought to do in a certain situation? Or, how duty is to be determined? The answer of the Jaina is that right, ought and duty can not be separated from the good. The criterion of what is right etc. is the greater balance of good over bad that is brought into being than any alternative. Thus, the view that regards goodness of the consequences of actions as the right-making characteristic is termed the teleological theory of obligation as distinguished from the deontological theory of obligation which regards an action as right or obligationy simply because of its own nature regardless of the consequences it may bring into being. The Jaina ethics holds the teleological theory of obligation (Maximum balance of Ahimsa over Himsa as the right-making characteristic).

The question now arises whether Jaina ethics subscribes to act-approach or rule approach in deciding the rightness or wrongness of actions. The former is called act-utilitarianism, while the latter, rule-utilitarianism. It seems to me that though the Jaina Acaryas have given us moralrules, yet in principle they have followed act-utilitarianism, according to which every action is to be judged on the goodness of the consequences expected to be produced. Since to calculate the consequences of each and every action is not practically possible, Jaina Acaryas have given us guiding moral principles in the form of Anuvratas and Mahavratas, Gunavratas and Siksavratas and so on. This means that Jaina ethics accepts the possibility that sometimes these general moral principles may be inadequate to the complexities of the situation and in this case, a direct consideration of the particular action without reference to general principles is necessary. May be, keeping this in view, Samantabhadra argues that truth is not to be spoken when by so doing the other is entangled in miseries;5 Svami Kumar in the Karttikeyanupreska disallows the purchase of things at low price in order to maintain the vow of non-stealing.6 According to rule-utilitarianism exceptions can not be allowed. This implies that Jaina ethics does not allow superstitious rule-worship but at the same time, prescribed that utmost caution is to be taken in

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breaking the rule, which has been built up and tested by the experience of generations. Thus according to Jaina ethics, acts are logically prior to rules and the rightness of the action is situational,

It is of capital importance to note here that according to Jaina ethics, there is no such thing as a moral obligation which is not an obligation to bring about the greatest good. To call an act a duty, is dependent on the fact of producing a greater balance of good over evil in the universe than any other alternative. Duty is not self-justifying; it is not an end in itself. "The very nature of duty is to aim beyond itself. There can no more be a duty to act, if there is no good to attain by it, than to think if there is no truth to be won by thinking".7 Thus, duty is an extrinsic good. good as a means; this does not deprive duty of its importance in ethical life, just as health does not become unimportant by its being extrinsic good. The pursuance of Anuvaratas for the householder and the Mahavratas for the Muni may be regarded as dutiful actions.

In view of the above, it seems that Jaina ethics will look with a critical eye at the deontologism of Prichard and Ross. According to Ross, there are self-evidently binding prima facie duties such as duties of gratitude, duties of self-improvement, duties of Justice The conviction of the Jaina is that all these duties are conducive to good as an end. Hence they should be followed because of the conduciveness to good, and not because they are independent of good consequences.

. We have so far considered the criterion by which we are to determine what we morally ought to do in a given situation, how the rightness or wrongness of action is to be decided. But the question that remains to be discussed is: How the moral worth of an action is to be evaluated? How does, in Jaina terminology, an action become punya and papa-engendering? In other words, how does an act become virtuous or vicious, praiseworthy of blameworthy, morally good or bad? (1) It is likely that an act by the criterion of rightness may be externally right but internally immorally motivated. A man may seem to be doing things according to a moral and according to a moral according to a moral and according to a moral according to a moral and according to a moral according to a mora ing to a moral rule, but it may be with a bad motive. (2) Again, an act by the atom. an act by the standard of rightness may be externally wrong, but it may be done with it may be done with a good motive. For example, one may the rich in order to constant of the rich i the rich in order to serve the poor. (3) An act may be externally right wro back to (in are in . pra the gor nal nat act the of me he extingued due lear

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g, but ay kill rnally right and done with good motive. (4) An act may be externally wrong and done with a bad motive. Thus there are four possibilities: (1) Right act and bad motive, (2) Wrong act and good motive, (3) Right act and good motive and (4) Wrong act and had motive. The third and fourth category of acts which according to Jaina ethics may be called Subha (Auspicious) and asubha (inauspicious) lesyas are respectively called virtuous and vicious. are acts having moral merit and demerit. The concept of Lesyas in Jainism also invites our attention to the fact that the degree of praiseworthyness and blameworthyness of actions will depend on the degree of intensity of good and bad motives. The first category of acts (Right act and bad motive) may look proper externally but its moral significance is zero. All deceptions are of this nature. The moral worth of the second category of acts (wrong act and good motive) is complicated and can be decided only on the nature of the case. Though in Jaina ethical works, importance of good motive is recognised as contributing towards the moral merit of an action yet the Jaina Acaryas have clearly stated that he who exclusively emphasized the internal at the expense of the external forgets the significance of outward behaviour.8 In consequence, both the internal and external aspects should occupy their due places. Ewing rightly observes that "they (good motives) lead us into evil courses on occasion if there is not at the back of our minds a moral consciousness which prevents this, so the strictly moral motive should always in a sense be present potentially ".9

Let us now try to find out the answer of the Jaina to certain meta-ethical questions. The fundamental questions to be taken into account are: (1) What is the nature of ethical judgments (obligatory and value) according to the Jaina? and (2) What is their justification? These two are the main questions of ethics in our times. Contemporary moral philosophy has concerned itself with this almost excluding normative ethics; it is not interested so much in practical guidance even of a very general kind as in theoretical understanding and conceptual clarification of ethical judgments.

Let me now state the first question more clearly. There have been recognised three kinds of knowledge (1) Knowledge of fact, as, this flower is yellow; (2) knowledge of necessity, as 7 + 5 = 12,

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and (3) Knowledge of value, as A was good man or murder is wrong. The question under discussion reduces itself to this: Are ethical judgments expressive of any congitive content in the sense that they may be asserted as true or false, or do they simply express emotions, feelings etc. The upholders of the former view are known as cognitivists, while those holding the latter view are known as non-cognitivists (emotivists). When we say that Himsa is wrong, are we making a true or false assertion or are we experiencing simply a feeling? Or are we doing both? According to the congnitivists, the ethical judgments, 'Himsa is wrong' is capable of being objectively true and thus moral knowledge is objective, whereas the non-cognitivists deny both the objectivity of assertion and knowledge, in as much as according to them, ethical judgments are identified with feelings, emotions etc. Here, the position taken by the Jaina seems to me to be that though the statement, 'Himsa is wrong' is objectively true, yet it can not be divested of the feeling-element involved in experiencing the truth of the statement. In moral life, knowledge and feeling cannot be separated. The Tattvarthasutra pronounces that the path of goodness can be traversed only be right knowledge (Darsana and Jnana) and feeling and activity (Caritra). Amrtacandra says that first of all knowledge of right, wrong and good is to be acquired, afterwards moral life is to be practised. Thus, the conviction of the Jaina is that the experience of value and obligation is bound up with our feelings and that in their absence, we are ethically blind. In fact, knowledge and feelings are so interwoven into a complex harmony that we have never a state of mind in which both are not present to some degree. So, the claims of cognitivists and non-cognitivists are onesided and are very much antagonistic to the verdict of experience. Blanshard rightly remarks, "Nature may spread before us the richest possible banquet of good things, but if we can look at them only with the eye of reason, we shall care for hone of these things; they will be alike insipid. There would be no knowledge of good and evil in a world of mere knowers, for where there is no feeling, good and evil would be unrecognischle? be unrecognisable". And a life that directs itself by feeling even of the most exalted kind will be a ship without a rudder. Thus the nature of ethical judgment according to the Jaina is cognitive affective. The achieve affective. The achievement of good is a joint product of our power to know and our power to feel.

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The next question in meta-ethics is to ask how our ethical judgments (value and obligations) can be justified. ethical judgments are objectively true, need not imply that their justification can be sought in the same manner as the justification of factual judgments of ordinary and scientific nature. reason for this is that, facts can not be derived from values, is from ought. In factual judgments our expressions are value-neutral, but in ethical judgments we cannot be indifferent to their being sought by ourselves, or by others. That is why derivation of ought from is, fact from value is unjustifiable. The value judgments according to the Jaina are self-evident and can only be known by intuition; thus they are self-justifying. The conviction of the Jaina is that no argument can prove 'Himsa is evil' and 'Ahimsa is good'. What is intrinsically good or bad can be known only by intuition. The justification of right can be sought from the fact of its producing what is intrinsically good.

In this paper I have ventured to deal with the Jaina ethical theory very briefly in the light of the contemporary discussion of ethical theory. In my view, the future of Jaina ethics should move in this direction so as to keep pace with the modern discussions of the ethical and meta-ethical problems.

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Kamal Chand Sogani

NOTE

1. Blanshard, Reason and Goodness, P. 136 The view of ethics which combines the utilitarian principle that ethics must be teleological with a non-hedonistic view of the ethical end, I propose to call Ideal Utilitarianism. Rashdall, Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. I, P. 184.

3. Moore, Principia Ethics, PP. 21, 22.

 Sutrakratanga, 1, 11, 11. 5. Frankena, Ethics, P. 11.

Ratnakaranda Sravakacara, 55.

7. Karttikeyanupreksa, 335.

8. Blanshard, B. Reason and Goodness, P. 332.

9. Purasarthasiddhupayaya, 50.

10. Ewing, Ethics, P. 129.

THE GUNA THEORY AND THE VARNA SYSTEM

The Samkhya view that Prakriti manifests itself in the three gunas—sattwa, rajas and tamas—was quite widely accepted by Indian thinkers. When applied to human beings, it holds that, while the three are present in every individual, one predominates. Thus, an individual's personality—his outlook, temperament, attitudes, likes, dislikes, activities—are all a result of the prominent guna. The Bhagavad Gita extends the Samkhya thesis, going so far as to claim the kind of food one likes, how one sacrifices, what one worships, how one gives gifts and what is conducive to one's happiness are determined by it.

The sattwa guna is associated with light, truth, calmness, serenity, egolessness, purity, harmony, balance, control, unity, thoughtfulness, gentleness, the inner sympathy and compassion. The raja guna is associated with passions, drives, action, physical strength, ruling, attachment, pleasure, restlessness, arrogance, heedlessness, disunity, divisions, power and wealth. The tamoguna is associated with inertia, darkness, sloth, confusion, obstinancy, unpleasantness, demonic, limitation, distortion and coarseness.

Disregarding philosophical arguments for the Samkhya view of the gunas, I would like to deal with the question of why the theory became widely accepted, from another perspective, namely, the pragmatic. Is it not obvious that such a view could be made to fit neatly into and to serve as a justification for a stratified social system in which the higher group or groups seek to keep the system intact and to retain their elevated status within the system? Dividing persons into three natural types provides a psychological justification. Secondly, it makes room for the classical "argument from nature" approach which one finds universally, and which reinforces the universal tendency in human beings to make distinctions between themselves of the superior/inferior type. Nature has endowed some persons with greater sagacity, abilities or skill, and thus it is quite right and natural that they should have a higher status or standing. Nature has

given others lesser capacities or talents and their role is naturally a subordinate or lesser one.

Without going into a great many historical details to demonstrate it, is it not true that this is what actually happened in India over the centuries? Social groups came into existence early in her history. The Brahmins were accepted as the highest even as early as Buddha's time, for he ridicules them by saying—"I do not call a man a Brahmana because of his origin or of his mother..." Certainly, the Samkhya view which, as Chatterjee and Datta point out, "must be a very old system of thought," may well have been called upon by the upper varna as it very well suited their purpose of retaining the status quo and keeping their place in it intact. Such a phenomenon is not limited to one country or tradition. Dominant power groups extoling views likely to ensure their remaining in power is a universal phenomenon. I could very easily demonstrate this in terms of the contemporary American scene.

The whole business is thrown into disrepute, however, if another view is taken as follows. Suppose we view reality ontologically in terms of levels of being or consciousness. We might, in the end, divide the levels into three general ones, even using the same terms as Samkhya philosophy does, sattwic, rajasic and tamasic. From this point of view, the life of an individual is a progression or evolution through these levels of existence, the ultimate goal being to transcend even the last one and attain final union with Brahman. Some pass through more easily and quickly than others. Nevertheless each one goes from the state of potential knowing to perfect knowing, little knowledge to greater knowledge, from the unbridled expression to the subduing and channeling of passions, from attachment and self-seeking to nonattachment and self-giving, confusion to clarity, restlessness to serenity, multiplicity to oneness, anxiety to faith, a process which religions denote as a purifying or redeeming one.

Such a process—view of individual life is not susceptible to the social rationalization of which the Guna view is. There is no superior/inferior dichotomy inherent in it. It begins with the nature of reality rather than the nature of the individual. It holds to a metaphysical monism or pluralism rather than a dualism.

It views all individuals as being subject to the same tendencies which all must ultimately transcend. It leads us to see individuals as simply beings in different stages of an identical process. The social history of India might have been quite different, had an ontological interpretation of man become the prevailing one.

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Donald H. Bishop

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A CRITIQUE OF REASON

The meaning or sense of the word 'reason' has historically varied with its uses. In the speculative tradition, reason has been the organ of knowledge, giving us, so to say, some sort of an insight into the nature of realities themselves. Reason has been compared and contrasted with sense—experience which, according to this tradition, can only give opinion or belief but not knowledge, cannot deliver things as they are, but only distortions or imperfect imitations of them. Realities are not 'given' to sense—they are 'given' to thought or reason which works as some sort of a non-sensuous intuition—an autonomous faculty, native to the rational self.

In the critical tradition, reason loses its autonomy in the theoretical sphere, and the possibility of a non-sensuous intuition is categorically denied. Speculative reason becomes reduced to some logical function of interpretations, and these, again, become limited to the 'given' of sensibility, without which latter, the former remains empty and inoperative. Reason here becomes a complementary faculty of knowledge having a distinctive nature of its own, but incapable of working by itself, without there being presentations of a sense-manifold through some other 'stem' of experience, such as, 'sensibility'. This dependence of theoretic reason as a logical faculty of interpretation on an alien1 faculty of 'given-ness' is denied in the Hegelian tradition, and the speculative tradition is restored in all its aggressive vehemence, with the distinction between the faculty of 'given-ness' and the faculty of 'construction' being completely denied. Reason is admitted not only as knowledge of Reality, but also as identical with it nay, as Reality itself.

In the empiricistic tradition, the separate origin of reason or understanding as a faculty of judgmental construction is denied, and reason is looked upon as a later out-growth from given sense-experience. This development of reason or understanding from sense-experience is interpreted by some as psychological, by others as physiological or behaviouristic, but on either view, its formulations or constructions are made subject to the test in terms of

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given experiences for their sufficiency or validity. In the contemporary analytic and linguistic tradition-which is equally empirical, the *meaning* or *sense* of whatever is said in language will have to be ascertained in terms of or by means of translatability or analysability into basic empirical structures—atomic propositions or protocol sentences.

The Indian tradition, with the solitary exception of Carvaka materialism, seems not interested in the question as to the relative priority, independence, and the so called autonomy of the different contributory factors of knowledge such as, the sense, the mind, the intellect, and so on. With most of the Indian schools, the senses, the mind and the buddhi-all these jointly. suffice to give knowledge or experience. With the Samkhya and the Advaita Vedanta, however, all these may only figure as components of the 'given', but without illumination by a transcendent principle of self-luminosity, there can be no experience or knowledge, and this principle is cit or pure consciousness, a nonnatural principle. So, even reason or buddhi requires to be illuminated so that it can, as a synthetic principle, reveal the 'given' in borrowed and reflected light. It is striking that in the statement of the various sources of knowledge, called pramana, reason by itself, or working unaided, has no place. Then, again, and here I want to hazard an opinion of my own, the distinction between svārtha and parārtha, traditionally drawn between inference as 'given' knowledge, and inference as a process of demonstration, can be extended to all other fields including presentative experience of the perceptual type also2, and we can review all our knowledge in two ways—as 'given truths' and as 'demonstrated truths'. In the former kind, all the cognitive processes. work more or less as samskaras, even the so called premises of mediate knowledge functioning as, unconscious tendencies, and delivering up a 'thought-out' content as a 'given' content. In the latter, that is, parartha variety, even the credentials of my presentative perceptual experience can be reasoned out to you to win your convinction. As far as the mediate cognitions are concerned, it is in this parartha shape that the various avayavas, are meticulously brought out and displayed for the purpose of demonstration, while in the svārtha type, they remain implicit and function as tendencies like the missing members

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enthymeme. I bring out this point to show that reason functions in two roles here—as a constitutive, though implicit factor, of any knowledge as 'given' knowledge, and as an explicit and yet an equally component part of 'demonstrative' truths-which may or may not be a 'given' knowledge to one before whom the demonstration is laid out, everything depending on the arousal of personal conviction in him3. But while presenting reason or buddhi in its constitutive role, although implicit, in any 'given' knowledge, I must make a distinction in order to be faithful to the Indian tradition. The principal systems make a distinction between nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) and savikalpaka (determinate) knowledge or pratyaksa. If we leave aside the Buddhistic and the Advaita accounts, knowledge proper4 seems to arise only at the determinate stage in which there is explication and elaboration of the presented materials of the indeterminate stage, and in this, buddhi functions in collaboration with other faculties or factors, and not by itself alone, in order to be able to deliver up a stage of 'given' knowledge. In the Buddhistic account, however, buddhi is looked down upon as a faculty of distortion, knowledge proper being limited to the nirvikalpaka, the apprehension of the svalak şanas (self-defined particulars). In the Vedanta account, if nirvikalpaka is to mean the experience of the ineffable in the realisation of absolute identity of Atman and Brahman, then, not only reason, but also the senses must be disarmed and disengaged in that knowledge. If, again, the nirvikalpaka is taken to mean knowledge of the referential one-ness5 of two contents shorn of their predicative qualities as seems to be the view of the Paribhāṣā in respect of identity-judgments, such as 'That thou art'. 'That one is this Devadatta', then although, sense may figure as an external occasion6 for it, without any relevance in the emergence of the feeling of identity, buddhi with its whole armoury of concepts and categories must be shelved aside as a preliminary condition of such knolwledge. Thus, in the Indian tradition, the function of buddhi and its categories seems mainly to be indicated in determinate knowledge, but there also buddhi cannot work by itself alone, but always in collaboration with other faculties in order to be a constitutive or contributary factor of knowledge. The conclusion to which I am led, therefore, is that, in the Indian tradition, reason is only one factor among others in knowledge as

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a 'given' experience of the individual himself, that is, in svārthānubhava where it is latent, and that even in parārtha anubhava, in which any knowledge of a person's own experience can be demonstrated to convince another, reason cannot work by itself but requires premises which it itself cannot manipulate, and this is its fundamental limitation as far as knowledge or prāmā goes. No purely formal knowledge seems to have been admitted in the Indian tradition. All 'reasoned' truths or truths of demonstration are tied up with and based upon 'given' knowledge and truths.

But we not only have 'given' knowledge, we not only attempt demonstration of it in order to convince some others and try successfully or unsuccessfully to make our knowledge also theirs. but we also seem to know a good deal about our knowledge, of its different forms and possible conditions. In other words, we seem to be capable of thinking about the nature of our knowledge as also about the nature of the known. We claim to have not one, but a whole multitude of alternative theories of knowledge as also alternative theories regarding the nature of the given order. So a question may be asked: how does this become possible? It may also be asked: Can our speculations about the nature of knowledge about the nature of truth as also our speculations about the nature of the given order, called reality, be admitted as knowledge in some sense? To my mind, the most significant role or function of reason is connected with these questions. Neither epistemology, nor logic, nor philosophy-nor any enquiry or theory or postutational system, can claim to be any 'given' knowledge. Knowledge is 'given' inspite of one's own self. it also becomes 'given' only in one way, and if corrected, it ceases to be knowledge, and is replaced by another which, again, is 'given' in one way only. Knowledge does not seem to support alternation. Yet if epistemology, philosophy, logic or linguistics which admit of alternative formulations, are not allowed some status somewhere in the cognitive sphere, and if the conditions under which such enquiries can or are likely to originate cannot be explained, then it seems to me that the situation becomes absurd.

Trying to solve this difficulty, paradox or puzzle, I am led to the concept of reflection, and the proper function of reason seems to be connected with reflection. We not only have our 'given'

knowledge or 'given' experience, but we seems also to be capable of reflecting upon it, capable of making it out as this or that. Similarly, we not only have some content given to us in knowledge but we also make it out as such and such. What knowledge is as given, and what it is made out to be are distinct and different, although the latter stage seems to follow upon the former, nay, it seems to rise up or emerge from the former. This latter stage is reflection, and it develops from the 'given' knowledge due to the general reflexivity of all knowledges as 'given' experiences. The 'given' knowledge, to my mind, is the non-relational one-ness of what subsequently comes to be distinguished into act and content. Given knowledge does not bring the two together-it starts with their nonrelational one-ness, and thereafter, in a reflexive taking of itself as an act, recoils upon its previous self as a fact or content relation to itself. In this way, the given experience becomes bifurcated into an act and a fact. Reason or buddhi, which formed an original component of the 'given' knowledge, seems to generate this reflexive movement in the given knowledge, seems to free itself from its original state of envelopment in the given. Thus, reason issues forth as reflective thought or simply, as reflection. If we leave aside its original enveloped state in which reason was one of the components of the given or a contributory factor in the given experience, and fix upon its role as reflection, we can distinguish three phases of its activity or function. In the first phase, reason, freed from its original state of envelopment, contemplates its own nature and role in relation to the given as constitutive of it or contributory to it. This reflection of reason on its own nature and function in given knowledge is the ground of all epistemological theories. In the second phase, reason, having arrived at some decisions about itself and its conceptual patterns in the different fields of 'given' knowledge, immediate or mediate, next focusses itself as a logical apparatus of knowledge upon the given order, trying to articulate it and render it intelligible in terms of its categorial structure, and this gives philosophies of the given order or metaphysics. And every metaphysics has its root in some appropriate epistemology. In the third phase, reason as a critique of itself, and also as a critique of the given order of reality, reflects itself as an autonomous principle, not limited to this or that

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sphere. It takes, so to say, an 'over-view' of itself as an operative principle of the world of revealed and self-conscious knowledge, and this kind of reflection is an aesthetic enjoyment.

The next question is: Can this reflection on the given knowledge-situation which gives rise to the various epistemological theories, be regarded as a knowledge just as given knowledge is called knowledge? If knowledge, why not uniform instead of being multiform? Is the reflective determination of the given order by self-conscious reason in terms of its various categories which goes by the name of the philosophy of the world also knowledge? If so, why alternative philosophies? Reason in the sphere of reflection is multi-dimensional, or as Sankara observes. purusamativaisvyar pyīt. Again, there seems to be no regulator no controlling agency in reflective thought or enquiry, nothing to check it from running riot-utpreksayah nirankusatva. Reason liberated from its limitation to a 'given' experience or knowledge reason as reflection seems always to be undecided in its aim and objective. Can it claim to be knowledge of any form in this sphere where reason works as reason, and not as one of the contributory factors of 'given' knowledge?

There are several things which can be said with respect to this situation. What works as a deciding factor in controversies is either a given experience, that is, a given knowledge, or an act of the will. So it can be said that reason left to itself as reflection, is, ex-hypothesi, undecided. It requires to be guided or controlled either by a 'new kind of knowledge' being given to it, or by an act of will and personal choice. Secondly, it can also be said that when reason as reflection reviews its role in the knowledge-situation, or by means of its conscious determination of itself seeks, to take a view of or measure upto reality, and gives rise to a philosophy, it is not entirely free, since it reviews its own participation alongwith the participation of the mind and the senses in given knowledge, and these latter, particularly the mind with its latent tendencies, define its attitude and compel it to work under some samskira or presuppositions, and that this factor lies at the back of the socalled multiformity of reason, at the back of diverse philosophies of knowledge and philosophies of the knowable. Although I do not completely cut myself off from any of these alternative to suggestions regarding the solution of the riddle, I would like to

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ative ke to abscribe to a still somewhat different line of treatment. To my mind, each theory, epistemological or metaphysical, can be looked at from three angles of vision. First, from the stand-point of the investigator himself, secondly, from the angle of a disinterested spectator not actively engaged in the thinking-game, and lastly, from the side of reason itself as taking an 'over-view' of the situation. From the angle of the investigator himself, it can be said that his reason or reason in him, is not at all undecided, he is serious about his theory, and not only claims truth for it, but makes an absolute claim. Reason in him corrects and renovaties itself at every step, and following the line of self-consistency, presses on towards a solution, and to him, what he aims at is knowledge and truth. To a spectator, the efforts of the rival theorists appear as mere exercises in language, in making alternative linguistic recommendations in the description of the very same phenomon already defined a priori. To him, however, the investigators themselves may say that they have agreed upon nothing, that nothing has been settled or defined a priori, that they are looking for solutions from their individual angles, and are not dealing in alternative languages at all. To reason again, taking a reflective view of itself in the diverse spheres of its activities, the whole panorama may appear as the field for the sportive enjoyment of its autonomy in terms of infinite modes of its operation which is not limited to any. My stand is the stand of the investigator, since I am myself actively engaged in determining the nature and function of reason, in framing an epistemological as also a philosophical theory, if I am allowed to say so. My reflection, as I see it, is not knowledge, since it is not a 'given' knowledge, but it is nevertheless a claim to knowledge, a claim to truth which is insistent and imperative, but yet a knowledge-claim or truth-claim, and not an accomplished knowledge or truth in which my mind and the reflective faculty could be at rest; but I am still restless and will be so untill a 'new experience' helps me to find a decision. Reason is to begin with experience and to end with it.

Ravenshaw College, Cuttack. S. K. Chattopadhyaya

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ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT, METHODS AND PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIONS

My attempt in this paper is to show that the ontological commitment, method and the metaphysical construction of a philosopher are inseparable. By ontological commitments of a philosopher, I mean the primitives which a philosopher takes for granted. For instance, the primitives of Locke were the entities of Newtonian physics. The metaphysical system of a philosopher-the system which he claims to have arrived at by following a particular method—is an attempt to vindicate, by rational arguments, his ontological commitments. This is true of the Rationalists and the Empiricists as well as of the modern Analytic philosophers.

Philosophers, both present and past, have claimed that their philosophical positions are the outcome of following the right method. And on the basis of this, they claim that their positions must, therefore, be accepted. Names have been ascribed to these methods. Thus, Plato and Hegel called their method "dialectic" Bergson, "intuition", Descartes, Mathematical (demonstrative), Russell and Moore "analytic", Wittgenstein, (Investigations) Description of ordinary language and Husserl, phenomenological description.

Let me take, to validate my contention, the claims of some philosophers regarding the rightness of their position and their method.

Descartes blamed his predecessors for presenting conflicting philosophical theories because they accepted entities without sufficient proof. Descartes claimed to have followed the demonstrative method of mathematics. Thus, he claimed to have resolved the uncertainty in the field of philosophy and laid the foundations of certain and necessary knowledge. How far is Descartes' claim justified? Does he really follow the method of deduction? Has he deduced the rest of his philosophy from the Cogito Ergo Sum? The answer, to all these questions, is in the negative. From the fact of doubting, a spiritual substance, as the Persisting subject of knowledge, cannot be deduced. At the most, Descartes could, by accepting the logic of subject and attribute of a proposition, deduce a momentary self.

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The ontological position of Descartes lies in his commitment to dualism. The reasons underlying his position are that Descartes wanted the mechanical laws to have absolute validity in their own field; thus he made body independent of the mind. But due to his religious involvement, he seems to have assigned an independent status to spiritual substance. His method is nothing but an attempt to find rational arguments for this position.

Take next the illustration of Russell; Russell like Descartes, was seeking a general acceptance and prestige for his philosophical positions (the positions he upheld at different times). Descartes, being a Rationalist, took mathematics as his model and Russell, being an empiricist, took the method of empirical sciences as his method and called his method scientific and analytic. Russell's ontologically primitive terms are sense-data. There are no logical grounds for an empiricist to accept sense-data instead of material objects as his primitive terms. One of Russell's ontological position we find in his lectures on "Logical Atomism". It is the position that our language can picture the structure of reality. Reality is the totality of simples. By analysis all factual complex propositions are resolved into their elementary forms and these in turn into their ultimate units of unanalysable simples.

The elementary forms or propositions mirror the facts of the world. The elementary propositions, to put it in another phraseology of Russell, represent the world. What are simples? Simples, for Russell, are the indefinable quality words. Thus, for example, 'yellow' as a quality word is simple and cannot be defined, whereas 'table' is complex and can be analysed into its qualities. This, in fact, is Russell's ontological position in "Logical Atomism". But as has been pointed out by Wittgenstein, in *Philosophical Investigations*, what is simple from one point of view may be complex from another point of view. Russell's concept of simplicity, as is obvious, is based upon his ontological position in "Logical Atomism". Without ontological position, material objects cannot be regarded as more complex than sense-data.

Thus we find that both Descartes and Russell, though claiming to follow different methods, are supporting their ontological commitments by rational arguments.

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claiming tological The claim of the modern analytic philosophers, beginning from Wittgenstein, is that they, by the application of their method, eliminate misleading and defective concepts. I again attempt to show that what is misleading and defective entirely depends upon the ontological scheme of the philosopher concerned. When a philosopher accepts one ontological scheme, all others inconsistent with it, become unwanted and defective. Thus, for Berkeley material substance is unwanted; for Hume both material and spiritual substances are unwanted and for the majority of analytic philosophers even mental states and mental processes are unwanted and defective. For those who only accept the categories of physical science, the whole world of common-sense with its solid objects becomes unwanted. (This is Russell's position in the Analysis of Matter).

Thus my basic contention, namely that all philosophers, analytic and non-analytic, start their philosophising with a preconceived ontological commitment, is reasserted. This ontological scheme can also be called as the metaphysical position of the philosopher. The linguistic philosophers' contention that they are free from metaphysical entanglement is, therefore, unwarranted.

We may ask: how can we explain the different ontological commitments of different philosophers? This, in other words, is the question why philosophers have different ontological schemes and how do they arrive at the ontological scheme that they do have? And it is connected with the question: how do philosophical problems arise? The different fields of knowledge have different primitives. The primitives are the irreducibles in a system. For instance, for physics, the primitives are electrons and protons and these have no sensible qualities. But, on the other hand, the primitives of common-sense are solid material objects and these have all sensible qualities such as colours and smells. Some how or the other, these two ontological schemes are in conflict with one another, and give rise to philosophical problems. A philosopher with a commitment to Physical science will start his philosophy with the ontological scheme of physics as his premises, while a philosopher of common-sense in the same way, will start from common-sense. It is, because of different ontological commitments, for examples, that Locke and Moore have different metaphysical reconstructions. Likewise, take the case of philosophical 200 SUMAN GUPTA

behaviourism. The science of Psychology, if it is to be an empirical science, must not deal with inner thoughts but with observable behaviour. Only on the basis of observable behaviour can psychology formulate general laws. Modern psychologists take behaviour as primitive terms and inner, private mental processes are of no interest to them. Ryle's ontological commitment is to bodies in space. He attempts to justify his position logically by taking recourse to the use ordinary language.

The ontological scheme with its arguments in support of it may be termed as metaphysical reconstruction. The philosophical arguments consist in arriving at such a reconstruction. The value of philosophy consists in the logic of such a reconstruction. For instance, Spinoza's system, as a system of philosophy, has unquestionable value by virtue of its metaphysical reconstruction; the value of analytic philosophy also consists in offering a metaphysical reconstruction although from a different perspective.

It is desirable for a philosopher to be conscious of his ontological commitments; otherwise he may become a prey to the misconception that his ontological scheme has some kind of necessity for its acceptance.

Delhi College, University of Delhi. Suman Gupta

BOOK-REVIEW

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S. Gopalan: Outlines of Jainism, Wiley Eastern Private Limited, New-Delhi, 1973.

There is a topical interest in Jainism just now, in the light of the 2500th anniversary of Shri Mahavir and hence many interested in the broad outlines of Jaina thought and philosophy are likely to welcome Dr. Gopalan's 'Outlines of Jainism' which presents the chief tenets of Jaina Philosophy in epistemology, metaphysics and ethics in a simple and lucid manner. Considering that the author himself does not belong to the faith that he expounds, the sympathetic treatment accorded to the doctrines is also noteworthy. Dr. Gopalan considers the relation between Buddhism, Jainism and Vedic-Hinduism in the early chapters and also discusses the view met with in some quarters that Jainism is an off-shoot of Buddhism. The discussions at this stage marshall the chief arguments involved in the debate and provide a convenient summary of the various opinions held. In the more strictly philosophical part of the book, the author considers the epistemological and metaphysical issues involved in Jaina philosophy. Here again one finds a simple and lucid presentation of the chief dotrines involved, but unfortunately sometimes such simplicity seems to have been purchased at the price of philosophic seriousness. Thus, while discussing the theory of perception, the author mentions the distinction between sensation and perception, between observation and interpretation, as if these distinctions do not raise certain subtle and serious issues. Similarly in his discussion of extra-sensory perception, one would have weleome a more probing and critical analysis than the simple taxonomy that he offers at the end of the chapter. But perhaps the need for an autonomous philosophical analysis is greatest in the chapters on anekantavada and syadvada, for these doctrines raise extremely serious problems regarding relativity of logical categories and the possibility of alternative conceptual characterizations. It is a pity that such issues are not even raised in the context of a discussion of Jaina views.

But it remains to be said in full measure of fairness to the author that the book succeeds very well in its chosen limited task;

it presents the outlines of Jaina philosophy in a clear and perspicuous manner and while the author has obviously a scholarly approach, the book itself manages to ride lightly over the underlying scholarship and hard reading which have gone into it. It also seems to the present reviewer that Gopalan's heart is really in Jaina ethics and psychology of moral development, rather than in their relativistic logic, for the chapter dealing with the ethical views of Jainas (Chapter 5) is perhaps the best part of the book. He there gives us an interesting account of the ethical categories and the doctrines of moral progress according to the Jainas: there is also a useful discussion of the ascetic ideal and a sympathetic account of the anuvrata movement, started by Acarva Tulasi. The value of the book would have been considerably enhanced if indeed this last chapter had been broadened into a discussion of the social relevance of the Jaina teaching in the context of present-day socio-political realities. But even as they are, these parts of the book present the ethical teaching of the Jainas with a never failing lucidity and sympathy.

The book carries a useful bibliography at the end.

University of Poona, Poona.

R. Sundara Rajan

BOOKS RECEIVED FOR REVIEW

(1) Index to Dissertations in Philosophy: Abdul Rawoof, Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, Madras. pp. 174.

(2) The Justification of Induction: Richard Swinburne, Oxford University Press, London, 1974 pp. 179.

(3) Materialism in Indian Thought: K. K. Mittal, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Private Limited, New-Delhi Rs. 50/- pp. 336.

(4) Two Essays on Whitehead's Philosophic Approach:
Ramchandra Gandhi, Indian Institute of Advanced
Study, Simla 1973 Rs. 13/- pp. 68.

(5) Outlines of Jainism: Gopalan, Wiley Eastern, Private Limited, New-Delhi 1973 pp. 205.

Supplement

Akhil Bharatiya Darshan Parishad

19th Annual Session: A Report

With Compliments from

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ANNOUNCEMENTS

(1) The Indian Philosophical Quarterly plans to commemorate the 2500th anniversary of Bhagwan Mahavir, founder of Jainism by publishing a few articles devoted to some important problems in Jaina logic and theory of knowledge. Contributions on the theme are most welcome and may be sent to the editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly.

(2) We have great pleasure in announcing that we intend to publish all the four issues of Volume I of the "INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY" as a single bound valume. I am sure that you will agree that such a convenient volume would serve as a valuable collection of essays and articles whice have so far appeared in our journal, and we hope you would honour us by placing your order with us for a copy. Further particulars regarding the price etc. may be had on writing to The Editor.

Editor,

Indian Philosophical Quarterly.

The 19th Annual Session of the Akhil Bharatiya Darshan Parishad Poona: 17th to 19th November, 1974

The Akhil Bharatiya Darshan Parishad is one of the three All-India associations for the promotion of Philosophy in India today, the other two being 'The Indian Philosophical Congress' and 'The Indian Philosophical Association' Considering the urgent need for promoting philosophical activity in India today, the three bodies are performing a truly valuable function by organising seminars and symposia which provide an opportunity to various scholars and thinkers from different parts of the country to meet periodically in a common forum and concert their several styles of philosophizing.

While all the three bodies thus have a common dedication to the cause of Philosophy, yet each has its own distinctive contribution to make and a role to fulfil in the larger context of philosophical thinking in India today. The Akhil Bharatiya Darshan Parishad is a distinctive association of dedicated scholars devoted to the task of developing creative thinking in the field of philosophical analysis. One of the ways in which the parishad seeks to realize this end is to organize symposia and seminars conducted through the medium of Hindi since it believes that such a step may be fruitful in the development of autonomous and original thinking in Philosophy.

The 19th Session of the Parishad was held this year at Poona, sponsored by the Department of Philosophy, University of Poona from 17th November, 1974 to 19th November, 1974. For the 19th Session of the Parishad, the following office bearers were elected for the Local Reception Committee.

Chairman .. Mrs. R. Vaswani,

St. Mira's College, Poona 1.

Secretary ..Dr. M. P. Marathe,

Department of Philosophy, University of Poona,

Poona 7.

Treasurer ..Dr. S. R. Talghatti,

Department of Philosophy, University of Poona,

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The session was attended by about 50 delegates from various parts of the country. At the inaugural function which was held at 9-00 a.m. on the 17th November, 1974, Dr. S.S. Barlingay, Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Poona warmly welcomed the distinguished delegates. The Mayor of Poona, Shri Bhai Vaidya who inaugurated the session, welcomed the delegates and said that he was glad to be associated with the distinguished function and was also proud that the City of Poona had been chosen as the venue for the 19th Session of the Association. Dr. G. S. Mahajani Vice-Chancellor of the University in his welcome address stressed the need for keeping alive the reciprocal ties between Philosophy and Science and emphasized the role of such learned associations as the Parishad in this context. Shri Yashdeo Shalva President of the Parishad in a moving presidential address analysed the causes of sterility in much of our Philosophical thinking today, which ultimately he felt is due to the root-lessness of our efforts in our own culture and form of life. Unless Philosophy gets anchored in our own culture and native styles of thought and expression, he felt that our philosophizing would continue as a faltering and crippled form of thinking without the ring of authenticity which only a fidelity to our own distinctive individuality could give. This need not, he felt, be misunderstood as a limitation or narrowing of our Philosophical efforts; on the liberation contrary, it could be the means for its genuine and growth.

The sessions conducted its deliberations in the form of sectional presidents' addresses, symposia on certain chosen themes and the presentation of individual papers, all of which were discussed. There were three sectional presidents' addresses, one on the conception of laws of nature in the section on Logic and Scientific Method, by Dr. Dharmendra Kumar of Delhi University and the second on the meaning and validity of religious experience in the section on Metaphysics by Dr. Sharma, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi and the third on Exitentialism by Dr. Yajnik in the Ethics and Social Philosophy Section. Besides, there were three joint symposia, the first one in Philosophy of History given by Dr. Dharmendra Goel, Chandigarh. The second symposium was in commemoration of the 2500th anniversary of Sri Mahavi

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ces ison id ty ce lu k re en m In this commemorative function, Prof. Vasvani, Principal, St. Mira's College gave an inspiring speech, and other noted Jain Scholars and Savants took part, followed by presentation of papers dealing with different aspects of Jain Philosophy by Shri Shah, Poona, and Dr. K. C. Sogani, Jaipur. The third symposium was devoted to the theme of Human Equality, in which Dr. Javadekar, Baroda and Dr. Chandmal Sharma, Jaipur took part.

The delegates to the sessions were also the guests of honour in a party given by the Mayor of the City of Poona on the first day and by the Vice-Chancellor of the University on the second day. The authorities of De Nobili College, Poona, also felicitated the delegates at a dinner given at De Nobili College on the third day. There was also a concert of Gazal and light music in their honour, which was organized by Principal Shaikh, Poona College, Poona.

The 19th Session of the Parishad was active and successful in terms of organising a stimulating series of papers and presentations on a wide variety of philosophical themes. It is to be hoped that the proceedings of the sessions would be soon published so as to reach and benefit a wider audience.

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
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